


CONCLUDING
UNSCIENTIFIC
POSTSCRIPT TO
*PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAGMENTS*



Søren Kierkegaard

VOLUME II

Edited and Translated by

Howard V. Hong and

Edna H. Hong

with Introduction and Notes

**CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO
*PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS***

VOLUME II

KIERKEGAARD'S WRITINGS, XII.2



**CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC
POSTSCRIPT TO *PHILOSOPHICAL
FRAGMENTS***

by Søren Kierkegaard

*VOLUME II: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION,
SUPPLEMENT, NOTES, AND INDEX*

*Edited and Translated
with Introduction and Notes by*

**Howard V. Hong and
Edna H. Hong**

**PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY**

Copyright © 1992 by Howard V. Hong

Published by Princeton University Press,
41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Chichester, West Sussex

All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Kierkegaard, Søren, 1813–1855.

[Afsluttende videnskabelig efterskrift. English]

Concluding unscientific postscript to Philosophical fragments / by Søren
Kierkegaard ; edited and translated with introduction and notes by Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong

p. cm.—(Kierkegaard's writings ; 12)

Translation of: Afsluttende videnskabelig efterskrift.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-691-07395-3 (v. 1 : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-691-02081-7 (pbk : v. 1)—

ISBN 0-691-02082-5 (v. 2 : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-691-02081-7 (pbk. : v. 2)

1. Christianity—Philosophy. 2. Apologetics—19th century.

1. Hong, Howard Vincent, 1912- . II. Hong, Edna Hatlestad, 1913- . III. Title

IV. Series: Kierkegaard, Søren, 1813-1855. Works.

English. 1978 ; 12

B4373.A472E5 1992

201—dc20 91-4093

Preparation of this volume has been made possible in part by a grant from the
Division of Research Programs of the National Endowment for the Humanities,
an independent federal agency

Princeton University Press books are printed
on acid-free paper and meet the guidelines
for permanence and durability of the Committee on
Production Guidelines for Book Longevity
of the Council on Library Resources

Designed by Frank Mahood

<http://pup.princeton.edu>

Printed in the United States of America

79108

ISBN-13: 978-0-691-02082-2 (pbk.)

ISBN-10: 0-691-02082-5 (pbk.)

CONTENTS

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

SUPPLEMENT

Key to References

Original Title Page of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*

Selected Entries from Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers
Pertaining to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments*

EDITORIAL APPENDIX

Acknowledgments

Collation of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments* in the Danish Editions of Kierkegaard's Collected Works

Notes

Bibliographical Note

Index

HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

Toward the end of *Philosophical Fragments*, Johannes Climacus¹ states: “In the next section of this pamphlet, if I ever do write it, I intend to call the matter by its proper name and clothe the issue in its historical costume. If I ever do write a second section—because a pamphlet writer such as I am has no seriousness, as you presumably will hear about me—why, then, should I now in conclusion pretend seriousness in order to please people by making a rather big promise? In other words, to write a pamphlet is frivolity—but to promise the system, that is seriousness and has made many a man a supremely serious man both in his own eyes and in the eyes of others.”²

The second section of the pamphlet became *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* to *Philosophical Fragments* and appeared February 28, 1846, scarcely twenty-one months after the triple publication of *Fragments* (June 13, 1844), *The Concept of Anxiety* (June 17, 1844), and *Prefaces* (June 17, 1844). According to the statement in *Fragments*, the copious clothed counterpart that eventually became *Postscript* was obviously on the agenda, and to write such a substantial work in a period of less than two years would scarcely constitute literary loitering. To maintain the appearance of an idler,³ however, in order to aid in masking the pseudonymity begun with *Either/Or*,⁴ Kierkegaard, while writing *Postscript* and other works, continued to be Copenhagen’s premier peripatetic, made a journey to Berlin, and averaged an excursion to points on Sjælland about every ten days. There were also three intervening publications: *Four Upbuilding Discourses* (August 31, 1844), *Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions* (April 29, 1845), and *Stages on Life’s Way* (April 30, 1845). In addition, the writing of *Two Ages* was begun late in 1845. Despite the brevity of time and the amazingly prolific productivity during that period of twenty-one months, the writing of *Postscript* involved sketches, a provisional draft, a second draft, and a final copy.

“The entire manuscript, lock, stock, and barrel, was delivered to the printer *medio* December, or thereabouts, 1845”⁵ Within about

two months (including the long Christmas and New Year holiday period), the type was hand set, first and second page proofs were printed and corrected, type corrections were made, and the volumes were printed, bound, and delivered to the bookstore—in its own way a feat comparable to the writing of the manuscript. In order not to interfere with the process, Kierkegaard withheld a desired addition.⁶ At the last moment, “A First and Last Explanation” was delivered for inclusion on unnumbered pages at the end of the volume. The “Explanation,” Kierkegaard’s public assumption of juridical and literary responsibility for the pseudonymous works from *Either/Or* to *Postscript*,⁷ had been “dashed off on a piece of paper in the original manuscript but was laid aside to be worked out in detail and was delivered as late as possible lest it lie around and get lost in a print shop.”⁸ The initial title in outlines of what became *Postscript* was “Logical Issues.”⁹ The first outline had eight headings, of which no. 4 was “On the leap,” no. 5 “On the difference between a dialectical and pathos-filled transition,” no. 6 “All historical knowledge is only approximation,” and no. 8 “What is existence.” Others were on the nature and historical significance of a category. A later outline¹⁰ under the same title included “by Johannes Climacus . . . a preface about *Philosophical Fragments*,” and “Something about the Art of Religious Address.” Other headings were “God’s Judgment / A Story of Suffering / Imaginary Psychological Construction” and “Writing Sampler / Apprentice Test Piece.” Some of the themes from each outline were developed in *Postscript*, others were omitted, and the title was changed to *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*.

The self-ironizing of calling *Fragments* a pamphlet is extended by calling its successor a “postscript,” an addendum that is over five times as long as its base, an afterthought that quintuples the original thought. Likewise, the self-minimizing of the title *Fragments* is repeated by calling *Postscript* a “compilation,” although its varied contents have a substantial internal coherence. Climacus calls himself a humorist,¹¹ and the work in many ways both exemplifies and discusses humor, but he himself as author and his new book are the objects of self-irony, a close cousin of humor.

The term “unscientific” is an accurate translation of the Danish *uvidenskabelig*, but because of the narrowness peculiar to the

Anglo-American word “science” it needs a wider definition that includes all kinds of scholarship. A clue to the use of “unscientific” in the title is a journal entry with the heading *Concluding Simple Postscript*—“simple” because “there can be no schoolmaster, strictly understood, in the art of existing. ... With respect to existing, there is only the learner, for anyone who fancies that he is in this respect finished, that he can teach others and on top of that himself forgets to exist and to learn, is a fool. In relation to existing there is for all existing persons one schoolmaster—existence itself.”¹² Therefore, didacticism is avoided, and barbs are aimed at the reductionist and quantifying natural sciences on the one hand, at the system builders on the other, and at the professor in both categories and in between.

Climacus’s objection is not to thinking, to reflection. He states that “would be especially foolish for one whose life in large part and at its humble best is devoted to its service, and especially foolish for me who admires the Greeks. After all, he must know that Aristotle, when discussing what happiness is, lodges the highest happiness in thinking.”¹³ His objection is rather to a confusion of categories, a failure to make a crucial distinction:

All essential knowing pertains to existence, or only the knowing whose relation to existence is essential is essential knowing. Essentially viewed, the knowing that does not inwardly in the reflection of inwardness pertain to existence is accidental knowing, and essentially viewed its degree and scope are a matter of indifference. . . . Therefore, only ethical and ethical-religious knowing is essential knowing. But all ethical and all ethical-religious knowing is essentially a relating to the existing of the knower.¹⁴

Therefore, just as the pseudonymous works from *Either/Or* through *Stages* are oriented away from the imaginative distance of a poet-existence,¹⁵ away from “having one’s life in what the poet recites”¹⁶ instead of existing, *Postscript* is oriented away from “speculative thought, away from the system.”¹⁷

“Concluding” in the title means first of all Kierkegaard’s intention to terminate his activity as an author. In two journal entries from February 1849, just before the last step in the printing and distribution of *Postscript*, Kierkegaard wrote:

Up until now I have made myself useful by helping the pseudonyms become authors. What if I decided from now on to do the little writing I can excuse in the form of criticism. Then I would put down what I had to say in reviews, developing my ideas from some book or other and in such a way that they could be included in the work itself. In this way I would still avoid becoming an author.¹⁸

It is now my intention to qualify as a pastor.¹⁹ For several months I have been praying to God to keep on helping me, for it has been clear to me for some time now that I ought not to be a writer any longer, something I can be only totally or not at all. This is the reason I have not started anything new along with proof-correcting except for the little review of *Two Ages*, which once more is concluding.²⁰

But the “concluding” did not remain a punctuating period at the end of his work as an author. In retrospect he wrote: “With every new book I thought: Now you must stop. I felt this most strongly with *Concluding Postscript*. At this point I meant to stop—then I wrote the lines about *The Corsair*”²¹ Instead of a period, *Postscript* became a semicolon because of some lines²² by Frater Taciturnus printed a few days after the delivery of the *Postscript* manuscript to the printer. The result was the most famous literary controversy in Denmark²³ and a change in Kierkegaard’s plans. “Now the situation is entirely different,” he wrote, “my circumstances so unrewarding that for the time it is appropriate, especially for a penitent, to stay where he is.”²⁴ “But in the meantime external situations involved my public life in such a way that I existentially discovered the Christian collisions. This is an essential element in my own education.”²⁵

How many times have I not said that a warship does not get its orders until it is out at sea, and thus it may be entirely in order for me to go further as an author than I had originally intended, especially since I have become an author in an entirely different sense, for originally I thought of being an author as an escape, something temporary, from going to the country as a pastor. But has not my situation already changed in that *qua* author I have begun to work for the religious? At first I planned to stop immediately after *Either/Or*. That was

actually the original idea. But productivity took hold of me. Then I planned to stop with the *Concluding Postscript*. But what happens, I get involved in all that rabble persecution, and that was the very thing that made me remain on the spot. Now, I said to myself, now it can no longer be a matter of abandoning splendid conditions, no, now it is a situation for a penitent. Then I was going to end with *Christian Discourses* and travel, but I did not get to travel—and 1848 was the year of my richest productivity. Thus Governance himself has kept me in the harness. I ask myself: Do you believe that out in the rural parish you would have been able to write three religious books such as the three following *Concluding Postscript*? And I am obliged to answer: No! It was the tension of actuality that put new strength into my instrument, forced me to publish even more.²⁶

Postscript thereby became not a concluding publication but, as termed in *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* (written in 1851), the “turning point”²⁷ and the “midpoint”²⁸ in Kierkegaard’s work as an author. It was the turning point inasmuch as what could be called the “second authorship” is direct communication, in contrast to the indirect communication of the pseudonymous works,²⁹ and is “exclusively religious.”³⁰

With *Postscript* no longer the stopping point, Kierkegaard again intended to cease writing after the publication of *Christian Discourses* (1848, preceded by *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, 1847, *Works of Love*, 1847) and *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress* (1848)³¹ He could appropriately regard *Postscript* (1846) as the chronological midpoint in the pseudonymous series from *Either/Or* (1843) to *Crisis* (1848), and as the substantive midpoint between the pseudonymous series and the subsequent religious series. He was also mindful of the continuation of the dialectical relation between the two original parallel series represented first by the contemporaneous publication of *Either/Or* and *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (1843) and continued up through the almost simultaneous publication of *Crisis* and *Christian Discourses*.³² The pseudonym Inter et Inter for the author of *Crisis* seems to be a token of the two parallel series up to and beyond *Postscript*. Inter et Inter seems to exploit two meanings of *inter* [between]: intermediate in a series and reciprocally related. *Crisis*,

which became the new midpoint between the pseudonymous series and the subsequent signed series of religious works, also represents a lateral relation between the pseudonymous series and the signed series: *Either/Or* (1843) to *Crisis* (1848) and *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (1843) to *Christian Discourses* (1848).

When Kierkegaard resumed writing after stopping a second time, his interest in maintaining the two parallel series of pseudonymous works and signed works is manifest anew in the publication of the second edition of *Either/Or* (the first of the few reprintings of Kierkegaard's works during his lifetime) on May 14, 1849, and of the signed work *The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air* on the very same day.³³

After the appearance of *For Self-Examination* in 1851, Kierkegaard did stop writing for publication until the end of 1854, a few months before his death (November 11, 1855). It was, however, a time of prolific journal writing, the time of the gathering storm that burst forth in polemical writings culminating in *The Moment* and the last of the signed works from his right hand: *The Changelessness of God* (September 3, 1855). He also formulated the title of what might have become his last work: "My Program: *Either/Or*,"³⁴ a title epitomizing the authorship as a totality—beginning with *Either/Or* as the title of the first work and ending with "Either/Or" in the title of the proposed work, and with *Postscript* as the midpoint and turning point.

Climacus's analyses and interpretations of the earlier pseudonymous and signed works³⁵ render superfluous any discussion here of the substantive relations of the various works to *Postscript*. Climacus was pleased that he had told no one, not even his landlady, of his plans to write, "because it is indeed rather droll that the cause I had resolved to take up is advancing, but not through me."³⁶ Excluded from consideration are *From the Papers of One Still Living* and the dissertation. *The Concept of Irony*, both of which Kierkegaard regarded as *ad hoc* pieces and not as parts of the authorship proper, and of course the unpublished *Johannes Climacus* was also excluded. The discussions place *Postscript* climactically in the context of both the series of pseudonymous works and that of signed works. Thus, *Postscript* occupies a substantive midpoint position in the lateral relation between the two series, a position described in *Point of View*: "*Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is not esthetic, but, strictly speaking, neither

is it religious. That is why it is by a pseudonymous writer, although I did place my name as editor, something I have not done with any purely esthetic work.”³⁷

The reception of *Postscript* was generally silent, and the first of the few reviews immediately after publication were cool or negative. Sales of the volume were correspondingly meager. Three years after its publication, Kierkegaard wrote, “Perhaps fifty copies were sold.” How many had been given away is not known. By mid-July 1847 none of Kierkegaard’s books except *Either/Or* had sold out, and as his own publisher he sold all the remaining books, including 341 copies of *Postscript* (out of an edition of 525 copies), to Carl A. Reitzel.³⁸ The eighteen discourses from 1843 to 1844 had already been sold to Philip G. Philipsen in 1845.³⁹

The Corsair, one day before the official publication date of *Postscript*, carried a brief, moderate announcement in which *Postscript* was attributed to Victor Eremita (editor of *Either/ Or*, “whom we have previously recommended to our readers.”⁴⁰ In the same issue, an announcement, part of the ongoing attack by *The Corsair* on Kierkegaard, was made of a prize (from the association of clothing manufacturers) allegedly given to Victor Eremita for a treatise on the thesis: “Trouser legs⁴¹ of cloth trousers in Denmark are equal in length or one is longer than the other. ‘*Tertium non datur*’ [There is no third]!”⁴²

In the next number,⁴³ a week later, came a scathing piece with the title “*The Great Philosopher*” plus other small pieces of personal ridicule, including the initial associating of Kierkegaard with Mr. Crazy Nathanson, the beginning of the character assassination carried on intermittently in *The Corsair* the next few months. The starting point of the piece is “A First and Last Explanation,” but *Postscript* itself is not considered. The most memorable part of the piece is a sketch of Kierkegaard conceitedly posing in the center of the universe.

reading *Postscript* a few pages at a time but in two columns says very little about the book.

Of special interest are the review⁵³ and (six months later) the refutation of *Postscript*⁵⁴ by Peter Vilhelm Christensen, who for a time had been Kierkegaard's secretary⁵⁵. After disclaiming philosophical insight and proficiency and saying that he had not read *Fragments* and only part of *Postscript*, Christensen proceeds in the review to criticize the discussion of Grundtvig and Lindberg in *Postscript*.⁵⁶ The subsequent refutation of *Postscript* begins with a reference to the earlier review as a hastily written "unscientific dismissal"⁵⁷ of *Postscript*. After another defense of Grundtvig and Lindberg, Christensen criticizes the concept of truth and inwardness and the indirect method. In closing, he states that he would solemnly "give this 'humorist' over to Satan ... simply and solely in order that I could really learn to love Mag. Kierkegaard, whom I cannot stop loving and yet can never really love from the heart, because I am too weak really to love the brother I do not see, and I never do see him, because it is either Victor Eremita or Johannes Climacus or Frater Taciturnus, now a dumb devil and now a jaunty demon who stands between him and me." ⁵⁸ Kierkegaard's draft of a response to Christensen, "An Unhappy Lover in *Dansk Kirketidende*,"⁵⁹ was not published.

More numerous and copious among Kierkegaard's responses to the first contemporary writing about *Postscript* were his unpublished pieces concerning admirers, Magnus Eiriksson⁶⁰ and Professor Rasmus Nielsen⁶¹. "And now finally there is the raging Roland, the cantankerous Magnus Eirikson [sic], who in an appalling manner caresses me [Kierkegaard] in the most affable and appreciative terms," who "rages like a person possessed in order to get Prof Martensen⁶² dismissed" ⁶³ Kierkegaard's objection to Nielsen's *Mag Kierkegaards "Johannes Climacus" og Dr. H. Martensens "Christelige Dogmatik"* (1849) was that Nielsen had become didactic and had tried to make *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* into a science, into a piece of scholarship.⁶⁴

Although *Postscript* received short shrift in Kierkegaard's lifetime, and both *Fragments* and *Postscript*, like David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, "fell dead-born from the press,"⁶⁵ Kierkegaard's confident prophecy about *Postscript* did come true in the next century "This book has an extraordinary future."⁶⁶

¹ On the origin of the name of the pseudonymous author, see Historical Introduction, *Philosophical Fragments, or A Fragment of Philosophy*, pp. ix-x, KW VII.

² *Fragments*, p. 109, KW VII (SV IV 270-71).

³ See, for example, *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* in *The Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 547); JP V 5614; VI 6332 (*Pap.* IV A 45; X⁵ A 153). See also Andrew Hamilton, *Sixteen Months in the Danish Isles*, I-II (London: 1852), II, P. 269: “The fact is *he walks about town all day*, and generally in some person’s company When walking, he is very communicative.”

⁴ *Postscript* was the last of the works of “indirect communication” by pseudonymous editors and authors. First came *Either/Or* (1843, Victor Eremita), followed by *Fear and Trembling* (1843, Johannes de Silentio), *Repetition* (1843, Constantin Constantius), *Philosophical Fragments* (1844, Johannes Climacus), *The Concept of Anxiety* (1844, Vigilius Haufmensis), *Prefaces* (1844, Nicolaus Notabene), and *Stages on Life’s Way* (1845, Hilarius Bookbinder).

⁵ JP V 5871 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 2). See also Supplement, pp. 2.116-18 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 69, 71).

⁶ See JP V 5871 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 2); Supplement, pp. 2.68-70 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:1, 83,84).

⁷ See pp. [1.625-30]; Supplement, p. 2.168 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 145).

⁸ JP V 5871 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 2).

⁹ See Supplement, p. 2.7 (*Pap.* VI B 13).

¹⁰ See Supplement, pp. 2.7-8 (*Pap.* VI A 146).

¹¹ See pp. 1.617-18.

¹² See Supplement, p. 2.107 (*Pap.* VI A 140), also pp. 2.8-9 (*Pap.* VI B 90, 98:1); JP III 2807, 2809, 2823 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 182, 186; X⁵ A 73).

¹³ P. 1.56.

¹⁴ Pp. 1.197-98.

¹⁵ See, for example, pp. 252-53; *Either/Or*, I, p. 36, KW III (SV I 20).

¹⁶ *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 563).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ JP V 5877 (VII¹ A 9) See also Supplement, pp. 2.137-38, 2.141-43, 2.153-54, 2.167 (*Pap.* IX A 54; X¹ A 138; X⁵ B 201; X³ A 318; X⁶ B 249); JP V 5887; VI 6843 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 98; X⁵ A 146).

¹⁹ See Supplement references in note 18 above.

²⁰ JP V 5873 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 4).

²¹ JP VI 6843 (*Pap.* X⁵ A 146) See Supplement, pp. 2.116-18. (*Pap.* VII¹ B 69, 71). See also *Pap.* VII¹ B 37, p. 207: “Since I am in the process just now of reading the proofs of a large work [*Postscript*] that finally will be annexed to the whole project that began and continued through the pseudonymous works, although the book is more closely related to *Philosophical Fragments*, edited by me, and since I am not in the habit of taking on any new work while reading proof, I think it would betray

myself and my position as a Danish author not to use this free time to protest what ought to have been protested long ago.”

²² “The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician and How He Still Happened to Pay for the Dinner,” *Fædrelandet*, 2078, December 27, 1845, col 16653-58, esp col. 16657, *The Corsair Affair and Articles Related to the Writings*, pp. 38-46, esp. p. 46, KW XIII.

²³ See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. VII-xxv, KW XIII.

²⁴ See Supplement, pp. 2.141-43 (*Pap.* X¹ A 138).

²⁵ See Supplement, p. 2.167 (*Pap.* X³ A 318), also pp. 137-38 (*Pap.* IX A 54).

²⁶ *JP* VI 6356 (*Pap* X¹ A 138). See Supplement, pp. 2.141-43 (*Pap.* X¹ A 138).

²⁷ *Point of View*, KWXXII (*S V* XIII 523, 542, 549, 579).

²⁸ *Ibid.* (497). See also Supplement, p. 2.140 (*Pap.* X¹ A 118).

²⁹ Later, however, two new pseudonyms were used H H for the author of *Two Ethical-Religious Essays* (1849) and Anti-Climacus for the author of *The Sickness unto Death* (1849) and *Practice in Christianity* (1850) At first sight, the prefix “Anti” may mislead a reader in regard to the relation of the two pseudonyms Climacus and Anti-Climacus. The prefix does not mean “against.” An old form of “ante” (before), as in “anticipate,” the prefix means a relation of rank, as in “before me” in the First Commandment. In a journal entry, Kierkegaard explains: “Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common; but the difference is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says that he himself is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he considers himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level . I would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus, lower than Anti-Climacus” (*JP* VI 6433 [*Pap.* X¹ A 517]). See also *Point of View*, KW XXII (*SV* XIII 531); *Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents*, Letters 213, 221, KW XXV; *JP* VI 6439 (*Pap.* X¹A 530); *Pap.* X⁵ B 20.

³⁰ *Point of View*, KW XXII (*SV* XIII 523).

³¹ See Supplement, pp. 2.138, 2.141-43 (*Pap.* IX A 228; X¹ A 138).

³² See Supplement, pp. 2.138-39 (*Pap.* IX A 241).

³³ *JP* VI 6361 (*Pap.* X¹ A 147): “It will never do to let the second edition of *Either/Or* be published without something accompanying it. Somehow the accent must be that I have made up my mind about being a religious author.”

³⁴ See *JP* VI 6944 (*Pap.* XI³ B 54).

³⁵ See pp. 1.251-300.

³⁶ Pp. 1.251-52.

³⁷ *Point of View*, KW XXII (*SV* XIII 523).

³⁸ See *Letters*, Letter 152, KW XXV. See also *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, pp. 211, 219, and notes 406, 434, KW XIII (*Pap.* VII¹ A 98, P. 45, and A 229).

³⁹ See *Letters*, Letter 119, KW XXV.

⁴⁰ See *The Corsair*, 284, February 27, 1846, col. 5; *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 130, KW XIII. See also *The Corsair*, 129, March 10, 1843, col. 1-3; *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, pp. 93-95. In 269, November 14, 1845, col. 14, Victor Eremita is immortalized: “Victor Eremita will never die” (*Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 96).

In 251, July 4, 1845, col. 3, it was presumed to be more enjoyable “to eat dry bread and drink water with Hilarius Bookbinder [*Stages*] than to drink champagne” with a certain Danish editor (*Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 96).

⁴¹ See *Corsair Affair*, Index, “trousers,” p. 318, KW XIII.

⁴² See *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 131, KW XIII.

⁴³ *The Corsair*, 285, March 6, 1846, col. 8-11; *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, pp. 131-34, KW XIII. See also *The Corsair*, 289, April 3, 1846, col. 9-10; *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, pp. 135-36.

⁴⁴ See Supplement, p. 2.153 (*Pap.* X² A 124).

⁴⁵ Møller, *Kritiske Skizzer fra Aarene 1840-47*, I-II (Copenhagen: 1847), II, p. 264.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁴⁷ See Supplement, pp. 2.117-18 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 71).

⁴⁸ See Supplement, pp. 2.119-25 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 86).

⁴⁹ *Nyt Aftenblad*, 75, 76, March 30, 31, 1846, col. 3-6, 7-10.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 76, col. 8.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 75, col. 3.

⁵² *Den Frisindede*, 29, March 10, 1846, col. 1-3.

⁵³ *Dansk Kirketidende*, 29, March 29, 1846, col. 561-62.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 52, September 20, 1846, col. 841-56.

⁵⁵ See *Letters*, Letters 187, 188, KW XXV; *JP* V 5662 (*Pap.* IV A 141).

⁵⁶ See pp. 1.34-46.

⁵⁷ *Dansk Kirketidende*, 52, September 20, 1846, col. 841.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, col. 845.

⁵⁹ See Supplement, pp. 2.125-27 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 87).

⁶⁰ See Supplement, pp. 2.127-37 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 88) and pp. 2.161-65 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 128, 68, 80, 81; X² A 601).

⁶¹ See Supplement, pp. 2.155-61 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 114, 116, 118, 121).

⁶² Hans Lassen Martensen (1808-1884), professor of theology, University of Copenhagen.

⁶³ See Supplement, pp. 2.129, 2.130 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 88, pp. 289, 290).

⁶⁴ See Supplement, pp. 2.156-57, 158 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 116, pp. 149-50, 151).

⁶⁵ David Hume, “The Life of David Hume, Esq., Written by Himself. My Own Life,” in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding and Selections from A Treatise of Human Nature* (Chicago: Open Court, 1907), p. vii.

⁶⁶ See Supplement, p. 2.146 (*Pap.* X² A 163, p. 129).

SUPPLEMENT

Key to References

Original Title Page of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to
Philosophical Fragments*

Selected Entries from Kierkegaard's
Journals and Papers Pertaining to
*Concluding Unscientific Postscript to
Philosophical Fragments*

KEY TO REFERENCES

References in brackets interposed in the text are to volume and page [VII 100] in *Søren Kierkegaards samlede Værker*, I-XIV, edited by A. B. Drachmann, J. L. Heiberg, and H. O. Lange (1 ed., Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1901-06). The same marginal references are used in Søren Kierkegaard, *Gesammelte Werke*, Abt. 1-36 (Düsseldorf, Cologne: Diederichs Verlag, 1952-69).

References to Kierkegaard's works in English are to this edition, *Kierkegaard's Writings* [KW], I-XXVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978-). Specific references are given by English title and the standard Danish pagination referred to above [*Either/Or*, I, p. 109, KW III (SV I 100)].

References to the *Papirer* [Pap. I A 100; note the differentiating letters A, B, or C, used only in references to the *Papirer*] are to *Søren Kierkegaards Papirer*, I-XI³, edited by P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting (1 ed., Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909-48), and 2 ed., photo-offset with two supplemental volumes XII-XIII, edited by Niels Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968-70), and with index, XIV-XVI (1975-78), edited by N. J. Cappelørn. References to the *Papirer* in English [JP II 1500], occasionally amended, are to volume and serial number in *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, I-VI, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk, and with index, VII, by Nathaniel Hong and Charles Barker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-78).

References to correspondence are to the serial numbers in *Breve og Aktstykker vedrørende Søren Kierkegaard*, I—II, edited by Niels Thulstrup (Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1953-54), and to the corresponding serial numbers in *Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents*, translated by Henrik Rosenmeier, *Kierkegaard's Writings*, XXV [Letters, Letter 100, KW XXV].

References to books in Kierkegaard's own library [ASKB 100] are based on the serial numbering system of *Auktionspro tokol over Søren Kierkegaards Bogsamling* [Auction-catalog of Søren Kierkegaard's Book-collection], edited by H. P. Rohde (Copenhagen: Royal Library, 1967).

In the Supplement, references to page and lines in the text are given as: 100:1-10.

In the notes, internal references to the present volumes are given as: p. 1.100 (Volume I) and p. 2.100 (Volume II).

Three spaced periods indicate an omission by the editors; five spaced periods indicate a hiatus or fragmentariness in the text.

Afluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift

til

de philosophiske Emuler.

Primisf. pathetisf. dialektisf Sammenskrift,
Eksistentielt Indlæg.

af

Johannes Climacus.

Udgiven

af

G. Hørfegaard.

Kjøbenhavn.

Hos E. H. Reigel, Universitets-Boghandler

Trykt i Bianco Lunos Bogtrykkeri.

1868.

Concluding Unscientific Postscript

to

Philosophical Fragments.

A Mimical-Pathetical-Dialectical Compilation,
An Existential Contribution

by

Johannes Climacus.

Edited

by

S. Kierkegaard

Copenhagen.

Available at University Bookdealer C. A. Reitzel's.

Printed by Bianco Luno Press.

1846.

SELECTED ENTRIES FROM KIERKEGAARD'S JOURNALS AND PAPERS PERTAINING TO *CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT*

From sketch; see 1.v-xi:

Logical Issues

No. 1. What is a category. What does it mean to say that being is a category.

Is it an *abbreviatur* [abbreviation] that world history gradually deposits.

No. 2. On the historical significance of the category.

No. 3. How does a new quality appear through a continuous quantitative increase.

No. 4. On the leap.

No. 5. On the difference between a dialectical and a pathosfilled transition.

No. 27. [*changed from: 6*] Conclusion—enthymeme—resolution a trilogy.

No. 16. All historical knowledge is only approximation.

No. 8. What is existence.

—JP V 5787 (*Pap.* VI B 13) *n.d.*, 1844-45

(1) Logical Issues

by

Johannes Climacus.

First a preface about *Philosophical Fragments*.

(2) Something about the Art of Religious Address with some Reference to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

by

Johannes de Silentio¹ with the motto from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, II, chapter 23 (in the little translation, p. 197²), about a priestess who forbade her son to become a public speaker.³

(3) God's Judgment⁴

A Story of Suffering

Imaginary Psychological Construction

(4) Writing Samplers
Apprentice Test Piece

by
A.W.A.H.

Rosenblad
Apprentice Author
—JP V 5786 (*Pap.* VI A 146) *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see title page:

Logical Issues
by
Johannes Climacus
Edited
by
S. Kierkegaard.
JP V 5850 (*Pap.* VI B 89) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see title page:

Concluding Simple Postscript
(Detailed yet superfluous *Postscriptum*)
to
Philosophical Fragments
by
Johannes Climacus
edited
by
S. Kierkegaard.
Cop. 1845
Available at Reitzel's.
—JP V 5851 (*Pap.* VI B 90) *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see title page:
unscientific [*changed from:* simple]

—Pap. VI B 98:1 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see title page:

Copenhagen 184

Available at University Bookseller Reitzel's

—Pap. VI B 98:2 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.3:1-8:

(Better well hanged than ill wed!)⁶

To be used as the epigraph, the last lines of Hippias in the dialogue *Hippias* and the first of Socrates' subsequent last lines. —
Pap. VI B 91 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.v:10-24:

A.

The Objective Issue of the Truth of Christianity

(a) The Historical Point of View

§1.

The Bible.

§2.

The Church.

[*deleted*: § 3.

Speculative Thought.]

(b) The Speculative Point of View.

—JP V 5788 (*Pap.* VI B 14) *n.d.*, 1844-45

Deleted from sketch; see 1.v:10-11, 1.19:1-4:

Part One [*changed from*: A].

The Objective Issue of the Truth of
Christianity. [*]

For the objective [*same as 1.19:1-4*] truth

[*]*In margin*: To the typesetter: This is to be printed on a
separate page.

—Pap. VI B 20 *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.v:20-23, 1.46:29-47:38:

[Deleted: (b) The Speculative Point of View]

§3.

The Evidence of the Centuries

the fact that Christianity has endured for 18 centuries.

(Mohammedanism has endured for 12 centuries.)

Jean Paul is very likely the one who has said that even if we eliminated all the proofs for the truth of Christianity, there would still remain the fact that Christianity has endured for 18 centuries.
—JP III 3607 (*Pap.* VI B 25) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.v:23, 1.50:1-3:

(b) the speculative point of view.

—*Pap.* VI B 27:1 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1. vi: 1-10:

B.

The Subjective Issue.

§1.

An Expression of Gratitude to Lessing.

—JP V 5789 (*Pap.* VI B 15) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1.vi:l-10, 1.11:28-38, 1.46:29-49:21, 1.59:1-71:21:

B.

The Subjective Issue.

§1.

An Expression of Gratitude to Lessing.

Madvig⁷ is somewhat like him.

(His whole style. That he ventured to say: I.)

§2.

Whether the approximation of probability (just as great for the contemporary and the latest) can be of interest (1) in order to gain faith—or (2) when one has faith.

No! (1) Illusion. —(2) Spiritual trial unto relapse.

In order to dispel the illusion that has gained a foothold during the eighteen centuries, the pamphlet made it all contemporary with the appearance of the god and canceled the distinction between the contemporary and the latest follower.⁸ —JP V 5790 (*Pap.* VI B 16) *n.d.*, 1844-45

Addition to Pap. VI B 16; see 1.162:12-163:12, 1.202:22-203:24:

Positions

(1)

the (a) objectivity of, for example, to God, to pray means to speak to God.

with (b) Subjectivity one does not stand and talk with one of the other cellar-merchants even though God's name is spoken.

(2)

what (a) Objectivity stresses is of thought-determinants.

how (b) Subjectivity stresses is crucial, not its content, for its content is in fact itself.

—JP V 5791 (*Pap. VI B 17*) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1. vii:5-8:

§2.

The Subjective Issue

or

How Subjectivity Must Be Constituted in Order

That the Issue Can Be Manifest to It.

—*Pap. VI B 40:1 n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.vii:10-15, 1.129:1-7:

§ 3 [*changed from: 2*].

What it means to treat the matter subjectively

(infinitely interested).

—JP IV 4537 (*Pap. VI B 19:1*) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From final draft; see 1.v:l-vi:29:

Concluding Postscript

Contents.[VI B 85:176]

Preface.

Introduction.

A

The Objective Issue of the Truth of Christianity.

(a) The Historical Point of View

§1.

Holy Scripture

§2.

The Church

§3.

The Proof of the Centuries for the Truth of Christianity
(b) The Speculative Point of View

B

The Subjective Issue, the Subject's Relation to the Truth of Christianity.

Chapter 1.

Something about Lessing.

§1.

An Expression of Gratitude.

§2

Possible Lessing Theses.

- (1) The existing subjective thinker is aware of the dialectic of communication.
- (2) In his existence-relation to the truth, the subjective existing thinker is just as negative as positive, has just as much of the comic as of pathos, is continually in the process of becoming, that is, striving. [VI B 95 177]
- (3) Contingent historical truths can never be a demonstration of eternal truths of reason; the transition whereby one will build an eternal happiness on historical reports is a leap.
- (4) *Wenn Gott* [If God] etc.

(p. 154 [p. 1.106]).

—*Pap.* VI B 95 *n.d.*, 1844-45

Addition to Pap. VI B 95; see 1.vi:9-viii:15:

§1.

An Expression of Gratitude to Lessing.

by

A Possible Learner.

§2.

The Subjective Issue

or

How Subjectivity Must Be Constituted in Order That the Issue Can Be Manifest to It.

(a) Becoming Subjective.

(b) Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth Is Subjectivity.

Appendix

A Retrospective Glance at a Contemporary

Effort in Literature.

—Pap. VI B 96 *n.d.*, 1844-45

From final copy; see 1.27:

(unless one is mad, since on that occasion mad people consider themselves obligated to become angry)— *Pap. VI B 98:3 n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.9:1:

[Deleted: **Post scriptum**

Post scriptum]

Introduction.

—*Pap. VI B 98:5 n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.11:5:

. a postscript [*changed from:* a preface] *with an adjacent very large penciled marginal N.B. crossed out with ink*

—*Pap. VI B 98:6 n.d.*, 1845

Addition in final copy; see 1.17:26-29:

The first part ... *Fragments.*

—*Pap. VI B 98:7 n.d.*, 1845

Addition in margin of final copy; see 1.21:1-12:

To the typesetter: This is to be shifted further down to about the middle of the page, since the part begins there.

—*Pap. VI B 98:8 n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.21:29:

. under B

—*Pap. VI B 21:1 n.d.*, 1844-45

From final copy; see 1.21:29:

. in Part Two— *changed from:* under B

—*Pap. VI B 98:9 n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.23:1:

Chapter I— *changed from:* (a)

—*Pap. VI B 98:10 n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.23:3:

(a) The Historical Point of View.

—*Pap.* VI B 21:2 *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1.28:27-29:14:

Moreover, there is no contradiction, since along this way one begins again to become philological-critical.—*Pap.* VI B 21:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.31:2-25:

This is taking faith in vain, just as also when speculation is supposed to be made necessary. One is unwilling to bear the martyrdom of faith; one wants to have one's cake and eat it, too, which is a long way from being faith.— *Pap.* VI B 21:5 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.35:40:

. "proclaimed even by street-corner loafers."

—*Pap.* VI B 98:11 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.36:15:

Lücke⁹—Delbrück

—*Pap.* VI B 21:7 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.36:35-37:

. became penetrated by a little thought and is no longer so hiatically bellowing as when it is rendered on the Jew's-harp of the genius, the seer, the bard, the prophet (since Grundtvig, in his position as pastor at Vartou, unites many world-historical dignitaries).—*Pap.* VI B 21:8 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.36:36-37:

. [*deleted: matchless*] hiatically bellowing, less matchless—and more accessible to sound common sense.

To the typesetter: From here go to p. 57 [1.36:38] at the bottom under the rule line.¹⁰

Nothing is lacking.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:12 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.36:37:

As essentially a poet, as an original and melodious* hymn

writer, serviceable outside the party if the authorities will cover the expense of having him shaved, as a powerful nature, although so powerful that it seems to need dispute and opposition, as a profound person whose statements are at times confirmed in a remarkable way; ** [VI B29 101] as a witnessing person who, powerfully moved in immediate passion, has worked day and night with rare perseverance, as a man with a very great deal of knowledge, even if it is not always exactly under control—Grundtvig will always maintain his significance. [VI B29 102] But this does not concern this inquiry, [*deleted*: here I am dealing with him as a thinker] which is occupied with only a single Grundtvigian idea. As a thinker, Grundtvig is a genius, but such an immediate genius that with regard to the psychic constitution the brilliant inspiration or the passion of genius under the idea has something in common with what an apoplectic seizure is for the physical constitution. An idea seizes him, he is astonished, moved, he wants to beatify all humankind with his matchless discovery. On the other hand, he lacks the dialectical mobility to inspect with the help of reflection what he has discovered, whether it is something great or something empty. Therefore, although his ideas are numerous, are exceedingly varied and of very different value, they all have a common stamp, a birthmark by which one recognizes them at once: the mark of absoluteness, undialectical or apoplectic absoluteness. Everything Grundtvig says is absolute. The moment he has any opinion whatever, it is the absolute, the matchless, the only saving opinion. At times, because the train of thought is interrupted, the idea does not actually come into existence but becomes a theme for lyrical effusions in which the poetic is unmistakable, whether it is his description of the foul ignorance of the age, or his bright vistas into a matchless future, or naive amazement about himself, that now he has once again made a matchless discovery. Stirred by the idea, he does not become a thinker but becomes poetic in proportion to that apoplectic obscurity in which the stimulation resides. If an [*in margin*: earlier] idea is revoked, he does not in turn become dialectical in relation to it; by no means, it is revoked absolutely—because now he has the opposite idea absolutely. The idea is promptly asserted [*in margin*: in the form of the most varied lyrical assurances] with such matchless absoluteness that every category of thought despairs of becoming involved with it. Just as the Muslim does not

become involved with Allah but only shouts: Great is Allah!—so Grundtvig's absolute idea can only be adored. Such a matching of variety, an adoring parish-clerk shout and a bellowing appreciation, which as an interjection-performance linguistically accomplishes everything and, humanly speaking, a bit more than one could wish from rational beings, is also heard occasionally. [VI B 29:103] Yet this meaningless shout, compounded of all interjections, still has its significance if one pays attention to its being shouted in just this way, for one learns to recognize a discovery by looking at the discovery itself, but also by considering* the one to whom the discovery has quite matchlessly given satisfaction, for whom it has caused a matchless light to rise over world history and the future of the human race. The strictly orthodox Grundtvig is not entirely free from a certain superstitious belief in the tremendous category of the absolute, which nevertheless is so illusive. [VI B 29:104] It is similar to opening the mouth wide in order to talk loudly. Obviously if a person wishes to talk he does not keep his mouth shut, but he may also open it so wide that nothing at all is said and the mouth merely gapes wide open. An absoluteness of this sort, which generally is rare, can be his lot, for it is not so rare that a genius has an adherent who caricatures him, but Grundtvig is his own caricature, so absolute is he. His absoluteness changes into parody just as does his style, which requires only a careful reproduction, be it polemical, as formerly by Poul Møller,¹² or admiring, as by Siegfried Ley.¹³ Then it is parody, so that as a consequence friend and foe, by doing the same, produce the same effect. Indeed, even if these innocent and insignificant remarks should move Pastor Grundtvig and prompt him to put on his Asa-strength,¹⁴ I am certain that he will slay me so absolutely that I will come out of it completely unscathed, because in order to slay, spiritually understood, what is only a very relative magnitude, spiritually understood, one must pay particular attention to the relativity. Otherwise the one who is alive will easily convince himself that it is not he who has been slain but one or another of the enormous absolutenesses against which Pastor Grundtvig defends himself and his mother tongue and fatherland and the North, an absoluteness just as Grundtvig is absolutely the absolute.

As a remarkable psychological feature, this Grundtvigian absoluteness could lay claim to more detailed exploration; here its

treatment can be granted only a very little space, since here only one single idea is essentially being treated, by which Grundtvig again has the dubious merit of absoluteness. Absoluteness is characteristic of Grundtvig even in trifles and is indeed most interesting psychologically to observe in them. [VI B 29:105] As is generally known, an author at times italicizes a few particular words in order either to help the reader follow the exposition better or to make the particular word stand out. But if one is to use italicizing successfully, one must understand the relative, for the idea of italics is relative. Lacking this relative understanding, Grundtvig has the matchless understanding: he italicizes absolutely in such a way that finally the notable words are the ones that are not italicized. This, to be sure, is an exaggeration—by Grundtvig, not by me—and when one speaks of Grundtvig, truth as well as esthetic considerations require the precaution of not exaggerating. For Grundtvig the relative does not go only a little way; as soon as he uses it he uses it absolutely. Italicizing seems particularly to increase in his later writings.

* but nevertheless eccentric

** *Note.* Indeed, also at times remarkable in the same way as when the continual repetition that the written word is dead and powerless was affirmed by a lower court's decision¹¹—that Grundtvig's written word was “dead and powerless.”

* *Note* As a rule, one draws [*slutte*] correct conclusions; yet empirically one can accidentally draw a wrong conclusion if a special event actually occurs and one is unaware of it. The special event is that a quiet and introverted person in the noble sense, an eminently endowed, educated, and cultured person, decisively joins [*slutte sig til*] a party, a special event that must be regarded as a psychological phenomenon, the explanation of which can be sought in *concreto* along different paths or perhaps be completely abandoned. But the [following] conclusion is unjustifiable and must not be drawn: neither from the excellence of this individual to that of the party nor from the genius of the party *en masse* to the insignificance of this individual. The person who has and can have significance for himself can religiously belong only incidentally to a party, especially to a party such as the Grundtvigian party, formed on the average of a few volunteer geniuses who by an “adhesive” relation to the universal genius take a shortcut past the more humble places in the world of spirit on to the grandiloquent appointment as almost geniuses with an almost “nearly matchless eye for world history,” in the free language of almost “incarnate universal genius.” For Grundtvig is pure [*pure*] genius or, if someone prefers, simple [*pære*] genius; it must not depend on the word—through the relation to him the adherents become almost the same.

Now and then an author makes a reference to a train of thought that is certainly somewhat unfamiliar but yet also so well known that it becomes invigorating for the reader, instead of obtaining a

new thought in a new dress, to be reminded in a pleasant way of an old thought. The good author does something like this frugally and carefully. Grundtvig does it absolutely. His writing, especially in the later pamphlets, does not include an occasional provocative reference to Norse mythology; no, it has become gibberish, in which nisses and trolls and the Dalby mill¹⁵ and a secondhand inventory list of hackneyed poetic phrases and God knows what all appear. One must read him with a lexicon or be prepared not to be able to understand him when he interlards his style with this chattel just as skippers interlard their speech with nautical expressions.

A prose writer who knows his art uses on a rare occasion a compound word, but very carefully, often even comically, because this language does not belong to prose. But Grundtvig does everything absolutely; he and his copiers use compound words with a matchless affectation. Even Aristotle (in his *Rhetoric*¹⁶) cautions against the use of compound words in prose because they only impress the masses and are a poetic reminiscence. [VI B29 106] Plutarch (in *Moralia*¹⁷) tells that King Philip was insulted because someone addressed him in compound words, since he was of the opinion that only the common herd is addressed in this way.—In the lectures he delivered here in 1803, Henrich Steffens made a short, epigrammatic statement about the Romans: that Nero, not Brutus, was the last Roman.¹⁸ Even though the statement is unjustified, which is explainable by his partiality to the Greeks, it is short, ingeniously expressed, provocative. As for Grundtvig's italicized, yard-long annually recurring lecture on the Roman yoke, is there in all that he says any additional category of thought? And then, after having soundly thrashed Hamann¹⁹ in the guise of the Romans, he customarily knits to that a hearty and stirring peroration about life and all that lives, life and spirit, the school for life, the high school in Soer,²⁰ in the North, on Skamlings-banken, first and last about the folk academy. *Posito*, I assume, that all these stirring lectures aroused all of us and we now stand there prepared to carry out Grundtvig's idea—could it perhaps be that he lacks the more concrete idea and has essentially concentrated on sounding the alarm? His absolute hatred of the Roman yoke and the Romans corresponds to his absolute partiality to the Greeks, who have been engaged by Grundtvig in his role as prophet to appear together with the Icelanders in a future world-

historical season. The present author, through reading the Greeks (even though he, in comparing his knowledge with an expert philologist's learned acquaintance with Greek culture, always admits his weakness), through repeatedly imagining himself back into the state of mind of those people, is in the situation of having found a reassurance he perhaps otherwise would never have found, a propitious guidance for his perhaps confused, perhaps also misled, thinking; he is in the situation of not having been occupied with any person as much as with the greatest intellectual hero in Greece: Socrates—but I wonder if Socrates would understand a single word about the matchless future for which Grundtvig vouches? [VI B 29:107] On the other hand, has Grundtvig said anything about Greece that contains thought categories, while he scoffs at everything German and at what German philologists and philosophers have learned from the Greeks? Do his style, his performance, and his behavior testify to his having learned anything from that very normatively cultured nation, from that beautifully modeled representative of beauty, art, intelligence, and happy balance?

* [*Deleted:* So, then, his genius as a thinker culminates in *the Living Word.*] Without quite needing exceptional ability, someone with a somewhat closer acquaintance [*in margin:* by continual reading] with Pastor Grundtvig's writing will easily be able to imitate the mysterious discourse about the Living Word since, like witchcraft formulas and other such things, it is produced by arbitrarily tossing together various strong compound words. But it is hard to say what thought there is in this matchless discovery. *Is it an esthetic discovery* that pertains to the relation between the written and the spoken word? Aristotle has already undertaken such inquiries, and about this relation a connoisseur will be able to make many tasteful and enlightening observations, which would also have psychological value, since the maturity of spiritual development is related to it, and the Living Word decreases in proportion to the increase of intellectuality—something of which Aristotle was already aware. But in vain does one seek development and thought in Grundtvig. For him the Living Word has obtained the meaningless worth of absoluteness. The written word, the dead letters, the black marks on white paper are dead and powerless, have no value whatever, are unable to call forth the spark of life in a human soul. One now lives as in a death (with

the exception of the noise that is made in Danish society and on the steamship) because books are written. In comparison with a condition like this, there was a matchless life here in the North in ancient times, since one did not write books—perhaps because one could not write. [VI B 29:108] Esthetically, the discovery that there is a difference between the spoken and the written word would be of the same kind as the discovery that the sun rises, matchless, that is, matchless that anyone would think of calling it a discovery. Therefore the merit can lie solely in the development, in the subtle observation, lest the merit, with the aid of absoluteness, become a matter of making the discovery into nothing at all. [*Deleted*: This happens easily to Grundtvig, since he has a superstitious belief in the tremendous category of absoluteness. He does not seem to know that it is a deceitful definition, that it also can be nothing at all. It is similar to opening the mouth wide in order to talk loudly. Obviously if a person wishes to talk he does not keep his mouth shut, but he may also open it so wide that nothing at all is said and the mouth merely gapes wide open.] The southern nations also speak this way in categories of absoluteness precisely because they lack abstraction; they use superlatives and measure everything by the criterion of the moment, whereby the matchless becomes a meaningless category. To talk in this manner indeed seems livelier, but it is only a rather imperfect representation of what life is. One who knows something of the fuss the Grundtvigians are making of life and all that lives, together with the nuisance they are creating with the expression, will readily perceive that the whole secret is to achieve a southern childishness that, ignorant of abstraction, lacking the concentration to learn from experience, unembarrassed by dialectical continuity, is Quakerishly made ecstatic in the apoplectic absoluteness.*

* And then finally the theory of *the Living Word*, which is closely connected to the Church theory, since the Church with the Living Word forms the contrast to the dead word of Scripture

Is the theory of the Living Word a *discovery in the ethical-psychological domain*? Does the word's liberating power pertain to quiet inwardness, consequently to passion, beyond that to inclosing reserve, and beyond that to the demonic? [VI B 29:109] Who would not gratefully read (for it is only Grundtvig who has an aversion to reading) what a competent observer would write about

that. But here again the merit would lie in the development. Nor would an absolute distinction between the written and the spoken word be imaginable, since generally it would be hardly advisable for any thinker to pretend to have thought an absolute distinction between subdivisions under the same basic concept.

* *In margin* Or is the Living Word perhaps the *mother tongue*? Does the discovery signify that everyone actually knows only one language and that one never learns any language in the way one learns this, but then also that for the native the originality of the mother tongue is liberating for his whole spiritual development? No one could wish to learn something about this more than I, who too often have experienced the truth that I, at least, could not learn other languages. But here again it is the particulars that will decide whether the discovery is something or it is altogether matchless. Until the particulars are at hand, only so much is certain, that as an author Grundtvig is not exactly enriching the mother tongue but rather is impoverishing it, for he has used many a good expression so extravagantly and affectedly that one becomes disgusted with it and is almost tempted to stop using it. If one wants to call such behavior partiality for the mother tongue, this must be taken in a very particularist and separatist sense. [VI B 29:109] A true son's endearing partiality for the mother tongue is recognized rather by his rewinning the prodigal sons of the language, by his regenerating the word ruined and rumbled by continual use and misuse and restoring to it the lost originality.

Is it a metaphysical discovery? Does it pertain to the relation between essence and form, that the word is the essential form of the thought, that in this relation there is an absolute commensurability? Is the discovery perhaps a counterpart to the Hegelian theory that the outer is the inner and the inner the outer? 21 Alas, how exceedingly meritorious to be able perspicaciously to clear up this part of the boundary disputes between the logical and the ontological. If this is the discovery, then the absolute distinction is again inexplicable, whereas the merit of the discovery would lie simply and solely in the development.

Is it a discovery in dogmatics? When the discourse is about the Living Word, the speaker's mood increases like this: The Living Word, life and spirit, the mother tongue, the feminine heart, Denmark's loveliest field and meadow, the word of the Church, Martin Luther, the matchless discovery, the Word that was in the beginning.* [VI B29 110] This last phrase, as all know, is a reference to the first chapter in the Gospel of John. A reference to this is not exactly a matchless discovery reserved for a world-historical genius; unfortunately, neither is a Neoplatonic-gnosticizing mess matchless. Just as there have been times when idolatry was practiced with numbers, just as even now a lottery

player concentrates all his conjecturing on the number, so also the Word has been used and is used—the Word that was from the beginning—in order to evoke the effect of profundity merely by saying it in a hollow voice. Wherever the dialectical and genuine thought development are lacking, one takes an easy shortcut to the most preposterous opposite: the profundity of the profound thought is made obvious by wrinkling the brow,** by yodeling with the voice, by pushing up the skin of the forehead, by staring fixedly ahead, by sounding the deep F in the bass scale. The profundity would consist in a more concrete understanding. Modern speculation has also taken up this λόγος [word]. Trendlenburg, splendidly educated by the Greeks, quotes the following passage from a modern philosophical work as an example of a fallacy (*Erläuterungen*, p. 69): [VI B 29 III] *Gott ist das Wort; die Kategorie ist ein Wort; also ist die Kategorie Gott* [God is the word; the category is a word; consequently the category is God].²³ Now, Grundtvig is seldom guilty of a fallacy; he is much too absolute, much too alive to respect the Roman yoke of the syllogism. To repeat, the discovery here would amount to nothing—to discover that “the word” is used in the New Testament with a special significance and κατ’ ἐξοχήν [in an eminent sense] would be a problematical matter in the nineteenth century, that is, after Christianity has lasted eighteen hundred years.

* *Note.* This rigmarole does not so much provide the train of thought, which I do not make so bold as to provide, but it is to be regarded as a recipe for preparing the mystical discourse.

** *Note.* With regard to thought, the mimetic has no significance whatsoever. Yet at times such a significance is conferred upon it. I recall a man who presumably had the content of all his thinking packed into one logical sentence, which he propounded as a formula. When I raised a little objection, he repeated the formula. When I again made a little objection, he repeated the formula and now said that I had not understood the sentence, that it essentially depended on the voice in which it was spoken. Thereupon he asked me to listen. He struck a pose and in a disguised voice,* half chanting, began to recite it three times in a row.²² Of course, I then confessed to him that I had now understood it—what one will not do to slip away from a lunatic man

Is it a *historical-dogmatic discovery*? Is the Living Word the tradition? So much acumen has been applied to this concept that it requires a subtle thinker to make discoveries. Even Magister Lindberg does not seem to have succeeded; from Grundtvig one did not dare to expect it. —Without daring to say with certainty what the Living Word is according to Grundtvig’s matchless

discovery (and who would dare to have a definite opinion on that), I venture the following hypothesis, that the riddle-word is a theme for Grundtvig's fantasizing.

[*Deleted:* What has been set forth here diverts me in a way from my project. And yet in another way it does belong in order to prepare for the small yield Grundtvig's matchless Church theory provides for thought. The indignation of not a few adherents at my procedure will not surprise me; neither do I fear that Grundtvig, arrayed in his Asa-strength, will slay me. Usually he slays his adversary so absolutely. . . .]

* It produced for the ear a monotony such as appears to the eye when a person reads the old manuscripts in which the writing continues without any punctuation marks.

So much for Grundtvig in general. Even if the place is only questionably appropriate, and thus the space is as limited as possible, this seems to be the moment to say it, the right moment, now since Grundtvig has come into vogue. Our age, which is so powerfully moved and fermenting, naturally always has use for an extraordinary, a seer, a prophet, a strong man, a man of power, a martyr, etc. And when it so fortunately happens that one man can take on this whole repertoire of extraordinariness with equal brilliance—and Grundtvig, whose life has never suffered from monotony, can do that in a way that must completely satisfy our age—no wonder he is appreciated. At times with the transfigured countenance of apostolic saintliness, at times unrecognizable in Old-Norse shagginess, always a boisterous individuality, godly, worldly, Old-Norsely, Christian, high priest, Holger the Dane,²⁴ at times jubilating, at times weeping, always prophetic, even when it so ironically happens that he becomes contemporary with the fulfillment first glimpsed in the distant times—is not Grundtvig a remarkable phenomenon? Another question is whether it has benefited Christian orthodoxy to be defended for dear life by such a fabulous character who in the role of defender of orthodoxy can easily cause offense. [VI B 29:112] Every more quiet concern about the religious, every more inward understanding that in fear and trembling is disciplined by self-concern, readily feels painfully disturbed by this unconstraint that nonchalantly is busy only with great visions and matchless discoveries. And the person who thinks that he should learn by living and that to exist is an art will not exactly be delighted by the Grundtvigian achievement: that one

can become sixty-five years old and yet be just as intrinsically undialectical, just as extroverted, just as noisy as in youth, consequently that one can be a genius and become an oldster without existentially learning the least thing from life, even if one is courteous enough to assume that the genius has taught all the other people, a relationship that essentially is reserved only for God: that he teaches others without learning himself—and now Grundtvig.

So, then, Grundtvig correctly perceived that the Bible could not possibly withstand the invading doubt, but he did not perceive that the reason for this was that the attack —*Pap. VI B 29 n.d.*, 1845

Continuation of passage deleted from draft (Pap. VI B 29 [2.25-26]):

. that the slain one survives completely unharmed and untouched, for in order to hit, especially in order to hit perilously, it always takes a little relativity in the death-dealing blow. [VI B 30:112] On the other hand, I would be sorry if someone whose judgment I respect were to misunderstand me, as if, because there simply is nothing to be found in the Grundtvigian ideas, there was no reason even to say it. [VII B 30 113] With a troubled and profound countenance, at times weeping, at times heralding, at times warning, at times ecstatic over the fulfillment of prophecy, Grundtvig everywhere pushes himself to the front as a boisterous religious individuality who would more than willingly let himself be called Rabbi and Master (Matthew 23:10). But just as a mocker of religion can at times be dangerous, so also a character like this can be dangerous for the opposite reason, because he really lends himself to causing offense. Every more quiet concern about the religious, every more inward understanding that in fear and trembling applies ethical categories to itself in self-concern, readily feels painfully disturbed by world-historical ale-Norse unconstraint that nonchalantly is busy only with great visions and matchless discoveries, readily feels painfully affected by the Grundtvigian inept unruliness [*ubehændige Ubændighed*], a strange mixture of a remarkable poet-individuality and a vaudeville character.—*Pap. VI B 30 n.d.*, 1845

Continuation of passage deleted from draft (Pap. VI B 29 [2.20:25]):

As a poet, as a hymn writer, as a speaker, as a strong character who, powerfully moved in immediate passion, has worked day and night with rare perseverance, as a man with a very great deal of knowledge, even if it is not exactly under control, Grundtvig will always have his significance, but as a thinker his significance is very dubious. [VI B 33:114] If there exists a contractual relation between readers and authors, if a young teachable person, who perhaps with unusual admiration takes up reading an author, has a right to complain when he feels disappointed, then most certainly such a one would have this right against Grundtvig. The absolute, world-historical shout is raised; it can be heard over more than one kingdom. One plunges in—one reads, and even if it is a matter of life and death one cannot extract any category of thought out of it all. In time, of course, one becomes familiar with this concurrent noise, just as with living next door to a coppersmith. In time, one learns not to be fooled, even if one readily admits that in every way Grundtvig is serviceable wherever there seems there could be use for a man of power, a seer, a bard, and a prophet. His life does not suffer from monotony; it is rich in unique variety. Now he makes his entry into the contemporary age weeping, weeping over the darkness and ignorance of the age; now he opens bright, smiling vistas to the Golden Age that is to come; now he is as old as if he were born at the time of the Reformation; now he walks youthfully with a light flourish of the hat, and although his hair is turning gray his eyes sparkle, he says, with the fire of youth; now he stands on Tabor²⁵ and prophesies but understands that it is the prophet's lot not to enter the holy land himself, not to share in the matchless future he glimpses at a distance of one or two thousand years—until on the occasion of a folk festival he suddenly discovers that the fulfillment has come and that now one must call it a day. [VI B 33:115] No wonder, then, that he has recently become popular! After all, a generation as profoundly stirred as the present one always has use for extraordinary ambassadors, be it a seer, a skald, a martyr, ^{*} a prophet, a hero in the present. And when it so fortunately happens that one man can play all these roles with equal brilliance, that he needs only to remove his beard^{**} in order to cease being a prophet and become a standard bearer.^{***} No wonder that this man becomes an indispensable artist!

As a thinker, his genius consists, among other things, in

annulling the concept as he propounds it. Thus while it is a familiar sight in the world to see a genius accompanied by a follower who caricatures him, Grundtvig as a thinker offers the rare phenomenon that as a genius he is his own caricature, so absolute is he....

* a strong man

** or put on a false nose

*** for young Denmark

—*Pap.* VI B 33 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.40:28:

. of becoming intelligible to him, but rather in a wanhope, so that he should feel called upon loudly to stifle himself and every expression of dialectical conscience in his soul.—*Pap.* VI B 98:13 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.41:38:

So the difference between these two men is this: Lindberg is a bright, intelligent head, with rare learning and rare dialectical perseverance, who with his wise moderation has been a ministering spirit; Grundtvig, on the other hand, is as a thinker a confused genius who gets carried away from himself into the heights, the depths, the world-historical. In the circumstances of their lives, the difference has always been that Lindberg has been ridiculed, mocked, insulted on all occasions, probably because his power has really been felt, and Grundtvig has enjoyed an inane recognition under the fading-into-the-blue categories: genius, seer, bard, prophet.—*Pap.* VI B 98:14 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.44:14:

. case*

* *Note.* In a little pamphlet about Baptism, Prof. Martensen, otherwise equipped with fortunate qualifications for becoming a dogmatic thinker, has not exactly legitimized himself as such.[VI B 98:15 179] The professor establishes Baptism as decisive for salvation, but for the sake of caution** he still adds that if anyone has not been baptized he also can be saved. It is scientific in every way to be of service with fine sand and coarse sand.²⁶ The only thing lacking, something I most respectfully do not doubt, is that

many a person has been reassured about the matter of his salvation by reading this pamphlet.*** [VI B 98:15 180] This can be called satisfying the demands of the times and being understood by the age. Without infinitely interested passion the whole question and all the talk about an eternal happiness is coquetry, but God help the infinitely interested person in passion who would be set aside in a lonely cubicle with dogmatic guidance such as that.

In margin: ** he naively seems to assume and without making use of the dialectical means of caution.

In margin: *** (Strangely enough, in our day it is not at all difficult to reassure people about the matter of their salvation; rather, it is more difficult to alarm them about it)—*Pap.* VI B 98:15 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.44:16:

Martensen's self-contradiction in the little book about Baptism.²⁷

Depression's need for something superstitious in order to be rid of the dialectical.

—*Pap.* VI B 24:1 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; replaced by 1.46:15-18:

. in the intellectual world not like a giant, a Lars Mathiesen,²⁸ who fences in the air.—*Pap.* VI B 98:16 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.46:28:

His life is so parodically patterned that one needs only to tell it quite simply and thereby write a satire, just as his style is so parodical that just a careful reproduction of it, for example, polemically by Poul Møller in the past, or admiringly by Siegfried Ley, is a parody. This is a good demonstration that it is in itself parodical, that friend and foe by doing the same thing produce the same effect.—*Pap.* VI B 98:17 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.50:1:

Changed from: (b)

—*Pap.* VI B 98:18 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.51:14:

. no wonder that it can be taken for granted that we are all Christians. [VI B 27:2 100] I recall an incident from my own experience. Once in my youth I was in a group where the young people suddenly had the gay notion of wanting to dance. Music was produced and everything was unusually lively and gay. Unfortunately, I cannot dance, and therefore I withdrew. Then into the room where I was came a young lady, accompanied by an elderly gentleman, who obviously wanted to embarrass me. She invited me to dance—and I had to say that I could not dance. And yet to be able to dance is an accomplishment, but to be a Christian is something so easy, so completely gratuitous, that it must be frightfully disgraceful to admit that one is not a Christian when everybody else is—ergo, we are all Christians.[VI B 27:2 101]—*JP* I 456 (*Pap.* VI B 27:2) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.57:24:

B.

The Subjective Issue, the Subjective Individual's
Relation to the Truth of Christianity

In margin: To the typesetter:

This is to be printed on a separate page.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:19 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.63:1-3:

Changed from:

§ 1.

An Expression of Gratitude to Lessing.

by

A Possible Learner.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:20 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.64:14-18:

Changed from: in my inverted relation to you, because if you, imaginatively constructing, found it necessary to raise doubts, then it now seems to me, imaginatively constructing, necessary to bring out the religious in its true supranatural magnitude; if it perhaps

was difficult at that time to understand doubt, then it is perhaps more difficult now to understand the religious—indeed, everyone in our day can explain it and go further.—*Pap.* VI B 98:21 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.71:15-19:

. Lessing would step up; with an ambiguously admiring expression on his face, he would pat me on the shoulder and say: *Daran haben sie Recht, wenn ich das gewusst hätte, ich aber habe mir nie so etwas einfallen lassen* [You are right in that, if only I had known, but nothing like that has ever occurred to me]—*Pap.* VI B 35:5 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.71:15:

. πολύμητις [of many wiles] (the wily Lessing).
—*Pap.* VI B 37 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of final copy; see 1.72:1-3:

Ch. II. Possible and Actual Theses by Lessing.
—*Pap.* VI B 98:22 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.72:31-32:

(1) *Lessing, as a subjective thinker, is aware of the dialectic of communication.*—*JP* III 2371 (*Pap.* VI B 35:7) *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.72:31-32:

Changed from: Lessing as a subjective thinker is. . . .
—*Pap.* VI B 98:23 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.73:21-74:40 fn., 1.110:3-29:

Double-reflection is already implicit in the communication itself, in the fact that the subjective individual (who wants to express the life of the eternal*) existing in isolation wants to communicate himself, something he cannot possibly want to do directly, since it is a contradiction.

One may very well want to communicate oneself, like the

person in love, but always indirectly.

Every finite certainty is simply a deception; to demand this of God is only to make a fool of him. It is like the unfaithfulness in an erotic relationship, which consists not in one's loving another girl but in having lost the idea.**

*in which all sociality and all communication are inconceivable, because movement is inconceivable. Trendlenburg's contribution to the category; the passage in the conclusion about Isis and Osiris, which is marked in my copy.

** thus if the girl were to long for the wedding day because it would give finite certainty, if she wanted to make me understand that now she was certain, I would deplore her unfaithfulness, for then she would have lost the idea of love.— *JP* I 632 (*Pap.* VI B 38) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.78:24-79:2:

. probably in the reliance that the other was greater than he, consequently that the pupil was greater than the master.²⁹ — *Pap.* VI B 35:13 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.80:21-24:

2. In his idea-relationship to truth, Lessing is just as negative as positive, equally as much, has just as much of the comic as he has of pathos, equally as much, and in his idea-relationship is continually in a process of becoming—that is, striving.— *JP* V 5793 (*Pap.* VI B 35:14) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.80:21:

Lessing as

—*Pap.* VI B 98:24 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.81:25-31:

. , which is not something historical, because as knowing myself in relationship to God I am more than historical, I am eternal; or the illusory result.—*JP* V 5794 (*Pap.* VI B 35:15) *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.83:26:

From draft; see 1.19-26:

The subjective existing thinker who has the categories of the infinite in his soul has them always, and therefore his form is continually negative. [VI B 35:19 117] Suppose such a person devoted his whole life to writing one single book, suppose he published it, suppose he assumed one reader—he would then altogether negatively express his relation to one reader; whereas a positive assistant professor who scribbles a book in fourteen days positively and beatifyingly addresses himself to the whole human race. That negative thinker, on the other hand, could never achieve any kind of direct relationship to his reader. [VI B 35:19 118] He therefore would probably say: I can just as well recommend the reading of this book as advise against it, because there is no direct gain from reading it and no direct loss from not having read it.*

The subjective existing thinker is therefore just as negative as he is positive. Among the negative ones there are a few. . . .

*Note. For the sake of caution, I must beg everyone not to be bothered about what he reads here. It is written for idle people; yes, the serious reader will easily perceive that it is a joke to tease Lessing.—JP V 5795 (Pap. VI B 35:19) n.d., 1845

From draft; see 1.92:33-93:17:

This is what Socrates develops in the *Symposium*. [VI B 35:24 118] In his dissertation, Magister Kierkegaard was alert enough to discern the Socratic but is considered not to have understood it, probably because, with the help of Hegelian philosophy, he has become super-clever and objective and positive or has not had the courage to acknowledge the negation. Finitely understood, of course, the continued and perpetually continued striving toward a goal without attaining it is to be rejected, but, infinitely understood, striving is life itself and is essentially the life of that which is composed of the infinite and the finite. An imaginary positive accomplishment is a chimera. It may well be that logic has it, although before this can be regarded as true it needs to be more precisely explained than has been done up to now; but the subject

is an existing [*existerende*] subject, consequently is in contradiction, consequently is in the process of becoming, and if he is, consequently is in the process of striving. [VI B 35:24 119]—JP V 5796 (*Pap.* VI B 35:24) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.93:31:

. leap.*

**Note.* ... Perhaps [*same as 1.99:6-10*] no relation to the leap, since a leap is precisely what is dialectically decisive. That is to say, being about to make the leap is still a nothing in relation to the leap, and to have been most earnestly very close to the leap, that is, to have executed this nothing with utmost earnestness is indeed just like a jest.

In margin: if one does not have sufficient earnestness to do as Münchhausen did.—JP III 2355 (*Pap.* VI B 98:26) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.94:27-95:28, 1.34-38 and fn.:

Rare thoughtfulness! If a historical point of departure can decide an eternal happiness, then it can also *eo ipso* decide an eternal unhappiness. But we easily understand the one, and we cannot understand the other—that is, we do not think either of the parts but talk our way glibly into the first and are a little shocked by the second. If anyone can think the one (the deciding in time of an eternal happiness through a relationship to a historical phenomenon), then he has *eo ipso* thought the other. If time and in it the relationship to a historical phenomenon can be an adequate medium for deciding an eternal happiness, then it is *eo ipso* adequate for deciding an eternal unhappiness. To that extent, then, all the extremely curious demonstrations with which a pious orthodoxy has fenced in this dogma are a misunderstanding, just as the demonstrations are also quite curious and completely devoid of the category.—JP II 1638 (*Pap.* VI B 35:25) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.98:15-99:28:

Now I shall take the text where he talks about the leap. Contemporaneity or noncontemporaneity makes no essential difference; a historical (and for the contemporary it is certainly the historical, that the god [*Guden*] exists, that is, exists by having

come into existence) point of departure for an eternal decision is and remains a leap.— *Pap.* VI B 35:30 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.101:19-27:

Here again is the contradiction, which shows that J. did not artistically understand,— *Pap.* VI B 35:32 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.102:32-34:

If Jacobi had been a Polus, he could have responded just as Polus answers Socrates on a similar occasion: The trouble with you, Lessing, is that you are always talking about your old legs and your heavy head. As far as his irony aided by the dialectical is concerned, the following may be noted.— *Pap.* VI B 35:33 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.104:16:

If by this L. perhaps even wanted to refer to a passage in Aristophanes, where Strepsiades is being instructed by the new philosophy on how rain is produced, whereas he had believed that it was Jupiter who rained (and in a peculiar way),³¹ then the jest is no less.— *Pap.* VI B 35:34 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.104:16:

It would also be quite droll if L. had had Aristophanes' *Clouds*, 1. 373,³² in mind.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:27 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.105:23-32:

. category, because all Christianity is rooted in the paradox, whether one accepts it (that is, is a believer) or rejects it (precisely because it is paradoxical), but above all one is not to think it out speculatively, for then the result is definitely not Christianity.— *JP* III 3083 (*Pap.* VI B 35:36) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.106:7-15:

. comfort, whether or not this author has become aware of

it by reading Lessing.— *Pap.* VI B 35:37 *n.d.*, 1845

Underlined and highlighted in a copy of Postscript; see 1.111:8-11:

. . . in what sense a category is an abbreviation of existence, whether logical thinking is abstract **after existence** or abstract without any relation to existence.—*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:1 *n.d.*, 1846

In margin of draft; see 1.114:14-115:16:

. on the whole, to begin with nothing is only a paraphrase of the act of beginning.— *Pap.* VI B 39:6 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.115:18:

. as the beginning.

—*Pap.* VI B 39:7 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.122:30-123:18:

the contrast cannot be stated in a direct form

—*Pap.* VI B 39:9 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.124:10:

If an age had invented wearing knickers and they came to be regarded as so matchless an invention that everyone who did not wear them was despised, it would still be carried too far if it was ordered that not a word might be said unless it had to do with some improvement, one more button on the knickers or something like that.— *Pap.* VI B 98:30 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.125:5, 1.63:4-64:6:

If a private thinker, a speculative capricemonger, like a poor lodger occupied a little garret room in a huge building —but why does he want to go on living there? After all, he can quietly move away, pack his few belongings. But where would he go, alone in the wide world? Well, if only he dared to knock on Lessing's door, but Lessing is a difficult man. Everyone can directly understand him right away, so popular is he compared with the systematians. But the person who ponders him cannot

understand him, which, however, is not to be understood directly, since on the contrary to him it is the enthusiastic expression for his perhaps having understood Lessing nevertheless. With the systematicians it is the reverse: the first understanding is difficult, but the last—well, it is hard for those who had trusted in it. But then Lessing has made matters much worse for the poor lodger. He has made him more than dissatisfied with his lodgings; he has made him more venturesome in being dissatisfied—and then, then he leaves him in the lurch. It may so happen that now in his solitude he perhaps longs for the little garret room and the distracting noise and bustle in the big building—perhaps, who knows? I do not know, since I myself, of course, am not the lodger. —*Pap.* VI B 98:31 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.127:1:

Changed from: § 2.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:32 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.129:1:

Changed from: a

—*Pap.* VI B 98:33 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.130:24-37:

To be subjective is regarded as something very easy. Of course, every human being is a subject, but [to be] a genuine subject, to comprehend infinite reality [*Realitet*] and infinite responsibility—only a few accomplish this, perhaps not ten in each generation.—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:2) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.131:4-22:

It is commonly believed that the task is to become more and more objective, to divest oneself of one's subjectivity.—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:4) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.131:23-132:3:

The poets say the opposite, that a lover is a great rarity.
The pastors likewise, that a believer is a great rarity.—*JP* IV

4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:5) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1.133:8-24:

If it has, for example, managed to organize world history into four monarchies and within that one wants to be of service with some piece of information, then that is acceptable; but it must be certain and fixed that the objective trend is the way and the truth.
— *Pap.* VI B 40:2 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of draft; see 1.133:37-134:17, 1.150:13-151:16:

Note. If I attempted to point out how the Hegelian ordering of the world-historical process perpetrates caprices and leaps, how it almost involuntarily becomes comical when applied to more concrete details, I would perhaps get the attention of a few readers. Essentially the interest would be in arranging world history, and perhaps I am the one who should do it. If I were merely to state this, I would probably cause quite a stir. But to regard all this interest as curiosity is, of course, ethical narrow-mindedness. yes, even to regard interest in astronomy as curiosity and silly dilettantism, which in order to advance disappoints by moving into other disciplines, would also be regarded as ethical narrow-mindedness. Yet I am happy at this point to remember Socrates, “who gave up astronomy and the study of heavenly things as something that did not concern man.”³³—JP II 1607 (*Pap.* VI B 40:3) *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.141:36-37, 1.316:11-21, 1.321:3-25, 1.322:28-323:2:

Here is an error in Julius Müller.³⁴ He is right in maintaining that sin and every manifestation of freedom (the younger Fichte has already repeatedly stressed this³⁵) cannot be [deduced] with necessity (no, neither before nor afterward; see *Philosophical Fragments*³⁶) but must be experienced.

Fine, now he should have swung directly into the ethical-religious, into the existential, to the *You* and *I*. Earnestness is that I myself become conscious of being a sinner and apply everything in this respect to myself. But, instead of that, he goes into the ordinary problems about the universality of sin etc. But if it is to be experienced, then either I must know all—and in that case,

since the world goes on, the whole thing becomes a hypothesis, which perhaps held water until now but does not for that reason hold water (as, I see, Prof. Levy writes in an article about the maternity hospital)—or else I must understand what Johannes Climacus has developed in *Concluding Postscript*, that with regard to actuality every individual is essentially assigned only to himself; he can understand every other individual only in possibility.—JP IV 4037 (*Pap. X² A 482*) *n.d.*, 1850

From draft; see 1.145:32-146:19:

. the trouble is not discovered; the trouble is—it is far too high.—*Pap. VI B 40:4 n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.151:77-152:23:

Yes, even wanting to regard interest in astronomy as curiosity, silly dilettantism, or even intellectual swindling, which in order to advance and advance does not penetrate into anything but merely makes variations of the sciences and intellectual disciplines—this, also, would be regarded as ethical narrow-mindedness. [VI B 40:5 123] Socrates,³⁷ however, was also narrow-minded: “He gave up the study of astronomy because he perceived that the heavenly things do not concern us.” But at that time Professor Heiberg had not demonstrated that astronomy was what the times required. Now he has demonstrated it,³⁸ and so it is certain. [VI B 40:5 124] Earlier Claudius Rosenhoff³⁹ expressed something similar, and at Tivoli an observatory has been erected where we can entertain ourselves astronomically for two shillings while poor folk occupy themselves with astronomy free at the Round Tower.⁴⁰ And thus it has also been demonstrated that the world-historical is what the age demands.

Yet joking is one thing and earnestness another. Praise be to science and learning. Praise be to daring to begin and despondently abandoning because human limitations frighten a person back.[*] An objection that merely fears the insurmountable work or merely fears that it is insurmountable without having anything higher to put in its place is not worthy of attention. Therefore the objection is not formulated in that way. The objection comes from the ethical. It says. . . .

[*]*In margin:* Learned science does not want to see the ethical in

the historical, still less to extract from all this. what the ethical is; scholarly research is solely in the interest of knowledge.— *JP II* 2286 (*Pap.* VI B 40:5) *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.153:29:

N.B. (This to be developed)

Excepted, however, is the noble philology* that concentrates in a scholarly way on only a single part—and is not guilty of speculatively wanting to confuse the ethical task for every single individual with the world-historical for the whole race.

*even though it can be required of the philologist that he be himself ethically clear and conscious before he enters upon his scholarship, that he develop himself ethically in the midst of all his scholarly activity.— *Pap.* VI B 40:6 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.154:28:

* *Note.* Thus without a doubt Prof. Rasmus Nielsen,⁴¹ in the role of a systematic Per Degn and Imprimatur, would find a place for Dean Tryde,⁴² who also is indeed said to know his business systematically and equally well both by reading and by rote, who also is said to have the merit of bringing the system into families, and finally has the remarkable peculiarity by which he differs from actual Hegelians in assuming that world history has had its amusement park season extended so that it does not end before Prof. R. Nielsen. I do not say this to arrogate to myself the credit for having pointed out that the dean must be included in the world-historical process, but it appears to me that Tryde as a systematician has for a long time been qualified to be mentioned with praise.— *Pap.* VI B 98:34 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.163:38:

., and only in a dreadful way can he acquire the power to discontinue this prematurely.— *Pap.* VI B 40:9 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.165:19:

Suppose that tailor who in Hoffmann's story⁴³ had drunk a flask of liquor, suppose he had had a lesser quantity so that by taking a relatively skewed direction he did not immediately seek the way

out into the open air through the open window, suppose he had had a lesser quantity so that there could be a possibility of exercising restraint—would it be a sign of his wisdom if he assumed that it was no art to restrain himself but an art to fly out through the window, which he could, after all, easily achieve with an extra little dose.— *Pap.* VI B 98:35 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.165:27-34:

. of four shillings' worth of sulfuric acid I will die, that Napoleon and Alexander always carried poison with them, that a man died in Berlin by getting a little hot sealing wax under his fingernail, while another person had all the sicknesses without dying, that one can die of everything, and that the same thing that killed the blacksmith can save the baker.—*Pap.* VI B 40:10 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.184:9-10) from:

. Dr. Marcussen, *changed from:* Prof. Heiberg
—*Pap.* VI B 98:36 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of final copy; see 1.184:13:

*whereas the barber who entered at just the same moment to shave the professor found him in a solemn mood with three subscription plans in hand that the spirit presumably had suggested to him.— *Pap.* VI B 98:37 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.184:27) from:

Prof. Heiberg the professor
—*Pap.* VI B 98:38 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.184:31-36:

. so that in addition to becoming a Hegelian, the professor became an April fool, just as later, in addition to becoming an astronomer, he became a Christmas goat.— *Pap.* VI B 40:14 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.184:33-36) from:

. just as later, in addition to becoming an astronomer, he also became a Christmas goat, which perfectly suggests how his speculative and astronomical intellectual existence has significantly made its mark out in the external world.—Pap. VI B 98:39 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.185:11) from:

3

—Pap. VI B 98:40 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.185:25-26) from:

. of the celebrated systematic jubilee hero Professor Heiberg

—Pap. VI B 98:41 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.187:35-188:15:

But the persons who ought to do it are the ones who strive to make everything easy, for they especially have benefit from me, and yet they will be most disinclined to it.—Pap. VI B 40:17 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.189:1-4:

b. subjective truth, inwardness;
truth is subjectivity.

—Pap. VI B 40:18 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.189:1) from:

b.

—Pap. VI B 98:42 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.196:19-24:

. that discourses on the positive [*positive*] and objective truth. One is prompted to think of that brilliant piece by J. Kerner⁴⁴ about a cane that had belonged to an assistant professor and finally, by daily association with him, became an assistant professor just like him.—Pap. VI B 40:21 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.197:26:

. and can never be stated.

Deleted: In order to clarify the divergent paths of objective reflection and subjective reflection and the diverse qualifications of truth related to them, I shall now provide an outline.—*Pap.* VI B 40:22 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.198:37-199:9:

Of course, subjectivity must be thoroughly and intensively worked through in order to come to such a decision: to conceive of an eternal decision, of its *eternal* happiness (what enormous passion this takes). This is the art of subjectivity, which is infinitely more terrifying than the *summa summarum* [sum total] of all the §§ of the whole system, both by reading and by rote. Freely to make up one's mind concerning it and to say: I will or I will not. It is only with such individuals that God has anything to do, either as diabolical or as holy. (How many infinitely understand even the decision of erotic love?)—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:6) *n.d.*, 1844, 45

From sketch; see 1.199:10-18:

Objective consideration does not emphasize *how* one is interested, that a person's eternal happiness depends on it, and that as a consequence it would be the greatest tragedy to be wrong.—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:7) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.199:10-18:

Subjectivity is inwardness. Inwardness is spirit. To have faith is not an *indifferent relation* to something that is true, but an *infinitely decisive relation* to something. The accent falls upon the relation.—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:8) *n.d.*, 1844-45

In margin of draft; see 1.200:31-38:

God becomes a postulate in a special sense, not in the usual way God is said to be that.

Hemsterhuis⁴⁵

it is rather the existing individuality's self-defense, consequently

nothing arbitrary.— *Pap.* VI B 40:23 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.202:10-21:

On the other hand, many a wedded matron has had her man secured by a formula of the wedding ceremony etc., has had countless demonstrations of erotic love, has more than once yielded to the tenderest expression of erotic love, and yet has not been in love.—*Pap.* VI B 40:24 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.203:16-204:16:

This is also dialectical with respect to time, continual repetition that is just as difficult as the first appropriation. [VI B 18 93] This is because man is a synthesis of the temporal and of the eternal, every moment out upon “70,000 fathoms.”⁴⁶[VI B 18 94]

In the moment of decision it appears as if the decision were in the present moment, and with that it changes into a striving. For example, prayer—it would be quite right once to sink into God and then remain there, but since man is a finite being, to pray means continual striving to achieve the true inwardness of prayer.

—*JP* V 5792 (*Pap.* VI B 18) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.204:9-16:

The essential thing about subjectivity is that in resolution and the decision of choice one runs a risk. This is the absolute decision. And the risk ought to be equally great for the contemporary and for the most recent.—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:3) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From sketch; see 1.204:9-16:

Subjectively, then, the requirement is that the point of departure for faith be just as original as it was for the apostles. [VI B 19:10 95] The eternal decision that is sought is transformed into a continued striving by the synthesis-factor of time in human existence. [VI B 19:10 96] (There is a lot of careless talk about the solemnity of being in holy places—arising out of the fact that one goes there so seldom; otherwise the difficulties would be apparent.)—*JP* IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:10) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1.204:17-217:3:

When subjectivity, inwardness, is truth, and the subjectivity is existing (this must never be forgotten), and from this point of view a question is asked objectively about truth, then the truth must be *the paradox*. [VI B 40:26 127] For the existing person, the eternal truth is the paradox, and his only true relation to it is in passion. True, a mathematical theorem is no paradox, but neither is a mathematical theorem essential truth, and it does not relate to an existing person in such a way that it is essential that he is an existing person.

Viewed eternally, there is no paradox; when the eternal truth relates itself to the eternal, there is no paradox. Quite correct. But I, may I say in all respect, am not the eternal and neither was the late Hegel when he was alive. [VI B 40:26 128] Although he was a great man and I am a nobody, we still had one thing in common: each of us was an individual existing person. Let us never forget this simple thesis, which all of us do indeed know from the catechism. Every eternal truth, when it proclaims itself to existing persons, that does not proclaim itself as paradox is *eo ipso* no eternal truth. It is this that comforts me with regard to the system: in turn it will no doubt go out of fashion and in turn the systematicians will probably remake their dress suit and will again be in fashion, for in their noble striving there is an eternal youthfulness.

The eternal truth must not be understood abstractly but must be understood as the essential truth that has an essential relation to existence or, more correctly, to the existing person. Precisely therefore it must simultaneously be eternal and temporal and as such be the eternal truth *in time* (that the eternal truth in abstraction's *species aeterni* [aspect of eternity] is the eternal truth is not difficult to understand, and speculative thought has made it fairly easy for itself under the very distinguished name "speculative thought," which is supposed to be something entirely different from faith, by obtaining something much easier to respond to) for the existing person, who is not a fantastic *I-I* but as such is simply a plain, ordinary human being, like me, for example, Johannes Climacus, born in Copenhagen, medium in height, with black hair and brown eyes, and now thirty years old. Just as the eternal essential truth is itself a paradox in relation to

an existing person, so is an existing person's essential relation to it in turn a paradox, in the same way as faith as well was defined in the above.

Herewith is dismissed all the bombastic prattle that eternally there is no paradox and that true speculative thought does not stop with the paradox, for all such prattle is blown away if only one places the accent of the question on the right place: whether a human being is speculative thought, or whether the speculating individual has ceased to be a human being, an individual human being, an existing human being, and whether an existing person must not be so kind as to be satisfied with being an existing individual. The speculating person's meritorious work of speculatively annulling the paradox is still not very meritorious but only a self-indictment that betrays that the eternal truth is no longer the eternal essential truth that essentially pertains to the existing person or that he himself has been fantastically changed into a chimerical *I-I*. [VI B 40:26 129]

Now, Christianity has explicitly proclaimed itself to be the essential eternal truth and has also proclaimed itself as the paradox, and has thereby also wanted to have essential meaning for the existing person, so that he, existing, would thereby appropriate it and would exist in it. The truth is only in inwardness, and therefore only in it is Christianity essentially in truth. Faith, therefore, is the Christian truth and, viewed essentially, is how it is believed. The paradox is reason's cross (the objective uncertainty), and faith is the passion of inwardness despite the paradox. And so it must be as true as a human being is a human being and as long as a human being is an existing human being. If the honorable speculating professor wants to understand it otherwise, would he then perhaps do me the service of suspending his speculating explanation of Christianity for a moment and explain to us who he is, to what species of beings he belongs? One cannot very well assume that the eternal essential truth came into the world because it needed to be explained by a speculator; it is better to assume that the essential eternal truth came into the world because human beings needed it. And why did they need it? Not in order to explain it, so they would have something to do, but in order to exist in it. But if it came into the world in this way, and if it has itself indicated this by proclaiming itself as a paradox, not in order to provide clever pates with a nut

to crack, but because for existing persons, as long as they exist, it cannot be anything else, except also to be the very guidance in their existence—in that case, speculation's modern merits become a phantom that goes the same way as *I-I*, pure being, and all such things.

In margin: Paganism culminates in the thesis that subjectivity is truth. Socrates' ignorance is more truth than all pagan knowledge. The Christian truth is in turn within this thesis.

From the pagan point of view, it is a paradox that an eternal truth is supposed to relate itself to an existing person—the Christian point of view is that the eternal truth as paradox relates itself to an existing person. [VI B 40:26 130] Christian knowledge is not knowledge of the paradox but knowledge of it in passion, and the knowledge of the wise that it can be known only in passion. Thus that subjectivity is truth is expressed objectively by this, that the truth proclaims itself to be a paradox.

Socrates, therefore, does not have Christian faith at all; it is of course not found in paganism, but he has an analogy to it. His paradox is just the expression for the passion of inwardness with which he relates to the eternal truth, which becomes a paradox only by pertaining to an existing person, by being appropriated by an existing person. Thus it was also a paradox of faith to believe that there is [*er til*] a god, which still is by no means Christian faith. The Christian paradox is the passion of inwardness in relation to the eternal truth, which itself proclaims itself to be a paradox, and in turn this passion of inwardness has subjectively its most paradoxical expression in the individual's being a sinner himself—and consequently he is hindered, not only by existing, in acknowledging the eternal truth. The objective paradox, on the other hand, is formed in this way: the eternal truth, which itself proclaims itself to be the paradox, has a historical element within itself, has come into existence. Just as the Socratic paradox appeared through the eternal truth's relating itself to an existing person, similarly the Christian paradox appears through the eternal truth's having itself come into existence and now in turn relating itself to an existing person in paradoxical passion.— *Pap.* VI B 40:26 *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.189:1, 1.200:18-30, 1.203:18-28, 1.205:28:

Spinoza rejects the teleological concept of existence [*Tilværelse*] and declares (at the end of the first book of *Ethics*⁴⁷) that the teleological view can be maintained only by seeking refuge in *asylum ignorantiae* [sanctuary of ignorance]—ignorant of *causa efficiens* [efficient or secondary cause], one then creates the teleology.—In the second part of his *Ethics*⁴⁸ he justifies his emphasis on immanence by saying that it is universal, except that we do not know what the *causa efficiens* is in every case. But here Spinoza resorts to *asylum ignorantiae*. The defender of teleology concludes: We do not know it; ergo it is not there. Spinoza concludes: We are ignorant of it; ergo it is there.

What does this mean? It means that ignorance is the invisible point of unity for the two roads. For it is possible to reach ignorance, and then, as it says in the *Concluding Postscript*, the road swings off. (See *Concluding Postscript*, Part Two, Chapter II, “Subjectivity Is Truth.”)—*JP* II 2291 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 31) *n.d.*, 1846

Deleted from final copy; see 1.210:23:

., so unrecognizable that not even the forerunner recognized him immediately, but first at his word, and the disciples did not recognize him immediately, because there was nothing to see, but first at the forerunner’s word (John 1:31,33 etc.).—*Pap.* VI B 98:43 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.210:32-213:2:

In relation to the absurd, objective approximation is nonsense, since objective knowledge, in grasping the absurd, has literally gone bankrupt down to its last shilling.[VI B 42:139]

In this case, the way of approximation would be to interrogate witnesses who have seen the god and have either believed the absurd themselves or have not believed it; in the one case I gain nothing, and in the other I lose nothing—to interrogate witnesses who have seen the god perform a miracle, which for one thing cannot be seen, and if they have believed it, well, it is one further consequence of the absurd.—But I do not need to develop this further here; I have done that in *Fragments*.⁴⁹ Here we have the same problem Socrates had—to prevent oneself from getting into objective approximation. It is simply a matter of setting aside introductory observations, and reliabilities, and demonstrations

based on effects, and pawnbrokers, and all such in order not to be prevented from making the absurd clear—so that one can believe if one will.[VI B 42:140]

If a speculator would like to give a guest performance here and say: From an eternal and divine point of view there is no paradox here—this is quite right. But whether or not the speculator is the eternal one who sees the eternal—this is something else again. If he then continues his talking, which does have the eternal in the sense that, like the song, it lasts for an eternity, he must be referred to Socrates, for he has not even comprehended the Socratic and even less found time to comprehend from that standpoint something that goes beyond it.—*JP* II 2287 (*Pap.* VI B 42) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.213:15-216:17:

Christianity does not want to be understood—but the rude speculator does not want to understand this. He cries incessantly: “From the standpoint of the eternal, there is no paradox.”

Christianity entered into the world not to be understood but to be existed in. This cannot be expressed more strongly than by the fact that Christianity itself proclaims itself to be a paradox. If the horror in the beginning of Christianity was that one could so easily take offense, the horror now—the longer the world exists—is that Christianity, aided by culture, abundant knowledge, and objectifying, can so easily become sheer nonsense. The longer the world continues, the more difficult it becomes to become a Christian.—*JP* III 3084 (*Pap.* VI B 43) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.217:7-218:12:

. in its principal doctrine and at every point proclaims itself as a paradox. Christianity’s teaching, that God was man, was an individual human being, lived a certain number of years in time, ate and drank, this is certainly the most terrible paradox that can be presented to an existing person, who precisely as an existing person is himself in the process of becoming and, because he himself is not eternal but only existing, cannot understand eternally.—*Pap.* VI B 40:27 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.221:32-223:8:

does explaining mean to *annul* (with all the word-plays) to explain what is decisive

—*Pap.* VI B 40:29 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.224:16-225.5:

The forgiveness of sin is indeed a paradox inasmuch as the eternal truth relates itself to an existing person; [VI B 45:140] it is a paradox inasmuch as the eternal relates itself to the person botched up in time and by time and who nevertheless is an existing person (because under the qualification of sin existence is registered and accentuated a second time). [VI B 45:141] But forgiveness of sin is really a paradox only when it is linked to the appearance of the god, to the fact that the god has existed [*existeret*]. For the paradox always arises by the joining of existing and the eternal truth, but the more often this occurs, the more paradoxical it is.*

**Note.* A reference to *Fragments*, in which I said that I do not believe that God exists [*er til*, (eternally) is] but know it; whereas I believe that God has existed [*har været til*] (the historical).⁵⁰ At that time, I simply put the two formulations together and in order to make the contrast clear did not emphasize that even from the Greek point of view the eternal truth, by being for an existing person, becomes an object of faith and a paradox. But it by no means follows that this faith is the Christian faith as I have now presented it.—*JP* III 3085 (*Pap.* VI B 45) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.226:26-227:8:

But the honorable speculating professor is absentminded, is not existing [*er ikke eksisterende*], is not subjective, is not impassioned—he is *sub specie aeterni*. Yes, anyone who is as great as that is, of course, a lucky fellow.—*JP* III 3562 (*Pap.* VI B 40:31) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of final copy; see 1.229:22:

*and the Christian would no doubt call him unhappy, for the deceived one is indeed always unhappy, and of the deceived the unhappiest one is in turn the one who deceives himself, and of such deceived ones the unhappiest one is in turn, in contrast to the devout deceived, the one who must be called the presumptuous

deceived.— *Pap.* VI B 98:44 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.230:14:

The difference between the Socratic paradox (Socrates himself produces it) and the Christian paradox.

If subjectivity*

* *Note.* I do not know if it is needed, but please remember from *a* that by subjectivity is meant not what is called a subject as such but to become subjective or the developed subjectivity.—*Pap.* VI B 40:32 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of final copy; see 1.234:18:

* A person can be a great logician and become immortal through his services and yet prostitute himself by assuming that the logical is the existential and that the principle of contradiction is abrogated in existence because it is indisputably abrogated in logic; whereas existence is the very separation that prevents the purely logical flow. [VI B 98:45 185] Hegel may very well be world-historical as a thinker, but one thing he has certainly lacked: he was not brought up in the Christian religion, or he was mediocresly brought up. For just as the person brought up to believe in God learns that even if every misfortune falls to his lot in life and he never sees a happy day, he must simply hold out, so also the person brought up in Christianity learns to regard this as eternal truth and to regard every difficulty simply as a spiritual trial [*Anfægtelse*]. But Hegel's concept of Christianity is so far from bearing the imprint of this primitivity of childlike inwardness that his treatment of faith—for example, of what it is to believe—is nothing but pure foolishness [*changed from*: stupidity]. I am not afraid to say this. If I had the cheek to say of the most simple person alive that he is too stupid to become a Christian, this would be a matter between God and me, and woe unto me! But to say this of Hegel remains a matter only between Hegel and me, and at most a few Hegelians, for the stupidity is of another kind, and to say this is no blasphemy against the God who created man in his image, consequently each human being, and against the God who took human form in order to save all, consequently the most simple as well.— *JP* II 1610 (*Pap.* VI B 98:45) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.234:21-25:

. that, like the Wandering Jew in a beautiful legend, I should lead the pilgrims to the promised land and not enter myself,⁵¹ that I should guide people to the truth of Christianity and that as my punishment for going astray in my younger days I myself would not enter in but would venture only to be an omen of a matchless future —*JP V 5797 (Pap. VI B 40:33) n.d., 1845*

From draft; see 1.234:28-235:17:

Although I had *already* made Christianity my target *several years ago* and although when I *began three years ago* with the idea of wanting to be an author I immediately aimed at it, I still have nothing of the sort to appeal to. [VI B 40:34 131] On the contrary, the beginning is quite simple. It was about eight years ago, it was a Sunday—well, perhaps no one will believe me, because once again it is a Sunday, but it is nevertheless quite certain that it was a Sunday. [VI B 40:34 132] It was rather late in the afternoon, the evening was already beginning and the beginning of leave-taking was thereby hinted, although I have often been tempted to misunderstand this as suggesting that one should stay. [*]

[*] *In margin:* to be reworked considerably

In margin: N.B. Perhaps this whole thing could best be used by itself under the title

An Attempt by a Failed Author to Be a Reader

and then in it to go through the pseudonymous books.

—*Pap. VI B 40:34 n.d., 1845*

From draft; see 1.235:1-17:

. for evening's taking leave of day and of the person who has experienced the day is enigmatic speech [*changed from:* [VI B 49:141] has a remarkable ambiguity]; its warning is like the caring mother's instruction to the child to come home, and its invitation is like an inexplicable beckoning, as if now for the first time the true life was beginning. [VI B 49:142] A human being is blended in the same way—finitude is like the child for whom it is expedient to come home early; infinitude is like the adult who wants to stay out at night—and the evening's leave-taking is

enigmatic speech. Sometimes one would like to interpret it as an invitation, persuaded by the night wind as it monotonously repeats itself and searches the forest and fields as if it were looking for something, persuaded by the distant echo of stillness in oneself as if it had a presentiment of something, persuaded by the sublime tranquillity of heaven as if it had been found, and by the audible soundlessness of the dew as if this is the explanation and the refreshment of infinitude, the fruitful visit of the quiet night concealed in the light fog.

In margin: As if one first found rest by remaining out for a nocturnal rendezvous, not with a woman but, womanlike, with the infinite.—JP I 56 (*Pap.* VI B 49) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.237:26-32:

It is an actual incident, and it shows how easy it is to be an observer, and how much reason people have to be angry at such a person for stealing from them, since every human being is for daily use a poetic figure, which the observer steals.

Very likely they were conversing together before I arrived, but I heard the following. In a deeply moved voice, the old man said to the little boy he was holding by the hand: Poor child, now you have left only me, an old man; you no longer have a father, I cannot be that for you. I love you more than anything else, yet the days of my life are soon numbered, and I myself long for rest away from the world. But there is a God in heaven, after whom all fatherliness on earth is called.⁵² He is more your father than both your father and grandfather; keep yourself close to him, he will not leave you. And there is still one name in which there is salvation,⁵³ the name of Jesus Christ; never forget it, and never forget my admonition.—*Pap.* VI B 40:35 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.239:4-241:23:

. because his years were numbered. [VI B 40:36 132] It has certainly happened at times, something that is dreadful to imagine, that death has come to a person who has had something infinitely important to say and robbed him of speech so that he could not say it; but here it was as if death had come and seized the old man, and he had one single person he loved, one single person he wanted to tell what he believed concerned his temporal and

eternal welfare; but the person he was going to talk to was a child, and an old man and a child, they are not, after all, equals who grow up together—they are separated.[VI B 40:36 133]

It is a doubtful matter to make a child promise something like that, or to have a child make an oath like that. Therefore something else happened. I stood there deeply moved by the whole thing; at that moment it seemed to me as if I myself were the young man whom the father was burying with tears, and at the next moment it seemed to me as if I were the child making that sacred promise. Yet I was neither one, and essentially it could not affect me in those ways either.

Now the father went away with the little boy, and I stayed behind, and the impression began to engage me more explicitly. I thought: Here is a task for you. You are tired of life's diversions, tired of girls so that you love them only in passing but do not even feel like following them. Even if Christianity were not such a tremendous phenomenon, no matter whether it ever becomes everything to you or you are offended by it, the grief and grave concern of such a venerable old man, a promise such as that and the request for such a promise, which must move stones, must move you, there must be a property of faith and an enemy power that wants to tear this away from the believer and put something else in its place. Let it be your task, then, to comprehend Christianity as an entrusted good so that it may become really clear what is Christian and what is not. Then you do have something to do, and one should, of course, have something with which to fill one's time, and this at least is not something evil.

The old man had gone; even if I had wanted to initiate him into my thoughts, it was too late. Well, it is not necessary; I do not like shaking hands but do like the quiet initiation of the resolution. The inwardness of spirit does indeed always live as a stranger and an alien in a body. Why, then, the gesture? Like Shakespeare's Brutus, I am thinking: No promises, for the one who promises is, after all, only myself. The old man has never learned that he also made me take an oath. If we ever see each other again, he will learn at once, so I hope, of my promise, and that I have kept it to the best of my ability.

In margin: Just once in my life has an oath been required of me, and then I laughed and said: [VI B 40:36 134] Nonsense, because I suspected the person who asked me for an oath—but while I

laughed I said to myself: Nevertheless you will promise. And this can very well be done; it is a *reservatio mentalis* [mental reservation] in the good sense, perhaps even out of solicitude for the one who asks one for an oath, lest it become ludicrous afterward.—*Pap.* VI B 40:36 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of final copy; see 1.239:37:

. *whereas there is such deep and beautiful truth in what Socrates says to Crito (in *Phaedo*), when in the solemn moment of taking leave he asks with spontaneous intimacy if there is anything the dying one in the moment of departure wishes him to do. Socrates answers: Nothing—only that you attend to your own selves, even if you promise me nothing now; but if you are indifferent to your own selves and do not follow in life the track of what has been set forth now and at other times, then you achieve nothing at all even though you promised ever so much and ever so solemnly. (See para. 115 in *Phaedo*.⁵⁴)—*JP* I 926 (*Pap.* VI B 98:46) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.249:5-8:

. “when the child is to be weaned, the mother blackens her breast,”⁵⁵ and an ethical individual, of course, is not supposed to be a child any longer. Similarly, to recall *Fragments*,⁵⁶ if the god wants to reveal himself in human form and is in the least conspicuous, he deceives, and the relationship does not become one of inwardness, which is truth. But if he looks just like this individual human being, just exactly like any other human being, then he deceives only those who think that getting to see the god has something in common with going to Tivoli.— *Pap.* VI B 40:38 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.249:29-251:6:

But it must not be presented didactically, because in that very moment I would have essentially defined myself in likeness to the deviation of speculative thought; to exist must be made clear not in its conception or in knowledge about it but in inwardness in existence.— *Pap.* VI B 40:39 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.254:21-256:15:

. the ethical pathos to embrace with infinite passion the ethical truth in the inwardness of the individuality.— *Pap.* VI B 40:41 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.259:21-261:29:

At this point lies the religious. It had now become clear to me, and I only waited for the spirit to come over me so that I could, with all possible passion, bring it forth in an existing individuality's inwardness, yet concealed in a deceptive form, which is always the dynamometer of inwardness. What happens? Well, I* actually cut a ridiculous figure, for I am like a failed author whom a fate persecuted—then a book came out.

In margin: * Magister K. and I, in different ways, cut a ridiculous figure.—*Pap.* VI B 40:43 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.262:9-14:

. and now breaks out in poetry; or Joh. de Silentio is a deceptive author who has himself experienced or believed he has experienced this collision, himself exists in this terror's telescopic distance from the universal, and now for a moment seeks relief in this mystification in the form of double-reflection, whereby his meaning and any such thing remain outside, but the impression of such an existing person's suffering is placed as close to existence as possible. Apart from the contradiction that an existing person such as this wants to communicate, then, as has been developed, all direct communication about truth as inwardness is a misunderstanding, a confusion, and therefore every production in these spheres ought to contain the reduplicated repetition of the content in its form.

In margin: Kts “die erhabne Lüge” [the noble lie]

—*Pap.* VI B 40:44 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.262:11:

Whether this is a deception is unknown, whether he himself has experienced or believes that he has experienced this collision, whether he himself, existing in this terror's telescopic distance from the universal and now for a moment seeks relief in this

mystification in the form of double-reflection— —*Pap.* VI B 98:49 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.262:13:

. and the only appropriate thing said about the pseudonymous books.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:50 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.264:27-30:

Later I again found illumination of the meaning of the imaginary construction as the form of communication. [VI B 40:45 135]

If existence [*Existents*] is the essential and truth is inwardness, if it is precisely the dubiousness of speculative thought to have overlooked this, if the misfortune it brings upon people is precisely that life becomes meaningless to them except perhaps for the two years they take to read the system, and even if one has entertained oneself with it for a longer time, it still makes individual existence meaningless to the existing individuality [*existerende Individualitet*] himself—then it is always good that this be said, but then it is also good that it be said in the right way. [VI B 40:45 136] But this right way is the very art that makes being such an author difficult; therefore it pleases me that the pseudonymous authors have overcome the difficulties that I had almost despaired over. If this is communicated in a direct form, then the point is missed; then the reader is led into misunderstanding—he gets something more to know, that to exist [*existere*] also has its meaning, but since he receives it as knowledge and it is communicated to him as knowledge, he keeps right on sitting in the same old thing. [*Essentially the same as 1.249:36-250:11.*] Thus the system, too, is well disposed; it says: Heavens, there is room enough; we can readily take it up into the system.* Alas, yes, in the system there is plenty of room.

*Thus Hamann, for example, comes along in Michelet.⁵⁷ Jacobi is also in a § in the system.⁵⁸—*JP* I 633 (*Pap.* VI B 40:45) *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.265:6-31:

Something about why they use an engagement in connection with the erotic: [VI B 41:2 136] an engagement is dialectical in quite another way than a broken relationship in which the highest is consumed.—The thoughtlessness, the immorality of calling it “a pledge” when a man makes a girl pregnant and then leaves her. Such behavior cannot be dialecticized. Sound common sense informs one that there are at least four crimes here, to make a girl pregnant before one is married, consequently to make a child illegitimate, then to leave her, and then to commit adultery if one becomes involved with someone else. [VI B 41:2 137]—*Pap.* VI B 41:2 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.265:32-38 fn.:

Something about why the pseudonymous authors use marriage particularly to elucidate the ethical.— *Pap.* VI B 41:1 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.266:25-30:

An ordeal is only a transitory element.— *Pap.* VI B 41:3 *n.d.*, 1845

Addition (ultimately omitted) in final copy; see 1.267:25:

.; and if even the clergy do not distinguish themselves by having faith (*fides*), a few clergy distinguish themselves all the more by saying *bona fide* [in good faith] everything they say, that is, without thinking the very least about it, although a few are also speculative.— *Pap.* VI B 98:51 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.267:36-270:15:

The Concept of Anxiety
a bit didactic.

Sin as an existence-qualification.

—*Pap.* VI B 41:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.269:22-25:

The inwardness of sin as anxiety in the existing individuality is the greatest possible distance from the truth when truth is subjectivity.— *Pap.* VI B 41:5 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.269:37-270:15:

Nicolaus Notabene,⁵⁹ a merry chap, perhaps in order to draw attention away from the fact that *The Concept of Anxiety* was a bit didactic.—*Pap.* VI B 41:6 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.270:19-272:31:

Magister Kierkegaard's four most recent upbuilding discourses⁶⁰ took on a certain humorous touch, perhaps as a sign that here what he wanted to achieve was achieved—the humorous is lightly brought about by using immanence and having time wrongly reflect itself in it, so that eternity lies behind. The religious consists in this, that eternity is behind; the essential is this, the humorous consists in this, that time is like a simulated motion.

Seen from my point of view, this is the direct transition to the paradox.

—*Pap.* VI B 41:7 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.273:40 fn.:

That the discourse on Job is different from the others,* is clear enough, and it is always a joy to see a judge like Kts, who strikes home with sureness. [VI B 98:52 186] The basis of the distinction the Magister himself has related to me. In the book *Repetition*,⁶¹ the use of Job was so caught up in passion that it could easily have a disturbing effect on one or another reader accustomed to something more quietly upbuilding in a consideration of the devout man.** Therefore he immediately decided to do his best to keep Job as a religious prototype also for one who is not tried in the extremities of the passions or who would not want this presented as imaginary construction [*experimenterende*]. Therefore the upbuilding discourse⁶² also appeared a few weeks after *Repetition*.

In margin: * without its therefore being a sermon.

In margin: **, even though the psychological and poetic use of Job in that work must be upheld. [VI B 98:52 187]—*Pap.* VI B 98:52 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.274:1-13:

Then I thought: [VI B 41:8 137] Now or never—and then

Fragments,⁶³ which Magister Kierkegaard had the kindness to publish, came out.

Without ever having forgotten that scene at the grave, I was very vividly reminded just then of that venerable old man. Speculative thought has taken a questionable interest in Christianity; it has said that it understood the truth of Christianity. But I have shown above⁶⁴ that, when this is understood more closely, this means that Christianity becomes truth only by way of speculative thought's conception. [VI B 41:8 138] In order to make this really clear, I thought: You must venture the utmost; you must make that attempted presumption become really clear by pretending as if Christianity were a thought-experiment that arose in your head. Every direct attack on speculation leads to nothing—because in the system there is, after all, plenty of room, and so the attack is absorbed into it. No, you must go further than speculation. But in this audacious ironic form against speculation you must take care so that, instead of having something that is very modern, perhaps a new religion, you have what that grieving old man praised as the highest, have the most stringent orthodox form, and have it in such a way that it becomes clear that it is inaccessible to speculation. On the other hand, by means of the form of the imaginary construction, your achievement must be that it is an existing person who asks about it and the matter is placed as close to existence as possible, so that it does not become a little more knowledge a knower can add to his much knowledge but a primitive impression for his existence, which, to repeat again, can never be done directly, since in that case the receiver receives it by way of knowledge, and the matter remains the same old thing.—*Pap.* VI B 41:8 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.275:26-276:23:

With regard to communicating, it is also of importance to be able to take away when the recipient is possibly in the state of knowing too much. One clothes it in an altogether strange way so that he does not recognize it and at the same moment for a short time takes away from him what he knows, because now he does not know it.—*Pap.* VI B 52 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.276:24-277:41 fn.:

. . . The review in the German *Repertorium* (the concluding remark in the review is silly; if *Fragments* had been pure and simple earnestness, it would have been correct, but there is indeed irony in the book—but that does not mean that the book is irony).
— *Pap.* VI B 51 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.278:36-280:11:

That subjectivity, inwardness, is truth is my thesis; that the pseudonymous authors relate themselves to it. . . . —*Pap.* VI B 53:3 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.282:31-36:

. . . . into a rebel against paragraph importance.

Penciled in margin: the pseudonymous authors are *subjective*—
Pap. VI B 53:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.283:6-23:

An apology to the pseudonymous authors for having reviewed them after a fashion; they are right in being unwilling to be reviewed, since they cannot be reported because the form here is so important, and they must rather be satisfied with few readers than with the many who with the help of a review have something to talk about. In connection with Theophrastus's having so many pupils, Zeno said: "His is the larger chorus, mine the more harmonious" (Plutarch on how one may praise oneself in a permissible way, a piece that I have read *just now* with much interest).— *Pap.* VI B 41:9 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.284:18:

The book itself ()

In margin: see journal 207 [*JP* V 5823 (*Pap.* VI A 78)].

—*Pap.* VI B 53:6 *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.284:8-18, 23-41:

William Afham's part (in *Stages*) is so deceptively contrived that it is praise and high distinction to have stupid fussbudgets pass trivial judgment on it and say that it is the same old thing. Yes,

that is just the trick. I never forget the anxiety I myself felt about not being able to achieve what I had once accomplished, and yet it would have been so very easy to choose other names. This is also the reason Afham states that Constantius said that never again would he arrange a banquet, and Victor Eremita, that he would never again speak admiringly of *Don Giovanni*.⁶⁵ But the Judge declares that he can keep on repeating.* As the author himself suggested, wherever it is possible and wherever it is not possible.

*“that only thieves and gypsies say that one must never return where one has once been.”⁶⁶

—JP V 5823 (*Pap.* VI A 78) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.286:3:

. *Either/Or*.*

**Note.* that the same will be said even about the last two-thirds of *Stages* is predicted in the book by Quidam of the imaginary construction and Frater Tac.⁶⁷— *Pap.* VI B 53:9 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.286:27:

Let Oehlenschläger try to rewrite his *Valborg*. As soon as the reading public sees the name Valborg it says: Boring. And now to have to outfit her, rapturously in love, with a completely new vegetation of pathos, while no diversion by way of a new name and other circumstances distract—the poet will surely find out that this matter of the same is very difficult.— *Pap.* VI B 53:10 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.287:27-297:10:

[*Deleted:* A story of suffering; suffering is precisely the religious category] [VI B 41:10 138]

In *Stages* the esthete is no longer a clever fellow frequenting B's living room—a hopeful man, etc., because he is still only a possibility; no, he is existing [*existere*]. [VI B 41:10 139]

“It is exactly the same as *Either/Or*.”

[*Deleted:* Constantin Constantius and the Young Man united in Quidam of the imaginary construction. (Advanced humor.)
as the point of departure for the beginning
of the religious.—

just as the tragic hero was used to show faith.]

Three Stages and yet one Either-Or.— *JP* V 5805 (*Pap.* VI B 41:10) *n.d.*, 1845

*Deleted from margin of first proofs with corrections written in Israel Levin's hand;*⁶⁸ *see* 1.287:28:

N.B. The attached note [*Pap.* VII¹ B 83] belongs to this column—to line 2.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 81:1 *n.d.*, 1846

From first proofs:

For p. 217 [1.287:28] [VII¹ B 83 276]

A note that was not printed because it was prepared later, although it was rough-drafted, and for certain reasons I did not want to change or add the least thing in the manuscript as it was delivered lock, stock, and barrel to Luno the last days of December 1845.

Note. This imaginary construction [*Experiment*] (“ ‘Guilty?’/ ‘Not-Guilty?’ ”) is the first attempt in all the pseudonymous writings at an existential dialectic in double-reflection. It is not the communication that is in the form of double-reflection (for all the pseudonymous works are that), but the existing person himself exists in this. Thus he does not give up immediacy, but he keeps it and yet gives it up, keeps erotic love’s desire and yet gives it up. Viewed categorically, the imaginary construction relates to “The Seducer’s Diary” in such a way that it begins right there where the Seducer ends, with the task he himself suggests: [VII¹ B 83 277] “to poetize himself out of a girl.” (See *Either/Or*, I, p. 470 [KW III 445; SV I 412].) The Seducer is egotism; in *Repetition* feeling and irony are kept separate, each in its representative: the Young Man and Constantin. These two elements are put together in the one person, Quidam of the imaginary construction, and he is sympathy. To seduce a girl expresses masculine superiority; to poetize oneself out of a girl is also a superiority but must become a *suffering* superiority if one considers the relationship between masculinity and femininity and not a particular silly girl. Masculinity’s victory is supposed to reside in succeeding; but the reality [*Realitet*] of femininity is supposed to reside in its becoming a story of suffering for the man. Just as it is morally impossible for Quidam of the imaginary construction to seduce a girl, so it is

metaphysically-esthetically impossible for a seducer to poetize himself out of a girl when it is a matter of the relationship between masculinity and femininity, each in its strength, and not of a particular girl. The Seducer's egotism culminates in the lines to himself: "She is mine; I do not confide this to the stars. . . . not even to Cordelia, but say it very softly to myself."⁶⁹ (See *Either/Or*, I, p. 446 [KW III 424; SV 1392].) Quidam culminates passionately in the outburst: "The whole thing looks like a tale of seduction."⁷⁰ What is a triumph to one is an ethical horror to the other.—JP V 5865 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 83) *n.d.*, 1846

Addition to Pap. VII¹ B 83:

The imaginary construction, however, is precisely what is lacking in *Either/Or* (see note in my own copy);⁷¹ but before it could be categorically correct, an enormous detour had to be made.[VII¹ B 84 277]

The imaginary construction is the only thing for which there existed considerable preliminary work before it was written. Even while I was writing *Either/Or* I had it in mind and frequently dashed off a lyrical suggestion. [VII¹ B 84 278] When I was ready to work it out, I took the precaution of not looking at what I had jotted down in order not to be disturbed. But not a word escaped me, although it came again in a superior rendering. I have now gone through what I had jotted down, and nothing was missing, but if I had read it first, I could not have written it. The imaginary construction is the richest of all I have written, but it is difficult to understand because natural egotism is against adhering so strongly to sympathy.—JP V 5866 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 84) *n.d.*, 1846

Deleted from first proofs; see 1.291:14:

. and thus has achieved in a supreme form what the esthete in *Either/Or* esthetically requested of the gods: "always to have the laughter on his side." (See I, the last diapsalm, p. 30 [KW III 43; SVI 27].)—*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:2 *n.d.*, 1846

From margin of draft; see 1.292:17-294:18:

That Christianity is like this, that it is preceded by humor,

shows how much living out of life it presupposes in order rightly to be accepted. [VI B 53:13 144] Christianity was certainly not proclaimed to children but to the world of superannuated science and art. For this reason the paradox is something else than, say, the marvelous, just as the hope Christianity proclaims is opposed to understanding. But the dialectic of hope goes this way: first the fresh incentive of youth, then the supportive calculation of understanding, and then—then everything comes to a standstill—and now for the first time Christian hope is there as possibility. [VI B 53:13 145] The fact that ecclesiastical chatterboxes have confused this as well as all Christian speech is none of my business.—JP II 1668 (*Pap.* VI B 53:13) *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.292:29) from:

. old woman's twaddle.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:54 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.299:25-27:

If someone were to give an account of Hegel and say that he represents thinking, we would have the right to answer: Well, that says nothing at all; I must have a better idea of which thoughts he represents. So also with inwardness. To say he represents it is to make a fool of oneself and the one under review, for *loquere ut videam* [speak, so that I may see]⁷² applies here, and I have to have an idea of *how* he represents it.—JP II 2115 (*Pap.* VI B 53:16) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.300:2:

. —and an old saying often comes to mind: *si tacuissent, philosophi mansissent* [if they had remained silent, they would have remained philosophers]. And although I usually believe that sufferings and the like can aid inwardness and style, I believe that most assistant professors are so oafish that one could flay them—without torturing an impassioned word out of them.—*Pap.* VI B 53:17 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.301:1) from:

c.

—Pap. VI B 98:56 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.301:5) from:

α.

—Pap. VI B 98:57 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.301:6:

α. *What it Means To Exist. Actuality.* [Changed from: *Possibility Higher than Actuality, Actuality Higher than Possibility.*]

—Pap. VI B 54:2 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.303:30-34:

If it is taken for granted that [*deleted: Hegel*(*)] lacked a sense of the comic, this is *eo ipso* proof that all his thinking is the feat of a talent that has simply followed its talent. The ethical act of reflection is in the last analysis decisive. However great, however glorious everything else is, it does not help. Everything higher than the universal must first have tested itself in the ethical act of reflection, which is the measure of the universal. Briskly to follow a talent, to choose a brilliant distinction, even if one amazes the world ten times over, means to remain behind. Ethical reflection is the authorization; if it is secured, then the distinction is praiseworthy. If a merchant sells yardgoods by the thousands of yards and a poor widow measures out only a single yard once in a while—the decisive thing is the authorized yard that legally makes the sale a lawful sale. Similarly, ethical reflection and going through the universal involved in it first make each human existence a truly beneficial existence. The distinction of talents is in itself a sad affair.

(*) *In margin:* an abstract thinker

—JP I 925 (Pap. VI B 54:3) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.305:6:

Messrs. Prof. Heiberg and Martensen

—Pap. VI B 54:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.305:6:

Thus among us Messrs. Prof. Martensen and Heiberg have. . . .
— *Pap.* VI B 98:58 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.309:26-311:3:

. . . . like what one becomes with the aid of speculative philosophy. Even if all that it says were true, it also turns the existing person into a phantom, a nonsensicality—which no existing person can allow unless it explains itself in greater detail, and as soon as it begins to do that it must embark on a completely different kind of dialectic, upon the Greek, and then we very likely shall agree. It is in the very beginning that one must hold back, there where the thinker ceases to be an existing person in order to think *sub specie aeterni*, and there one merely has to have the courage to be quite humanly simple and dull-witted—then it will be all right.— *Pap.* VI B 54:7 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.312:14-313:17:

. . . . the statement that everything is in motion is an attempt to think motion in the form of rest. Whereas abstract thinking cancels all motion as a matter of course, it holds true for the existing person that passion is the maximum needed in order to hold back, whereas passion itself is in turn the impetus of motion.—*Pap.* VI B 54:8 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.313:26-314:29:

. . . . whereas pure thinking soars by itself in a mystical suspension and wants to answer everything within itself, by which means everything about which there is a real question cannot possibly be answered.— *Pap.* VI B 54:9 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.318:5-18:

That an abstract thinker in our age does not think about such things [existing and abstraction] is irrelevant, but the Greeks were at any rate aware and their skeptical ataraxia was at any rate a serious attempt to abstract from existing [*existere*], completely different from unthinkingly not becoming aware of it at all and continuing to live in this manner because lack of awareness has become habit and custom. [VI B 54:10 147] If I did not exist

[*existere*], my thinking would never add existence [*Existents*]; on the contrary, it subtracts it. The being [*Være*] that specifically is the being of thinking is within possibility, is possibility's representation of actual being, but it is not the being that relates itself as actuality to the whole sphere of abstraction as possibility. [VI B 54:10 148] The annulled being Hegel himself calls essence [*Væsen*], and the medium of thinking is not being but essence.—JP I 1039 (*Pap.* VI B 54:10) *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.318:19) from:

C.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:59 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.318:22:

. aphoristically elucidated*

In margin: **Note.* I here request the reader's attention for an observation I have often wished to make. Do not misunderstand me, as if I fancied myself to be a devil of a thinker who would remodel everything etc. Such thoughts are as far from my mind as possible. I feel what for me at times is an enigmatical respect for Hegel; I have learned much from him, and I know very well that I can still learn much more from him when I return to him again. The only thing I give myself credit for is sound natural capacities and a certain honesty that is armed with a sharp eye for the comic. I have lived and perhaps am uncommonly tried in the *casibus* [cases] of life; in the confidence that an open road for thought might be found there, I have resorted to philosophical books and among them Hegel's. But right here he leaves one in the lurch. His philosophical knowledge, his amazing learning, the insight of his genius, and everything else good that can be said of a philosopher I am as willing to acknowledge as any disciple. —Yet, no, not *acknowledge*—that is too distinguished an expression—willing to admire, willing to learn from him. But it is still no less certain that someone who is really tested in life, who in his need resorts to thinking, will find Hegel comic despite all his greatness.—JP II 1608 (*Pap.* VI B 54:12) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.319:20:

. in the sense of existence.

—JP III 3654 (*Pap.* VI B 54:13) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.321:7-10:

The only actuality that I do not change into a possibility by thinking it is my own, because my actuality *allem meinem Denken zuvorkommt* [precedes all my thinking]; so I do not get hold of my actuality by thinking and only by thinking, an actuality that in turn is preserved essentially not by thinking it but by existing [*existere*].—JP III 3654 (*Pap.* VI B 54:14) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.328:26-27:

The Kantian discussion about an *an sich* [in itself] that thinking cannot get hold of is a misunderstanding occasioned by bringing actuality as actuality into relation with thinking. But to conquer this misunderstanding with the help of pure thinking is a chimeric victory. In the relation between Kant and Hegel it is already apparent how inadequate immanence is.—JP II 2235 (*Pap.* VI B 54:16) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.331:9-35:

. but is indeed existing, and, existing in that way, the person thinking asked about the relation between thinking and being, and philosophy answered something quite different.—*Pap.* VI B 54:17 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.338:26-29:

Self-reflection [*Selv-Reflexion*] was a skepticism; it is overcome in pure thinking. [VI B 54:19 149] But pure thinking is a still more extreme skepticism. Despite all the inwardness of self-reflection, it nevertheless could not forget its relation to actuality in the sense of actuality, its relation to the *an sich* that pursues it. Pure thinking, however, is positive through having taken the whole matter imaginatively into a sphere where there is no relation to actuality at all. Pure thinking does not even dream that it is skepticism—but this itself is the most extreme skepticism. If, without pressing the comparison, one were to compare skepticism with insanity, [*] a person who has a notion of being insane and

whose life goes on amid this conflict is less mad, however, than one who jubilatingly triumphs as the cleverest of all.

[*] *In margin*: And Danish readers will not forget that Poul Møller regarded Hegel as mad.⁷³—JP III 3702 (*Pap.* VI B 54:19) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.343:15:

Very likely what our age needs most to illuminate the relationship between logic and ontology is an examination of the concepts: possibility, actuality, and necessity. It is desirable, however, that the person who would do something along this line would be influenced by the Greeks. The Greek sobriety is seldom found in the philosophers of our day, and matchless ingenuity is only a mediocre substitute. Good comments are to be found in Trendlenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen*, but Trendlenburg was also shaped by the Greeks.—JP I 199 (*Pap.* VI B 54:21) *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.343:16) from:

Y.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:60 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.349:33) from:

δ.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:61 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.353:16-19:

A play by Scribe ends with the masterly retort by a chambermaid, who by saying to each one individually in the play, "I know everything,"⁷⁴ although she herself knows nothing, has carried on the intrigue. [VI B 54:19 150] So?. . . . It looks as if everyone but me knows what I want to say: a modern speculator who has explained the whole of existence can find himself in the same awkward situation that everyone knows to whom his statements refer, and only he does not. [VI B 54:25 151]—*Pap.* VI B 54:25 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.355:29-356:1:

. as infinitely little as an individual existing human being is.—

—*Pap.* VI B 54:26 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.356:38:

What our age needs, if I am to speak shallowly about something I ordinarily do not begin to discuss, is not a new contribution to the system but a subjective thinker who relates himself to existing *qua* Christian just as Socrates related himself to existing *qua* human being. Yet he himself must not be aware that the age needs him or at least not want to be aware of it, for at that very same moment he, too, has steered off course, misled by the world-historical.—*Pap.* VI B 98:62 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.361:1:

d.

—*Pap.* VI B 54:27 *n.d.*, 1845

Marginal note in Israel Levin's hand in first proofs; see 1.361:6:

N.B. The phrase “Division 1” must be set in larger type, not Gothic, but as in the title to Molbech’s pamphlet about Vedel.⁷⁵

—*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:3 *n.d.*, 1846

See 1.363:34:

Infant Baptism can very well stand, but confirmation ought to be postponed to the twenty-fifth year.—JP I 494 (*Pap.* IX A 461) *n.d.*, 1848

From draft; see 1.364:20-367:12:

. categories. [*] All that was lacking was for Hegelian philosophy to have also a visible custom such as Baptism, an act that could be performed with small children; thus one could bring it to the point where babies fourteen days old would be everything—Hegelians as well. And if a person baptized at fourteen days as a Hegelian were to announce himself as a Hegelian, if a watchman, for example, had his child baptized as a Hegelian and then brought the child up to the best of his humble abilities and the child had

no special aptitudes and grew up to become a watchman, too—but also a Hegelian—would this not be ridiculous. Let it be true ten times over that, unlike Hegelian philosophy, Christianity does not consist in differences, that it is Christianity’s holy humanity that it can be appropriated by all—but is this then to be understood to mean that everyone is a Christian automatically?

[*] *In margin*: the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church.— *JP* II 1609 (*Pap.* VI B 54:30) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.366:4:

Moreover, the dubiousness of being a Christian in relation to becoming a Christian will appear to correspond to individual differences: the lethargic individuality will feel tempted to let it be decided; the ardent individuality will feel tempted to give up and renounce Christianity decisively just in order to belong to it in a decisive manner; for the in-between kind, Christianity will become a type of unhappy consciousness that makes existence very difficult for them, even if they do not in turn have the strength to cast off the yoke. This situation is perhaps far more common than one thinks and may be best compared to an unhappy marriage in which one is not happy, but with which one does not have the courage to break because it is a crime, and so consoles oneself with the divorce of death.— *Pap.* VI B 98:63 *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.366:21-31:

Somewhere in the book *Concluding Postscript* I quoted some words of Luther (on the Babylonian captivity). It reads: “*in diesen Sacramenten*,” and without a doubt Luther meant thereby the five Catholic [sacraments]. Now someone rushes forward and protests etc. Well, go ahead. That is just what I wanted. I did not wish to begin a scholarly investigation in the book or use my best weapons. Now a little advantage tempts an honored gentleman, and then I can quote the far more significant lines in the same book that I have noted in my copy (Gerlach’s edition).— *JP* V 5855 (*Pap.* VI A 141) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.367:1:

. old?*

* *Note.* Only with a kind of uncertainty and, so to speak, against my will, I will recall a few words by Luther. I have a continual fear of entering into an everlasting learned quoting to which there can never be an end. Therefore if this sparse quotation should prompt anyone to begin such a thing, I hereby immediately withdraw the quotations and give up appealing to Luther. The first passage is. . . . — *Pap.* VI B 98:65 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.369:1-7:

The pamphlet (*Fragments*) was not didactic, nor is what is written here. [VI B 54:31 152] This is no lecture about Christianity as the truth; I am merely seeking to find a decisive expression for essential Christianity—which certainly can have its significance, inasmuch as in the midst of Christendom we seem to have forgotten what Christianity is.— *Pap.* VI B 54:31 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.369:26:

. . . . —not to decide it.

But I shall now try in another way to clarify the issue itself so that its difficulty becomes properly clear, because the issue already presupposes existence-inwardness and dialectic merely in order to be understood.

Existence-inwardness presupposes the issue in terms of the phrase: an eternal happiness; dialectic in terms of [*in margin:* comprehending the difficulty by] placing it together with a decision in time, which becomes the decision of the eternal happiness. The dialectical difficulties are especially emphasized in the pamphlet (*Fragments*) and therefore I shall not dwell on them any longer.

The much-admired discovery of modern speculative thought was that there is no beyond, that the beyond amounted to doubtful claims that no one honored and thus finally no one made.⁷⁶ If that is the case, it is easy to see what answer can be expected to the issue from that quarter, that the issue itself is an undialectical narrow-mindedness. My response is unchanged if a speculator wants to take the trouble to involve himself with me, and if in that case I may have the honor to ask with whom I have the honor of speaking, whether he is an individual existing human being—in short, take the necessary precautionary measures in order not to

become a fool by talking with a fantastical pure *I-I*. Uncertainty in the world of speculative thought has become great in our day, because fantastical beings are the most dangerous of all to involve oneself with. Next, I will ask him if he will deny that in the N.T. Christianity teaches an eternal happiness [*in margin*: in the next world] and whether in that case he wants to aim his charge of narrow-mindedness against Christianity itself, for I am not propounding but exploring.— *Pap.* VI B 54:32 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.370:7:

Xenophon tells of a young man who wanted to assume the government of the state. Socrates halted him by asking if he had the requisite preparation, if he knew how many ships the state had, etc.⁷⁷ This preparation is of great importance if a mediation between Christianity and speculative thought is to amount to anything; to mediate between speculation and speculation is not so difficult but is rather meaningless.—JP III 3307 (*Pap.* VI B 54:33) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.371:21-372:7:

. in order to seize hold at once of the new generation of children. Let us, then, consider a pagan philosopher who in the man's mature age possessed all of Greek culture. Christianity was proclaimed to him. But the person who proclaimed it to him certainly must have told him what Christianity is and thus made deliberation possible for him. Indeed, the Apostle Paul also says that the believer must be prepared to account for the faith to those who ask about it.⁷⁸— *Pap.* VI B 54:34 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; 1.372:8-375:4, to which the following paragraph is added:

(In the generation contemporary with Christianity there was certitude, for Socrates makes the proper distinction that the person who knows what he knows or knows that he does not know it is on firm ground, and the person who thinks that he knows something he does not know is on shaky ground.⁷⁹ And in the same way Christendom in our day is on shaky ground—very likely because we all are Christians as a matter of course.)— *Pap.* VI B 54:35 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.383:14:

A decision in time of an eternal happiness through relating oneself to something historical—that, then, is the issue—the difficulty of which I shall now show to the best of my ability. [VI B 55:154] I am fully aware that the difficulty must be demonstrated, for otherwise everyone says: “Nothing else, are those the difficulties? What he is talking about is, after all, what everyone talks about, an eternal happiness in the next world after a well-conducted life and the like. No, pure thinking, astronomy, the art of fortification, foreign languages—those, you see, are difficulties.” Undeniably they are indeed difficulties, and bedazzling difficulties, but the trouble is that no one wants to concern himself with the simple thing that has to do with every human being, very likely for fear of getting in bad with every human being. “Does not the simplest of persons also talk about an eternal happiness, and what is the sense of an intelligent person’s wasting his time and energy thinking about such things and then in the end advancing no further than the simplest of persons?” “But neither is it required of him that he shall not advance further, even if it is not understood to mean that he must advance to astronomy and other such things, for if he joins the definitely clear thought to the words that the simplest person also uses—then he nevertheless has always gained something.” The trouble with our age is that it has disdained the inwardness of existence in relation to thought; therefore it pursues the bedazzling. Everyone possesses the art of being able to speak his mother tongue [*essentially the same as 1.83:29-85:16 (Pap. VI A 150)*] art dilettantes.[*] Is it not true, [*essentially the same as 1.85:20-25*] because the one who is being tried is supposed to know how to join the definite thought to this solemnity. Ordinary prattling about solemnity will perhaps please the dilettante and hurt the good listener, because he despairs of succeeding. [VI B 55:155] Ordinary church solemnity is a counterpart to the stiffness and obtuseness that prevail at funerals. How is it that the pastor who preaches can hold a certain abstract idea that this is normal, that one is solemn in precisely the right way in God’s house (which a good churchgoer knows is far from happening every time, and an infrequent churchgoer is perhaps not devout but is only sensuously affected, amazed), that one is in a festive mood on the great festival days etc.—in short, that in God’s house it is quite normal

that those assembled there are almost not human beings but saints—to what is this due other than that the pastor thinks only momentarily** about some definite theme but does not himself exist in his thinking, for in that case he would be altogether differently informed about how the most different things crisscross. If he is supposed to talk about spiritual trial, about human imperfection, he knows how to throw something together momentarily, but he has completely forgotten this when he talks about solemnity in God's house, where those who are present are nevertheless imperfect human beings.—I shall take another example from the godly discourse again, for this still may be closest to existing. Through a casual contact [*essentially the same as 1.86-87 (Pap. VI A 152)*].

—Pap. VI B 55 n.d., 1845

[*] *In margin Note.* But if a man sat apart there by himself (spiritually understood), troubled that in this moment of worship he would fail to become devout, that perhaps a certain anxiety about the terrible possibility of failure would indeed make him fail, so that he could easily be tempted to stay away from God's house that day, but yet he went—in short, a person being tried— nothing is preached about him.

In margin of Pap. VI B 55:

** *Note.* That what it means to exist is a protest against pure thinking, that an existing person's thinking cannot gain the eternal continuity was shown under *a*, but to think momentarily is something else, and to understand about the continual varying of subject matter, one thinks now about one thing and now about another and does not hold the one thought fast in the passionately strenuous existence in it.— *Pap. VI B 56 n.d., 1845*

Continuation of Pap. VI B 55: see 1.385:3-8:

To grasp the difficulty of the issue requires two things: (a) *an actual conception of what an eternal happiness means*;* (c) *The thought-passion to be able to grasp the dialectical contradiction that this is decided in time through relation to something historical. . . .*[VI B 57:156]

In margin: *(b) the dialectical difficulty of expecting an eternal happiness. . . .

—Pap. VI B 57 n.d., 1845

Everyone possesses the art of being able to speak his mother tongue; there are words in this mother tongue that express the highest things. Inasmuch, then, as every native-born person can speak the language, he can also say the word. On the other hand, if the sage uses the same word, it looks momentarily as if he had wasted his life by not having advanced beyond it. But the person who is very ingenious in listening when people are speaking also discovers what a fraud takes place when definite thoughts are not attached to the words, a fraud that does not disclose itself if we merely listen to the separate words but shows itself immediately if we hear the words together with others. The simplest person is able to say: There is a God; and a child names the name of God, yet it is not perceived that it would be a task requiring a thinker's utmost effort to attach a definite thought to the word. I could easily write reams if I wanted to give examples of how people talk in such a way that their own words testify that they think nothing. I now take an example from devotional discourse. In the same sense as a general impression is associated with the idea of a forest, a theater, a fort, a prison, so the idea of quiet repose full of solemnity and devotion is immediately linked to the idea of the house of God. This is as it should be. For a score of years now I have heard and read sermons and have never found any other kind of talk than this: "The congregation here assembled now rests in a devotional peace of mind." But the person who is very much occupied with the religious, who perhaps reads a sermon every day, goes to church every Sunday, may also have been distracted—yes, not only this, but according to the law that spiritual trial [*Anfægtelse*] increases proportionately to religious inwardness, he perhaps has been most disturbed of all when he counted on having peace of mind in this holy place, most disturbed because he himself was so fearful of becoming disturbed (a completely unthinking person is usually free from spiritual trial). [VI A 150 63] Conversely, a man who enters a church now and then will be seized by a sensuous, esthetic impression in which the unfamiliar plays an essential role, and thus he will be solemn. He will therefore understand perfectly what the pastor says about solemnity. On the other hand, the person who is being tried, who

at times does not succeed in getting properly in tune, will struggle and listen and listen, and when he listens and reads year in and year out but never hears anything except that one is solemn—he will feel abandoned, perhaps despairingly regard himself as trash. Who, then, is really being preached to?—Only God knows. Esthetically it holds that the less frequent, the more solemn. For example, I love the Danish woods—but for that very reason I would never live in a wooded area. If I had to live there and be there every day, there would be days and times when it would not seem so beautiful to me, times when I would become despondent because at some time it did appear beautiful to me, and it would seem as if I had lost both it and myself. Therefore if the pastors want to be consistent, they ought to recommend going to church as infrequently as possible. If, on the other hand, I occupy myself *every day* with the religious (which the pastor does mention now and then), something very grievous may happen to me, and yet I am supposed to struggle through. Here is where the pastor's task begins. He is not supposed to preach to art dilettantes and let it come to the point that a man sitting there alone, spiritually understood, concerned because he has not managed to feel devotional during the time of devotions—that he then shall also be excluded from the sermon.—Is it not true, then, that there is and is supposed to be solemnity in God's house? Yes, of course. And although every bungling preacher can say, "How solemn!"—is the most experienced preacher not supposed to venture to say something else—and yet there should be an infinite difference between what they say, because the experienced preacher will understand what predicates to use in order to say what is needful for the one being spiritually tried. [VI A 150 64] An experienced preacher preaches for those being spiritually tried; a preacher who relates himself to the religious only on Saturday night will best satisfy the people who go to church only a few times a year. The ordinary preacherly, ecclesiastical solemnity is theatrical scenery and has a theatrical effect, a parallel to the formality that prevails at funerals.—How does this solemnity come about unless the pastor who is preaching maintains a certain abstract idea about what is normal, so that a person is solemn in just the proper way in God's house, yes, even in a special way according to the particular festival day (which is not often achieved, as is known by a tried listener)—in short, what usually goes on in God's house is

such that those assembled are almost not human beings but saints, that is, art dilettantes who manage to feel solemn by going to church infrequently. On Saturday night the pastor thinks about this theme or that, does not himself exist [*existere*] in his thinking, for then he would be quite differently informed. If he is going to preach about spiritual trial, about human frailty, he scrapes together a few points (for in a curious way there is always something true in the peasants' superstition that the pastor has a book—not Cyprianus,⁸¹ however, but a handbook for pastors, just as in Germany there is even a handbook for lovers). But this he forgets completely when he speaks about solemnity in the house of God, where imperfect people nevertheless also come.— *JP* III 3467 (*Pap.* VI A 150) *n.d.*, 1845

The preacher says: It is good to be here in God's house. Would that we could remain here, but we must go out again into the confusion of life! Lies and nonsense! The most difficult thing of all would be to remain day after day inside God's house. The listener gets the impression that the trouble lies in the confusion of the world and not in the listener himself.— *JP* III 3468 (*Pap.* VI A 151) *n.d.*, 1845

Through a casual contact, by reading a book, or in some other accidental way, it occurs to a pastor just as he is going to ponder a sermon Saturday evening that the hymn singing, the chanting of the liturgy, and other related matters have great significance, that so often the congregation handles them shabbily. So he preaches about that; he warns against neglecting that part of the service; he complains that for the most part people come to church only to hear the sermon; he appeals to his own experience, that people come to church late, etc. So he has preached about that. What happens? Two weeks later someone gets the idea that what the age really needs is a new hymnbook since the congregation cannot possibly find edification in the official hymnbook. Our pastor immediately goes along, and now it is clear to him that this is a long and deeply felt need. Two weeks earlier it was he himself who observed that it was a bad habit for people to come so late, a bad habit that had a basis quite different from dissatisfaction with the official hymnbook. This is altogether forgotten. Our preacher thinks only of the immediate moment; otherwise he would have to say: No, wait—let us first get people to come to church and sing

hymns, and then we can always see if a profound need shows up, for the development of a long-felt need involves a long view; but to say that the same congregation that is indifferent to the divine service as a whole, except *höchstens* [at best] for the sermon, feels a need for a new hymnbook, feels a deep need for a new hymnbook—this is preacher-prattle.—JP III 3469 (*Pap.* VI A 152) *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.386:7-387:8:

How many people have any idea of their eternal happiness? What energetic perseverance it takes not to relinquish [the idea of an eternal happiness] and to risk offering resistance under this responsibility; [what energetic perseverance it takes] to wrestle alone with God and to risk wanting to scale it down.—JP IV 4537 (*Pap.* VI B 19:9) *n.d.*, 1844-45

From draft; see 1.391:27:

., well-brought up children*

In margin: *Note. And yet it is already a great thing that the eternal happiness is on the same level as such priceless goods; soon it perhaps will be knocked down into a class with butter and cheese, salami, and other delicatessen wares of which the household makes a purchase now and then.—*Pap.* VI B 58:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.391:28:

Note. And it is already a great thing that it ranks in a class with such priceless goods; soon it probably will be knocked down into a class with butter, cheese, salami, and delicatessen wares of which the household makes a purchase now and then; or it will go so far that when someone uses this phrase one looks at him, amazed and quizzical—whether what he names is something to eat or to wear.—*Pap.* VI B 98:66 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.397:1-399:13:

. and so also with the eternal—a little introductory study of enthusiasm is in order—but then one must have certainty.—*Pap.* VI B 58:5 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.399:17:

. (to refer to the third of the Sophist Gorgias's theses⁸²)
—*Pap.* VI B 58:6 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.402:21-406:13:

I willingly concede, however, the dubious character of the monastic movement, for it went too far in externalizing what ought to be inward; but then, instead of comprehending the dubiousness and rejoicing in the truth, to get mediation established in the place of honor makes a poor solution.—*JP* III 2749 (*Pap.* VI B 58:8) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.407:2-408:31:

The highest moment of decision, when the individual gains his absolute orientation toward the absolute τέλος [end, goal], is not an *überschwenglich* [superabundant] moment from which life must subtract but a maximum that life is, if possible, continually to come to express.

—*Pap.* VI B 58:9 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.412:6:

Note. It must be remembered that when falling in love is not the absolute τέλος [end, goal], the wife must be reconciled to her husband's speaking like this: "Yes, my little Mother, you really will have to reconcile yourself to my also being councilor and flute player etc.—and then your husband." And she dare not complain about any high treason. But it is high treason to speak about the absolute τέλος this way, because the absolute τέλος, indeed, what I am about to say now even a syllogizer such as Cousin Charles in Scribe can grasp when he says: Either one has an uncle or one has no uncle⁸³—either the absolute τέλος is the absolute τέλος or it is not the absolute τέλος, and then it is mediated.—*Pap.* VI B 58:10 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.418:13:

. —as one is at times also tempted to ask oneself whether it is a pastor who steps forward and bows or one of those in the

barrel organ that bows with the collection hat. —Pap. VI B 98:67 n.d., 1845

From final copy; see 1.418:37:

. (see Flögel, *Geschichte der comischen Literatur*, IV, p. 198⁸⁴).— Pap. VI B 98:68 n.d., 1845

See 1.428:12-14:

The Dialectic of Community or Society Is as Follows:

(1) the individuals who relate to each other in the relation are individually inferior to the relation. [VII¹A20 11]

Just as the separate members of the body are inferior to the body; the particular heavenly bodies in the solar system.

(2) the individuals who relate to each other in the relation are individually equal in relation to the relation.

Just as in earthly love each one is a separate entity, but the need for the relationship is the same for both.

(3) the individuals who relate themselves to each other in the relation are individually superior to the relation. [VII¹A 20 12]

As in the highest form of religion. The individual is primarily related to God and then to the community, but this primary relation is the highest, yet he does not neglect the second.

See also *Concluding Postscript*, p. 327 [1.428]—that the task is not to move from the individual to the race but from the individual through the race to reach the individual.

See an article by Dr. Bayer, “*Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft*” (in Fichte’s journal, 1844, XIII, p. 80⁸⁵). His tripartition is: *Beziehung, Bezug, Einheit* [connection, relation, unity]. (See pp. 80 and 81.)— *JP* IV 4110 (Pap. VII¹ A 20) n.d., 1846

Underlined in copy of Postscript; see 1.428:12-14:

. *since it knows that the task is not to move from the individual to the race but from the individual through the race (the universal) to reach the individual.*—Pap. VII¹ A 249:3 n.d., 1846

Underlined in copy of Postscript; see 1.428:28-29:

The merit of the religious discourse is in making the way difficult
. —Pap. VII¹ A 249:4 n.d., 1846

From draft; see 1.431:12-14:

The basis and meaning of suffering: [*deleted: dying to immediacy and*] that a person is capable of nothing at all himself, dying to immediacy and yet remaining in the finite.—JP III 3739 (Pap. VI B 59:2) n.d., 1845

From final copy; see 1.436:36:

. (in the middle of Christendom, in the middle of enlightenment [*Oplysning*], there is pointless [*i en Lygte*] preaching)

—Pap. VI B 98:69 n.d., 1845

Deleted from draft; see 1.451:14-25:

I will still emphasize a *confinium* [border territory] of the religious, a psychological collision (see journal, p. 209 [JP IV 4590; Pap. VI A 80]).

—Pap. VI B 59:9 n.d., 1845

From draft; see 1.455:27-29:

. and between them there is, if I may say so, a devil of a difference.—Pap. VI B 59:10 n.d., 1845

From draft; see 1.457:7-19:

. —well, they are obtuse. They have lost imagination, and that is why they, by seeing everything only to a certain degree, have a remedy for everything. But this is nothing but obtusity.—Pap. VI B 60:1 n.d., 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.457:19:

In margin: Note. Rightly understood by worldly wisdom, the illusion of immediacy cannot become comic, for it is higher than all sagacity, and insofar as a religious speaker dares to do it, it is

only by virtue of the higher illusion of religiousness.— *Pap.* VI B 98:70 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.458:10-460:3:

Insofar as the religious address is confused with worldly wisdom or with the doctrine of calculation and results, it is to be regarded as an estheticizing lecture on the ethical. [VI B 60:2 159] In a strict sense it is not even ethical, much less religious. It is by no means my opinion that a religious speaker should make light of what he in so many ways must naturally be occupied with; but he should never dare to forget the totality-category of his sphere, and that this is what he should use and have with him throughout, however mildly he admonishes the happy one that the religious lives within a person and that suffering will also come if he is religious, and speaks likewise to the unhappy one. But if he becomes so complexly involved in the traffic of finitude that he forgets suffering as essentially different from the dialectic of fortune and misfortune, then he also transforms the church, if not into a robber's den then into a stock-exchange building. But why is it that the religious address in these times treats fortune, misfortune, duty, the seven last Commandments, uses the name of God and of Christ—and almost never draws attention to spiritual trials [*Anfægtelse*]? Spiritual trial belongs to the inwardness of religiousness, and inwardness belongs to religiousness; spiritual trial belongs to the individual's absolute relation to the absolute τέλος. [VI B 60:2 160] What temptation [*Fristelse*] is outwardly, spiritual trial is inwardly. I shall venture an imaginary psychological construction.—JP I 634 (*Pap.* VI B 60:2) *n.d.*, 1845

Underlined in copy of Postscript; see 1.458:18-21:

Although I ordinarily concern myself with religious address *only insofar as this is the organ of the religious life-view*, I can **in passing** still consider its *factual nature in our day*. . . . —*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:5 *n.d.*, 1846

From draft; see 1.461:20-462:4:

. . . . and the jest becomes manifest to the religious person himself when in the external world it begins to look as if he were

capable of something.— *Pap.* VI B 60:3 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.466:11:

..... or to be in the service of vanity and worldliness with special-occasion pastries at* funerals and weddings—

In margin: *ten rix-dollar

—*Pap.* VI B 98:71 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.478:26:

..... or a ring in his nose.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:72 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.479:8:

When a child becomes tired on the road and there is no carriage to be had, one is really in a fix. I have, however, seen a practical father find a way out: he suggested that the little fellow ride on Papa's cane—now he went giddap in a gallop! The child was no longer tired.—*Pap.* VI B 98:74 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from draft; see 1.488:7-11:

for p. 1 of *provisional copy*.

..... here I shall not dwell on how the ethical (which is already somewhat distanced from the absolute God-relationship) must intervene regulatively and take command. This is not the interest of my task; I am not dealing with that part—this is why I use the foreshortened perspective.— *Pap.* VI B 64 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.489:5-13:

Knowledge can in part be set aside, and one can then go further in order to collect new; the natural scientist can set aside insects and flowers and then go further, but if the existing person sets aside the decision in existence, it is *eo ipso* lost, and he is changed.— *Pap.* VI B 66 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.491:21-38:

The time the disciples fell asleep in Gethsemane. Yes, the person

who has no other association than with bedfellows may easily find it quite all right to sleep; but the person who associates with an eternal, for him sleep is here again a terrifying matter.— *Pap.* VI B 63:2 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.503:15:

. want [*deleted*: teasingly] to bring out only the one side,
[*deleted*: something I have frequently had to remedy]

—*Pap.* VI B 98:76 *n.d.*, 1845

From final copy; see 1.505:30:

Deleted: Note. Yet the humorist has an inwardness that is undialectical and is only the nearest approximation to the dialectical inwardness of religiousness. The spheres are ordered in relation to the dialectical development of inward deepening, and to the degree an individual keeps himself on the outside, fortifies himself against it or even partially fortifies himself, to the same degree his religiousness is less. The inwardness of the immediate person is externality; he has his dialectic outside himself. The ironist is already turned inward in the exercise of the consciousness of contradiction. The ethicist is turned inward, but the development of inwardness is self-affirmation against himself; he strives with himself but does not remain dialectical to the end because he has fortified himself in a possibility by which he conquers himself. Humor is turned inward in the exercise of the absolute contradiction, is not without the inwardness of suffering, but still has so much of an undialectical self left that in the shifting it sticks its head up like a nisse and raises laughter; the inwardness of religiousness is a crushing of the self before God.—*JP* II 2116 (*Pap.* VI B 98:77) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.515:19-24 fn.:

—Likewise when a little child says to a child who is perhaps a half year younger: Come, now, my little lamb. The child has heard its mother say this, but the contradiction is in the relativity the little one wants to claim in relation to the other little one, within which they are both small.

In margin: This is also sad, and one smiles more because of that.

From draft; see 1.516:27-42 fn.:

. —therefore one laughs at a drunken man. It is the contradiction of motion. Thus even that which otherwise prevents laughter expressly produces it: a man who despite his prosperity ordinarily goes around dressed with a shocking simplicity is laughed at—but when he finally is properly dressed up for once, he is also laughed at.— *Pap.* VI B 70:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.518:20-35 fn.:

When, out in the cemetery, one reads an inscription on a gravestone, a man who is mourning in verse his lost little daughter but finally bursts forth in the line: Take comfort, reason, she lives, signed Hilarius, Slagtermester [Butcher]—this is very comic. First, the name itself (Hilarius) in this connection produces a comic effect, then the position: butcher, and finally the outburst: reason! That it could occur to a philosophy professor to confuse himself with reason can pass, but it will not come off for a butcher.— *Pap.* VI B 70:10 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.518:42-519:17:

The immorality does not lie in the laughing but rather in the indefiniteness and the titillation in the laughing, when one does not really know whether to laugh or not and one is thereby prevented from repenting of having laughed in the wrong place.— JP II 1746 (*Pap.* VI B 70:13) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.519:20:

And this I know from my own experience, that my sense of the comic seldom disturbs me now when I do not want to see the comic, and I also know that because I have been attentive to myself I have more often repented of having laughed in the wrong place.— *Pap.* VI B 98:78 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.519:30-34:

Thus there may be someone who is able to be comically

productive only in flippancy and excessive mirth. If one were to say to him: Remember, you are ethically responsible for your use of the comic, and he took time to understand this, his *vis comica* [comic power] perhaps would cease—that is, it would be unauthorized, without the direct implication that he actually did harm with it while he used it.—*JP* II 1746 (*Pap.* VI B 70:14) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.519:36-43:

In contrast to the flippancy and wantonness (as productive) and ambiguity and sense-titillation (as receptive) of shrill laughter [stands] the quiet transparency of the comic. [VI B 70:15 165] A person ought to practice laughing not in connection with the objects of his antipathetic passions but in connection with the objects of his gentleness and consideration, that which he knows he cannot totally lose, the area where he is protected by the opposition of all his emotions against the indefinite, the selfish, the titillating. [VI B 70:15 166]—*JP* II 1746 (*Pap.* VI B 70:15) *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.545:16) from:

. little atomistic duckweed.

—*Pap.* VI B 98:80 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.551:25:

Note. Since with regard to the little bit that I know I have made it my principle to show definitely which is which, or show definitely why it cannot definitely be shown, I shall once again do it here in a note, although I know very well and with considerable definiteness that it is thankless work to occupy oneself with such things in which one perhaps very slowly acquires proficiency and steadiness, whereas everyone as a matter of course has an opinion about the same, in which consequently, humorously enough, the difference between the most advanced person and a garrulous person is negligible, since they both talk about the same thing, about the humorous, the ironic, while the person who occupies himself with Hebrew, with astronomy etc. is freed from all the fraternization of the uninitiated. Consequently when that remark .

. . . . —*Pap.* VI B 71:3 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.555:6:

.because the relativity rests upon a nothing.

—*Pap.* VI B 71:4 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.555:6-11:

For the passage: it is comic when the basis
of the comparative goodness is the total guilt.

If the reason for the movement is something firm, it is not comic, but if the reason for it is downfall, all this running is actually comic: the contradiction is that despite all movement and all movement away from the specific site one never escapes the totality.

for example, on a sinking ship

—*Pap.* VI B 72 *n.d.*, 1845

From ms. of The Book on Adler; see 1.556:27:

Note. On this matter, I refer the reader to Johannes Climacus, *Concluding Postscript*, to the distinction between Religiousness A and B, or that which has the dialectical in first place and that which has the dialectical in second place also. —*Pap.* VII² B 235, p. 200 *n.d.*, 1846-47

From final copy; see 1.559:9:

Deleted in margin: and in this case the Incarnation would have direct analogies in the incarnations of paganism; whereas the distinction is: incarnation as man's invention and Incarnation as coming from God.—*JP* II 1344 (*Pap.* VI B 98:81) *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.567:31-569:30:

Hugo de St. Victor states a correct thesis (Helfferrich, *Mystik*, Vol. I, p. 368⁸⁶): [X² A 354 256] "Faith is really not supported by the things that go beyond reason, by any reason, because reason does not comprehend what faith believes; but nevertheless there is something here by which reason becomes determined or is conditioned to honor the faith that it still does not perfectly

succeed in grasping.”

This is what I have developed (for example, in *Concluding Postscript*) —that not every absurdity is the absurd or the paradox. The activity of reason is to distinguish the paradox negatively—but no more.

In an earlier journal or in loose papers [*Pap.* VI A 17, 19] from an earlier time (when I read Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*) I was of the opinion that a Christian art of speaking should be introduced in place of dogmatics. It ought to relate itself to πίστις [belief, confidence, faith]. πίστις in the classical Greek means the conviction (more than δόξα, opinion) that relates itself to probability. But Christianity, which always turns the concepts of the natural man upside down and gets the opposite meaning out of them, relates πίστις to the improbable.

This concept of improbability, the absurd, ought then to be developed, for it is nothing but superficiality to think that the absurd is not a concept, that all sorts of absurdities belong equally under the absurd. [X² A 354 257] No, the concept of the absurd is precisely to grasp the fact that it cannot and must not be grasped. This is a negatively determined concept but is just as dialectical as any positive one. The *absurd*, the *paradox*, is composed in such a way that reason has no power at all to dissolve it in nonsense and prove that it is nonsense; no, it is a symbol, a riddle, a compounded riddle about which reason must say: I cannot solve it, it cannot be understood, but it does not follow thereby that it is nonsense. But, of course, if faith is completely abolished, the whole sphere is dropped, and then reason becomes conceited and perhaps concludes that, ergo, the paradox is nonsense. What concern there would be if in another realm the skilled class were extinct and then the unskilled found this thing and that to be nonsense—but in regard to the paradox faith is the skilled. It believes the paradox, and now, to recall the words of Hugo de St. Victor, reason is properly determined to honor faith, specifically by becoming absorbed in the negative qualifications of the paradox.

Generally it is a basic error to think that there are no negative concepts; the highest principles of all thinking or the proofs of them are certainly negative. Human reason has boundaries; that is where the negative concepts are to be found. Boundary disputes are negative, constraining. But people have a rattle-brained,

conceited notion about human reason, especially in our age, when one never thinks of a thinker, a reasonable person, but thinks of pure reason and the like, which simply does not exist, since no one, be he professor or what he will, is pure reason. Pure reason is something fantastical, and the limitless fantastical belongs where there are no negative concepts, and one understands everything like the sorcerer who ended by eating his own stomach.—*JP* I 7 (*Pap.* X² A 354) *n.d.*, 1850

Deleted from final copy; see 1.577:32:

Note. And the difficulty involved in the miracle of creation as something happening to an existing person is thrust aside as much as possible by being baptized as a child. The thinking probably goes something like this: An infant of eight days is scarcely an existing being [*Tilværende*], and if by being baptized it becomes a Christian (at an age when usually it is hardly looked upon as a human being), all difficulties are over. But this reasoning is not the paradox; it is much, much easier to show that it is nonsense. It attempts to thrust becoming a Christian so far back esthetically that to be born and to become a Christian amount almost to the same thing. And the dark discourse about a grown person's becoming a child again is cozily exchanged for a little very charming flattery and baby talk about an eight-day infant's superabundant meritoriousness in being an infant of eight days, not a bit older.—*JP* III 3086 (*Pap.* VI B 98:82) *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.579:8:

I heard a pastor preaching about a miracle, who, in order to make the report of it credible, first developed that the disciples had seen it with the eyes of faith, but then, doubting the credibility of the argument himself, concentrated all his mimetic gifts, his eloquence, and perspiring efforts on the last point—that they had even seen it with their physical eyes. [VI B 98:83 191] His Right Reverend Sir seemed to think that the certainty of the physical senses is higher than that of faith (it was already confused enough) even in relation to a miracle, which is dialectically and diametrically against the senses—it was good he said “Amen”; it was the best thing he said, for he actually seems to be just as well informed about Christianity as Per Degn about the Greek language,

who at one time knew the entire Our Father in Greek but now could only remember that the last word was “Amen.”⁸⁷ [VI B 98:83 192] It will finally end with making this the definition of a sermon: it is a discourse by a pastor that ends with the word “Amen.”— *Pap.* VI B 98:83 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from final copy; see 1.581:23:

One can also regard the matter in another way, and willing as I always will be to admit that until now my writings have had no influence or importance, I am also inclined to console myself with the consideration that they still possibly could have it, and that judgment has not already been made upon them—by having satisfied the demand of the times.— *Pap.* VI B 98:84 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of final copy; see 1.591:11-18:

It is the idea of womanliness and childlikeness; it is the lovely meeting between the generations at the moment the one becomes conscious of setting the other aside. When the vague cravings of youth are over, when they come to a halt in maturity and the eternal shines back in existence, then mother love and father love understand themselves in religiousness. —*Pap.* VI B 98:85 *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.593:31-604:10:

Christmas is certainly a real children’s festival, and the whole pandering concept of the advantages of childhood in regard to becoming a Christian has its stronghold in this holiday with all its spurious emotionality and sentimentality. Please note that the Christmas festival was first introduced in the fourth Christian century and that it did not occur at all to the earlier Christians to do this. The culmination of their life-view was that death is birth unto life.

Regarding the historical aspects of this, see Lisco’s *Kirchenjahr*, I, p. 9, para. 17-18.⁸⁸

But, as I have said in *Concluding Postscript*, everything Christian has been dislocated by this *orthodox* sentimentality.—*JP* I 566 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 161) *n.d.*, 1846

See 1.593:31-604:10:

In margin: N.B.[IX A 460 263]

Without a doubt Johannes Climacus is right in everything he says about the sentimentality of this so-called childlike Christianity. The Christmas celebration is really a heresy—that is, as it is now observed. [IX A 460 264] It goes together with the whole enormous illusion of an established Christendom. How reassured I am (for I have long had a suspicion in this direction but have not quite dared to express it) that the Christmas festival first came into existence in the third and fourth centuries—and as a substitute for a pagan festival.— *JP* I 569 (*Pap.* IX A 460) *n.d.*, 1848

Deleted from draft; see 1.595:36-596:3:

For example: the error of transforming faith into a genius-differential in order to jack up the price in that way.⁸⁹— *Pap.* VI B 77 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.596:38-597:22:

. then Christianity is not the paradox, then Christianity is humankind's own idea, since this is humor.— *Pap.* VI B 74:6 *n.d.*, 1845

Folded page corner in copy of Postscript; see 1.597:16-598:17.

—*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:6 *n.d.*, 1846

From draft; see 1.598:8:

. , something that seems to be that but yet is not, for otherwise the paradox is a direct paradox.— *Pap.* VI B 74:7 *n.d.*, 1845

Changed in final copy (see 1.599:13) from:

big dunce

—*Pap.* VI B 98:86 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft, see 1.599:21-600:17:

. about whom even the prophet foretold; there was nothing in him for the eye, so despised that we regarded him as nothing, indeed, that we regarded him as punished, stricken, and smitten by God (Isaiah 53:2,3,4).— *Pap.* VI B 74:8 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.603:11:

Suppose the humorist to be childhood's unhappy lover or happy in recollection, and every humorist knows about that—but the Christian is turned forward.— *Pap.* VI B 78 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from draft; see 1.613:4-7:

I do not deny that I am a great friend of people, but an even greater friend of laughter.— *Pap.* VI B 74:11 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.614:37-39:

. because the person who states it directly betrays himself, that is, it must be said indirectly, and thereby all cheating is prevented, and all later rattling off at seventh hand.— *Pap.* VI B 82 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.615:35-38 fn.:

Note. Thus it would not be at all inconceivable that in a turbulent time, when a government is compelled to take strong measures against agitators, a man could be executed for the opinion that the country needed a changed form of government, a constitution, whereas the man actually had no opinion at all on this matter or had never given such matters a thought.—*Pap.* VI B 74:13 *n.d.*, 1845

From sketch; see 1.617:1-3:

Revocation
Johannes Climacus and His Reader

In margin: This little appendix should contain the humorous revocation—since all humor is revocation.— *Pap.* VI B 83:1 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.617:1-3:

*An Understanding with the Reader.
Johannes Climacus and the Reader.*

—Pap. VI B 86:1 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.617:25:

From the foregoing, the reader [*deleted*:, [VI B 83:2 170] and [if I] still [have] any on this last page,] will recall that there were two events in my life that made me decide to be an author: first, that out there in the café in Frederiksberg I came to realize that I had to see about making something difficult in order also to do something, and then the scene in the cemetery* that decisively turned my attention to Christianity. [VI B 83:2 171] The whole. . .

In margin: *a few months later

—Pap. VI B 83:2 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of draft; see 1.618:34-619:24:

Let no one bother to appeal to me, because whoever appeals to me has *eo ipso* misunderstood me.

Even less let no one bother to attack me*—because I say it beforehand that I revoke everything. What a person has done for his own pleasure should not cause him trouble.** If, for example, the censor takes it into his head to cross out something, just the least little bit, then I revoke the whole book, and just as someone when he intends to go for a drive one day and there is a threat of rain, thinks, “It isn’t worth the trouble,” and stays home and saves his money—this is how I think and I revoke the book. I can well understand that a person who writes a book that has importance may prefer to change the particular passage and then have the whole book published, but since I do it only for my own pleasure why should I? Pleasure is the first consideration. If he is going to spend money, he must also have pleasure from it; if he does not have it, then he must at least have the pleasure of saving his money.

*in a way that will oblige me to answer even less than by pursuing me with the law and legal action.

**and I do not feel the slightest disposition or inclination in me

to become a martyr or resemble such a one in the least. If it should happen that I should be executed as a martyr, one can be sure that it is indeed not my fault, for I revoke everything.— *Pap.* VI B 83:3 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.619:4-24:

For “*An Understanding with the Reader*”
. above all that no vehemence befalls the book, so that a monster, a party-liner [*essentially the same as 1.619:6-20*].

The only lack would be that a party-liner would appeal to me in such a way that I would be carried off and would be executed. But it is extremely impossible that I could become a martyr and be executed for an opinion, I who simply have no opinion and who continually revoke on page three what was said on the previous two pages insofar as anyone would think that it was my opinion.

I desire no proof from actuality that I actually have an opinion (an adherent, cheers, being executed, etc.), because I have no wish at all to have any opinion.— *Pap.* VI B 87 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from margin of final copy; see 1.619:4-24:

Above all, I protest in advance against all vehemence, anyone’s appealing to the book so that by his quoting in these religiously unsettled times I could become the object of attack, perhaps even of prosecution. [VI B 98:87 192] In that case, I revoke everything. Through earnest self-examination, I am convinced that I do not have the slightest disposition, fitness, or urge to become a martyr or in the remotest way to resemble such a one. If it is already disturbing to have importance, to have it in such a way is really too offensive. [VI B 98:87 193] If it should nevertheless happen that I am executed as a martyr, one can be sure that it is definitely not my fault.—*Pap.* VI B 98:87 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.620:9-621:3:

. the reader.*[VI B 83:4 171]

*and only the positive is an intervention in another’s personal freedom; the negative is the courtesy that refrains from calling a single actual person one’s reader.

In margin: still less wants to inconvenience a whole reading

public, which, even if it never regrets the inconvenience because the books are so very important, still ought to be considered a fully occupied public that one ought not inconvenience in vain. [VI B 83:4 172]— *Pap.* VI B 83:4 *n.d.*, 1845

Deleted from draft; see 1.620:36:

Neither can I perceive why anyone can be so eager to participate in the administration of the state. [VI B 88:174] In my opinion, if anyone wants to do it, I am indeed happy, and one of my secret anxieties is rather what the result would be if no one wanted to.

It is also curious that our age is so inclined to tear down great men; I consider it to be precisely one of life's greatest comforts that there are such outstanding men. One does not oneself need to have any opinion about things that do not directly concern one but assumes as a matter of course that his is the right one.—*Pap.* VI B 88 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see 1.621:4-30:

What if I placed here the conclusion of the preface, pp. 5 and 6.

For if I myself may say it to you, my dear
reader—and then the rest

Such a fictitious reader
understands one; to him one can speak in
complete confidence

My dear reader, I am anything but a devil of a fellow in
speculative thought. . . .

—*Pap.* VI B 84 *n.d.*, 1845

See 1.621:29-623:36:

Concluding Simple Postscript

The meaning of the last section in the Preface (or if it comes to be in the Appendix): [VI A 140 53] “For if I may say so myself, I am anything but a devil of a fellow,” etc., is that on the whole there can be no schoolmaster, strictly understood, in the art of existing [*existere*]. [VI A 140 54] This is said often enough in the book, but

it is said here in such a way that many will understand it straightforwardly, and yet probably no one will raise an objection. Barbs bristle in the words: “the ambiguous art” and further on, “be this a joyful or a sorrowful sign,” joyful, namely, that there is no one, because he who will straightforwardly be this is a fool, and finally, “far be it from me, the vain and empty thought of wanting to be such a teacher” (vain here in the biblical sense). —With respect to existing, there is only the learner, for anyone who fancies that he is in this respect finished, that he can teach others and on top of that himself forgets to exist and to learn, is a fool. In relation to existing there is for all existing persons one schoolmaster—existence itself. ... —*JP* I 1038 (*Pap.* VI A 140) *n.d.*, 1845

From draft of Appendix; see 1.622:18-623:1:

If only there were among our philosophers a teacher who would attend to me, not a teacher of classical learning, because we do have such a person, and I am by no means worthy of being his pupil, not a teacher of historical philosophy, because I may not have the necessary prerequisites, but a teacher in thinking about existence and existing—then I dare to guarantee that something will come of it. . . . — *Pap.* VI B 94 *n.d.*, 1845

In margin of final copy; see [1.625:1]:

To the typesetter:

the entire section is to be printed in brevier like the text in the notes.

—*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:1 *n.d.*, 1846

From draft; see [1.625:3-15]:

[*In pencil: No!*]

Note. [In pencil: No!]

For the sake of order and for various reasons not worth the trouble to cite, I formally acknowledge what really can be of interest neither to anyone to know nor to me that anyone knows it: that I am the author of an article in *Flyveposten* etc. Everything— — — — — plus that I have never written anything else, and herewith also take leave of the reader, provided I have

had any such at all.*

To use an expression from bowling, now that I have hit all nine:
That's the end of that.

S. K.

*Fortunately I do not owe the reading public very much, neither with regard to income nor to honors; on the other hand, I feel compelled to thank the God who allowed me to express what I wished to express precisely as I wished, the God who favored my external circumstances, the God who blessed the exertion of my laboring thoughts, who often transformed the mute pain into refreshing expression—to thank him, something I otherwise prefer to do in secret, publicly here, in the presence of others, as it were, something they will either smile at or wonder about, or continue to be ignorant of, or be moved by.

Whether for me God will transform it all
into a jest, whether the work will have
any meaning for anyone, whether I shall
have no reader at all, for me it will not therefore
become a jest or less sacred and earnest, since to me
it was my task; if I had known that I
would have many readers, this would not have
made it any more sacred to me.

—Pap. VI B 99 *n.d.*, 1845

From draft; see [1.625:3-15]:

An Attested Announcement

For the sake of form and order, for reasons not worth the trouble either to write or to read, I hereby acknowledge what really* can scarcely be of interest to anyone to *know*, as little as it is to me that anyone knows it, that I am, plainly understood, the author of:

One article in *Flyveposten* and the two⁹⁰
of *From the Papers of One Still Living*.

An article in *Fædrelandet* signed A. F. . . .

(about *Either/Or*)⁹¹

A serial article in two numbers (about Zerlina).⁹²

furthermore, that I am, as is said, the author of

the pseudonymous books
 an article in *Fædrelandet* (Victor Eremita).⁹³
 two articles in *Fædrelandet* (Frater Taciturnus)⁹⁴
 plus that I otherwise have written nothing, not one line, without
 my name under it.
 *even if curiosity can find pleasure in guessing for an incredibly
 long time
 —Pap. VII¹ B 74 n.d., 1846

From draft; see [1.625:1-630:5]:

A First and Last Explanation.[VII¹ B 75 267]
Announcement.

For the sake of form and order, [*essentially the same as*
 (1.625:3-626:5)] except as a reader; the voice of the one speaking
 comes from me, but it is not my voice; the hand writing is mine,
 but it is not my handwriting. [VII¹ B 75 268] In a legal and in a
 literary sense, the responsibility is mine,^a but [*essentially the same*
as (1.627: 2-16)] that my personal actuality in relation to the
 pseudonymous authors is a burden of actuality that they may wish
 removed^b in order to live unconstrained.^c Precisely when the
 relationship is like that, it is indeed ironical that I, as the hidden
 source dialectically reduplicated—yes, it is indeed ironical enough
 —must be called^d the authors' author; yet this relationship is
 different from the unseemly one of an *actual* author's having
 another behind him, one who is really the author, not of the book,
 for this really belongs to the first one, who precisely by the book
actually became the author, but is the author of the author. The
 poetized author has his definite life-view [*essentially the same as*
 (1.627:34-628:10)] to dance with^e—then this cannot be truly
 charged to me, who properly and in the interest of the purity of
 the relation have from my side done everything to prevent what
 the inquisitive part of a small reading public has done everything
 to achieve—in whose interest, God knows!^f

^a Note. For this reason my name as editor was placed on the title page of
*Fragments** as early as 1844 [*essentially the same as* (1.621:36-38) fn.]

In margin. *as crucial to the whole effort

In margin: ^b or made as insignificant as possible

In margin: ^c so my facsimile, my picture, my figure, as conceived by a passport

issuer would have a wholly disturbing effect and have very little ironic significance only if such a thing became the object for the profundity of an ingenious researcher

In margin: ^d the author's or

In margin: ^e If someone in judging has^{**} deceived himself by taking for indiscretion that which not only is not mine but has even been placed by the pseudonymous authors in the deceptive indirect form of revocation

^{**}has been busy deceiving himself.

With gratitude to Governance [Styrelse], who in such multitudinous ways—even though often in spiritual suffering—through independence, through health, through undiminished strength of mind, through a balanced overview despite a productivity that advanced by leaps and bounds—has encouraged my endeavor continuously, in that through labor I found the rest I needed for labor, and granted me much more than I had expected—whether now to others the accomplishment seems to be a complicated triviality—I lay down the pen that in my authors' hands was to me my mandatory work but also the satisfaction of my need, the guided pen that has been so dear to me despite the repeated fines^g I have had to pay so that the pseudonyms could be authors. [VII¹ B 75 269]

The opportunity seems to invite it, yes, to demand it. Well, then, I will use the opportunity, where the story is at an end, also to bid farewell to my reader, if I dare to speak of such a one. If so, I request of him a forgetting-recollection, as the relationship requires, just as the fervent appreciation of it is sincerely offered here in the moment of farewell, when I, with all good wishes for their future, am being separated from the pseudonymous authors and cordially thank everyone who has kept silent, and with profound veneration thank the firm Kts—that it has spoken.

In margin: ^f from the very beginning.

In margin: ^g instead of honoraria.

There is only one thing a limited person, acting, can understand and strive to understand to the point of compliance: what Governance requires of him as duty. What use it will make of him, when, how, or *perhaps* none at all; what is going to happen to him, *perhaps* this, *perhaps* that—one who learns to obey has no right to raise these questions, but neither does he have responsibility for the outcome, he who in obedience is humorously released from embarrassing illusions about an extraordinary importance in

regard to the demands of the times, who in self-concern is ironically released from governing-solicitude for the masses, who, indeed all, each one individually, are able only in self-concern to seek and find the truth, if they are going to find it at all in the only place where it is to be sought. [VII¹ B 75 270] When no disturbing, apparently great but deceitful, middle term falsifies a person's relation to the Deity [*Guddom*], then, according to what I have learned from my elders and sought to understand on my own, the only reasonable thing to do is earnestly and inwardly to pledge oneself in unconditioned obedience and carefreely, if possible hilariously, to let the outcome be the Deity's affair and no concern of one's own, coveting* assurance in God that just as a doubtful result is powerless to make something doubtful, so also the most brilliant result is powerless to demonstrate something and a catastrophic result is powerless to refute something with regard to truth as inwardness.

Copenhagen, February 1846

In margin: * inner strengthening and

—JP V 5864 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 75) February, 1846

From draft; see [1.626:1-628:37]:

. . . a poet-production* . . .

The opportunity seems to invite it, yes, to demand it. [VII¹ B 76 271] Well, then, I will use the opportunity, where the tale is at an end, also to bid farewell to my reader, if there can be any mention of such a one. The elders, the developed, the more superior no doubt have not found it worth the trouble, some who may have wished to be that have perhaps not been able to. This is not my affair. My joy was the work; my reward is that, in my opinion, it succeeded. I considered it to be my duty; I am encouraged that it is fulfilled. I was aware that it was a call in my inner being, I am aware that the responsibility is discharged, regardless of whether what has been done is regarded *perhaps* by all as wasted paper or *perhaps* at a later moment seems meaningful to someone. There is only one thing an insignificant person, [essentially the same as 2.111:26-112:3 (Pap. VII¹ B 75, p. 269, 11. 22-31)] only in self-concern to find the truth. If a sick person, who personally may have had a different idea about his sickness and the medication that should be used, were to say, in order to express his respect for the physician, “Well, fine, I will carry out your instructions, but if I die, think about this, if I die, then it will be your affair”—this would sound somewhat humorous. . . . [VII¹ B 76 272]

In margin: *Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me.** [VII¹ B 76 270] I am as little the Judge in *Either/Or* as I am the book’s editor, Victor Eremita, precisely just as little; my name is on the title page of *Philosophical Fragments* as editor, but I am just as little the author of the preface as of the book, since I am merely an unknown person who is the author’s author. This is indeed different from the unseemliness of an *actual* author’s having someone behind him who actually is the author’s author, because the author of the book is, of course, not the second; the first is the one who by way of the book becomes the author, but the second is the author of the author. This relation of actuality between the two is unseemly. My relation of possibility ideally is innocent, when I, dialectically reduplicated, may be called the author of the authors, not in the eminent sense as the outstanding one, but in the philosophic sense as the ground that goes to the ground.⁹⁵ [VII¹ B 76 271]

*** I, an insignificant man who, ironically enough, dialectically reduplicated—yes, it is indeed ironic—must be called the author of the authors.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 76 *n.d.*, 1846

Deleted from final copy; see [1.626:10, 33-38]:

. . . The voice of the one speaking comes from me, but it is not my voice; the hand writing is mine, but it is not [*deleted: my handwriting, so that*] my manuscript, so that my facsimile or my picture or any other personal thing made out of the relation would be disturbing and could become only somewhat droll if an ironic [*deleted from margin: fate*] had the incredible idea to let such things become the object for the profundity of an ingenious researcher in the interest of the pseudonymous authors.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 80:2 *n.d.*, 1846

From draft; see [1.626:33-627:21]:[VII¹ B 78 272]

In a legal and in a literary sense, then, the responsibility is mine, but understood purely dialectically in the poet-actuality of ideality, the relation must be accurately defined in such a way that the utterances are not my words, but that it is I who by producing the poetically actual author who speaks have *occasioned* the audibility of the utterances in the world of actuality, which of course cannot become involved with the poetically actual persons and therefore altogether consistently looks to me in a legal and in a literary sense. [VII¹ B 78 273] My wish, my prayer, [*same as (1.627:11-15)*]. All poetic creation would *eo ipso* be made impossible or meaningless or unbearable if every word is supposed to be [*deleted: the poet's own word*] the producing person's own word; and in relation to the pseudonymous books my personal actuality is a burden of actuality from which they actually might wish to be free, just as a facsimile of *my* handwriting or a picture of *my* face, if it is supposed to enlighten an ingenious researcher about the pseudonymous authors, would be ludicrous.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 78 *n.d.*, 1846

Changed in margin of final copy (see [1.628:10-13]) from:[VII¹ B 80 4 274]

.....if anyone in judging has been busy deceiving himself

inasmuch as he, with rude intrusion upon my private person, has transformed the whole into his likeness and obtained a private garrulousness out of what is not only not my words but even continually contains their own contrast (which is the absolute expression of silence in relation to communication), something that has been set forth at the furthest distance by the poetically actual pseudonymous authors in the indirect form of a deceptive revocation [VII¹ B 80 4 275]—*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:4 *n.d.*, 1846

Changed in margin of final copy (see [1.629:27-630:2]) from:

.....and my acquaintance with the pseudonymous authors entitles me to be assured of their agreement, since their entire importance, whatever it may be, unconditionally does not consist in making any new proposal, some unheard-of discovery, in founding a new party or in going further, but simply and solely in precisely the express opposite, in once again reading through solo, if possible in a more inward way, the original text of existence-relationships, all the old and familiar text.

In margin: the original text of individual or human existence-relationships.

—*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:5 *n.d.*, 1846

From first proofs, in Israel Levin's hand; see [1.625:1]:

N.B. N.B. N.B. The following “First and Last Explanation” concludes the present book and *should stand last and at the end of it*, which must be indicated to the bookbinder by a short title below ([signature] 31), since these three pages have no pagination.

N.B. N.B. N.B. Before the present Explanation there should be a blank page, like a flyleaf.

The typesetter will please deliver the second proof in the form the printed sheet is to be, that is, with the added short title and the inserted blank page.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 81:4 *n.d.*, 1846

Because of the present situation (the unpleasantness with *The Corsair* and the town gossip⁹⁶), I was momentarily unable to make up my mind whether I should not leave out the acknowledgment of my authorship, whether I should not indicate in the printed material by specifying the dates that the whole thing was older

than all this unpleasantness. But, no! I owe it to the truth to pay no attention to all this and to do everything as had been decided, leaving the outcome up to God and accepting everything from his hand as a good and perfect gift, refusing to act shrewdly, trusting that he will give me a steady and wise spirit.—JP V 5872 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 3) *n.d.*, 1846

It is now my intention to qualify as a pastor.⁹⁷ For several months I have been praying to God to keep on helping me, for it has been clear to me for some time now that I ought not to be a writer any longer,⁹⁸ something I can be only totally or not at all. This is the reason I have not started anything new along with proof-correcting⁹⁹ except for the little review of *Two Ages*,¹⁰⁰ which again is concluding.—JP V 5873 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 4) February 7, 1846

Up until now I have made myself useful by helping the pseudonyms become authors. What if I decided from now on to do the little writing I can excuse in the form of criticism. Then I would put down what I had to say in reviews, developing my ideas from some book or other and in such a way that they could be included in the work itself. In this way I would still avoid becoming an author.—JP V 5877 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 9) February 1846

Note. Now I hear that the new book, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, is supposed to have been commended in *The Corsair*,¹⁰¹ but in a moderated way. [VII¹ B 59 245] I am not so dense that I do not see that from its own point of view *The Corsair* has wanted to make it as good as possible. It has not wanted to abuse, because even it has a notion of what is unseemly; it has not wanted to give high praise, because it does have the notion that from my point of view it would in fact be an insult. [VII¹ B 59 246] So it has chosen a third way: an acknowledging trade announcement. But that cannot be done; I will not agree to that.—*Pap.* VII¹ B 59 *n.d.*, 1846

... The manuscript of my latest book was ready by the middle of December 1845, and a few days before Christmas I delivered the manuscript in its entirety, as I am in the habit of doing, to the printer. [VII¹ B 69 252] Thus I was finished and at leisure, had the time and opportunity to do what I otherwise could not do, and in my joy and gratitude over being finished, I felt like doing somebody a little service. ... —JP V 5863 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 69) *n.d.*, 1846

From much that has been written the last three months, according to my barber, in that organ of literary contemptibleness¹⁰² in this country, together with something that just now came to my attention in a more respectable paper (*Kjøbenhavnsposten*¹⁰³), I must conclude that there are a few people who curiously connect everything I write or edit, big or small books, with a little article in *Fædrelandet*¹⁰⁴ written three months ago by Frater Taciturnus against Mr. P. L. Møller.¹⁰⁵ It created a sensation at the time, for, needless to say, the biggest sensations are created by nothing at all, and this article, after all, dealt with Mr. P.L.M. Anyone who thinks but a moment of this strange connecting-together will quickly perceive that it completely turns everything upside down. As a rule, it would hardly occur to me to say anything, but since I can factually prove in a few words the impossibility of this connection, I will do it. [VII¹B 71 259] The manuscript of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* was completely finished in the middle of December and delivered complete to the printer a few days before Christmas, as the records of book printer Luno can prove. That little review of *En Hverdags Historie*¹⁰⁶ was begun in the middle of December, which Giødwad¹⁰⁷ must be able to corroborate. Not until then, consequently after that time, did Mr. P.L.M.'s *Gæa* come out containing the piece¹⁰⁸ that prompted that little article. Thus it was *after I was finished* with what I had regarded as my task for four and one-half years, a task that claimed all my time and attention. I wrote that little article with the stated intention of doing a few people a service. Rarely does one see Mr. P.L.M.'s name, and what I stated in the article is true: "obtrusive as he (P. L. Møller) is and known to many, I really believed I would be doing some people a service by challenging him."¹⁰⁹

Of course, I consider the article in *Fædrelandet* to be insignificant, at most something that one writes to do someone a service. If there can be one person here in the country who considers it anything else, who regards that little article as far more important than all the pseudonymous books, who believes that everything I do focuses on that little article and thereby even less on the one on whom the article focuses—this must be considered an optical illusion. If that same one has a friend who

for friendship's sake abandons himself to the same illusion, this must be regarded as a matter of friendship.— *Pap.* VII¹ B 71 *n.d.*, 1846

And so I am criticized¹¹⁰ because I am for Mynster and find pleasure in a little expression of his approval. [VII¹ A 26 14] Did I not say the same thing in *Fædrelandet*¹¹¹ in 1845 when I declined the commendation of the *Berlingske Tidende*;¹¹² have I not said the same thing all along, from the first book to the last?

As for the preface to “*Concluding Postscript*”¹¹³: (1) it is by Johannes Climacus, and here again what appears at the end of the book¹¹⁴ holds true, namely, that I am not the pseudonymous author who permits himself a recklessness that I neither am able nor wish to do; (2) what expressions of approval and censure are meant? The analogies to the hurrah of the mobs and *pereat* [let him die]. As a consequence of his disdaining and rejecting mob approval, does he therefore disdain the truly distinguished single individual? What foolishness. If a paper like the *Corsair* were not utterly lacking in self-knowledge, it would readily see why I do not want its approval; and if it had any self-knowledge, it would perceive why I even want to be abused by that contemptibleness which is concealed only from its own eyes. [VII¹ A 26 15]—JP V 5884 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 26) *n.d.*, 1846

Report[VII¹ A 97 41]
March 1846[VII¹ A 98 41]

the ninth

The *Concluding Postscript* is out; the pseudonymity has been acknowledged;¹¹⁵ one of these days the printing of the “Literary Review”¹¹⁶ will begin. Everything is in order; all I have to do now is to keep calm, be silent, depending on *The Corsair*¹¹⁷ to support the whole enterprise negatively, just as I wish. From the standpoint of the idea, I am at present as correctly situated in literature as possible, and in such a way that to be an author becomes a deed.¹¹⁸ In itself it was a most capital idea to make a break with *The Corsair* in order to prevent any direct advances at the very moment I was through with the authorship¹¹⁹ and, by assuming all the pseudonyms, ran the risk of becoming an authority of sorts. This is why right now, when I am advancing polemically against the age, I owe it to the idea and to irony to

prevent any confusion with the ironical bad brandy *The Corsair* serves in the dance halls of contemptibleness. . . .[VII¹ A 98 42]

But my activity as an author is finished—God be praised. [VII¹ A 98 46] It has been granted to me to conclude it myself, to understand myself when it ought to stop, and next to publishing *Either/Or* I thank God for that. I know very well and find it quite in order that people will not see it this way and that it would in fact take but two words from me to prove it so. This has hurt; it seems that I still could have desired that recognition but let it be.

If only I could make myself become a pastor. Out there in quiet activity, permitting myself a little productivity in my free time, I shall breathe easier, however much my present life has gratified me.—JP V 5886-87 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 97-98) March 9, 1846

Letter to *Aftenbladet*

Mr. Editor:[VII¹B 86 278]

You may, of course, be right in protesting that an article such as the one that reviewed* my book in *Kjøbenhavnsposten*¹²⁰ is printed in any respectable newspaper. [VII¹B 86 279] It is not for its coarseness and rudeness that I am passing judgment in this way on that article, because in this regard the writer occasions no doubt: everyone can promptly see what it is as he reads it and then, according to his individuality or according to his view of the author reviewed, agree or disagree with the reviewer. No, but lies and untruth in reporting the contents of the book being reviewed, the most unscrupulous tearing out of completely isolated words, brazenness in splitting a quoted passage in the middle in order to derive the very opposite from it etc.—such conduct ought never to be tolerated in any respectable newspaper because, especially in relation to a very big book that only very few read, it has an advantage, since the person who reads the review is by no means at the same time able to perceive, and perhaps will never know, that the whole report was nothing but lies. An editor certainly cannot be required to read every book, but every editor's practiced eye, the minute he reads the manuscript of an article such as that in *Kjøbenhavnsposten*, must be able to see that there is something wrong, that there must be an inveterate ill nature venting itself in such mendacities. If the editor of a respectable paper still wants to

accept it, then he at least ought to see to it that it is signed. A name does indeed have an enormous effect. A name, well, in my haste I know of none better to mention than Bishop Mynster's name. [VII¹ B 86 280] When it is at the end of an article, how attentive one becomes, in what a totally different way one now holds the paper in one's hand, how carefully one looks at it, how one avoids any disturbance in order to concentrate completely on the reading. Yes, a name does indeed have an enormous effect. In my haste I know of none better to mention, and, thank God, hardly a better one even by the most careful search—than Mr. P. L. Møller's name. If only that name is at the end of an article, how speedily one puts down the paper, how quickly one allows one's attention to turn to anything whatever, how much one wants someone around to talk with. Yes, a name can indeed have an enormous effect.

*In margin: *Note.* A reviewer he cannot properly be called, but the whole episode, like many earlier ones in literature, reminds me of what one sees in daily life On market day, the farmer drives in with his wares; he has them carefully packed in clean wrappings; he is already happily anticipating that when he opens up, everything must look clean, inviting, and tempting to the buyers. But the buyer does not come first No, first come three or four loathsome marketplace loafers who paw and tear at the wares and soil the clean meat with their loathsome handling. This reviewer can best be compared to that kind of marketplace loafer, they have not only loathsomeness in common but also their aim: to earn a little drink money—by carrying home and by reviewing.

To that extent *Aftenbladet* may be right, but now to the next point. In *Kjøbenhavnsposten* the reviewer was of the opinion that my book, indeed, all the pseudonymous authors, are rough drafts and that I am not an author at all. Perhaps it is so; it is indeed possible. But if he says it in everyone's name, then it is untrue, not because it cannot be true that all are of that opinion, but because he cannot possibly know it. In *Aftenbladet* you say "that this book is unanimously judged to be one of the most profound etc." Perhaps it is so; it is not impossible. But when you say it in the name of all, it is untrue, because you cannot possibly know it. It is my conviction that the misfortune of our age is that everyone wants to speak in the name of all, and it was this that I seek to the best of my ability to counteract by being a single human being.

In the next place, you intimate in your article a possibility of future review in "a dozen or so numbers." To be honest, I shudder to think of it. Please do not misunderstand me, I am able *ex animi*

sententia [by inclination] to thank you for your kindness, and since it has not yet happened, I can, of course, unconditionally assume that it would be competent etc. But I truly do not desire any review. It seems to me that eventually one confuses the concept of being an author: it finally becomes less a matter of reading a book than of judging and censuring. Writing a book soon becomes confused with taking a final examination. [VII¹ B 86 281] Finally, then, it is not the book that has importance, but the examination, so that it is not the reader's appropriation that is intended, but one is inquisitive about the result of the examination.

But, good Lord, I really do not write for that reason and, as far as that goes, will have nothing against being left out of things, as does that reviewer in *Kjøbenhavnsposten*. My joy and satisfaction is to write the book: from that moment I wish peace and quiet so that an individual can see whether he can have any benefit from reading it. Why all the sensation! Indeed, I have never pretended to be a scholar who had something extraordinary to communicate; then it would be important for everyone to come to know it more or less; nor have I pretended to be a poet who has rare enjoyment to offer—I am a “poor individual human being.” What I have to say is by no means anything new, and what is required of my reader is therefore the inwardness with which he reads, and this [.....] review. The competent, the exceptionally gifted, the less gifted—they may all, each one, have another view of existence; they may have some other writing in which they [.....] stronghold. For that very reason it would be foolish of me to claim many readers. In order for someone to be my reader, it is required that he have a [.....] sympathy and to have felt a pressure from existence that makes it possible for a [.....] to be able to make an impression. Then it is required that the book become his in a propitious moment and that he be resolved to concentrate his mind mainly upon it. The main point is the inwardness with which he reads, and therefore he could have the same benefit from many another book, whereas his purely individual characteristics decide his choice of my book.

But if this is the way it is, how unreasonable then to occasion any sensation whatever. If everyone were to read the book through once superficially, then I would be misunderstood. On the other hand, if only one person were to read the book in such a way that he appropriates it in essential inwardness, then ultimately it is

incidental that it is I who have written it, because he himself produces it—then I would be understood and be happy. [VII¹ B 86 282] These thoughts will then totally occupy that person just as they occupy me. When I wake up in the night, I am tossed about by the same thoughts that I busy myself with unceasingly during the day; indeed, even if I were to imagine the most dreadful thing, that I would be buried alive, if I could only formulate my thoughts for myself, it would still be a consolation in all that agony. This is what I believe one must understand by a thinker in the subjective sense: a poor individual human being who has a few thoughts in which he lives. A review promptly changes me into something else. Therefore I have asked Nathanson¹²¹ and *Fædrelandet* to desist and thank them for doing so: now I am asking you to do the same.

When the book was published, I certainly felt how powerless I am. I have only a few, very few readers; on the other hand, I have much against me. Young people consider it ridiculous to write a big book: older people do not have time to read it—and at the same time lies and untruth and slander and rudeness have the most widely circulated organ in the kingdom and now seem to have acquired a new paper in which to play starring roles. When I through a big book address myself to one person, jeering and sneering untruth addresses itself to one thousand, it has the privilege of contemptibleness to say everything it wishes. It falsely charges me with what I am striving to the best of my ability to avoid, what I with much self-sacrifice know that I do avoid—and if I wanted to defend myself, then I have one reader—when the others have thousands. Good Lord, be that as it may. After all, we are all liberals and optimists and assume that the world we live in is the best. I also do that as a humorist. But certainly balance or an equitable distribution of good things belongs to the best of worlds. Now, if what I have to say is untruth and I also am neglected and have to pay out money, then I would indeed be the stepchild and the balance would be disturbed. On the other hand, if what I have to say is the truth and I win worldly honor and esteem, the balance would again be disturbed. [VII¹ B 86 283] Now, however, everything is in order: on the one side, wide circulation, money, influence—untruth; on the other side, obscurity, loss, powerlessness—and the truth. Praised be this best of worlds—who with this view would not have to become an optimist? Whoever is not an optimist would have to become one. Why should one

person have everything, why should one person be excluded from everything? No, praised be the equal distribution of the goods of existence: everyone obtains his own; the individual's striving is favored according to his desire. The person who aspires to wide circulation, money, and influence acquires these goods with the help of untruth; the person who aspires to truth has to purchase it with financial loss and by being scorned. This edifying observation has often inspired me, because it is, indeed, so beautiful that there is balance if one only understands properly how to evaluate the goods: wide circulation, money, influence—truth. Only they are unhappy who vacillate between them and presumably to a certain degree fear being in error, but also to a certain degree fear the lack of money in their hands and influence on people.

The situation at present is really favorable for me. It is not opportune for my reader if it becomes fashionable to read my books. No, when it becomes a mark of quality to leave them unread, when one becomes ashamed to admit that one has read them—that is the moment for *my* reader.

On several occasions I have imagined myself in the role of a pastor. Suppose the throng presses in to hear me and stands way out on the street—well, praise and honor to the person who is so gifted that he then could really speak as one inspired—for me it would be impossible. But suppose it was a Sunday afternoon with unpleasant and dreary weather, when the wind whistled through the streets and everyone who had a warm parlor stayed at home; but there in the empty church sat a couple of poor women who had no warm parlor and could just as well sit and freeze in a church as at home—on my honor, I would preach both them and myself warm. Frequently I have imagined myself beside a grave. What a ceremonious mood permeates the large host—indeed, honor and praise be to the person who is so gifted that he really can be an interpreter for the many—I would be unable to be that. [VII¹ B 86 284] But if it was a poor funeral cart and no one followed when only a poor woman walked beside it, the dead person's widow, who did not even have the means to ride, and no pastor was there—if she asked me to speak beside that grave—on my honor I would speak in just as masterly a manner. More than once I have imagined myself at death's final decision—if there was consternation in the camp, if many inquired about me, etc., I do not believe that I could die, because dying also requires a stillness:

I believe that my polemic nature would awaken and make it impossible for me. But if I lay in an out-of-the-way place, I hope to God that I would die peacefully.

Scarcely anyone, I suppose, will regard what is written here as presumptuous, but neither do I humble myself. Nor do I think that Magister Kierkegaard causes anyone any trouble by speaking about my or the pseudonymous authors' authorship. But while one may judge as one wishes with regard to this, there could readily be agreement on one thing, to appreciate that by placing himself against the literary rabble so decisively he has exposed himself to many annoyances that he could easily have avoided if on account of others as well as of the situation he had not considered it unseemly that no one protested against it.

Johannes Climacus

S. Kierkegaard.
—*Pap.* VII¹ B 86 *n.d.*, 1846

An Unhappy Lover in *Dansk Kirketidende*¹²² [VII¹ B 87 284]

It is perhaps less well known, but it is certain that there exists [*existere*] a kind of private newspaper that is called *Dansk Kirketidende*. In this paper I, the undersigned, am persecuted by an unhappy lover, * Mr. Christensen, graduate student in theology, a young man “who never can cease loving me,” and who, moreover, would do everything, even hand Johannes Climacus over to Satan, “just in order to have the opportunity really to love the Magister.”^[**]¹²⁴ [VII¹ B 87 285] Next to smoke and drafts and bedbugs, I know nothing more disastrous than to become the object of a person's fixed idea, or that it could occur to a person altogether personally to become occupied with his presumed relationship to someone. What shall I do! If I were to say, “Mr. Christensen! Be a man, give up this unhappy love, try to forget me, do not be like a woman but show that you are a man, Mr. Christensen,” it very likely would not help at all, because his presumed relationship to me has fixed itself too firmly in his mind.

**Note.* Analogies to Mr. Christensen's relation to me, insofar as hate is also a kind of unhappy love, are found in abundance in our surroundings. For example, Bishop Mynster has an unhappy lover in Dr. Beck; Prof. Heiberg an unhappy lover in Mr. P

L. Møller; Prof. Martensen an unhappy lover in Magnus Eirikson [sic]; Prof. Madvig an unhappy lover in Torkild Baden.¹²³ These respective unhappy lovers are unable to give up the relationship, although certainly [are able to give up] the object with pleasure

[**] It is fortunate, then, that there still is something to prevent Mr. Christensen from having the opportunity

His first article concerning me (*Kirketidende* no. 29, to which he himself refers) was written in order to show that he was not afraid to write against me. And he was so intent upon showing his courage that he himself admits that he has not read the book about which he speaks.¹²⁵

In no. 52 Mr. Christensen has on my account again become an author in connection with the same book (*Concluding Postscript*), and again for a purely personal reason: because he cannot cease loving me—indeed, even if it should be necessary to hand me over to Satan, Mr. Christensen (whatever I am) is willing to do it—just in order really to have the opportunity of loving me. [VII¹ B 87 286] Yes, just as I say, he is a devil of a fellow, this Mr. Christensen; these unhappy lovers are the most disastrous type. What shall I do? If I were to say: Mr. Christensen, get hold of yourself; consider for your own sake, because you are not to do anything for my sake, but for your own sake consider what an unhappy passion such as this can lead to; consider that it is also unfaithfulness on your part to run after me, you who as a Grundtvigian are engaged to another: it presumably would not help.

No. 52 refers to no. 29 and concerns the same book: *Concluding Postscript*. When one reads a person's comments on a book, one ordinarily assumes (at least it was the custom previously even if it is disappearing) that the man has read the book. Since, however, according to his own statement in no. 29, Mr. Christensen has written about this book without reading it and since he now provides no information about whether he has now read it, he is himself to blame when one assumes that he has still not read it; but just as he once wrote about it in order to show me his courage, he now writes in order to show me his love.

Since the book has thus become a matter of indifference, I disregard it entirely. It certainly can be defended, but this cannot happen until it has found the person who has sufficient skill to be able to read it and then wants to attack it, and, please note, not in

a couple of unbridled columns in a paper intended to be read as one reads newspapers.

Thus the main point is Mr. Christensen's personal relation to me, to which end he even introduces me to his mother, as if we were already engaged. And God knows that with all my heart I believe everything good about his mother,* and if I had the honor of knowing her I would say to her: Since you know what lofty ideas your son has of you and of your never having put anything over on him, please ask him if he could not give up this unhappy love, prevail upon him to forget me.

* See column 853.

—Pap. VII¹ B 87 n.d., 1846

Self-Defense against Unauthorized Acknowledgment

“Above all, may heaven spare the book and me from approving vehemence, so that a vociferous party-liner quotes it approvingly and enrolls me in the census. [VII¹ B 88 287] If it escapes him that no party can be served by an imaginatively constructing humorist, then he can all the better perceive his incapacity for what he in every way must seek to escape.” See “Concluding Postscript,” p. 475 bot. [p. 1.619].

On several occasions I have been actually tempted to attest literarily to the truth of the saying: “Unhappiness is not to love without being loved, but to be loved when one does not love.”¹²⁶ What I have said once and for all seems to be in vain: Let no one invite me, for I do not dance—my later precautions seem also to be only wasted trouble.

In “*Kirketidende*”¹²⁷ I am constantly being harassed by a graduate student in theology, Mr. Christensen, a young man “who never can cease loving me” and who also has the erotic concern that he as yet cannot really have the opportunity. Would that he may never succeed, because as soon as a lover can have an opportunity it is too late. In other papers also there are unmistakable signs of unhappy lovers. Even there where I am abused and insulted¹²⁸ it is a womanish form of unhappy love, inasmuch as the insults continue in the same way as a giddy woman keeps on running after the beloved in order to scold him.

And now finally there is the raging Roland, the cantankerous

Magnus Eirikson [*sic*], who in an appalling manner caresses me in the most affable and appreciative terms. When I read his advertisement in *Adresseavisen*¹²⁹ last year, I thought it was a trick,* that probably there was no book, but that it was for the purpose of getting this terror-striking, heaven-storming, nonsensical-martial, self-infatuated public notice printed and read by as many as possible. [VII¹ B 88 288] But no, I was mistaken; a book actually has come out. On the other hand, I perhaps am not mistaken when I assume that M. E. could well have confined himself to advertisement. The advertisement must obviously decide the battle; if Prof. Martensen can take that blow, then the book can certainly do him no harm. Everything indeed depends upon the advertisement!

Adresseavisen merely seems to be a peace-loving paper, alas, what inner dissension, what tribulation,** when the one advertiser seeks to trample on the others by means of gigantic letters! O you immense playground for the interests of the moment:

Adresseavisen. Yonder droops a shopkeeper under the weight of the colossal letters of the advertisement; and when underneath in smaller print one reads: on Halm Street the fourth place from Østergade on the left side on the ground floor—the words “on the ground floor” acquire a poignant significance. One sympathetically thinks of the unhappy shopkeeper on the ground floor, that he may be buried alive, because it is clearly the weight of the advertisement that compresses the ground floor. Here a grocer triumphantly battles to come first with the freshly arrived Flemish herring; here a stockfish-dryer, a maker of brushes—here also Magnus Eriksen [*sic*]—his advertisement! What a wonderful masterpiece! So let there be dissension and tribulation and warfare and strife in *Adresseavisen*; about one thing there has to be agreement in *Adresseavisen*: that this advertisement is a masterpiece that surpasses anything hitherto seen in the miscellaneous announcements. This pithiness in the well-chosen words, this tragic pathos in using compound words, the inexplicable, the magical, which makes the advertisement into a conjuring formula and M. E. into a sorcerer or a devil of a fellow! Just as one forgets, over this advertisement, all the rest of the contents of *Adresseavisen*, so does one forget all that M. E. has otherwise produced: [VII¹ B 88 289] he stands solely as the author—of the advertisement!

In margin: *a stratagem

In margin: ** what a life-and-death battle

Of course, I have not read the book, but I have seen enough, something one could expect from such a robust thinker as M. E., that he has set himself a purely practical and tangible objective completely in the spirit of *Adresseavisen*. His efforts are concentrated on neither more nor less than having Prof. Martensen dismissed. And with devilish violence and power he has managed to connect my *Concluding Postscript* to Philosophical Fragments with this *Adresseavis* endeavor. *Pro di immortales* [Ye immortal gods]! A poor, defenseless, imaginatively constructing humorist who, at a distance of 100,000 miles or rather at the distance of the idea from the moment, thinks through some issues, for the sake of the thinking itself, and in the disinterestedness of ideality lays out everything only maieutically—a bellowing partisan, by means of an admiring acknowledgment, connects a humorist like that with the most odious kind of attack on a specific man. By assigning me intentions, of which not a trace is to be found in the book, which has not mentioned or discussed Prof. Martensen with one single word, by appealing to a few students with whom M. E. is supposed to have talked, he gets this out in a brutish manner. To become admiringly acknowledged in this manner, I call a literary assault.

Whether M. E. is competent to understand my book at all,' whether above all he has self-control and the necessary self-concern, mitigated in jest yet earnest, whether he has the proper erotic distance from all busyness and externality in life, and then love-rapture's listening for the dialectical, no matter whether there is a fire in Copenhagen or bombardment or strife in *Adresseavisen*—that I do not know. Neither do I know whether M. E. has read the book; but if he has read it, then I know that he [*deleted* mendaciously and presumptuously] has absolutely misunderstood it, and I believe that one merely has to contrast the figure he cuts with the sketch of *my* reader outlined here to be convinced of it. [VII: B 88 290]

M. E.'s passion has now risen to fanatic bad temper; indeed, he rages like a person possessed in order to get Prof. Martensen dismissed. On the stage it can create a really comic effect to have an actor speak through the window with someone who is not there, to quarrel with someone who is no one, and yet become more and more intense. And when it is he of whom one must say

that he, himself rich, makes others poor, makes even admiration poor or someone poor by his admiration, because the depth of his comic richness is so inexhaustible that thought goes bankrupt and one laughs so hard that one scarcely has time to say: He is priceless—when Rosenkilde¹³⁰ does it, it can have an incomparable effect. But one is art and an excess of genius on stage, another is clumsiness in actuality; and it is really in the sense of clumsiness that M. E.'s one-man battle is comic. The dispute mounts in intensity, and the only thing lacking is—someone with whom to quarrel, because passion is not lacking. One can very well say that M. E. has the passion of ten, but that one person has that is still not enough for a dispute. Considerably less passion and then two—then there can be a dispute. But since M. E., despite all his* passion, cannot pick a quarrel,** he comes up with the notion of wanting to pull me into the dispute— *against* Martensen. But this obviously is a mistaken notion that leads to nothing, because even if it were not a shameless attack on me, there still cannot be a dispute Here again it is the case that one hundred on *one side* are not enough for a dispute. Much less is needed, just another grouping one on one side and one on the other—then the dispute takes its course As far as that goes, it is a just nemesis that a mistaken notion miscarries, that M. E., instead of pulling me into the imaginary dispute with Prof. [VII¹ B 88 291] Martensen, gets into an actual little dispute with me, which nevertheless is not carried on, as disputes usually are, for the sake of agreement, because agreement is the only condition on which I refuse to make peace since my desire is only to remain in disagreement with M. E. Any further reply from my side therefore will presumably be altogether inexpedient. This self-defense, however, I hope will be sufficient for M. E. to continue disputing with me for a long time in the same sense, in the very same sense as he up until now has disputed with Prof. Martensen, except with the difference that I am a humorist whose silence means everything and nothing. I have never passed myself off as an authority whose silence is a court judgment.

* *In margin* contentious

** *In margin* with Prof. Martensen

Here I could end this little article, but since I as humorist *ex professo* [openly] in all earnestness am really a friend of jest, I

cannot deny that the idea of having Prof. Martensen dismissed seems such a happy one to me that it certainly is worth dwelling on a little. When one starts from a droll assumption, one can at times find the opportunity to say something or other that one otherwise does not manage to say. Therefore I am assuming that M. E. has won; Prof. Martensen has been dismissed and has been given a job in the customs department or provided for in some manner. This is the jest.

But now comes the earnestness. What, then, if M. E. in an idle moment reflected on the question: How can someone be found to take Prof. Martensen's place? I say in an idle moment, for as long as M. E. is indefatigably engaged in getting Prof. Martensen dismissed, there can be no question of an idle moment—or of reflection. In the first place, at present it is a simple fact in Denmark that on the whole there can be no question of many candidates for a professorship. In the second place, it is absolutely certain that Prof. Martensen, at the time he was appointed, was unconditionally not only the best qualified one, for there was no one else at all who could be considered, but also that he was absolutely qualified, in possession of talent and knowledge. It is also well known what a sensation he made at the time. Perhaps a little exaggeration slipped in—well, it can happen so easily, but nevertheless it is certain that he is a distinguished lecturer, and just as he cannot be said to have had a rival at the time, it still cannot be said that he has one. [VII¹ B 88 292]

When all is said and done, the admiring and acknowledging M. E. might be of the opinion that Magister Kierkegaard is the man. This I regard as a very foolish, indeed, an obtuse, opinion. Magister Kierkegaard is neither more nor less than what he has claimed to be, an independent thinker. In this regard one may concede to him whatever one wishes, perhaps there are one or two things one may readily deny him. One may also concede to him learning and “a rich education.” But this is certain: he is not qualified to be a lecturer, and least of all in the sense in which Prof. Martensen is an excellent lecturer, indeed so excellent that he, without reservation, must at any moment be able to obtain an appointment at the most famous university in Germany.

But if it is the case that in the past no one could be preferred to Prof. Martensen and that there is no one to replace him at this moment, then it is detestable to want to weaken his impact on the

students in any way, and the attempt is no less detestable because it is powerless. It is detestable to gossip in print about what this and that student have said and in this way try to put an academic teacher and the students together. It is detestable to give the impression that my *Concluding Postscript* has turned any listener away from him, because in my whole book no student can have found a word about Prof. Martensen. Prof. Martensen's worth remains unchanged. A little exaggeration, well, it was the mistake of the students. A little critical fastidiousness, well, if it is there, it is again the mistake of the individual student. But if any author could generally be said to have worked to prevent sensation, tumult in the moment, party-bellowing, scuffling and the like, then it is I, and therefore I have with indignation perceived this (M. E.'s) attack upon my erotic absorption in the issues. As a thinker I am too highborn to believe that thinking revolves around this one and that one, not to mention insanely and spitefully and downright humoristically injuring a man in his honest and serviceable position. [VII¹ B 88 293]

Holberg no doubt was of the opinion that in his day there was far too much disputation and by far too many people, to the point that all the disputing became an empty and futile game. But if in his day there had been a teacher in the art of disputation at the university, I wonder if Holberg would have found it ludicrous that this man in the role of teacher and with educational earnestness trained young people entrusted to him in disputing? In my opinion, the trouble with our day, as well as its comic side, is that there is too much lecturing and by far too many people. But it certainly does not follow from that or from its being set forth here that there should be anything comic in the lecturing at a university by an officially appointed teacher who has students to instruct; and if there is nothing comic in that, then there cannot be anything comic either in his doing it well and with talent. Insofar as on occasion there is polemicizing against Hegel in my books, insofar as the aim is continually directed at the great amount of lecturing, it is all maintained with diligence, and I also dare to say with such artistic correctness that the book could just as well have been written in Germany as in Copenhagen. Indeed, the typical character I have continually used somewhat, but with much less success than Holberg used the *Magister*—the *Privatdocent*¹³¹—is actually not found at all in Denmark. The *Privatdocent* is a

genuinely German character, and yet I am convinced that if Holberg had lived in our day he would have immortalized the *Privatdocent*. There is an infinite difference between a lecturer [*Docent*] and a *Privatdocent*, particularly as I have individualized the latter. The *Privatdocent* is a didacticizing braggart, a lightly armed encyclopedist. He has a slapdash kind of scholarliness; he is neither teacher nor independent thinker. In a way he is the same as Holberg's *Magister*, except that he does not dispute but didacticizes. Just as a Holbergian *Magister* could have an absolute superstitious belief in the effect of one single syllogism, in the same way a *Privatdocent* relates himself superstitiously to the system. A *Privatdocent* would be in an acutely awkward position if he became an actual *Docent*, in exactly the same sense as the political tinker¹³² was in a most awkward position when he actually became mayor. [VII¹ B 88 294] The *Privatdocent* is a halfness; he has the pretentious form of the didacticizing lecturer and has essentially nothing to say, or he has a short rigmarole in which he in turn has joint ownership with every other *Prtvatdocent*. To me this halfness is expressed in the word *Privatdocent* itself, someone who does not essentially belong at a lectern and yet lectures. The *Privatdocent* is an utterly fanciful character; he does not accomplish anything; he merely makes wind, especially by means of promises and announcements. Therefore as an author a *Privatdocent* belongs mainly to subscription-prospectus dust-jacket literature. If an actual lecturer begins to try his hand at something fanciful like this as a sideline to his work at the university, to that extent he comes to be perceived as a *Privatdocent*, but only to that extent.

One can take an interest in M. E., who without a doubt has certainly been well intentioned. One can with respect appreciate that a theological graduate works hard for his living, that he must gain time in order to work himself into debt by being an author.* With sympathy for M. E., one can have an idea that the elite have indeed contributed to his mounting bitterness, that they, by a misuse of the polemics of silence, have wanted to destroy him by means of public opinion. One can admit (which can be done with justification) that there are many sound comments in his big book, even if he by no means should have ventured out into scholarship, which is different from religiousness, and even if it is unjust to carry the whole affair into a forum where Prof. Martensen cannot

possibly come to exercise his superiority. But it by no means follows that one would in any way be able to sanction his recent conduct or that I should completely refrain from defending myself against his consummated attack by way of unauthorized acknowledgment. I am not happy to write this; it is quite obvious that in every way M. E. is the weaker; it is quite obvious that both elite and actual skill have unconditionally the victory of public opinion and actuality over him, and I have not the heart to push the weaker. [VII¹ B 88 295] I could easily have forgiven him whatever harm he might have done to me in the opinion of certain people through his attack, but the whole consistency of my idea-existence necessarily requires this self-defense. If only M. E. had been the stronger one, had had the power of wide circulation or of public opinion—well, then that would have been something that could incite me to polemicize.

In margin: *—without a doubt there are plenty of people in every generation who want to do well on the public's money, and plenty of people who aspire to important offices and prestigious positions

If it is the case that the proof of one's having served the truth is the benefit one has had from it, how much money one has accumulated, how many distinctions one has collected from above or below!—ah, then I have never served the truth! But if [*in margin:* humorously enough] it is the case that the proof of one's having served the truth increases in proportion to the size of loss, misjudgment, and troubles—ah, then I dare to hope that my name, even though far down, will be included on the list of its servants. According to all the philosophers, it is indeed the best of worlds in which we live, something of which I, too, as a humorist am right heartily convinced. But of course to the best of worlds belongs equality. Why should one person have everything and another be a stepchild? Therefore, if it were so that I as an author had some truth or some true understanding on my side, and then I also earned much money, enjoyed great honor and esteem—then, of course, the balance in this the best of worlds would be disturbed. If, however, the situation in this the best of worlds is: on the one side, money, honor, esteem—and mistaken understanding; on the other side, financial loss, disgrace, insults—and sound understanding, then there is indeed balance. Who, if he were not already an optimist, would not become one through this, to me, edifying, reassuring, and completely satisfying view? In this the

best of worlds, the only unhappy ones are those who do not really know how to value either money, honor, and esteem for what they are or truth for what it is, those who do fear to a certain degree the only thing that Socrates feared, and please note, absolutely: [VII¹ B 88 296] to be in error—but who nevertheless are also not entirely able to do without money in their hands and esteem among people.

There is an old book that has a list of witnesses to the truth. One can read in it as one at other times reads, or as others perhaps read, in the rules governing rank and precedence. Just as someone who reads in the rules governing rank and precedence perceives with quiet exaltation how the person of rank ascends the many steps to the pinnacle of honor, so one reads in that book with quiet exaltation how the witness to the truth step by step descends to the minority where he belongs, until he stands utterly alone, repudiated. These are the two movements: crescendo and decrescendo. Basically they are one and the same, and therefore there is a very remarkable antistrophic harmony. Crescendo: I enjoyed the honor of becoming the high dignitary of Spain; decrescendo: I thank God that I enjoyed the honor of being scourged.* It is a paltry soldier who does not hope to become a general, but it is also paltry, when one will walk the decrescendo road, to whine, not to know how to speak the court language of the idea with the elegance with which it is spoken in that immortal circle; for unquestionably they are the proudest words ever spoken in the world: I, too, have had the honor of being scourged. Truly, the lover who does not love his girl in such a way that in the midst of all his sufferings on her behalf he does not have sufficient high-mindedness to understand and sufficient elegance to say: I have the honor—he does not love. And the person who does not love his idea in such a way that for its sake he has the honor of losing money, has the honor of being insulted, has the honor of being scourged, the honor of being executed—he does not love his idea.** [VII¹ B 88 297] If he is merely ready and willing for all this but it escapes him that it actually is an honor he has, then he is already lukewarm. Is not the faithful courtier the one who accompanies a dethroned emperor in exile, and when the emperor is clad in poverty continues to say with the same deference as once in the halls of the palace: Your Majesty. In the same way when someone's idea fails to conquer and likewise

clothes itself, so to speak, in lowliness, one still does not forget that it is the idea, and therefore that it is unchanged when everything else is changed, and that it is a matter of honor to serve it.

In margin *Crescendo: I enjoyed the honor of being hailed with jubilation and crowned with a wreath by the public; decrescendo: I enjoyed the honor of being hissed. —But there is the difference that the vaulted ceiling under which the person of rank speaks is not as acoustically well constructed as that under which the witness to the truth speaks, because eternity echoes only in the latter place; the first utterance sounds without an echo or, as one says in everyday language, like cotton batting. But there is the difference that the difference between seventy years and fourteen days proves to have been an optical illusion when there is the eternal difference —

In margin **or rather, he has no idea

Whether M. E. is called by an idea, I do not decide; but what is set forth here is the norm for the existence of such a person or, to express myself more elegantly: the protocol. And just as one of the pseudonymous authors¹³³ has said that he never wished to be Napoleon but would rather be one of the two chamberlains who opened the folding doors, bowed, and said: The Emperor—in the same way I would say: I have never wished to be the master of ceremonies for any crowned head, but if I could find someone and find a position as master of ceremonies for someone who for the sake of the idea had the honor of being persecuted, I am convinced that I would prove equal to the post; indeed, I would be an outstanding master of ceremonies. Just as the simple wise man has said that he could not give birth but merely help the one giving birth,¹³⁴ in the same way I must say: I myself am unable to become the great one, but I could become an outstanding master of ceremonies. Alas, until now I certainly have sought in vain. In my books, I on occasion sketch that glorious one whom I merely wish to see in life so that I could be the master of ceremonies. Then along comes someone or other who regards these sketches as completely finished clothes. He puts them on; alas, but when he has put them on, I must say that I easily perceive that he is not the one, that he is not the one advertised for, or the one whom I as master of ceremonies could have the honor of advertising. [VII¹ B 88 298]

—Pap. VII¹ B 88 n.d., 1846

Originally I had thought to end my work as an author with

Concluding Unscientific Postscript, to withdraw to the country, and in quiet unobtrusiveness to sorrow over my sins. The fear and trembling in my soul about being a Christian, my penitence, seemed to me to be sufficient suffering. I had almost forgotten that being a Christian is and should be a thing of scorn in the world, as he was, my Lord and Master, who was spat upon: then Governance came to my assistance again. I became aware of that and now stay in my place. God in heaven, who has reason to be disgusted with me because I am a sinner, has nevertheless not rejected what I, humanly speaking, honestly intended. Yet before God even my best deed is still miserable.—JP VI 6157 (*Pap.* IX A 54) *n.d.*, 1848

Now add the thought of death to the publication of that little article!¹³⁵ If I were dead without that: indeed, anyone could publish my posthumous papers, and in any case R. Nielsen¹³⁶ would be there. But that illusion that I did not become religious until I was older and perhaps by reason of accidental circumstances would still have been possible. But now the dialectical breaks are so clear: *Either/Or* and *Two Upbuilding Discourses*, *Concluding Postscript*, the upbuilding writings of two years,¹³⁷ and then a little esthetic treatise.—*Pap.* IX A 228 *n.d.*, 1848 [IX A 241 135]

N.B. N.B.

Strange, strange about that little article¹³⁸—that I had so nearly gone and forgotten myself. When one is overstrained as I was, it is easy to forget momentarily the dialectical outline of a colossal structure such as my authorship. That is why Governance helped me.

Right now the totality is so dialectically right. *Either/Or* and the two upbuilding discourses*¹³⁹—*Concluding Postscript*—for two years only upbuilding discourses¹⁴⁰ and then a little article about an actress. The illusion that I happened to get older and for that reason became a decisively religious author has been made impossible. If I had died beforehand, then the writing I did those two years would have been made ambiguous and the totality unsteady.

In a certain sense, of course, my concern is superfluous when I consider the world of actuality in which I live—for as a matter of fact I have not found many dialecticians.

In margin: *Note. And these two discourses quite properly did not appear at the same time as *Either/Or* but a few months later—just as this little article now. [IX A 241 136]—JP VI 6242 (*Pap.* IX A 241) *n.d.*, 1848

N.B. N.B.

To be a Christian involves a double danger. [IX A 414 242]

First, all the intense internal suffering involved in becoming a Christian, this losing human reason and being crucified on the paradox. —This is the issue *Concluding Postscript* presents as ideally as possible.

Then the danger of the Christian's having to live in the world of secularity and there express that he is a Christian. Here belongs all the later productivity, which will culminate in what I have ready at present and which could be published under the title: *Collected Works of Consummation* (see this journal, p. 21 [*Pap.* IX A 390]).

When this has been done, the question bursts forth as with elemental power: But how can it occur to a human being to want to subject himself to all this, why should he be a Christian when it is so demanding? The first answer might be: Hold your tongue; Christianity is the absolute, you shall. But another answer may also be given: Because the consciousness of sin within him allows him no rest anywhere; its grief strengthens him to endure everything else if he can only find reconciliation.

This means that the grief of sin must be very deep within a person, and therefore Christianity must be presented as the difficult thing it is, so that it may become entirely clear that Christianity is related solely to the consciousness of sin. To want to be involved in becoming a Christian for any other reason is literally foolishness—and so it must be. [IX A 414 243]—JP I 493 (*Pap.* IX A 414) *n.d.*, 1848

*From draft, with numerous changes, of "Three Notes":*¹⁴¹

No. 3

Preface to "Friday Discourses"

Two (no. II and III) of these discourses (which still lack something

essential in order to be, and therefore cannot be called, “sermons”) have been given in Frue Church.

An authorship that began after *Either/Or* and advanced step by step seeks here its decisive place of rest, at the foot of the altar, from which a beginning can be made in another sense, where the author, personally most aware of his own imperfection and guilt, does not call himself a witness to the truth but a singular kind of thinker and poet, nor does he say that he has had anything new to bring, but that he has tried to think through the old once again, if possible more inwardly.* ...

In margin: *Note. See S. K. postscript to Johannes Climacus's *Concluding Postscript*. Cop. Feb. 1846.

—*Pap.* IX B 63:14 *n.d.*, 1848

N.B. N.B.

N.B.

[*In margin:*
N.B. N.B. N.B.]

My task was to pose this riddle of awakening: a balanced esthetic and religious productivity, simultaneously.

This has been done. There is a balance even in quantity.
Concluding Postscript is the midpoint.

The “Three Notes” swing it into the purely religious.

What comes next cannot be added impatiently as a conclusion. For dialectically it is precisely right that this be the end. What comes next would be the beginning of something new.—*JP* VI 6347 (*Pap.* X¹ A 118) *n.d.*, 1849

† †
†

With regard to a merely human prototype—and here there can, after all, be no question of worship—there is no time for admiration; get busy right away at the task of imitating him.[X¹ A 134 100] The ethical truth of the matter is just this—that admiration is suspiciously like an evasion. With respect to Christ, however, this cannot be the case. Here it is again apparent (as I have so often pointed out in *Concluding Postscript*) that the

Christian-religious is a unique sphere¹⁴² where the esthetic relations reappear, but paradoxically, as higher than the ethical relations; but otherwise this is all reversed. Esthetically (taking here only the relation to a human prototype) admiration is the highest; wanting to imitate has no place in the esthetic. Then along comes the ethical and says: As a matter of fact, wanting to imitate is decisive; admiration has no place or is an evasion. Then comes the paradox-prototype (the God-man). Here we have the esthetic paradox again. If I want to proceed directly to be ethical about this, I take this prototype in vain. Here it is a matter of worship and adoration first and foremost—and only through worship and adoration can there be any question of wanting to imitate. Here must [*sic*] [*in margin*: [X¹ A 134 101] unless the prototype himself helps the one who is supposed to imitate him. And in one respect no one can imitate him, yes, cannot even think of wanting to imitate him (it would be blasphemy), inasmuch as the prototype is the Atoner and the Atonement.] [*A page removed from the journal.*] —JP IV 4454 (*Pap.* X¹ A 134) *n.d.*, 1849 [X¹ A 138 104]

N.B.

N.B.

N.B.

N.B.

N.B.

It is true that my original intention was always to try to get appointed to a small rural parish. But at the time I was actually thinking of it as a contrast to having become, despite my efforts, successful in the world as an author. Now the situation is entirely different, my circumstances so unrewarding that for the time it is appropriate, especially for a penitent, to stay where he is. Humanly speaking, if it were up to me I would give it up, for the generation in which I live is a miserable one indeed when an author of my competence and my self-dedication is treated in this way. I have no interest whatsoever in fighting with them, for in fact there is hardly one I really can say has the competence to judge me. Christianly speaking, my only concern is obedience to God.

It is also true, as I have always said, that the place was unoccupied: an author who knew how to stop. Right. But I was bound to the idea of trying to introduce Christianity into Christendom, albeit poetically and without authority (namely, not making myself a missionary). That, too, has been carried out. But

the trouble is that it nauseates me to have to say one more word to this generation, a word that merely will cost me new sacrifices and expose me to new nastiness. And if it is printed, it can just as well lie until after my death. But Christianly, the only question is that of obedience. If it had anything to do with this kind of nastiness, Christ would never have kept his mouth closed.

It is difficult to know whether it is more humiliating to declare right out that I can no longer afford to be an author and now take on the burden of the finite or to lay myself wide open to all that may follow if I publish something and then, note well, do not make myself an extraordinary who acquires a few disciples. [X¹ A 138 105]

Finally, there is one thing to remember—that my original thought must still be subject to a certain control. How many times have I not said that a warship does not get its orders until it is out at sea, and thus it may be entirely in order for me to go further as an author than I had originally intended, especially since I have become an author in an entirely different sense, for originally I thought of being an author as an escape, something temporary, from going to the country as a pastor. But has not my situation already changed in that *qua* author I have begun to work for the religious? At first I planned to stop immediately after *Either/Or*. That was actually the original idea. But productivity took hold of me. Then I planned to stop with the *Concluding Postscript*. But what happens, I get involved in all that rabble persecution, and that was the very thing that made me remain on the spot. Now, I said to myself, now it can no longer be a matter of abandoning splendid conditions; no, now it is a situation for a penitent. Then I was going to end with *Christian Discourses* and travel, but I did not get to travel—and 1848 was the year of my richest productivity. Thus Governance himself has kept me in the harness. I ask myself: Do you believe that out in the rural parish you would have been able to write three religious books¹⁴³ such as the three following *Concluding Postscript*? And I am obliged to answer: No! It was the tension of actuality that put new strength into my instrument, forced me to publish even more. [X¹ A 138 106] And so again in 1848.

Moreover, now it is only a question of publishing a few short ethical-religious essays¹⁴⁴—and three friendly notes.¹⁴⁵ But as I said, I have become sickened at the thought of having to address

what I say to such an age, to which, humanly speaking, the only proper response would be silence.

I must travel in the spring.—JP VI 6356 (*Pap.* X¹ A 138) *n.d.*, 1849

N.B. N.B.

As yet I have not said a direct word about myself: the postscript to *Concluding Postscript* contains nothing of the sort; all I did was to assume responsibility for the pseudonymous authors and speak *hypothetically* (“according to what I have understood”¹⁴⁶) about their ideas. The information given in *Concluding Postscript*¹⁴⁷ about the character of the pseudonymous authors is by a third party. The conclusion of *Works of Love* (“The Work of Love in Praising Love”) contains nothing direct about me; on the contrary, it says that “the most selfish person” “may be the one who undertakes to praise love.”¹⁴⁸ The review of *Two Ages*¹⁴⁹ has one little hint about me, but that again is not direct communication but is concealed by making it seem as if I had learned it from the novel.—JP VI 6366 (*Pap.* X¹ A 161) *n.d.*, 1849

De se ipso [About oneself]

Actually, something else will happen than what I originally had in mind. [X¹ A 541 344]

When I began as the author of *Either/Or*, I no doubt had a far more profound impression of the *terror* of Christianity than any clergyman in the country. I had a fear and trembling such as perhaps no one else had. Not that I therefore wanted to relinquish Christianity. No, I had another interpretation of it. For one thing I had in fact learned very early that there are men who seem to be selected for suffering, and, for another thing, I was conscious of having sinned much and therefore supposed that Christianity had to appear to me in the form of this terror. But how cruel and false of you, I thought, if you use it to terrify others, perhaps upset ever so many happy, loving lives that may very well be truly Christian. [X¹ A 541 345] It was as alien as it could possibly be to my nature to want to terrify others, and therefore I both sadly and perhaps also a bit proudly found my joy in comforting others and in being

gentleness itself to them—hiding the terror in my own interior being.

So my idea was to give my contemporaries (whether or not they themselves would want to understand) a hint in humorous form (in order to achieve a lighter tone) that a much greater pressure was needed—but then no more; I aimed to keep my heavy burden to myself, as my cross. I have often taken exception to anyone who was a sinner in the strictest sense and then promptly got busy terrifying others. Here is where *Concluding Postscript* comes in.

Then I was horrified to see what was understood by a Christian state (this I saw especially in 1848); I saw how the ones who were supposed to rule, both in Church and state, hid themselves like cowards while barbarism boldly and brazenly raged; and I experienced how a truly unselfish and God-fearing endeavor (and my endeavor as an author was that) is rewarded in the Christian state.

That seals my fate. Now it is up to my contemporaries how they will list the cost of being a Christian, how terrifying they will make it. I surely will be given the strength for it—I almost said “unfortunately.” I really do not say this in pride. I both have been and am willing to pray to God to exempt me from this terrible business; furthermore, I am human myself and love, humanly speaking, to live happily here on earth. But if what one sees all over Europe is Christendom, a Christian state, then I propose to start here in Denmark to list the price for being Christian in such a way that the whole concept—state church, official appointments, livelihood—bursts open.

I dare not do otherwise, for I am a penitent from whom God can demand everything. I also write under a pseudonym because I am a penitent. Nevertheless, I will be persecuted, but I am secure against any honor and esteem that from another side could fall to me. [X¹ A 541 346]

For some years now I have been so inured to bearing the treachery and ingratitude of a little country, the envy of the elite and the insults of the rabble that I perhaps—for want of anything better—am qualified to proclaim Christianity. Bishop Mynster can keep his velvet robe and Grand Cross.— *JP* VI 6444 (*Pap.* X¹ A 541) *n.d.*, 1849

What an accomplishment the *Concluding Postscript* is; there is

more than enough for three professors. But of course the author was a someone who did not have a career position and did not seem to want to have one; there was nothing worthy of becoming a paragraph in the system—well, then, it is nothing at all.

The book came out in Denmark. It was not mentioned anywhere at all. Perhaps fifty copies were sold; thus the publishing costs for me, including the proofreader's fee (one hundred rix-dollars), came to about four or five hundred rix-dollars, plus my time and work. And in the meantime, I was caricatured by a scandal sheet that in the same little country had three thousand subscribers, and another paper (also with wide circulation, *Flyveposten*) continued the discussion about my trousers.¹⁵⁰— *JP* VI 6458 (*Pap.* X¹ A 584) *n.d.*, 1849

On My Authorship

The heterogeneity must definitely be maintained, that here is an author, that objectively it is not a cause but that it is a cause for which an individual has stood alone, suffered, etc. But just as it has not been understood why *Concluding Postscript* has a comic design—and just as the matter is thought to be improved by taking particular theses and translating them into the didactic—so it will probably end with treating me, unto new confusion, as a cause and translating everything into the objective, making it into something new that here is a new doctrine, rather than that the new is that here is personality. . . .—*Pap.* X² A 130 *n.d.*, 1849

The Position of Christianity at the Present Moment [X² A 163 128]

. . . What Christianity needs for certain is traitors. Christendom has insidiously betrayed Christianity by wanting not to be truly Christian but to have the appearance of being so. [X² A 163 129]
Now traitors are needed.

But this concept, traitors, is dialectical. The devil also, so to speak, has his traitors, his spies, who do not attack Christianity but attack the Christians—with the express purpose of getting more and more to fall away. God, too, has his traitors: God-fearing traitors, who in unconditional obedience to him simply and sincerely present Christianity in order that for once people may get

to know what Christianity is. I am sure that established Christendom regards them as traitors, since Christendom has taken illegal possession of Christianity by a colossal forgery.

Strangely enough, I always understand best afterwards. Dialectically Johannes Climacus¹⁵¹ is in fact so radical a defense of Christianity that to many it may seem like an attack. This book makes one feel that it is Christendom that has betrayed Christianity.

This book has an extraordinary future.

And I, the author, am in a way held up to ridicule as always. I manage to do things the entire significance of which I do not understand until later. This I have seen again and again. For that very reason I cannot become serious in the trivial sense in which serious people are serious, for I realize that I am nothing. There is an infinite power that, as it were, helps me; when I turn to it, I pray—this certainly is earnestness; but when I turn to myself, I almost have to laugh at the thought that I, a wretched nobody etc., seem to be so important. [X² A 163 130] I cannot quite make myself intelligible to others, for whatever I write they promptly categorize as pertaining to me. In my own consciousness, where I understand the way things really hang together, at every alternate moment jest can scarcely be avoided. But it is a pious jest, for precisely in smiling at myself in my nothingness there is again an expression of devotion. To use a metaphor and example, it is as if a little miss were loved by someone whom she feels to be very superior to her intellectually. In the ordinary sense of the word this relationship does not become serious. The like-for-like that provides finite security and earnestness is lacking. She cannot help smiling at herself when she thinks of being loved by—him, and yet she feels blissful during every moment of his visit. Nor does she dare tell herself “in earnest”: He loves me, for she will say: My relationship to him is actually nothing; he would do no wrong whatsoever in leaving me this moment, for there is no relationship between us, but the relationship is blissful as long as it lasts.

But my relationship has the peculiar quality of being reflective, so that I do not see it until later—see, there I have been helped again. I take my pen, commend myself to God, work hard, etc., in short, do the best I can with the meager human means. The pen moves briskly across the paper. I feel that what I am writing is all my own. And then, long afterwards, I profoundly understand what

I wrote and see that I received help.

It is easy to see that dialectically Johannes Climacus's defense of Christianity is as radical as it can be, for dialectically the defense and the attack are within a single hair of being one.

"Johannes Climacus" was actually a contemplative piece, for when I wrote it I was contemplating the possibility of not letting myself be taken over by Christianity, even if it was my most honest intention to devote my whole life and daily diligence to the cause of Christianity, to do everything, to do nothing else but to expound and interpret it, even though I were to become like, be like the legendary [X² A 163 131] Wandering Jew—myself not a Christian in the final and most decisive sense of the word and yet leading others to Christianity.—JP VI 6523 (*Pap.* X² A 163) *n.d.*, 1849

From draft of Point of View; see 1.251:18-252:2: [X⁵ B 168 360]

N.B. This postscript is partly or essentially used in the postscript to "The Accounting"¹⁵² and consequently cannot be used both places.¹⁵³

Postscript to the Reader

To the typesetter:

To be set in smallest possible brevier.

My dear reader, I have wanted to and believed that I ought to say this to you, and at this very time when I am about to meet my first work: [X⁵ B 168 361] the second edition of *Either/Or*, which I was unwilling to have published earlier. Direct communication, that is, by me personally *concerning* and *about* my authorship, its comprehensive plan, its objective, the placing of each individual work in the whole, and every individual part in each individual work, etc., is in a way, even where it is not a plain impossibility, against my nature, my personality—and against my work as an author, all of which is dialectics from first to last, and all of which until now at least from one side, has hitherto considered itself to be religiously committed to silence. Lest [*changed from:* God forbid, therefore, or if it should happen, may he then forgive me if] these few direct words about myself personally and about my authorship might in any way be a breach of, a weakness in relation to, what I myself have hitherto understood, namely, that I was committed to silence concerning myself personally and concerning

direct communication about my authorship. In this regard, everything is in order and proper, even the little I have here communicated directly to you, I have not communicated, although from one side, without concern, without the concern that from this side unconditionally preoccupies me most—that I in some way might have said too much about myself and too little about Governance.

In one sense my explanation of my work as an author has a special coherence. My explaining is not like that of an author who says: This and this I have done—and then by inspecting the books is convinced that this is exactly what he has not done. No, what I explain is always something factual, is factual for the reader just as for me, is printed in the books, or if I consider the arrangement of the books, then this, too, is something factual, something anyone can verify whenever he wishes—in what order the books actually came out. Nor is my thought this, which is indeed only a simple and natural development, that in the process of working out something I gradually was better satisfied with my effort or what I want generally. [X⁵ B 168 362] This is the position taken by Johannes Climacus, who in a survey of the pseudonymous works together with my upbuilding discourses expressly states that he, who as reader kept abreast of the books, every time he had read such a published work, understood better what it was that he had wanted, he who from the beginning had himself wanted to carry out the very thing that was carried out in this authorship (see *Concluding Postscript*, p. 187 bot. [1.251]). No, in my case what I myself have planned, carried out, and said—I myself sometimes understand only afterward how correct it was, that there was something far deeper in it than I thought at first—and yet I am the one who is the author. Here in my thoughts is an inexplicable something suggesting that I was, as it were, helped by someone else, that I have come to work out and say something whose deeper meaning I myself sometimes understand only afterward. This, in my view, is quite simply and God-fearingly the cooperation of Governance in such a way as everyone ought and should be able to speak of this. In other words, if the discussion of it is to be only scholarly and philosophical, it should be titled: The Relation between Immediacy and Reflection within Reflection, or The Process of Development That within Reflection Is the Transposing of Immediacy into Reflection, Here Reflected in the

Work of an Author and in the Author's Corresponding Supporting Existence. The individuality in whom the same happens, if he has religiousness, and to the same degree as he has religiousness, must religiously, and to the same degree religiously attribute it to God, and all the more fervently and gratefully to the same degree as he perhaps otherwise feels unhappy and sad and, seen from another side, humble before God, feels not at all worthy or feels unworthy to have this happiness be granted to him in particular. But this can be *truly* said only in the silence of inwardness—that is, it cannot be communicated.

If I myself religiously understand that I have been helped by another, what wonder, then, that I am uneasy about speaking *personally* about my work as an author and that I, when I have said only the very least thing in the first person, immediately have a great concern about having said too much about myself and too little about Governance! And, my dear reader, the difficulty involved here in speaking returns in another way: [X⁵ B 168 363] that when I personally, in the first person, make myself if possible into nothing, which in one sense I would like to do—and really let the pathos-filled emphasis of humility fall so that everything is due to Governance—then of course I run into another danger, which makes me shudder even more, that in someone's conception of me I would be raised so high up into the extraordinary, as if in some way I had an immediate relationship with God, which, if possible, would be even more untrue and for me more appalling than if I were categorically to attribute unconditionally everything to myself, I who indeed am like an epitome of reflection.

It is difficult to speak personally here, to say in the first person what is developed there, what is in the books in their actual sequence to each other etc. This is something any third person can do without the slightest trouble at all, and what I myself as a third person can so very easily do, indeed have shown that I can do [*In margin: Note*. For example, Johannes Climacus's report on the pseudonymous writers (see *Concluding Postscript*, pp. 187-227 [1.251-300]) by me as third person by a third person]—since my case differs from that of most authors in that it is easiest for them to speak in the first person about their endeavor. For me it is very easy to talk about it in the third person. So it is difficult to speak, but being silent also has its difficulty. By unconditionally attributing everything to myself I can defraud Governance of what

I religiously and personally must call its share. [*In margin: Note.* To give just one example of what I mean. It would be untrue if I were unconditionally to claim the whole authorship as *my intention* from the beginning, because it is also the possibility of my author-nature that has come into existence but it has not been conscious (*deleted: from the very beginning*). It would be untrue to say unconditionally that I used the esthetic productivity as maieutic from the very beginning, but for the reader the whole authorship actually will still be maieutic in relation to the religious, which in me was most basic.] [X⁵ B 158 364] But I can also defraud Governance by being silent, since in that case my reader would straightway be prompted to trace everything to me, as if I myself had envisioned everything this way from the beginning.

This is why I have chosen to say the little that I have said here. In my own innermost being on my own responsibility I understand everything easily—in my own innermost being, where before God I have my personal life, its cunning, its nevertheless God-fearing cunning in relation to my work as an author and its objective—in my own innermost being before God, where, as a beneficial tempering and correcting middle term in relation to whatever extraordinariness may possibly have been granted me, I have my personal life, its pain and sufferings, and above all its errors and sins and the consequences, its repentance and regret. But to speak about myself as someone who is dead, I cannot do or, rather, I cannot defend doing it as long as I am a living person.

Just one thing more: the little that is said in this little book about my work as an author is about the past, about what has been accomplished—something that obviously is implied in the subject itself, and something you yourself will surely become aware of during your reading, even just from the tenses that are used. With regard to the future—whether I will continue to be an author for a time, a longer or shorter time, and as before, or whether I will begin to be a different kind of author, or whether I will simply cease to be an author now—about that absolutely nothing is known, not even by me. I, who by nature am also a born dialectician and sheer reflection, have with much fear and trembling learned quite accurately, literally, and earnestly to understand that I cannot ever know whether the talents and qualifications I have possessed so far, the good fortune that has followed me so far, etc., whether all this may be taken from me in

the next moment, perhaps before I have finished this sentence. [X⁵ B 168 365] Do not think that this is a depression of the kind that renders one unproductive. Under the weight of this mood—and perhaps it weighed upon me even more heavily than it does now, since in the course of time I have become more practiced in it—I began as an author, and under the weight of this mood I have written—shall I now say the few pages I have written.

Copenhagen. Spring 1849.

S. K.

—*Pap.* X⁵ B 168 *n.d.*, 1849

Lines about Myself

If someone were to say that I as a religious author am very severe with my contemporaries, I would (yet without altogether admitting it to be so) answer: [X² A 124 94] But why are you so severe with me? Consider my life as an author, my diligence, my exertions—and then the judgment is supposed to be that I am a kind of eccentric, an exaggerator—while those who carry on the most contemptible literary trade live in abundance and have power, while everyone with a finite goal is rewarded with this and in addition is regarded as earnest.

Is this not being severe with me? Well, my life is in rapport with ideas, and I personally feel myself to be religiously committed. [X² A 124 95] Halfheartedness and blather I cannot endure; my life is either/or everywhere. If I am supposed to be an ornament for my country, well, then express it. But if everything against me is supposed to be permitted, well, then I also must express that I live in my native country as a piece of folly—and I must have the idea with me; I cannot do without the essentially Christian: ergo, I must raise the price of being a Christian.¹⁵⁴ If wantonness and rudeness and envy are permitted to treat a literary endeavor, respectable in every regard, the way I have been treated, well, then people will have to put up with my suspicions about the right such a country has to call itself totally Christian, will have to put up with my jacking up what it is to be Christian.

I may very well suffer for it, but I will not relinquish the idea. If the pressure on me is increased, well, then I will suffer more, but I cannot relinquish the idea, and so the counter pressure that I

provide will be even stronger. I find no pleasure in this situation, but with regard to the idea I cannot do otherwise, and I feel myself to be religiously committed.

Or has it become a crime for me to be an author? To take just one example. Three years ago, *Concluding Postscript* was published. It is the capstone to an earlier splendid literary endeavor; it is itself the fruit of one or one-and-a-half years of diligence, and diligence that I call diligence; it cost me between five and six hundred rix-dollars to publish. Sixty copies of the book were sold. It was not mentioned in one single place. On the other hand, to the delight of the rabble, I was caricatured and insulted in the *Corsair*; in *Kjøbenhavnsposten*, P. L. Møller poured insults on it and me; in *Flyveposten*, in order to incite the rabble's ridicule, they wrote about my trousers, that they had now become too long.¹⁵⁵

And then they want to complain that I am too severe—but the severity that is shown to me, no mention must be made of that.—*Pap. X² A 124 n.d.*, 1849

From draft of On My Work as an Author:

. . . The movement it [the authorship] describes is: from “the poet,” from the esthetic—from the philosopher, from the speculative—to the indication of the most inward qualification of the essentially Christian; **from** the **pseudonymous** *Either/Or*, which was immediately accompanied by *Two Upbuilding Discourses* with *my name* as author, **through** *Concluding Postscript* with *my name* as editor, **to** *Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* [*here a double dagger in red crayon, in margin a double dagger and: see the attached*], the latest work¹⁵⁶ I have written, and “of which two have been delivered in Frue Church” ...—*Pap. X⁵ B 201 p. 382 n.d.*, 1849

From draft of “The Accounting,” in On My Work as an Author:

Yet I owe it to the truth to admit that in the beginning it was by no means my thought to become a religious author in the sense I have become that; on the contrary, it was truly my intention in the beginning to become a rural pastor the moment I laid down my pen. [*X⁵ B 217 404*] I profoundly understood that I belonged to the religious, that it was a deception on my part, albeit a pious deception, to pass myself off as an esthetic author, and I sought an

energetic expression for my belonging in the strictest sense to the religious and thought to find this in leaping away from being an esthetic author—and at once becoming a rural pastor. My first thought was to stop with *Either/Or*—and then at once a rural pastor. It did not happen; but since it did not happen, there was promptly a religious signaling (*Two Upbuilding Discourses*). [X⁵ B 217 405] Then for a time my thought was to break off with *Concluding Postscript*—and then rural pastor. That did not happen, but then, too, the authorship became decidedly religious. Now these seven years have passed. It is again, unchanged, my thought to become a rural pastor, but a point has also been reached from which I can survey the totality of the authorship. ... My thought was to deceive by becoming an esthetic author and then promptly to become a rural pastor, accentuating the religious doubly strongly by the contrast. Something else happened: the religious found its expression in my becoming a religious author, but consequently a religious author who began with an esthetic productivity as a deception. The point was that the religious found its expression unconditionally at the same time the esthetic deception was initiated—otherwise there would have been a show of justification in saying that originally I was not conscious that the esthetic productivity was a deception and that the explanation would be that in the beginning I wanted to be an esthetic author and then later changed. [X⁵ B 217 406] But the presence of the religious at exactly the same time found its expression not as I had thought, by my becoming a rural pastor, but by the publication of *Two Upbuilding Discourses*.¹⁵⁷— *Pap.* X⁵B 217 *n.d.*, 1849

*From draft of unpublished reply to Rasmus Nielsen's review of Postscript:*¹⁵⁸

There is a Duplexity in *Concluding Postscript* [X⁶ B 114 143]

A

In the strictest sense, Christianly understood, there is no Christian scientific scholarship, and in any case the Christian scholar should apply to *faith* for the indulgence to dare to occupy himself with scholarship, since scholarship is not superior but inferior.

This is not some new principle, for it is itself the Christian

principle; still less is it a new scientific principle that is now supposed to be made into the science that there is no science. No, this is the boundary of the essentially Christian.

Concluding Postscript correctly makes the turn from faith into faith, to the existential—not to the speculative, and least of all to this as the higher. ... [X⁶ B 114 144]

This is the significance of *Concluding Postscript*. [X⁶ B 114 145] Its protest against scientific scholarship is consistently carried out; it is a μετᾱβᾱσις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [shifting from one genus to another]. [X⁶ B 114 146] There is no didacticizing that there must be no didacticizing in any way; everything is transposed into the existential, and the author himself is an existing humorist. If the author had been a bungler, he would in one didacticizing lecture have didacticized that there is no scientific scholarship and then along with the basic error of our time would have connived a superstitious belief in didacticizing, he would have quickly managed to be understood and would have made a hit. By being consistent, he missed out on all this and, conscious that what he had to communicate and had communicated ought to be advanced, it must be advanced, he prepared to endure the inevitable martyrdom, such as to be ignored for a few years, regarded as a superfluity, a foolish trick, etc.

To bring myself also into this, the publishing of *Concluding Postscript* has cost me between five and six hundred rix-dollars; sixty copies were sold; it was not mentioned anywhere; a certain scholarly clique spread the opinion that it was rather slapdash work—and the exulting rabble-barbarians in the lead of those hooting thousands caricatured me, a sacrifice to ridicule and insults.

It makes no difference—this *must be said*. This book is only one element in the totality of my work as an author, but an important element, but a work that by its content, its artistic structure, its dialectical consistency, has a significant future. ... —*Pap*. X⁶ B 114 n.d., 1849-50.

Addition to Pap. X⁶ B 114:

About Prof. Martensen, Prof. R. Nielsen,
Joh. [X⁶ B 116 149] Climacus

by
S. K.

Concluding Postscript. It is not any new principle, since it is itself the Christian principle; least of all is it a new scientific principle, that there is no science,* which should now be made into a science.

It is the boundary of Christianity. The swing is properly made from faith into faith, to the existential—not to the speculative, which goes further.

If someone is unable to be satisfied with that, feels an urge to go further, then Christianity also has in readiness for him: the honor of martyrdom—to be laughed at, mocked, ridiculed, spat upon, put to death.

**Note.* Yet the thesis—the knowledge that one cannot and shall not understand faith—must be held in contrast to an understanding of faith.

Is scientific scholarship thereby abolished or made impossible? No. But the judgment about Christian scholarship has become something else. Instead of the inflated conceitedness of scholarship about going further than faith, faith is established in its manorial right, and scholarship, or the scholar's life, is to be regarded as an enjoyment, a pleasure, etc. that he may wish for—which can also be granted to him if he, please note, declares for the faith, receives and acknowledges his order to remain courteously within its boundary and recognize scholarship not as higher but as lower.

Who, now, is to present this? In the stricter sense a preacher of penitence could do it. But perhaps the trouble is not so deep, and in any case caution is also a Christian virtue.

So a humorist is sent. [X⁶ B 116 150] He says it. That he is a humorist is precisely the leniency. He will call attention only to certain things, indicate them to people—and then no further.

But through the judgment upon himself he will also come to know the state of affairs. If the judgment is: what he says is fantasticality; scholarship, Christianly understood, is earnestness for sure—then Christian scholarship is brazen—and then he must take more rigorous measures. That is, by pressing down a little bit harder on the corrective.¹⁵⁹

** In margin: Note.* But Frater Taciturnus has already said of himself: Do not incite him, because he could become dangerous.¹⁶¹

Let me illustrate the same by other [*changed from*: purely] existential relations. Christianly understood, the boundary of Christianity is: to become a fool in the world.¹⁶⁰ Now, if there is a country, a city, where, as it is said, all are Christians, and yet where altogether in the ordinary human sense the striving of the majority is along the line of honors, glory, status—then, if these people still want to be Christians, it is necessary to call attention to Christianity's more rigorous requirement. How is this to be done? It can be done by a preacher of penitence in character. But this may be too strong a means, and in any case caution is also a Christian virtue. Consequently a humorist is used for this. He sets forth the rigorous requirement. He leniently pretends as if it were almost a jest, although the presentation still has the appropriate daggerstab.* It is now left up to the person concerned to utilize the suggestion. If the judgment now becomes: No, to aspire to honors, glory, and status, that is the earnestness of life; the other is fantasticality—then one is brazen, and then it will become necessary to jack up the corrective a little.

Take, for example, marriage. Christianly understood, in the strictest sense the essentially Christian is: the single state. Does Christianity, then, have something against marriage? No, but marriage, Christianly understood, must take into account that it is an indulgence. If marriage becomes secularly inflated, it becomes brazen and wants to be the earnestness of life and wants the single state to be fantasticality. [X⁶ B 116 151] Then there must be a trial. Who should do it or be the prosecuting lawyer? Indeed, an unmarried man, a preacher of penitence, who lets all the religious accent fall upon his being unmarried. But perhaps this is too severe. So a humorist is used. He refrains from marriage—but he slips in an entirely different, flimsy explanation in order not to press too hard and alarm. Meanwhile he expounds Christianity. It is leniency. Now the judgment about him is that he is a visionary; then the corrective must be jacked up a few notches.

Prof. Nielsen's¹⁶² merit is to have become aware. His mistake, however, is that he tries to make this into scholarship. Furthermore, instead of temporarily limiting himself just to admitting something about himself and his earlier standpoint—he promptly wants to use what he has learned to judge others.

Prof. Martensen has wanted to ignore the whole thing and

finally became brazen in the preface to his dogmatics.¹⁶³

The course of my authorship was described before in that article “Public Confession,”¹⁶⁴ which came out when I was through with the manuscript for *Either/Or*. I wanted to have no earthly reward as author, and therefore it was my desire that when the few years in which I could be an author were over, everything in literature should stand unchanged: Heiberg—Mynster—Madvig.

Heiberg promptly confused things. He became malapert.—As for Martensen, I have always regarded him with suspicion, but, as the pattern also shows, he marked Prof. Nielsen in particular as the one who should bear the brunt on behalf of speculative thought. Martensen has now become malapert.

Madvig stands unchanged.

And above them all, Mynster—here there could be a eulogy on Mynster.— *Pap.* X⁶ B 116 *n.d.*, 1849-50

Addition to Pap. X⁶ B 114:

The emphasis falls all too inadequately on the point that this work is only a link in a whole totality. [X⁶ B 118 152]

In the next place, the protest against speculative thought is contained just as much in the form of the work as in its contents. It has been martyrdom to endure this misunderstanding. From Prof. Nielsen we in turn involuntarily receive the impression that the didactic discourse is the only earnest kind, is “earnestness.” By taking a few separate sentences that were partially didactic and working them together, he indeed seems to want to concur with the delusion that the didactic discourse is earnestness. [X⁶ B 118 153] In this way injustice is done to the book. It weakens the impression of the book’s merit: a consistent correspondence of its form and its communication.

It also ought to be emphasized that Joh. Climacus is not Magister Kierkegaard but a fictive character. The crowd always confuses such things.

He (Nielsen) somehow credits himself with the merits of the pseudonymous author, as if it were he who ordered the whole thing and organized it under points of view; but then the separate points as well as what falls under them are literally copied.— *Pap.* X⁶ B 118 *n.d.*, 1849-50

On Prof. Nielsen's Relationship to My Pseudonym
Johannes Climacus¹⁶⁵ [X⁶ B 118 154]

A

What I Cannot Approve

1. "There must be no didacticizing"—in the pseudonymous writers this has found adequate expression in the abeyance of didacticizing. A μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος [shift to a different genus] is made in relation to didacticizing; the idea is reduplicated in the form—everything is changed into a poetcommunication by a poor individual human being like most people, an imaginatively constructing humorist—everything is situated in existence. Probably the reason the pseudonymous writer was so alien to a didacticizing age was simply that he was very consistent.

It is different with Prof. Nielsen. His form, his presentation, his address, are more or less didacticizing, especially if compared with the pseudonym's. The numerous scholarly allusions recalled by the professor are reminiscent of "the professor," and it becomes more or less a kind of doctrine that there must be no didacticizing.

From the standpoint of the idea, the cause has retrogressed, because it has acquired a less consistent form.

2. In the pseudonymous writings the content of Christianity has been compressed to its least possible minimum simply in order to give all the more powerful momentum toward becoming a Christian and to keep the nervous energy all the more intensively concentrated so as to be able to master the confusion and prevent the intrusion of "the parenthetical."

It is different with Prof. N. With him the contents expand. He goes into an investigation of each particular miracle etc. etc.—in short, he goes into details. [X⁶ B 118 155] At the same time it is made difficult to provide momentum and to maintain the qualitative tension, because doubt and reflection are essentially related to this dispersive trend, to the details, and they get the upper hand as soon as one gets involved in them.

From the standpoint of the idea there has been a loss, and the tension of the issue has been weakened—and yet no doubt many have now become aware of the cause.

3. There must be a swing off from science and scholarship, away from theory. The pseudonym does not concentrate upon this

thought; the pseudonym himself is continuously this new direction; the entire work is repulsion and the new direction is into existential inwardness.

It is quite different with Prof. N. Here this thought is dwelt upon, details are gone into, the same thought is followed through in relation to the particular theological disciplines—sheer lingering. But in the very second there is one second of lingering, science and scholarship are on the way to becoming the stronger, for science and scholarship are and consist in *lingering*, whereas faith is itself the impetus of the existential away from that from which one is to move. But in the very second of lingering, theory thrusts itself forward and begins to take shape, for theory is and consists in lingering. And with Prof. N. the new direction is not taken; it does not find its expression qualitatively different from all theorizing. A kind of concluding paragraph is formulated so one can always remember that a new direction is to be taken. N. is much too professionally serious to be able to take a new direction as that jesting Joh. Climacus can in all consistency, because “to swing,” “to swing off,”¹⁶⁶ so one always takes oneself back, is impossible without the unity of jest and earnestness.

From the standpoint of the idea, there is a loss—although no doubt more have now become aware of the cause.

4. The significance of the pseudonym, as of all the pseudonyms, is: the communication of interiority. In the infinite distance of the idea from actuality, yet in another sense so close to it, interiority becomes audible. But there is no finite relation to actuality, no one is attacked, no name is named; no one is under obligation to appropriate this communication, no one is constrained, although it does not follow thereby that no one by himself has a truth-duty toward this communication.[X⁶B 121 156] ... —JP VI 6574 (*Pap.* X⁶B 121) *n.d.*, 1850

Occasioned by a Comment in

Magnus Eirikson's [*sic*]

Latest Book *Speculativ Rettroenhed* etc.¹⁶⁷

The comment¹⁶⁸ states that in his book *Concluding Postscript* Magister Kierkegaard has ridiculed, yes, insulted Martensen's theology (the speculative professor etc.).

In reply it must be pointed out that *Concluding Postscript* is not by me but by a pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, and at the end of

the book¹⁶⁹ there is an adequate clarification of my relationship as editor. In the second place, Professor M. is mentioned nowhere in the book, and not only this, the scene is deliberately sustained in such a way that rather than being in Denmark it is in Germany, where, after all, the speculative thought that “goes beyond” originates. A comic type is created that is called “the assistant professor [*Privat-Dozent*],” a type I consider to be very valuable. Everything is kept as poetic as possible, because as the editor I am no friend of finite squabbles. And Germany is practically designated as the scene, because I, who otherwise am rather well informed on the speculative “scientific” accomplishments of Prof. Martensen and the Danish moderns, do not know whether either he or they have added anything at all new to what any fairly well-read student knows from Germany. I know very well that for a long time now here in Denmark certain ones have made themselves important by what they have learned from the Germans and rendered practically word for word (as if it were their own), that they have compiled various diverse German thinkers, professors, assistant professors, tutors, etc. But insofar as this is not the fraud one wishes to depict in a comic light, insofar as it is modern speculation (especially that of the post-Hegelian gang) one wishes to oppose from the side of *faith*, it is poetically appropriate to keep the scene vague, roughly in Germany, recognizable by “the assistant-professor,” of which there were myriads in Germany at that time, even though in various models, while in fact there was not one single assistant professor in Denmark the year *Concluding Postscript* came out. [X⁶ B 128 171] As the editor I was aware of this, yes, I regarded *Concluding Postscript* to be, among other things, a Danish protest against modern speculation; I understood, as time will surely bear me out, that when the tyrannical opinion by which “The System” maintained itself has vanished, my pseudonym will be acknowledged to have been right in his view that it was genuinely Danish to regard the exaggerations of this speculation as comic, yet without forgetting that it is also Danish to love and honor true scholarship, such as Greek scholarship at present, which actually is what the pseudonym uses, although he is also indebted very much to an earlier German scholarship as well as to Hegel.—JP VI 6596 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 128) *n.d.* 1849-50

Reply to Theophilus Nicolaus [pseud.[X⁶ B 68 72] of Magnus Eiriksson], author of a book titled: [*Er Troen et Paradox og "i Kraft af det Absurde"? et Spørgsmaal foranledigt ved "Frygt og Bæven, af Johannes de silentio", besvaret ved Hjælp af en Troes-Ridders fortrolige Meddelelser til fælles Opbyggelse for Jøder, Christne og Muhammedanere* (Copenhagen: 1850)] . . .

The new and curious turn you give to the matter is this, then. You throw out all of Christianity and thereupon, with an exultant look, say something like this: Where now is the paradox? More correctly, you should say: Where now is Christianity? Incidentally, an amazing situation! I, Johannes Climacus, say that I “by no means make out that I am a Christian” (see *Concluding Postscript*¹⁷⁰), but I let Christianity stand. [X⁶ B 68 73] You throw out all of Christianity—and then continue to be a Christian and, furthermore, in the capacity of a Christian make no petty distinctions between (see title page) “Jews, Christians, and Mohammedans.” ... —JP VI 6598 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 68) *n.d.*, 1850

*From draft of unpublished reply to Magnus Eiríksson:*¹⁷¹

That there is a difference between the absurd in *Fear and Trembling*¹⁷² and the paradox in *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is quite correct. [X⁶ 80 86] The first is the purely personal definition of existential faith—the other is faith in relationship to a doctrine.

The author would like to get rid of the absurd—he assumes that faith is by virtue of a higher hint, a higher communication, etc. (pp. 140, 143). Look more closely. Johannes de Silentio¹⁷³ does not say that he is a believer, but a “higher hint” etc. can very well be anything but the absurd for the believer—but for a third person! In the meantime, this is of no help with regard to Abraham, because for him the collision is precisely between two higher hints—God’s promise about Isaac and God’s demand that he sacrifice Isaac; nothing is said about a third “higher hint.”

Moreover, an observation in *Postscript*, p. 193¹⁷⁴ [1.259], is of importance. [X⁶ B 80 87]

Also there are the more precise qualifications (that) Joh. Climacus gives to make sure that the absurd as such is not the absurd in the ordinary sense. P. 437, 11. 9-10 [1.568:15-17] etc. from top, also reference there [pp. 1.557-58].

The absurd is the negative criterion of that which is higher than

human understanding and knowledge. The operations of understanding are to note it as such—and then to submit it to everyone for his belief.

Also important in *Postscript* are pp. 470-71 [1.610-11] etc.

Finally, it is one thing to believe by virtue of the absurd (the formula only of the passion of faith) and to believe the absurd. The first expression is used by Johannes de Silentio and the second by Johannes Climacus.—JP I 11 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 80) *n.d.*, 1850

From draft of unpublished reply to Magnus Eiríksson:

The objection that there is conflict between the absurd in Johannes de Silentio and in Johannes Climacus is a misunderstanding. In the same way according to the New Testament Abraham is called the father of faith, and yet it is indeed clear that the content of his faith cannot be Christian—that Jesus Christ has been in existence. But Abraham's faith is the formal definition of faith. So it is also with the absurd.—JP I 12 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 81) *n.d.*, 1850

[*In margin:* About Theophilus Nicolaus]

About Theophilus Nicolaus

This is what comes when bungling stupidity takes sides directly opposite to an artistic design.

Johannes Climacus himself declares that he does not have faith. Theophilus Nicolaus portrays the believer.

He does not perceive at all that to be consistent he has to assume that everything Johannes Climacus says proves nothing, since he himself says he does not have faith, is not a Christian.

But Theophilus Nicolaus has no inkling of this. He plunges in *bona fide*.

How tragic to live in such a limited setting that there is virtually no one who has an eye for a profoundly executed artistic design.

What daily toil, enormous effort, almost sleepless dialectical perseverance it costs me to keep the threads straight in this subtle construction—such is not for others at all. I am identified automatically with my pseudonyms, and some nonsense is concocted, which—of course—many more understand; yes, of

course!—*JP* VI 6597 (*Pap.* X² A 601) *n.d.*, 1850

About Myself

When I think back on it now, it is wonderful to think of that stroke of a pen with which I hurled myself against rabble-barbarism! [X² A 586 417]

And this was my mood when I took that step. I thought of stopping writing with *Concluding Postscript*, and to that end the manuscript in its entirety was delivered to Luno. Grateful, unspeakably grateful for what had been granted to me, I decided—on the occasion of that article in *Gæa*¹⁷⁵—to take a magnanimous step for “the others.” I was the only one who had the qualifications to do it emphatically, the qualifications along these lines: (1) Goldschmidt had immortalized me¹⁷⁶ and saw in me an object of admiration, (2) I am a witty author, (3) I have not sided with the elite or with any party at all, (4) I have a personal virtuosity for associating with everybody, (5) a shining reputation that literally did not have one single speck of criticism or the like, (6) I altruistically used my own money to be an author, (7) I was unmarried, independent, etc.[X² A 586 418]

So, religiously motivated, I did it. And look, this step was determinative for my continuing to write! And what significance it has had, how I have learned to know myself, learned to know “the world,” and learned to understand Christianity—yes, a whole side of Christianity, and a crucial side, which very likely would not have occurred to me at all otherwise, and except for that the situation for coming into the proper relation to Christianity myself perhaps would not have been my fortune, either.

But what a range: an established consummate reputation as an author, and then suddenly almost beginning all over again!— *JP* VI 6594 (*Pap.* X² A 586) *n.d.*, 1850

Regarding a statement in the postscript to “Concluding Postscript” with respect to publishing the books about my work as an author

The statement is: “Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me. I have no opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning except as a reader, not the

remotest private relation to them, since it is impossible to have that to a doubly reflected communication. A single word by me personally in my own name would be an arrogating self-forgetfulness that, regarded dialectically, would be guilty of essentially having annihilated the pseudonymous authors by this one word.”¹⁷⁷

Now it could be said that in “The Accounting,”¹⁷⁸ for example, there is indeed direct discussion of the pseudonymous authors, pointing out the principal idea that runs through the whole.

With regard to that, it may be observed *both* that what I wrote then can be altogether true and that what I wrote later just as true, simply because at that time I was not as advanced in my development, still had not come to an understanding of the definitive idea for all my writing, still did not even dare to declare definitely whether or not it would possibly end with my finding something that would push me back from Christianity, although I still continued with religious enthusiasm and to the best of my ability to work out the task of presenting what Christianity is. *And* it may also be noted that I do not discuss the pseudonyms directly in the books about my authorship or identify with them but merely show their significance as maieutic method. Finally, I must add: This is how I understand the totality *now*; by no means did I have this overview of the whole from the beginning, no more than I dare to say that I immediately perceived that the τέλος of the pseudonyms was maieutic, since this, too, was like a phase of poetic emptying in my own life-development.—JP VI 6654 (*Pap. X³A 258*) *n.d.*, 1850

When I had published *Concluding Postscript*, I intended to withdraw and devote myself more to my own relationship to Christianity.[X³ A 318 231]

But in the meantime external situations involved my public life in such a way that I existentially discovered the Christian collisions.[X³ A 318 232]

This is an essential element in my own education.—JP VI 6660 (*Pap. X³ A 318*) *n.d.*, 1850

A Direct Word about Myself as an Author[*]

From the beginning it was never my thought to be an author for many years, which I could not afford either—and for me it has

been in both the one sense and the other seven costly years in which I have been an author in the language that, as I hope and trust, will still not be disgraced by my having the honor to write it. . . .[X⁶ B 249 410]

At the end of '47 and in the beginning of '48 I again considered finishing as an author in order to become a rural pastor, which had continually been my desire, to end with *Christian Discourses*, whose last section is "Discourses at the Communion on Fridays," of which two were given in Frue Church—then came the year 1848—for me the richest and most fruitful year, without any comparison, I have experienced as an author. . . .[X⁶ B 249 412]

[*] *In margin*: Perhaps the words about Paul by Thomas à Kempis could be used here: He sometimes defended himself lest the weak be offended on account of his silence.¹⁷⁹— *Pap*. X⁶ B 249 n.d., 1849-51

... As is well known, my authorship has two parts: one pseudonymous and the other signed.[X⁶ B 145 202] The pseudonymous writers are poetized personalities, poetically maintained so that everything they say is in character with their poetized individualities; sometimes I have carefully explained in a signed preface my own interpretation of what the pseudonym said. Anyone with just a fragment of common sense will perceive that it would be ludicrously confusing to attribute to me everything the poetized personalities say. Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, I have expressly urged once and for all that anyone who wants to quote something from the pseudonyms will not attribute the quotation to me (see my postscript to *Concluding Postscript*¹⁸⁰). It is easy to see that anyone wanting to have a literary lark merely needs to take some quotations higgledy-piggledy from "The Seducer," then from Johannes Climacus, then from me, etc., print them together as if they were all my words, show how they contradict each other, and create a very chaotic impression, as if the author were a kind of lunatic. Hurrah! That can be done.[X⁶ B 145 203] In my opinion anyone who exploits the poetic in me by quoting the writings in a confusing way is more or less either a charlatan or a literary toper.

The little book *On My Work as an Author* declares: "It must end with direct communication,"¹⁸¹ that is, I began with pseudonymous writers representing the indirect communication I have not used over my signature. And somewhat earlier (in my preface to

Practice in Christianity, whose author, the last pseudonymous writer, Anti-Climacus, again discourses on indirect communication) there is the statement: I understand the whole (whole book) as addressed to me so that I may learn to resort to *grace*.¹⁸² Consequently, it ends with direct communication.—JP VI 6786 (*Pap. X⁶ B 145*) *n.d.*, 1851

EDITORIAL APPENDIX

Acknowledgments

Collation of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical
Fragments* in the Danish Editions of Kierkegaard's Collected Works

Notes

Bibliographical Note

Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparation of manuscripts for *Kierkegaard's Writings* is supported by a genuinely enabling grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. The grant includes gifts from the Dronning Margrethes og Prins Henriks Fond, the Danish Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Augustinus Fond, the Carlsberg Fond, the Konsul George Jorck og Hustru Emma Jorcks Fond, and the Lutheran Brotherhood Foundation.

The translators-editors are indebted to Grethe Kjær and Julia Watkin for their knowledgeable observations on crucial concepts and terminology.

Per Lønning, Wim R. Scholtens, and Sophia Scopetéa, members of the International Advisory Board for *Kierkegaard's Writings*, gave valuable detailed criticism of the translation. Catherine Gjerdingen, Theodore N. Hong, Craig Mason, Jack Schwandt, and Julia Watkin helpfully read all or parts of the manuscript. Translations of German quotations were provided by Rune Engebretsen and Regine Prenzel-Guthrie. The Greek was checked by Anne Groton and James May. Kathryn Hong and Regine Prenzel-Guthrie, associate editors for *Kierkegaard's Writings*, scrutinized the entire manuscript. The index was prepared by Regine Prenzel-Guthrie.

Acknowledgment is made to Gyldendals Forlag for permission to absorb notes to *Søren Kierkegaards samlede Værker*.

Inclusion in the Supplement of entries from *Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers* is by arrangement with Indiana University Press.

The book collection and the microfilm collection of the Kierkegaard Library, St. Olaf College, and Gregor Malantschuk's annotated set of *Kierkegaards samlede Værker* have been used in preparation of the text, Supplement, and Editorial Appendix.

The manuscript was typed by Kennedy Lemke. Francesca Lane Rasmus did the word processing of the final manuscript and prepared the composition tape. The volume was guided through the press by Cathie Brettschneider and Marta Steele.

COLLATION OF *CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT TO*
 PHILOSOPHICAL FRAGMENTS IN THE DANISH EDITIONS OF
 KIERKEGAARD'S COLLECTED WORKS

Vol. VII

Ed. 2

Pg.

xi

xii

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii

xviii

xix

xx

xxi

xxii

xxiii

xxiv

xxv

xxvi

xxvii

xxviii

xxix

xxx

xxxi

xxxii

xxxiii

xxxiv

xxxv

xxxvi

xxxvii

xxxviii

xxxix

xl

37
38
39
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

70
70
72
80
80
82
82
83
83
84
84
86
86
87
88
88
89
90
90
91
91
92
92
93
93
94
94
95
95
96
96
97
97
98
98
99
99
100
100
101
101
102
102
103
103
104
104
105
105
106
106
107
107
108
108
109

120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

156
157
158
159
130
135
136
137
138
139
160
168
162
160
163
163
165
166
166
166
166
169
180
192
193
193
193
195
196
196
198
199
200
209
200
203
204
206
206
208
208
209
280

298

282

290

293

298

293

296

299

226

222

298

299

200

203

208

209

200

203

208

209

206

200

230

238

239

240

248

244

248

246

240

248

249

229

230

222

236

234

228

226

238

238

239

200

260

260

266

264

268

260

266

260

230

238

239

246

276

243

276

279

230

280

288

283

288

289

286

258

298

2189

2010

2021

2132

2163

2073

2165

2163

2168

2199

2169

270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309

3576
3577
3578
3579
3584
3582
3583
3584
3585
3586
3587
3588
3589
3590
3591
3592
3593
3594
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3610
3611
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3617
3618
3619
3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626
3627
3628
3629
3630
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636
3637
3638
3639
3640
3641
3642
3643
3644
3645
3646
3647
3648
3649
3650

~~350~~

~~353~~

~~352~~

~~355~~

~~357~~

358

359

363

362

369

366

363

362

369

369

366

366

362

368

369

376

375

372

379

379

376

376

373

372

379

327

328

326

327

328

322

386

383

386

382

390

399

390

393

398

398

390

397

398

399

400

400

403

400

403

408

400

407

408

409

400

402

403

406

408

408

400

407

400

402

400

404

403

406

408

408

400

407

408

409

480
484
487
488
489
490
490
493
494
496
497
498
499
500
502
506
507
508
509
509
510
510
512
512
513
513
515
516
517
518
519
520
520
528
529
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
540
548
549
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559

329

330

432

433

334

435

336

337

438

379

320

382

382

223

225

385

386

387

388

389

490

493

392

496

397

498

396

397

408

409

500

305

302

303

309

305

346

308

309

300

530

532

538

539

586

386

386

388

388

386

388

389

300

503

502

505

396

397

308

309

390

550

802

003

804

005

806

807

578

539

580

682

682

583

885

886

588

589

589

NOTES

TABLE OF CONTENTS, TITLE PAGE, AND EPIGRAPH

TABLE OF CONTENTS. See Supplement, pp. 2.7-14 (*Pap.* VI B 13; VI A 146; VI B 14, 20, 25, 27:1, 15, 16, 17, 40:1, 19:1, 95, 96).

TITLE PAGE. See Supplement, pp. 2.8-9 (*Pap.* VI B 89, 90, 98:1,2). *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* was intended as the final work of Kierkegaard as an author. See Historical Introduction, pp. 2.xi-xiii.

Mimical. Mime is the dramatic art of expressively imitating emotions and thoughts by actions and gestures, usually without words. Here “mimical” presumably can be interpreted as “poetically artistically elucidated” in such a way that the tone and form are appropriate to the content. It may also refer to a gathering of all the earlier “mimed” (pseudonymous) works as background material for this “concluding” work.

Pathetical. Because the English “pathetic” is usually taken to mean “pitiful,” the Danish *pathetisk* is translated in *Postscript* as “pathos-filled” (and *det Pathetiske* as “pathos”). Here, because of the trio of adjectives in like form, “pathetical” is used. Pathos marks the poet and his work, and in *Postscript* Kierkegaard is the poet’s (Climacus’s) poet.

Dialectical. The dialectical marks the thinker. Climacus is a poetic philosopher.

EPIGRAPH. Plato (?), *Platonis quae exstant opera*, I-XI, ed. Friedrich Ast (Leipzig: 1819-32; ASKB 1144-54), IX, p. 64; *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 1558. See Supplement, p. 2.9 (*Pap.* VI B 91).

PREFACE AND INTRODUCTION

1. See *Fragments*, pp. 5-7, 109, KW VII (SV IV 175-77, 270-71).
2. Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, I, 5, 20-21; Hellig Tre Kongers Aijen, eller: Hvad man vil, tr. Adolphe Engelbert Boye, *Det Kongelige*

Theaters Repertoire, 22 (1829), p. 5: “At blive godt hængt, er mangel Gang bedre end at blive slet givet [To be well hanged is many times better than to be ill wed]”; *Was ihr wollt*, I, 5, *Shakspeare's dramatische Werke*, I-XII, tr. August Wilhelm v. Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck (Berlin: 1839-41; ASKB 1883-88), V, p. 116: “Gut gehängt ist besser, als schlecht verheirathet [Well hanged is better than ill wed]”; *The Complete Works of Shakspeare*, ed. George Lyman Kittredge (Boston: Ginn, 1936), p. 404 (Clown to Maria): “Many a good hanging prevents a bad marriage.” See *Fragments*, p. 3, KW VII (SV IV 174).

3. See *Fragments*, p. 5, KW VII (SV IV 175-76).

4. See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, *Kong Salomon og Jørgen Hattemager* (Copenhagen: 1825), 14-26, pp. 47-79; *Samlede Skrifter. Skuespil*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1833-41; ASKB 1553-59), II, pp. 352-87. See also *Fragments*, p. 6, KW VII (SV IV 176).

5. See *Fragments*, Historical Introduction, pp. xix-xxii, KW VII.

6. See Ludvig Holberg, *Hexerie Eller Blind Allarm*, *Den Danske Skue-Plads*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1788; ASKB 1566-67), IV, no pagination; *Fragments*, p. 7, KW VII (SV IV 177).

7. Jens Immanuel Baggesen, “*Thomas Moore, eller Venskabs Seier over Kiærlighed*,” *Jens Baggesens danske Værker*, I-XII (Copenhagen: 1827-32; ASKB 1509-20), I, p. 329:

8. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1416 b; *Aristoteles graece*, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), II, p. 1416; cf. *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, I-II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Oxford tr.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, p. 2262.

9. The Danish *Individualitet* is used by Kierkegaard to designate a level of development in each of the spheres of existence: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. As such it is placed above “individual” and below “the single individual” in the qualitative series of human possibilities from “specimen” to “the single individual.” Therefore one may *become* an individuality and not only *have* individuality. “Individuality” in Kierkegaard’s writings means more than individuation on the basis of the distinguishing or individuating characteristics of a particular person. It denotes also a measure of reflection and the volitional integrating development of the becoming self beyond the life of immediacy.

10. See Supplement, p. 2.14 (*Pap.* VI B 98:3).

11. The punishment of silence or solitary confinement had been

introduced in the United States in 1823.

12. See, for example. *The Concept of Anxiety*, p. 137, KW VIII (SV IV 404); *Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age*, *A Literary Review*, pp. 86, 106, KW XIV (SV VIII 80, 99).

13. Similar expressions are found in Cicero, *Philippics*, II, 37; *M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia*, I-IV and index, ed. Johann August Ernesti (Halle: 1756-57; ASKB 1224-29), II², pp. 1376-77; *Cicero*, I-XXVIII, tr. Harry Kaplan et al. (Loeb, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1913-58), XV, pp. 156-59. See *Fragments*, p. 5, KW VII (SV IV 175).

14. See Holberg, *Den Pantsatte Bonde-Dreng, Danske Skue-Plads*, IV, no pagination; *The Peasant in Pawn, Seven One-Act Plays by Holberg*, tr. Henry Alexander (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 133-63.

15. See Supplement, p. 2.14 (*Pap.* VI B 98:5).

16. The page reference in the text is to the first Danish edition (1844). See *Fragments*, p. 109, KW VII (SV IV 270).

17. See Supplement, p. 2.14 (*Pap.* V B 98:6).

18. Literally, “the personal act of seeing” (Greek *autos* [self] + *optos* [seen]). See *Fragments*, pp. 70, 102, KW VII (SV IV 233, 264).

19. On *Anfægtelse*, *Prøvelse*, *Prøve*, and *Fristelse*, see *Fear and Trembling*, p. 341, note 2, KW VI. See also p. 1.21 and note 3, and pp. 458-59.

20. See Matthew 22:21.

21. G.W.F. Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, I, *Die Logik*, 63, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, I-XVIII, ed. Philipp Marheineke et al. (Berlin: 1832-45; ASKB 549-65 [I-VIII, X-XVIII]), VI, pp. 128-31; *Sämtliche Werke Jubiläumsausgabe* [J.A.], I-XXVI, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann, 1927-40) (*System der Philosophie*), VIII, pp. 166-68; *Hegel's Logic* (tr. of L., 3 ed., 1830; Kierkegaard had the same text, plus *Zusätze* in 1 ed., *Werke*, 1840), tr. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 97-99, esp. p. 99: “With what is here called faith or immediate knowledge must also be identified inspiration, the heart's revelations, the truths implanted in man by nature, and also in particular, healthy reason or Common Sense, as it is called. All these forms agree in adopting as their leading principle the immediacy, or self-evident way in which a fact or body of truths is presented in consciousness.” See also Hegel, *Philosophische Propädeutik*, I, 72, *Werke*, XVIII, p. 75;

J.A., III, p. 97; *The Philosophical Propaedeutic*, tr. A. V. Miller, eds. Michael George and Andrew Vincent (Oxford, New York: Blackwell, 1986), p. 52. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 69, KW VI (SV III 118); JP I 49; II 1096 (*Pap.* V A 28; I A 273, which includes a reference to Hegel).

22. According to Hegel, the concept of essence, when deprived of all its concretions, is identical with “nothing.” On “nothing” and “presupposition-lessness,” see, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 63, 68; J.A., IV, pp. 73, 78; *Hegel’s Science of Logic* (tr. of W.L., Lasson ed., 1923, based on the 2 ed., 1833, which Kierkegaard had), tr. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 70, 73:

But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken *immediately*, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an *absolute*, or what is synonymous here, an *abstract* beginning; and so it *may not presuppose anything*, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must be purely and simply *an immediacy*, or rather merely *immediacy* itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it cannot contain within itself any determination, any content; for any such would be a distinguishing and an interrelationship of distinct moments, and consequently a mediation. The beginning therefore is *pure being*.

As yet there is nothing and there is to become something. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning, therefore, contains both, being and nothing, is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being.

Among references to the theme of nothing and presuppositionlessness, Kierkegaard’s journals (JP III 3306 [*Pap.* VI A 145]) include a sketch of Hegel and Socrates;

The Dialectic of Beginning
Scene in the Underworld.

Characters: Socrates
Hegel .

Socrates sits in the cool [of the evening] by a fountain, listening.

Hegel sits at a desk reading Trendelenburg's *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, p. 198, and walks over to Socrates to complain.

SOCRATES: Shall we begin by completely agreeing or disagreeing about something that we call a presupposition.

[sic] HEGEL:

SOCRATES; With what presupposition do you begin?

HEGEL: None at all.

SOCRATES: NOW that is something; then you perhaps do not begin at all.

HEGEL: I not begin—I who have written twenty-one volumes?

SOCRATES: Ye gods, what a hecatomb you have offered!

HEGEL: But I begin with nothing.

SOCRATES: Is that not with something?

HEGEL; No—the inverse process. It becomes apparent only at the conclusion of the whole process, when I have treated all the sciences, world history, etc.

SOCRATES: How shall I be able to surmount this difficulty, for many remarkable things must certainly have happened which would captivate me. (Misuse of the oratorical element.) You know that I did not allow even Polos to talk more than five minutes at a time, and you want to talk XXI volumes.

See, for example. *Anxiety*, p. 81, KW VIII (SV IV 350-51).

23. See note 16 above.

24. See *Fear and Trembling and Repetition*, Historical Introduction, pp. xxi-xxviii, and pp. 357-62, KW VI.

25. See Luke 14:26; *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 72-74, KW VI (SV III 120-23).

26. See Matthew 25:1-12.

27. See, for example, “The Expectancy of Faith,” *Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses*, pp. 7-29, KW V (SV III 13-34).

28. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.14 (*Pap* VI B 98:7).

PART ONE

1. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.14 (*Pap*. VI B 98:8).

2. Danish: *Tilegnelse*, literally, “making (something) one’s own.”

3. Danish: *Anfægtelse*. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 31 and note 14, KW VI (SV III 83), also p. 341, note 2. In *Postscript*, *Anfægtelse* is used both as “temptation [*Fristelse*]” and in the higher and stricter sense of “spiritual trial” in which the ethical itself becomes a temptation. See pp. 1.458-59.

4. See Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap*. VI B 21:1, 98:9).

5. See Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap*. VI B 98:10).

6. See Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap*. VI B 21:2).

7. A satire.

8. See Suetonius, “Gaius C. Caligula,” 30, *The Lives of the Caesars; Caji Suetonii Tranquilli Tolv første Romerske Keiseres Levnetsbeskrivelse*, I-II, tr. Jacob Baden (Copenhagen: 1802-03; ASKB 1281), I, p. 312; *Suetonius*, I-II, tr. J. C. Rolfe (Loeb, New York: Macmillan, 1914), I, pp. 452-53. See also, for example, *Either/Or*, II, p. 187, KW IV (SV II 169); *JP* I 738 (*Pap*. II A 409).

9. See, for example. *Fragments*, p. 100, KW VII (SV IV 263).

10. Trustworthiness.

11. See, for example, Karl Rosenkranz, *Encyclopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften* (Halle: 1831; ASKB 35), 60-61, pp. 113-22.

12. The tunnel under the Thames between Wapping and Rotherhithe was begun in 1825 and completed in 1845.

13. Presumably Johan Nicolai Madvig (1804-1886), philologist and politician, whose *De finibus bonorum et malorum* was published 1839 in Copenhagen.

14. An arithmetical expression to designate the “carrying” of a number from one column to the next in addition and multiplication, hence here an important point to be carried or kept in mind throughout the discussion.

15. In the preface to his translation of the New Testament

(1522), Luther calls the Epistle of James a “*strohern Epistel* [straw epistle]” in comparison with the Gospel of John and the Epistles of Paul, Peter, and John, because it lacks the central Gospel. See “*Vorrede auf das Neue Testament*” (1522) and “*Vorrede auf die Episteln S Jacobi und Judä*” (1522), *Dr. Martin Luther’s sämtliche Werke*, I-LXVII (Erlangen, Frankfurt am Main: 1829-57), LXIII, pp. 108-15, 156-58, esp. p. 115; *Works of Martin Luther*, I-VI, ed. Paul Zeller Strodach (Philadelphia: Holman, 1915-32), VI, pp. 439-44, 477-479, esp. p. 444:

In a word, St. John’s Gospel and his first Epistle, St. Paul’s Epistles, especially Romans, Galatians and Ephesians, and St. Peter’s first Epistle are the books that show you Christ and teach you all that it is necessary and good for you to know, even though you were never to see or hear any other book or doctrine. Therefore St. James’ Epistle is really an epistle of straw, compared to them; for it has nothing of the nature of the Gospel about it.

See also *For Self-Examination*, p. 16, KW XXI (SV XII 307).

16. Danish: *Redningschor*, a play on *chor* (choir) and *korps* (corps).

17. Cf. J H. Wessel, *Kierlighed uden Strømper*, IV, 1, *Johan Herman Wessels samtlige Skrifter*, I-II (Copenhagen: 1787), I, p. 55.

18. Argument on the basis of an admission of the opponent’s thesis or mutual admission.

19. Cf. II Timothy 3:16.

20. With reference to the following seven sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap.* VI B 21:4).

21. See Hans Adolph Brorson, “*Jeg gaaer i Fare, hvor jeg gaaer,*” I, 1, *Psalmer og aandelige Sange*, ed. Jens Albrecht Leonard Holm (Copenhagen: 1838; ASKB 200), 168, p. 513.

22. Cf. Genesis 4:7.

23. Cf. Galatians 3:24.

24. Cf. I Corinthians 13:8-13.

25. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap.* VI B 21:5).

26. Cf. Exodus 20:7.

27. See Ludvig Holberg, *Den Stundesløse*, III, 5, *Den Danske Skue-Plads*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1788; ASKB 1566-67), V, no pagination;

The Fussy Man, Four Plays by Holberg, tr. Henry Alexander (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1946), p. 59.

28. See Matthew 4:18-22, 21:21; Mark 1:16-20, 11:23.

29. The Zelotes or Zealots were a radical Jewish party of the first century (c. A. D.. 6). Their leader was Simon of Galilee. See Luke 6:15.

30. A modification of the Danish proverb "While the grass grows, the mare starves." The result comes too late to be of any use.

31. On subjectivity/objectivity, see *JP* IV 4534-74; VII, p. 92.

32. *Mediering* is the Danish rendering of the Hegelian term *Vermitt(e)lung*: reconciliation of opposites in a higher unity. See, for example, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, I-XVIII, ed. Philipp Marheineke et al. (Berlin: 1832-45; ASKB 549-65 [I-VIII, X-XVIII]), III, pp. 92, 100, 105, 110, 159, 197, 456; IV, pp. 75-77, 90-91, 107, 117-18, 120-25, 127-29, 167-68; V, pp. 229-30, 233-35, 311-12, 353; *Sämtliche Werke. Jubiläumsausgabe [J.A.]*, I-XXVI, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann 1927-40), IV, pp. 102, 110, 115, 120, 169, 207, 466, 553-55, 568-69, 585, 595-96, 598-603, 605-07, 645-46; V, pp. 229-30, 233-35, 311-12, 353; *Hegel's Science of Logic* (tr. of W.L., Lasson ed., 1923, based on 2 ed., 1833, which Kierkegaard had), tr. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 93 ("For being which is the outcome of *mediation* we shall reserve the term: *Existence*"), 99, 103, 107, 146, 175, 375, 445-47, 456-57, 469, 477-78 ("This immediacy that is mediated by ground and condition is self-identical through the sublating of mediation, is *Existence*"), 481-84, 486-87, 516-17 ("The truth of the relation consists therefore in the *mediation*; its essence is the negative unity in which both the reflected and the simply affirmative [*seiende*] immediacy are sublated"), 749, 752-54, 811-12, 843-44 ("But in this next resolve of the pure Idea to determine itself as external Idea, it thereby only posits for itself the mediation out of which the Notion ascends as a free Existence that has withdrawn into itself from externality, that completes its self-liberation in the *science of spirit*, and that finds the supreme Notion of itself in the science of logic as the self-comprehending pure Notion"); *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, I, *Die Logik*, 65, 70, *Werke*, VI, pp. 133-34, 138; *J.A.*

(*System der Philosophie*), VIII, pp. 171-72, 176; *Hegel's Logic* (tr. of L., 3 ed., 1830; Kierkegaard had the same text, plus *Zusätze* in 1 ed., *Werke*, 1840), tr. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 101, 104-05. See also *Anxiety*, pp. 81-93, KW VIII (SV IV 350-63); *JP* II 1578; III 3072, 3294 (*Pap.* II A 454; III A 108; IV A 54).

On transition and becoming, see, for example, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wtssenschaften*, II, *Die Naturphilosophie*, 349, *Werke*, VII¹, pp. 548-49, *J.A.*, IX, pp. 574-75; *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature* (tr of part 2 of *EW*, 4 ed, 1847, 2 ed *Werke*; Kierkegaard had 1 ed. *Werke*, 1841), tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 350-51; *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 78-111; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 88-121; *Science of Logic*, pp. 82-108.

33. Cf. *JP* I 1030 (*Pap.* IV A 164): "Philosophy is perfectly right in saying that life must be understood backward. But then one forgets the other clause—that it must be lived forward The more one thinks through this clause, the more one concludes that life in temporality never becomes properly understandable, simply because never at any time does one get perfect repose to take a stance—backward."

34. See, for example, Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschthie*, *Werke*, IX, pp. 70-71, 79; *J.A.*, XI, pp. 92-93, 101; *The Philosophy of History* (tr. of P.G., 2 ed., 1840; 1 ed., *Werke*, IX, is not listed in ASKB), tr. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), pp. 56-57, 63-64:

Universal History exhibits the *gradation* in the development of that principle whose substantial *purport* is the consciousness of Freedom. The analysis of the successive grades, in their abstract form, belongs to Logic; in their concrete aspect to the Philosophy of Spirit. Here it is sufficient to state that the first step in the process presents that immersion of Spirit in Nature which has been already referred to; the second shows it as advancing to the consciousness of its freedom. But this initial separation from Nature is imperfect and partial, since it is derived immediately from the merely natural state, is consequently related to it, and is still encumbered with it as an essentially connected element. The third step is the elevation of the soul from this still limited and special form of freedom to its pure universal form; that state in which the spiritual

essence attains the consciousness and feeling of itself. These grades are the ground-principles of the general process; but how each of them on the other hand involves within *itself* a process of formation—constituting the links in a dialectic of transition—to particularize this must be reserved for the sequel.

Here we have only to indicate that Spirit begins with a germ of infinite possibility, but only possibility—containing its substantial existence in an undeveloped form, as the object and goal which it reaches only in its resultant—full reality. In actual existence Progress appears as an advancing from the imperfect to the more perfect; but the former must not be understood abstractly as *only* the imperfect, but as something which involves the very opposite of itself—the so-called perfect—as a *germ* or impulse. So—reflectively, at least—possibility points to something destined to become actual; the Aristotelian δύναμις is also *potentia*, power and might. Thus the Imperfect, as involving its opposite, is a contradiction, which certainly exists, but which is continually annulled and solved; the instinctive movement—the inherent impulse in the life of the soul—to break through the rind of mere nature, sensuousness, and that which is alien to it, and to attain to the light of consciousness, *i.e.* to itself.

Universal history—as already demonstrated—shows the development of the consciousness of Freedom on the part of Spirit, and of the consequent realization of that Freedom. This development implies a gradation—a series of increasingly adequate expressions or manifestations of Freedom, which result from its Idea. The logical, and—as still more prominent—the *dialectical* nature of the Idea in general, viz. that it is self-determined—that it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends; and by this very process of transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a richer and more concrete shape;—this necessity of its nature, and the necessary series of pure abstract forms which the Idea successively assumes—is exhibited in the department of *Logic*. Here we need adopt only one of its results, viz. that every step in the process, as

differing from any other, has its determinate peculiar principle. In history this principle is idiosyncrasy of Spirit—peculiar National Genius.

35. A character in a Holberg play thinks *Imprimatur* is the title of a person holding an office. See Holberg, *Erasmus Montanus eller Rasmus Berg*, III, 3, *Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination; *Erasmus Montanus or Rasmus Berg, Comedies by Holberg*, tr. Oscar James Campbell, Jr., and Frederic Schenck (New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1935), p. 147 (III, 4):

PER. Who is *Imprimatur* this year?

MONTANUS. What does that mean?

PER. I mean, who is *Imprimatur* of the verse and the books which are published?

36. An allusion to Solon's observations to King Croesus. See Herodotus, *History*, I, 32; *Die Geschichten des Herodotos*, I-II, tr. Friedrich Lange (Berlin: 1811-12; ASKB 1117), I, pp. 18-19; *Herodotus*, I-IV, tr. A. D. Godley (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), I, pp. 38-39:

Thus then, Croesus, the whole of man is but chance. Now if I am to speak of you, I say that I see you very rich and the king of many men. But I cannot yet answer your question, before I hear that you have ended your life well.... If then such a man besides all this shall also end his life well, then he is the man whom you seek, and is worthy to be called blest; but we must wait till he be dead, and call him not yet blest, but fortunate.

37. Protagoras (481-411 B.C.) was the leading Greek Sophist. His famous formulation, based upon the privacy of experience, is given in Plato's *Theaetetus*, 152 a (see also *Cratylus*, 385 e); *Platonis quae exstant opera*, I-XI, ed Friedrich Ast (Leipzig: 1819-32; ASKB 1144-54), II, pp. 50-51; *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 856: "Man is the measure of all things—alike of the being of things that are and of the not-being of things that are not." Cf. *Fragments*, p. 38, KW VII (SV IV 205-06).

38. See Plutarch, "Eudamidas," 1, *Sayings of Kings and Commanders, Moralia*, 192; *Maximen von Königen und Feldherren*,

Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen, I-IX, tr. Johann Friedrich S. Kaltwasser (Frankfurt am Main: 1783-1800; ASKB 1192-96), II, p. 283; *Plutarch's Moralia*, I-XV, ed. and tr. Frank Cole Babbitt (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967-84), III, pp. 136-37.

39. See Plato, *Apology*, 41 b-c; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 154-57; *Dialogues*, p. 25:

Put it in this way How much would one of you give to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die ten times over if this account is true. It would be a specially interesting experience for me to join them there, to meet Palamedes and Ajax, the son of Telamon, and any other heroes of the old days who met their death through an unfair trial, and to compare my fortunes with theirs—it would be rather amusing, I think. And above all I should like to spend my time there, as here, in examining and searching people's minds, to find out who is really wise among them, and who only thinks that he is. What would one not give, gentlemen, to be able to question the leader of that great host against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or the thousands of other men and women whom one could mention, to talk and mix and argue with whom would be unimaginable happiness?

40. See Frederik Christian Olsen, “Poul Martin Møllers Levnet,” Poul Martin Møller, *Efterladte Skrifter*, I-III (Copenhagen: 1839-43; ASKB 1574-76), III, p. 109 fn. (ed. tr.). “ ‘Yes—Hegel is really mad. He suffers from a monomania and believes that the concept as such can extend itself—here he made some wide motions with his hands and said no more.’ ”

41. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.15 (*Pap.* VI B 98:11).

42. See *Fragments*, Supplement, p. 218, KW VII (*Pap.* V B 1:6).

43. On Kierkegaard's multiple use of “romanticism,” see, for example. *The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates*, pp. 274-75, 288-89, 302-05, 318-19, 328-29, KW II (SV XIII 347-48, 359-60, 371-73, 384-85, 392); *JP* III 3796-3823; VII, pp. 82-83.

44. See, for example, Nicolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig's review of Jakob Peter Mynster's *Om Begrebet af den christelige Dogmatik* in *Maanedsskrift for Christendom og Historie*, ed. Jacob

Christian Lindberg, I, 1831, p. 609 (ed. tr.):

What I nevertheless in the most urgent way must and will *request* of him, as well as of all *Christian* pastors and theologians in Denmark and Norway, is only that they will give my explication of the independent universal validity of the expression of faith the keen and kindly disposed attention undeniably deserved by a discovery that promises to Christ's kingdom on earth an amendment of its bonds and opens the brightest prospects, not only of victory over all enemies but of an increasing enlightenment and free development of powers the world will be compelled to call matchless.

For another use of "matchless," see Grundtvig, "*Blik paa Kirken i det første Aarhundrede*," *Theologisk Maanedsskrift*, ed. Andreas Gottlob Rudelbach, X, 1827, pp. 2-4. The "matchless discovery" was the distinction between the "Living Word" in the sacraments as well as in the Apostles' Creed and the written word in its various forms (see pp. 1.37, 40-44).

45. Johann Friedrich Ferdinand Delbrück, author of *Philip Melanchthon, der Glaubenslehrer. Eine Streitschrift* (Bonn: 1826), part of which was translated, with commentary, by Grundtvig under the title "*Om den Apostoliske Troes-Bekindelse som christelig Troes-Regel*," in *Theologisk Maanedsskrift*, X, 1827, pp. 122-50. See Supplement, p. 2.16 (*Pap. VI B 21:7*).

46. Presumably an allusion to G. E. Lessing on the oral transmission of the Apostles' Creed. See, for example, "*Axiomata*," VII, *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's sämtliche Schriften*, I-XXXII (Berlin: 1825-28; ASKB 1747-62), VI, pp. 80-81.

47. Jacob Christian Lindberg (1797-1852), Danish theologian closely associated with N.F.S. Grundtvig and with Peter Christian Kierkegaard, brother of Søren Kierkegaard.

48. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.16 (*Pap. VI B 21:8*, 98:12).

49. For continuation of the text, see Supplement, pp. 2.16-29 (*Pap. VI B 29*, 30, 33).

50. Grundtvig stressed the spoken word in contrast to the written word.

51. An allusion to Grundtvig. See N.F.S. Grundtvig, *Haandbog i Verdens-Historien, efter de bedste Kilder*, I-III (Copenhagen;

1833-42), I, p. 321.

52. See, for example, *Fragments*, pp. 38, 82-83, KW VII (SV IV 205-06, 245-46).

53. Danish: *Guden*, which Climacus, following Plato (ὁ θεός, the god), uses in *Fragments*. See *Fragments*, p. 278, note 13, KW VII.

54. See *Fragments*, pp. 41-42 fn., KW VII (SV IV 208-09).

55. Ibid., pp. 89-110, Supplement, pp. 225-26 (252-71; *Pap.* VII² B 235, p. 84).

56. In Scandinavian folklore, a nisse is an elf-like household creature, benevolent if treated properly, vexatious otherwise, and invisible when wearing his pointed red stocking cap.

57. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.29 (*Pap.* VI B 98:13).

58. See Lindberg, “Om den christne Troes-Bekjendelses Form i den sidste Udgave af den danske Alterbog,” *Den Nordiske Kirke-Tidende*, ed. Jacob Christian Lindberg, II, 1834, 49, col. 825-32; 50, col. 844-48, esp. 49, col. 829 (ed. tr): “**“En hellig christelig Kirke, de Helliges Samfund”** istedetfor den gamle Alterbog har **‘en hellig christelig Kirke at være som er hellige Menneskers Samfund’** [‘A Holy Christian Church, the Communion of Saints,’ *instead of which the old altar-book has* ‘there is a Holy Christian Church that is the Communion of Sainted People’]“.

59. See note 61 below; Jakob Peter Mynster, *Om de danske Udgaver af Luthers lile Katechismus* (Copenhagen: 1835), pp. 43-50; Christian Andreas Hermann Kalkar, *Om Troesbekjendelsens Form i den danske Kirke* (Copenhagen: 1836).

60. See, for example, Henrik Nicolai Clausen, “Belysning af de seneste af Mag. Lindberg fremførte Beskyldninger, anførte under 29 forskellige Punkter,” *Den theologiske Partiaand, dens Character og Stridsmaade oplyst ved Exempler* (Copenhagen: 1830), pp. 20-81. For continuation of the note, see Supplement, p. 2.29 (*Pap.* VI B 98:14).

61. See Lindberg, “Om den christne Troes-Bekjendelses Form,” *Den Nordiske Kirke-Tidende*, II, 1834, 49, col. 828-29; “I Anledning af Hr. Overlærer Kalkars Skrift om Troesbekjendelsens Form i den danske Kirke,” *ibid.*, IV, 1836, 20, col. 313-14; 22, col. 342-47; 23, col. 353-61. Lindberg maintained that the change from “den Hellig-Aand” [the Holy-Spirit] to “den hellige Aand” [the holy spirit] denied the personhood of the Holy Spirit.

62. See Supplement, pp. 2.29-30 (*Pap.* VI B 98:15).

63. For marginal notation, see Supplement, p. 2.30 (*Pap.* VI B 24:1).

64. See Romans 9:7.

65. See Supplement, p. 2.30 (*Pap.* VI B 98:16).

66. See Supplement, pp. 2.30-31 (*Pap.* VI B 98:17).

67. Pp. 37-48, KW VII (SV IV 204-14).

68. The first word of the Danish heading of this section is the genitive *Aar-hundredernes* [of the centuries].

69. See Genesis 1:27.

70. Jean Paul, pseudonym of Johann Paul Friedrich Richter (1763-1825), German author. See Supplement, p. 2.10 (*Pap.* VI B 25). The source of the allusion has not been located. Kierkegaard had *Jean Paul's sammtliche Werke*, I-LX (Berlin: 1826-28; ASKB 1777-99), and *Vorschule der Aesthetik*, I-III (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1813; ASKB 1381-83).

71. See Daniel 5:27.

72. Danish: *Velærværdighed*, which the *Ordbog over det danske Sprog*, ed. Det Danske Sprog- og Litteraturselskab (Copenhagen: Nordisk Forlag, 1919-56) [ODS], defines only as a clerical title. The source of the story has not been located.

73. See Luke 23:34.

74. See Supplement, p. 2.31 (*Pap.* VI B 98:18).

75. See 1.14 and note 22.

76. A German translation of the Latin *precario*, literally, “by entreaty” or “by request” See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 68-69; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 78-79; *Science of Logic*, p. 74:

The being contained in the beginning is, therefore, a being which removes itself from non-being or sublates it as something opposed to it.

But again, that which begins already *is*, but equally, too, *is not* as yet The opposites, being and non-being are therefore directly united in it, or, otherwise expressed, it is their *undifferentiated unity*.

The analysis of the beginning would thus yield the notion of the unity of being and nothing—or, in a more reflected form, the unity of differentiatedness and non-differentiatedness, or the identity of identity and non-identity. This concept could be regarded as the first, purest, that is, most abstract definition of the absolute—as it would

in fact be if we were at all concerned with the form of definitions and with the name of the absolute. . . .

But there is a still further observation to be made about this procedure. The said analysis presupposes as familiar the idea of a beginning, thus following the example of other sciences. These presuppose their subject-matter and take it for granted [*bittweise*] that everyone has roughly the same general idea of it and can find in it the same determinations as those indicated by the sciences which have obtained them in one way or another through analysis, comparison and other kinds of reasoning. But that which forms the absolute beginning must likewise be something otherwise known; now if it is something concrete and hence is variously determined within itself, then this *internal relation* is presupposed as something known; it is thus put forward as an *immediacy* which, however, it is not; for it is a relation only as a relation of distinct moments, and it therefore contains *mediation* within itself.

77. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.31 (*Pap.* VI B 27:2).

78. Cf. H. C. Andersen, “*Lykkens Kalosker*,” *Tre Digtninger* (Copenhagen: 1838), p. 42; “The Magic Galoshes,” *Hans Christian Andersen, The Complete Fairy Tales and Stories*, tr. Erik Christian Haugaard (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1974), p. 102; “The only words of human speech that Polly [the parrot] had mastered were: ‘Let us be human!’ “ Some have theorized that the parrot is a caricature of Kierkegaard.

79. Cf. Plato, *Apology*, 27 b-c; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 122-23; *Dialogues*, p. 13:

Is there anyone in the world, Meletus, who believes in human activities, and not in human beings? Make him answer, gentlemen, and don’t let him keep on making these continual objections. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but believes in horses’ activities? Or who does not believe in musicians, but believes in musical activities? No, there is not, my worthy friend. If you do not want to answer, I will supply it for you and for these gentlemen too. But the next question you must answer. Is there anyone who believes in supernatural activities and not in supernatural beings?

80. See, for example, *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 5 and note 1, 7, 9, 23, 32-33, 37, 69, 88, 121-23, KW VI (SV III 57, 59, 61-62, 75, 84, 88, 118, 136, 166-68).

81. An allusion to the tall tales based on the anecdotes of Karl Friedrich Hieronymus Freiherr von Münchhausen (1720-1797) of Bodenwerder, Hanover, Germany. See *Wunderbare Reisen zu Wasser und Lande, Feldzüge und lustige Abenteuer des Freyherrn von Munchhausen . . . , Aus dem Englischen nach der neuesten Ausgabe übersetzt . . . , tr. Gottfried August Burger (London: 1786); Baron von Münchhausens vidunderlige Reiser, Feldtog og Hændelser, fortalte af ham selv (Roskilde: 1834); Rudolph Erich Raspe, The Surprising Adventures of Baron Munchausen (New York: Crowell, 1902).*

82. The source has not been located.

83. Cf. *Fragments*, pp. 72-86, KW VII (SV IV 235-49).

84. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, p. 178; *J.A.*, IV, p. 656; *Science of Logic*, p. 524:

The inner is determined as the form of *reflected immediacy* or of essence over against the outer as the form of being, but the two are only one identity. This identity is first, the substantial unity of both as a substrate pregnant with content, or the *absolute fact* [*Sache*], in which the two determinations are indifferent, external moments. By virtue of this, it is a content and that totality which is the inner that equally becomes external, but in this externality is not the result of becoming or transition but is identical with itself. The outer, according to this determination, is not only *identical* with the inner in respect of content but both are only *one fact*.

See *Either/Or*, I, pp. 3-4, KW II (SV I v-vi); *Fear and Trembling*, p. 69, KW VI (SV III 118), *Pap.* III B 28.

85. See Karl August v. Hase, *Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-luthenschen Kirche* (Leipzig: 1839; ASKB 581), 124, pp. 312-16; *Hutterus redivivus eller den Evangelisk-Lutherske Kirkes Dogmatik*, tr. Andreas Lauritz Carl Listow (Copenhagen: 1841), pp. 322-26.

86. Danish: *visse* [certain, sure]. See Psalm 51:12. The Danish Bible of Kierkegaard's time has *stadig* [steady], but the King James version has "free" and the Revised Standard Version [RSV] "willing."

87. See Matthew 21:12; Mark 11:15; John 2:14-16.

88. See, for example, Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177 a; *Aristoteles graece*, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), II, p. 1177; *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, I-II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Oxford tr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, pp. 1860-61:

If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence; and this will be that of the best thing in us. Whether it be intellect or something else that is this element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper excellence will be complete happiness. That this activity is contemplative we have already said.

Now this would seem to be in agreement both with what we said before and with the truth. For this activity is the best (since not only is intellect the best thing in us, but the objects of intellect are the best of knowable objects); and, secondly, it is the most continuous, since we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can *do* anything. . . .

But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as something divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of excellence. If intellect is divine, then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life.

89. See, for example. *Anxiety*, pp. 43, 81, KW VIII (SV IV 315, 350); *The Sickness unto Death*, pp. 13, and Supplement, pp. 143-44, KW XIX (SV XI 127, *Pap.* VIII² B 168:5).

90. For continuation to Part Two, see Supplement, p. 2.31 (*Pap.* VI B 98:19).

PART TWO

1. With reference to the following two headings, see

Supplement, p. 2.32 (*Pap.* VI B 98:20).

2. See *Fragments*, Supplement, p. 217, KW VII (*Pap.* V B 8).

3. See Ludvig Holberg, *Erasmus Montanus eller Rasmus Berg*, I, 2, *Den Danske Skue-Plads*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1788: ASKB 1566-67), V, no pagination; *Erasmus Montanus or Rasmus Berg, Comedies by Holberg*, tr. Oscar James Campbell, Jr., and Frederic Schenck (New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1935), p. 122.

4. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.32 (*Pap.* VI B 98:21).

5. For eleven years until his death, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) was librarian or curator of the Duke of Brunswick's library in Wolfenbüttel.

6. Perhaps an allusion to the arbitration of Pope Alexander VI in a boundary dispute between Spain and Portugal. The pope drew a hypothetical line from pole to pole through a point one hundred leagues west of the westernmost point of the Azores. The territory west of this line should belong to Spain and the territory east of this line to Portugal.

7. See G. E. Lessing, "*Laokoon, oder uber die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie*," XVI, *Zur Philosophie und Kunst*, III, *Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's sammtliche Schriften*, I-XXXII (Berlin, Stettin: 1825-28; ASKB 1747-62), II, pp. 268-69; *Laocoon, Nathan the Wise and Minna von Barnhelm*, tr. William A. Steel (Everyman, New York: Dutton, 1930), p. 55:

My conclusion is this. If it is true that painting employs in its imitations quite other means or signs than poetry employs, the former—that is to say, figures and colours in space—but the latter articulate sounds in time; as, unquestionably, the signs used must have a definite relation to the thing signified, it follows that signs arranged together side by side can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, exist thus side by side, whilst signs which succeed each other can express only subjects which, or the various parts of which, succeed each other.

Subjects which, or the various parts of which, exist side by side, may be called *bodies*. Consequently, bodies with their visible properties form the proper subjects of painting.

Subjects which or the various parts of which succeed each other may in general be called *actions*. Consequently,

actions form the proper subjects of poetry.

Yet all bodies exist not in space alone, but also in time. They continue, and may appear differently at every moment and stand in different relations. Every one of these momentary appearances and combinations is the effect of one preceding and can be the cause of one following, and accordingly be likewise the central point of an action. Consequently, painting can also imitate actions, but only by way of suggestion through bodies.

On the other hand, actions cannot subsist for themselves, but must attach to certain things or persons. Now in so far as these things are bodies or are regarded as bodies, poetry too depicts bodies, but only by way of suggestion through actions.

Painting, in her co-existing compositions, can use only one single moment of the action, and must therefore choose the most pregnant, from which what precedes and follows will be most easily apprehended.

Just in the same manner poetry also can use, in her continuous imitations, only one single property of the bodies, and must therefore choose that one which calls up the most living picture of the body on that side from which she is regarding it. Here, indeed, we find the origin of the rule which insists on the unity and consistency of descriptive epithets, and on economy in the delineations of bodily subjects.

See *Either/Or*, I, p. 169, KW III (SV I 147).

8. See Lessing, "*Fabeln und Erzählungen*", "*Fabeln (Drei Bücher)*," *Zur schonen Litteratur, Schriften*, XVIII, pp. 3-39, 93-159.

9. See Plutarch, "Marcellus," 14, *Lives, Plutark's Levnetsbeskrivelser*, I-IV, tr. Stephan Tetens (Copenhagen: 1800-11; ASKB 1197-1200), III, p. 272; *Plutarch's Lives*, I-XI, tr. Bernadotte Perrin (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968-84), V, pp. 472-73: "Archimedes, who was a kinsman and friend of King Hiero, wrote to him that with any given force it was possible to move any given weight; and emboldened, as we are told, by the strength of his demonstration, he declared that, if there were another world, and he could go to it, he could move this."

10. Danish: *primitiv*. In Kierkegaard's writings, the term in its

various forms does not mean “undeveloped” or “ancient” but pertains rather to an individual’s freshness and authenticity in thinking, feeling, acting, and responding. It designates the opposite of habit and external conformity. See *JP* III 3558-61 and pp. 887-88; VII, p. 76.

11. Tranquillity through suspension of judgment. See, for example. *Fragments*, pp. 82-83, KW VII (SV IV 245-46).

12. See *The Book on Adler*, KW XXIV (*Pap.* VII² B 235, p. 178).

13. Horace, *Epistles*, I, 1, 14; *Q Horatii Flacci opera* (Leipzig: 1828; ASKB 1248), p. 224; *Horace Satires, Epistles and Ars Poetica*, tr. H. Rushton Fairclough (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 252-53.

14. Cf. *Repetition*, p. 225, KW VI (SV III 259).

15. See F. H. Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn*, Friedrich Hetnrich Jacobi’s *Werke*, I-VI (Leipzig: 1812-25; ASKB 1722-28), IV¹, pp. 51-81.

16. Johann Caspar Lavater (1741-1801), Swiss pastor and writer. Kierkegaard had his *Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beforderung der Menschenkenntniss und Menschenliebe*, I-IV (Leipzig, Winterthur: 1775-78; ASKB 613-16) and *Physiognomische Reisen*, 1-4 (Altenburg: 1788; ASKB 617-618).

17. The source of the statement has not been located.

18. The first edition of *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe*, ed. Philipp Marheineke et al., has eighteen volumes (Berlin: 1832-45; ASKB 549-65). The original auction catalog of Kierkegaard’s library, *Fortegnelse over Dr. Soren A. Kierkegaards efterladte Bogsamling* (Copenhagen: 1856), lists the Hegel titles (seventeen volumes) separately. Volume IX, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, is not included.

19. The Danish *Salighed*, here rendered as “salvation.” Ordinarily *Salighed* and *evig Salighed* are translated as “happiness” and “eternal happiness” in *Fragments* and *Postscript* because of the Platonic context of *Fragments*. On the richness of meaning in this Danish word, see *Fragments*, p. 273, note to epigraphs, KW VII.

20. Plutarch, “Cato the Elder,” 18, *Sayings of Romans, Moralia*, 199; “*Maximen von Königen und Feldherren*,” *Plutarchs moralische Abhandlungen*, I-IX, tr. Johann Friedrich S. Kaltwasser (Frankfurt am Main: 1783-1800; ASKB 1192-96), II, p. 269; *Plutarch’s Moralia*, I-XVI, ed. and tr. Frank Cole Babbitt et al. (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967-84), III, pp. 180-81:

“He used to say that those who are serious in ridiculous matters will be ridiculous in serious matters.”

21. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2 32 (*Pap.* VI B 35:5).

22. Odysseus is called “goodly,” “divine,” “godlike,” “Zeus-born,” “noble,” but he is also said to be very ingenious, a man “of many wiles.” See, for example, Homer, *Odyssey*, II, 27, 259; VI, 331; VII, 230, 302; VIII, 3; IX, 1; X, 251; XI, 354, 377. *Homers Odyssey*, I-II, tr. Christian Wilster (Copenhagen: 1837), I, pp. 17, 23, 88, 95, 97, 99, 115, 138, 156, 157; *Homer, The Odyssey*, I-II, tr. A. T. Murray (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976, 1980), I, pp. 38-39, 54-55, 230-31, 248-49, 254-55, 258-59, 302-03, 362-63, 410-11, 412-13. See also Supplement, p. 2.32 (*Pap.* VI B 37).

23. With reference to the following two headings, see Supplement, p. 2.32 (*Pap.* VI B 98:22).

24. With reference to the following heading, see Supplement, p. 2.33 (*Pap.* VI B 35:7, 98:23).

25. With reference to the following note, see Supplement, p. 2.33 (*Pap.* VI B 38).

26. Cf. John 4:23.

27. See Matthew 20:3-4.

28. A Copenhagen newspaper specializing in advertisements and announcements.

29. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.33 (*Pap.* VI B 35:13).

30. Presumably an allusion to Lessing, *Laokoon*, XII, *Schriften*, II, pp. 248-58; *Laocoon*, pp. 47-50. Lessing discusses the difference in treatment of the invisible by a poet or an artist in the light of the theories of the French Count Caylus, who recommended the events of Homer’s *Iliad* to painters as suitable subjects. Lessing uses as his example the invisible battle between the Gods where Minerva (Pallas Athene) strikes down Mars (Ares) with a huge rock. Cf. Homer, *Iliad*, XXI, 385-434; *Homers Iliade*, I-II, tr. Christian Wilster (Copenhagen: 1836), II, pp. 162-63; *Homer, The Iliad*, I-II, tr. A. T. Murray (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976-78), II, pp. 436-39.

31. See Plato, *Apology*, 40 a-c; *Platonis quae exstant opera*, I-XI, ed. Friedrich Ast (Leipzig: 1819-32; ASKB 1144-54), VIII, pp. 152-55; *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and

Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 24-25:

Gentlemen of the jury—for *you* deserve to be so called—I have had a remarkable experience. In the past the prophetic voice to which I have become accustomed has always been my constant companion, opposing me even in quite trivial things if I was going to take the wrong course. Now something has happened to me, as you can see, which might be thought and is commonly considered to be a supreme calamity; yet neither when I left home this morning, nor when I was taking my place here in the court, nor at any point in any part of my speech did the divine sign oppose me. In other discussions it has often checked me in the middle of a sentence, but this time it has never opposed me in any part of this business in anything that I have said or done. What do I suppose to be the explanation? I will tell you. I suspect that this thing that has happened to me is a blessing, and we are quite mistaken in supposing death to be an evil. I have good grounds for thinking this, because my accustomed sign could not have failed to oppose me if what I was doing had not been sure to bring some good result.

32. With reference to the following heading, see Supplement, p. 2.34 (*Pap.* VI B 35:14).

33. See Supplement, p. 2.34 (*Pap.* VI B 98:24).

34. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 108-10; *Sämthche Werke Jubtläumsausgabe* [J.A.], I-XXVI, ed. Hermann Glockner (Stuttgart: Frommann 1927-40), IV, pp. 118-20; *Hegel's Science of Logic* (tr. of W.L., Lasson ed., 1923, based on the 2 ed., 1833; Kierkegaard had this ed.) tr. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), pp. 105-07:

2. MOMENTS OF BECOMING: COMING-TO-BE AND CEASING-TO-BE

Becoming is the unseparatedness of being and nothing, not the unity which abstracts from being and nothing; but as the unity of *being* and *nothing* it is this *determinate* unity in which there is both being and nothing But in so far as being and nothing, each

unseparated from its other, *is*, each *is not*. They *are* therefore in this unity but only as vanishing, sublated moments. They sink from their initially imagined *self-subsistence* to the status of *moments*, which are still *distinct* but at the same time are sublated.

Grasped as thus distinguished, each moment is in this *distinguishedness* as a unity with the *other*. Becoming therefore contains being and nothing as *two* such unities, *each* of which is itself a unity of being and nothing; the one is being as immediate and as relation to nothing, and the other is nothing as immediate and as relation to being; the determinations are of unequal values in these unities.

Becoming is in this way in a double determination. In one of them, *nothing* is immediate, that is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or in other words changes into it; in the other, *being* is immediate, that is, the determination starts from being which changes into nothing: the former is coming-to-be and the latter is ceasing-to-be.

Both are the same, *becoming*, and although they differ so in direction they interpenetrate and paralyse each other. The one is *ceasing-to-be*: being passes over into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of itself, transition into being, coming-to-be. This coming-to-be is the other direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally sublates itself and is rather transition into nothing, is ceasing-to-be. They are not reciprocally sublated—the one does not sublate the other externally—but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.

3. SUBLATION [*Aufheben*] OF BECOMING

The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is in the first place *becoming* itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are in this unity only as vanishing moments; yet becoming as such *is* only through their distinguishedness. Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of becoming or the vanishing of the vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.

This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them. It is therefore inherently self-

contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.

This result is the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not *nothing*; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations. not the resultant of *nothing and being*. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as a determination on its own but as a determination of the whole.

Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the one-sided *immediate* unity of these moments, is *determinate being*.

Remark: *The Expression 'To Sublate [aufheben]'*

To sublate, and the *sublated* (that which exists ideally as a moment), constitute one of the most important notions in philosophy. It is a fundamental determination which repeatedly occurs throughout the whole of philosophy, the meaning of which is to be clearly grasped and especially distinguished from *nothing*. What is sublated is not thereby reduced to nothing. Nothing is *immediate*; what is sublated, on the other hand, is the result of *mediation*; it is a non-being but as a *result* which had its origin in a being. It still has, therefore, in *itself* the *determinateness from which* it originates.

'*To sublate*' has a twofold meaning in the language: on the one hand it means to preserve, to maintain, and equally it also means to cause to cease, to put an end to. Even 'to preserve' includes a negative element, namely, that something is removed from its immediacy and so from an existence which is open to external influences, in order to preserve it. Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy but is not on that account annihilated.

35. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 81; *J.A.*, IV, p. 91; *Science of Logic*, pp. 84-85:

If the result that being and nothing are the same seems startling or paradoxical in itself, there is nothing more to be said; rather should we wonder at this wondering which shows itself to be such a newcomer to philosophy and forgets that in this science there occur determinations quite different from those in ordinary consciousness and in so-called ordinary

common sense—which is not exactly sound understanding but an understanding educated up to abstractions and to a belief, or rather a superstitious belief, in abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and nothing in every example, in *every* actual thing or thought. The same must be said of *being* and *nothing*, as was said above about immediacy and mediation (which latter contains a reference to an other, and hence to *negation*), that nowhere in heaven or on earth is there anything which does not contain within itself both being and nothing. Of course, since we are speaking here of a particular *actual something*, those determinations are no longer present in it in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing; they are in a more developed determination, and are grasped, for example, as positive and negative, the former being posited, reflected being, the latter posited, reflected nothing; the positive contains as its abstract basis being, and the negative, nothing.

36. Cf. Luke 18:11.

37. See p. 1.38 and note 52.

38. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.34 (*Pap.* VI B 35:15).

39. See, for example, B. Spinoza, *Ethics*, V, 36, 40; *Benedicti de Spinoza opera philosophica omnia*, ed. August Gfroerer (Stuttgart: 1830; ASKB 788), pp. 427 (“*sub specie aeternitatis*”), 429 (“*aeternus cogitandi modus*”). *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, I-II, ed. and tr. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985-), I, pp. 612 (“under a species of eternity”), 615 (“eternal mode of thinking”). See also *Sickness Unto Death*, pp. 97-98, KW XIX (SV XI 208); *Practice in Christianity*, pp. 123, 125-27, KW XX (SV XII 115, 118).

40. The Danish *vare til*, *Tilværelse* [German *Dasein*, being there], and *existere* do not have distinctive counterparts in English and therefore are all translated by some form of “exist.” “To exist” must do additional multiple duty to signify generic being and in some contexts to signify qualitative life beyond the life of immediacy. This qualitative meaning is implicit in the Latin root of the English word (*ex* [out] + *sistere* [to cause to stand] from *stare* [stand]). See, for example. *Fragments*, p. 73 and note 6, KW VII.

41. See, for example. *Fragments*, p. 13 and note 25, KW VII.

42. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, "Socrates," *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, II, 5, 21; *Diogenes Laertii de vitis philosophorum*, I-II (Leipzig: 1833; ASKB 1109), I, p. 70; *Diogen Laertsens filosofiske Historie eller: navnkundige Filosofer Levnet, Meninger og sindrige Udsagn*, I-II, tr. Børge Riisbrigh (Copenhagen: 1812; ASKB 1110-11), I, p. 66; *Diogenes Laertius*, I-II, tr. R. D. Hicks (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979-80), I, pp. 150-51: "convinced that the study of nature is no concern of ours" See also notes 100 and 544 below.

43. See Plato, *Symposium*, 220 c-d; *Opera*, III, pp. 540-41; *Udvalgte Dialoger af Platon*, I-VIII, tr. Carl Johan Heise (Copenhagen: 1830-59; ASKB 1164-67, 1169 [I-VII]), II, pp. 97-98; *Dialogues*, p. 571 (Alcibiades speaking):

And now I must tell you about another thing "our valiant hero dared and did" in the course of the same campaign. He started wrestling with some problem or other about sunrise one morning, and stood there lost in thought, and when the answer wouldn't come he still stood there thinking and refused to give it up. Time went on, and by about midday the troops noticed what was happening, and naturally they were rather surprised and began telling each other how Socrates had been standing there thinking ever since daybreak. And at last, toward nightfall, some of the Ionians brought out their bedding after supper—this was in the summer, of course—partly because it was cooler in the open air, and partly to see whether he was going to stay there all night. Well, there he stood till morning, and then at sunrise he said his prayers to the sun and went away.

44. Hans Friedrich Helweg, "*Orest og Ødip eller Collisionen*," *For Literatur og Kritik. Et Fjerdingaarsskrift udgivet af Fyens Stifts Iiterære Selskab*, III, 1845, pp. 55-60.

45. See Supplement, p. 2.34 (*Pap.* VI B 98:25).

46. See Plato, *Gorgias*, 511 d-512 b; *Opera*, I, pp. 428-31; Heise, III, pp. 164-66; *Dialogues*, pp. 293-94 (Socrates speaking):

But if this seems to you insignificant, I can tell you of one [art] greater than this, the pilot's art which, like rhetoric, saves not only our lives but also our bodies and our goods from the gravest dangers. And this art is unpretentious and orderly, and

does not put on airs or make believe that its accomplishments are astonishing. But, in return for the same results as those achieved by the advocate, if it brings you here safely from Aegina, it asks but two obols, and if from Egypt or the Black Sea, for this mighty service of bringing home safely all that I mentioned just now, oneself and children and goods and womenfolk and disembarking them in the harbor, it asks two drachmas at the most, and the man who possesses this art and achieves these results goes ashore and walks alongside his ship with modest bearing. For I suppose he is capable of reflecting that it is uncertain which of his passengers he has benefited and which he has harmed by not suffering them to be drowned, knowing as he does that those he has landed are in no way better than when they embarked, either in body or in soul. He knows that if anyone afflicted in the body with serious and incurable diseases has escaped drowning the man is wretched for not having died and has received no benefit from him; he therefore reckons that if any man suffers many incurable diseases in the soul, which is so much more precious than the body, for such a man life is not worth while and it will be no benefit to him if he, the pilot, saves him from the sea or from the law court or from any other risk. For he knows it is not better for an evil man to live, for he must needs live ill.

47. See Plato, *Symposium*, 174 e-175 b, 215 a; *Opera*, III, pp. 436-37, 528-29; Heise, II, pp. 8-9; 87; *Dialogues*, pp. 529-30, 566 (Apollodorus speaking):

I looked round, supposing that Socrates was bringing up the rear, but he was nowhere to be seen; so I explained that we'd been coming along together, and that I'd come at his invitation.

Very nice of you, said Agathon, but what on earth can have happened to the man?

He was just coming in behind me; I can't think where he can be.

Here, said Agathon to one of the servants, run along and see if you can find Socrates, and show him in. And now, my dear Aristodemus, may I put you next to Eryximachus?

And so, Aristodemus went on, I made my toilet and sat down, the servant meanwhile returning with the news that

our friend Socrates had retreated into the next-door neighbor's porch.

And there he stood, said the man. And when I asked him in he wouldn't come.

This is very odd, said Agathon. You must speak to him again, and insist. But here I broke in. I shouldn't do that, I said. You'd much better leave him to himself. It's quite a habit of his, you know; off he goes and there he stands, no matter where it is. I've no doubt he'll be with us before long, so I really don't think you'd better worry him.

Then here goes, said Alcibiades. There's one thing, though. If I say a word that's not the solemn truth I want you to stop me right away and tell me I'm a liar—but I promise you it won't be my fault if I do. On the other hand, you mustn't be surprised if I tell them about you just as it comes into my head, and jump from one thing to another. You can't expect anyone that's as drunk as I am to give a clear and systematic account of all *your* eccentricities.

48. With reference to the following three sentences, see Supplement, pp. 2.34-35 (*Pap.* VI B 35:19).

49. Cf. John 5:4

50. See Lucian, "Charon, or the Inspectors," 6; *Lucians Schriften*, I-IV (Zurich: 1769-73; ASKB 1135-38), II, pp. 291-92; *Lucian*, I-VIII, tr. A. M. Harmon et al. (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913-68), II, pp. 408-09. See *Either/Or* I, p. 25, KW III (SV I 9).

51. Literally, "double-faced," like the ancient Roman god Janus, guardian of the gates, after whom the first month of the year is named because it faces both the old year and the new.

52. *Du* is the familiar form of the Danish second-person singular pronoun (distinguished from the formal *De*), used in addressing family members, relatives, close friends, and God. The use of *De* has become almost obsolete in recent years. Oddly enough, the use of the old familiar "thou" in English biblical and religious language has lost its familiar character and has become specialized and formal. To drink *Dus* means to pledge enduring friendship and loyalty.

53. See Plutarch, "The Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in

Verse,” 19, *Moralia*, 403; Kaltwasser, IV, p. 39; Loeb, V, pp. 308-09.

54. See *Irony*, pp. 176-77 and note 407, KW II (SV XIII 259).

55. See Matthew 6:17.

56. See Romans 8:26.

57. Johann Melchior Goeze (1717-1786) was Lessing's opponent in the controversy over Lessing's anonymous edition of Hermann Samuel Reimarus's *Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger. Noch ein Fragment des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten* (Berlin: 1774-77). See Lessing, “Eine Parabel ...,” “*Gotth. Ephr. Lessing's nöthige Antwort ...*,” “*Der nöthigen Antwort ... Erste Folge*,” “*Axiomata Wider den Herrn Pastor Goeze in Hamburg*,” “*Anti-Goeze ...*,” *Zur Theologie, Schriften*, VI, pp. 3-224. See also JP III 2375-77, 2379, 2526, 2720, 3042, 3195 (*Pap.* X¹ A 379, 449, 465; XI² A 39, X⁴ A 335, X¹ A 373, XI¹ A 482, X¹ A 401).

58. See Plato, *Symposium*, 203 b-204 a; *Opera*, III, pp. 500-03; Heise, II, pp. 78-80; *Dialogues*, pp. 555-56 (Diotima speaking, as related by Socrates):

I'll tell you, she said, though it's rather a long story. On the day of Aphrodite's birth the gods were making merry, and among them was Resource, the son of Craft. And when they had supped. Need came begging at the door because there was good cheer inside. Now, it happened that Resource, having drunk deeply of the heavenly nectar—for this was before the days of wine—wandered out into the garden of Zeus and sank into a heavy sleep, and Need, thinking that to get a child by Resource would mitigate her penury, lay down beside him and in time was brought to bed of Love. So Love became the follower and servant of Aphrodite because he was begotten on the same day that she was born, and further, he was born to love the beautiful since Aphrodite is beautiful herself.

Then again, as the son of Resource and Need, it has been his fate to be always needy; nor is he delicate and lovely as most of us believe, but harsh and arid, barefoot and homeless, sleeping on the naked earth, in doorways, or in the very streets beneath the stars of heaven, and always partaking of his mother's poverty. But, secondly, he brings his father's resourcefulness to his designs upon the beautiful

and the good, for he is gallant, impetuous, and energetic, a mighty hunter, and a master of device and artifice—at once desirous and full of wisdom, a lifelong seeker after truth, an adept in sorcery, enchantment, and seduction.

He is neither mortal nor immortal, for in the space of a day he will be now, when all goes well with him, alive and blooming, and now dying, to be born again by virtue of his father's nature, while what he gains will always ebb away as fast. So Love is never altogether in or out of need, and stands, moreover, midway between ignorance and wisdom. You must understand that none of the gods are seekers after truth. They do not long for wisdom, because they are wise—and why should the wise be seeking the wisdom that is already theirs? Nor, for that matter, do the ignorant seek the truth or crave to be made wise. And indeed, what makes their case so hopeless is that, having neither beauty, nor goodness, nor intelligence, they are satisfied with what they are, and do not long for the virtues they have never missed.

59. See Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," 57-58, *Moralia*, 374; Kaltwasser, III, pp. 449-50; Loeb, V, pp. 136-39:

This subject seems in some wise to call up the myth of Plato, which Socrates in the *Symposium* gives at some length in regard to the birth of Love, saying that Poverty, wishing for children, insinuated herself beside Plenty while he was asleep, and having become pregnant by him, gave birth to Love, who is of a mixed and utterly variable nature, inasmuch as he is the son of a father who is good and wise and self-sufficient in all things, but of a mother who is helpless and without means and because of want always clinging close to another and always importunate over another. For Plenty is none other than the first beloved and desired, the perfect and self-sufficient; and Plato calls raw material Poverty, utterly lacking of herself in the Good, but being filled from him and always yearning for him and sharing with him. The World, or Horus, which is born of these, is not eternal nor unaffected nor imperishable, but, being ever reborn, contrives to remain always young and never subject to destruction in the changes and cycles of

events.

We must not treat legend as if it were history at all, but we should adopt that which is appropriate in each legend in accordance with its verisimilitude. Whenever, therefore, we speak of material we must not be swept away to the opinions of some philosophers, and conceive of an inanimate and indifferentiated body, which is of itself inert and inactive. The fact is that we call oil the material of perfume and gold the material of a statue, and these are not destitute of all differentiation. We provide the very soul and thought of Man as the basic material of understanding and virtue for Reason to adorn and to harmonize, and some have declared the Mind to be a place for the assembling of forms and for the impression of concepts, as it were.

60. See Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," 57, *Moralia*, 374, Kaltwasser, III, p. 449, Loeb, V, pp. 136-37.

It might appear that Hesiod, in making the very first things of all to be Chaos and Earth and Tartarus and Love, did not accept any other origins but only these, if we transfer the names somewhat and assign to Isis the name of Earth and to Osiris the name of Love and to Typhon the name of Tartarus; for the poet seems to place Chaos at the bottom as a sort of region that serves as a resting-place for the Universe.

See also Hesiod, *Theogony*, 116-28; *Hesiod The Homeric Hymns and Homerica*, tr. Hugh G. Evelyn-White (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 86-89;

Verily at the first Chaos came to be, but next wide-bosomed Earth, the ever-sure foundation of all the deathless ones who hold the peaks of snowy Olympus, and dim Tartarus in the depth of the wide-pathed Earth, and Eros (Love), fairest among the deathless gods, who unnerves the limbs and overcomes the mind and wise counsels of all gods and all men within them. From Chaos came forth Erebus and black Night; but of Night were born Aether and Day, whom she conceived and bare from union in love with Erebus. And Earth first bare starry Heaven, equal to herself,

to cover her on every side, and to be an ever-sure abiding-place for the blessed gods.

61. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.35 (*Pap.* VI B 35:24).

62. On “actuality” [*Virkelighed*] and “reality” [*Realitet*], see *JP* III, pp. 900-03.

63. Lessing, “*Ueber den Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft*,” *Schriften*, V, p. 80; cf. *Lessing’s Theological Writings*, tr. Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 53. See also *Fragments*, title page and note, KW VII (SV IV 173).

64. “Contingent” or “accidental” as distinguished from “eternal” and “essential.” See pp. 1.197-98.

65. Lessing, “*Ueber den Beweis*,” *Schriften*, V, pp. 82-83; Chadwick, pp. 54-55.

66. See Supplement, pp. 2.35-36 (*Pap.* VI B 98:26).

67. See *Fragments*, title page, KW VII (SV IV 173).

68. An allusion to oral reading by the class and a delinquent’s lip movements.

69. See *JP* III 3633 (*Pap.* VI A 62).

70. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.36 (*Pap.* VI B 35:25).

71. See note 63 above. The English translations in the paragraph are from Chadwick, pp. 53 and 54.

72. See *Fragments*, pp. 100-05, KW VII (SV IV 263-67).

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-66 (221-31).

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-05 (266-67).

75. See Lessing, “*Ueber den Beweis*,” *Schriften*, V, pp. 77-78; Chadwick, pp. 52-53. Origen’s position as cited was based on miracles, which Lessing regarded as historical events but of a kind that he did not find in the eighteenth century.

76. See, for example, Romans 10:12; I Corinthians 12:13; Galatians 3:28; Colossians 3:11.

77. See note 63 above.

78. See p. 1.53 and note 83.

79. See *Fragments*, pp. 74-75, KW VII (SV IV 238).

80. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.36 (*Pap.* VI B 35:30).

81. See Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 75 a; *Aristoteles graece*, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), I, p. 75; *The*

Complete Works of Aristotle, I-II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Oxford tr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I, p. 122 (“Crossing from another genus”). See also *Fragments*, p. 73, KW VII (SV IV 236).

82. See Lessing, “*Ueber den Beweis*,” *Schriften*, V, p. 82; Chadwick, p. 54.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 83; Chadwick, p. 55.

84. See *Fragments*, Supplement, p. 183, KW VII (*Pap.* V B 1:3).

85. See Shakespeare, *Macbeth*, II, 2, 60-61, V, 1, 39-45; *W Shakspeare's dramatische Werke*, I-VIII, tr. Ernst Ortlepp (Stuttgart: 1838-39; ASKB 1874-81), I, pp. 34, 96; *Shakspeare's dramatische Werke*, I-XII, tr. August Wilhelm v. Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck (Berlin: 1839-41; ASKB 1883-88), XII, pp. 296 (II, 1), 346-47; *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, ed. George Lyman Kittredge (Boston: Ginn, 1936), pp. 1123, 1140. Kierkegaard read Latin, Greek, and German, but not English. His reading of Shakespeare was in German translations or in the then available Danish translations. See *Letters*, Letter 2, KW XXV, on the prospect of beginning to learn English in his last year in the gymnasium. In *Pap.* V B 72:28 (1844), he wrote (in connection with Edward Young's *Night Thoughts*), “Because I do not understand English, and also because no doubt there are more who understand German than English, I quote from a German translation”

86. See Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, *Werke*, IV¹, pp. 49-51.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

89. See, for example. *Fragments*, pp. 52, 104, KW VII (SV IV 218, 266); *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 34-37 and note 18, 40-41, 46-59, and Supplement, pp. 259-65, KW VI (SV III 85-88, 91-92, 97-109; *Pap.* X⁶ B 68).

90. With reference to the following four sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.36 (*Pap.* VI B 35:32).

91. See Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, I, 2, 146; *William Shakspeare's Tragiske Værker*, I-VII, *Dramatiske Værker*, VIII-IX, tr. Peter Foersom and Peter Frederik Wulff (Copenhagen: 1807-25; ASKB 1889-96), I, p. 22; Ortlepp, I, p. 232; Schlegel and Tieck, VI, p. 14; Kittredge, p. 1151: “Frailty, thy name is woman.”

92. See note 9 above.

93. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see

Supplement, p. 2.37 (*Pap.* VI B 35:33).

94. See, for example, Plato, *Gorgias*, 490 c-491 a; *Opera*, I, pp. 370-73; Heise, III, pp. 110-11; *Dialogues*, pp. 272-73:

SOCRATES: Then must he have a larger portion of the food than we do, because he is better, or in virtue of his authority should he do all the distributing, but in the use and expenditure of it ought he to seek no excessive portion for his own body, if he is not to suffer for it, but to receive more than some and less than others? And if he happens to be the weakest of all, then must not the best man get the smallest share of all, Callicles? Is it not so, my good friend?

CALLICLES: You keep talking about food and drink and doctors and nonsense. I am not speaking of these things.

SOCRATES: Do you not say the wiser man is the better? Yes or no?

CALLICLES: I do.

SOCRATES: But should not the better have a larger share?

CALLICLES: Not of food or drink.

SOCRATES: I see. Of clothes perhaps, and the most expert weaver should have the largest cloak and should go around clad in the most numerous and handsome garments?

CALLICLES: Garments indeed!.

SOCRATES: Well then, the best and wisest expert in shoes should obviously have the advantage in them. The cobbler, I suppose, should have the largest and most numerous shoes in which to walk around.

CALLICLES: Shoes! You keep talking nonsense.

SOCRATES: Well, if that is not what you mean, here it is perhaps. A farmer for instance who is an expert with good sound knowledge about the soil should have a larger share of seed and use the most seed possible on his own land.

CALLICLES: How you keep saying the same things, Socrates!

SOCRATES: Not only that, Callicles, but about the same matters.

CALLICLES: By heaven, you literally never stop talking about cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if we were discussing them.

95. The references have not been located.

96. See Hegel, “*Ueber: ‘Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke’* Dritter Band ...,” *Werke*, XVII, p. 33; *J.A.*, VI, *Aufsätze aus den Heidelberger Jahrbüchern*. I, p. 343; Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I-II (Berlin: 1840; ASKB 843), I, p. 191.

97. The conversation between Lessing and Jacobi was originally reported in a letter from Jacobi to Moses Mendelssohn that was sent via Elise Reimarus (daughter of Hermann Samuel Reimarus, author of *Fragmente des Wolfenbüttelschen Ungenannten* and *Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger*, which Lessing published), their mutual friend, whom Jacobi calls Emilie in *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, *Werke*, IV¹, p. 37. For continuation of the text, see Supplement, p. 2.37 (*Pap.* VI B 35:34, 98:27).

98. See Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza*, *Werke*, IV¹, p. 74.

99. See *Fragments*, pp. 37-39, 47, KW VII (SV IV 204-06, 214). See also *Fear and Trembling*, p. 100, KW VI (SV III 148-49).

100. See *Fragments*, p. 37, KW VII (SV IV 204). See also Plato, *Phaedrus*, 229 d-230 a; *Opera*, I, pp. 130-31; *Dialogues*, p. 478 (Socrates speaking):

For my part, Phaedrus, I regard such theories [an account of how Boreas seized Orythia from the river] as no doubt attractive, but as the invention of clever, industrious people who are not exactly to be envied, for the simple reason that they must then go on and tell us the real truth about the appearance of centaurs and the Chimera, not to mention a whole host of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasus and countless other remarkable monsters of legend flocking in on them. If our skeptic, with his somewhat crude science, means to reduce every one of them to the standard of probability, he'll need a deal of time for it. I myself have certainly no time for the business, and I'll tell you why, my friend. I can't as yet 'know myself,' as the inscription at Delphi enjoins, and so long as that ignorance remains it seems to me ridiculous to inquire into extraneous matters. Consequently I don't bother about such things, but accept the current beliefs about them, and direct my inquiries, as I have just said, rather to myself, to discover whether I really am a more complex creature and more puffed up with pride than Typhon [son of Typhoeus, a monster with a hundred snake heads, later identified with

Typhoeus], or a simpler, gentler being whom heaven has blessed with a quiet, un-Typhonic nature.

101. Johann Wilhelm Ludwig Gleim (1719-1803), German poet, lived in Halberstadt.

102. Jacobi, *Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, Werke*, IV¹, p. 79. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.37 (*Pap.* VI B 35:34, 98:27).

103. A rhyme used, for example, in counting a child's buttons in order to find out what his occupation will be; freely translated: rich man, poor man, beggar man, thief See *Irony*, p. 282, KW II (SV XIII 350).

104. See I Corinthians 2:7-9; *Fragments*, p. 109, KW VII (SV IV 271).

105. KW VI (SV III). Published October 16, 1843.

106. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 42 fn., KW VI (SV III 93).

107. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.37 (*Pap.* VI B 35:36).

108. See Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph v Schelling, *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studium* (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1830; ASKB 764), pp. 97-98; *On University Studies*, ed. Norbert Guterman, tr. E. S. Morgan (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966), pp. 49-50; *System des transscendentalen Idealismus* (Tübingen: 1800), pp. 146-69; *System of Transcendental Idealism* (1800), tr. Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), pp. 72-82. See also *Fragments*, p. 79, VII (SV IV 243); *Anxiety*, p. 11, KW VIII (SV IV 283).

109. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 64-65; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 74-75; *Science of Logic*, p. 71:

It must be admitted that it is an important consideration—one which will be found in more detail in the logic itself—that the advance is a *retreat into the ground*, to what is *primary* and *true*, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which the beginning is made. Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost *truth*. This last, the ground, is then also that from which the first proceeds, that which at first appeared as an immediacy. This is true in still greater measure of absolute

spirit which reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the *end* of the development is known as freely externalizing itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an *immediate being*—opening or unfolding itself [*sich entschliessend*] into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle. The essential requirement for the science of logic is not so much that the beginning be a pure immediacy, but rather that the whole of the science be within itself a circle in which the first is also the last and the last is also the first.

We see therefore that, on the other hand, it is equally necessary to consider as *result* that into which the movement returns as into its *ground*. In this respect the first is equally the ground, and the last a derivative; since the movement starts from the first and by correct inferences arrives at the last as the ground, this latter is a result. Further, the *progress* from that which forms the beginning is to be regarded as only a further determination of it, hence that which forms the starting point of the development remains at the base of all that follows and does not vanish from it. The progress does not consist merely in the derivation of an other, or in the effected transition into a genuine other; and in so far as this transition does occur it is equally sublated again. Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development, remaining completely immanent in its further determinations.

See also Frederik Christian Sibbern, “*Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837 . . .*,” *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, XIX, 1838, pp. 283-360 (esp. p. 301), 424, 460; XX, 1839, pp. 20-59, 103-36, 193-244, 293-308, 405-48; *Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, fornemmelig betreffende Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid* (Copenhagen: 1838; ASKB 778), p. 19.

110. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.37 (*Pap. VI B 35:37*).

111. Lessing, “*Eine Duplik*,” I, *Schriften*, V, p. 100. See *Eighteen Discourses*, p. 272, KW V (SV IV 155-56); JP IV 4375, p. 266 (*Pap. X¹ A 478*, p. 306).

112. An anonymous allusion (“*den frommen Mann*”) in the opening paragraph of Lessing’s “*Eine Duplik*,” *Schriften*, V, p. 95.

113. Lessing published anonymously Hermann Samuel Reimarus’s *Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Jünger* (Berlin: 1774) and *Fragmente des Wolfenbutelschen Ungenannten* (Berlin: 1777).

114. Cf. Luke 23:1-12.

115. Israel Joachim Behrend (d. 1821), a well-known Copenhagen character about whom many anecdotes were told. See JP I 140 (*Pap. II A 571*); Lauritz Nicolai Bjørn, *Dumriana eller Indfald, Anecdoter og Charactertræk Claus Dumrians Levnet* (Copenhagen: 1821), p. 19; Jakob Davidsen, *Fra det gamle Kongens Kjøbenhavn*, I-II (Copenhagen: 1880-81), I, pp. 364-69.

116. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 5-6; J.A., IV, pp. 483-84; *Science of Logic*, p. 391:

In the *whole* of logic, essence occupies the same place as quantity does in the sphere of being; absolute indifference to limit. But quantity is this indifference in an *immediate* determination, and the limit is present in it as an immediately external determinateness, quantity passes over into quantum; the external limit is necessary to quantity and is *affirmatively present* in it [*1st an 1hr seiend*]. In essence, on the other hand, the determinateness is not a simple immediacy but is present only as *posited* by essence itself; it is not free, but is present only as *connected* with its unity. The negativity of essence is *reflection*; and the determinations are *reflected*, posited by essence itself and remaining in essence as sublated.

Essence stands between *being* and *Notion*-, it constitutes their mean, and its movement is the *transition* from being into the Notion. Essence is being-in-and-for-itself, but in the determination of being-in-itself; for the general determination of essence is to have proceeded from being, or to be the *first negation of being*. Its movement consists in positing within itself the negation or determination, thereby giving itself *determinate being* and becoming as infinite being-for-self what it is in itself.

See also *Repetition*, Supplement, pp. 308-10, 321-22, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 117, 118:7); *Anxiety*, pp. 12-14, KW VIII (SV IV 284-86).

117. Cf. Sirach 43:27 (“the sum of our words is: ‘He is the all.’”). See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II, *Werke*, V, pp. 329-35, esp. pp. 330-31; *J.A.*, V, pp. 329-35, esp. pp. 330-31; *Science of Logic*, pp. 825-30, esp. p. 826:

From this course the method has emerged as the *self knowing Notion that has itself*, as the absolute, both subjective and objective, *for its subject matter*, consequently as the pure correspondence of the Notion and its reality, as a concrete existence that is the Notion itself.

Accordingly, what is to be considered here as method is only the movement of the *Notion* itself, the nature of which movement has already been cognized; but *first*, there is now the added *significance* that the *Notion is everything*, and its movement is the *universal absolute activity*, the self-determining and self-realizing movement. The method is therefore to be recognized as the unrestrictedly universal, internal and external mode; and as the absolutely infinite force, to which no object, presenting itself as something external, remote from and independent of reason, could offer resistance or be of a particular nature in opposition to it, or could not be penetrated by it. It is therefore *soul and substance*, and anything whatever is comprehended and known in its truth only when it is *completely subjugated to the method*! it is the method proper to every subject matter because its activity is the Notion. This is also the truer meaning of its *universality*, according to the universality of reflection it is regarded merely as the method for *everything*; but according to the universality of the Idea, it is both the manner peculiar to cognition, to the *subjectively* self-knowing Notion, and also the *objective* manner, or rather the *substantiality, of things*—that is of Notions, in so far as they appear primarily to *representation* and *reflection* as *others*. It is therefore not only the highest *force*, or rather the *sole* and absolute *force* of reason, but also its supreme and sole *urge* to find and cognize *itself by means of itself in everything*.

See also *Fragments*, p. 78 fn., and Supplement, pp. 200-05, KW VII

(SV IV 241-42, *Pap.* V B 14).

118. Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I-II. Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was professor of philosophy at the University of Berlin and a critic of Hegel's philosophy. See Supplement, pp. 2.33, 2.76 (*Pap.* VI B 38, 54:21); *JP* I 263; V 5977, 5978 (*Pap.* X² A 324, VIII² C 1, VIII¹ A 18). Kierkegaard repeatedly misspelled Trendelenburg's name.

119. See Plutarch, "Isis and Osiris," 60, *Moralia*, 375; Kaltwasser, III, pp. 452-53; Loeb, V, pp. 142-45:

In general this god [*Isis*] is the better, as both Plato and Aristotle conceive. The creative and conserving element of Nature moves toward him and toward existence while the annihilating and destructive moves away from him towards non-existence. For this reason they call Isis by a name derived from "hastening" (*hiemai*) with understanding, or being borne onward (*pheromai*), since she is an animate and intelligent movement; for the name is not a foreign name, but, just as all the gods have a name in common derived from two words, "visible" (*theaton*) and "rushing" (*theon*), in the same way this goddess, from her understanding and her movement, we call Isis and the Egyptians call her Isis. So also Plato says that the men of ancient times made clear the meaning of "essence" (*ousia*) by calling it "sense" (*isia*). So also he speaks of the intelligence and understanding as being a carrying and movement of mind hasting and being carried onward; and also comprehension and good and virtue they attribute to those things which are ever flowing and in rapid motion, just as again, on the other hand, by means of antithetical names they vilified evil: for example, that which hinders and binds fast and holds and checks Nature from hasting and going they called baseness, or "ill-going" (*kak-ia*), and helplessness or "difficulty of going" (*apor-ia*), and cowardice or "fear of going" (*deil-ia*), and distress or "not going" (*an-ia*).

120. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.37-38 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:1).

121. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 68; *J.A.*, IV, p. 78; *Science of Logic*, p. 73; "As yet there is

nothing and there is to become something. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; therefore being, too, is already contained in the beginning. The beginning, therefore, contains both, being and nothing is the unity of being and nothing; or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being.”

122. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 63; *J.A.*, IV, p. 73, *Science of Logic*, p. 70.

But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken *immediately*, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an *absolute*, or what is synonymous here, an *abstract* beginning; and so it *may not presuppose anything*, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must be purely and simply *an immediacy*, or rather merely *immediacy* itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it cannot contain within itself any determination, any content; for any such would be a distinguishing and an interrelationship of distinct moments, and consequently a mediation. The beginning therefore is *pure being*.

123. The Danish *slet* and the German *schlecht* are commonly translated as “bad.” The English translations of Hegel have “wrong” (Wallace) or “spurious” (Miller) or “false” (Haldane and Simson). See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 147-48, 150-51, 163, 263-64; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 157-58, 160-61, 173, 273-74; *Science of Logic*, pp. 137, 139, 148-49, 226:

The infinite in its simple Notion can, in the first place, be regarded as a fresh definition of the absolute; as indeterminate self-relation it is posited as *being* and *becoming*. The forms of *determinate being* find no place in the series of those determinations which can be regarded as definitions of the absolute, for the individual forms of that sphere are immediately posited only as determinatenesses, as finite in general. The infinite, however, is held to be absolute without qualification for it is determined expressly as negation of

the finite, and reference is thus expressly made to limitedness in the infinite—limitedness of which being and becoming could perhaps be capable, even if not possessing or showing it—and the presence in the infinite of such limitedness is denied.

But even so, the infinite is not yet really free from limitation and finitude; the main point is to distinguish the genuine Notion of infinity from spurious [*schlecht*] infinity, the infinite of reason from the infinite of the understanding; yet the latter is the *finitized* infinite, and it will be found that in the very act of keeping the infinite pure and aloof from the finite, the infinite is only made finite.

The infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation wherein they are as qualitatively distinct others, is to be called the *spurious infinite*, the infinite of the understanding, for which it has the value of the highest, the absolute Truth. The understanding is satisfied that it has truly reconciled these two, but the truth is that it is entangled in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction; it can only be brought to a consciousness of this fact by the contradictions into which it falls on every side when it ventures to apply and to explicate these its categories.

This infinite, as the consummated return into self, the relation of itself to itself, is *being*—but not indeterminate, abstract being, for it is posited as negating the negation; it is, therefore, also *determinate* being for it contains negation in general and hence determinateness. It is and is *there*, present before us. It is only the spurious infinite which is the *beyond*, because it is *only* the negation of the finite posited as *real*—as such it is the abstract, first negation; determined *only* as negative, the affirmation of *determinate* being is lacking in it; the spurious infinite, held fast as only negative, is even *supposed to be not there*, is supposed to be unattainable. However, to be thus unattainable is not its grandeur but its defect, which is at bottom the result of holding fast to the *finite* as such as a *merely affirmative being*. It is what is untrue that is unattainable, and such an infinite must be seen as a falsity.

In this way, finitude and infinity each acquire in themselves a dual, and indeed, an opposite meaning. The quantum is *finite*, in the first place simply as limited, and secondly, as impelled beyond itself, as being determined in an other. But the *infinity* of quantum is first, its unlimitedness, and secondly, its returnedness into itself, its indifferent being-for-self. If we now compare these moments with each other, we find that the determination of the finitude of quantum, the impulse to go beyond itself to an other in which its determination lies, is equally the determination of the infinite; the negation of the limit is the same impulsion beyond the determinateness, so that in this negation, in the infinite, quantum possesses its final determinateness. The other moment of infinity is the being-for-self which is indifferent to the limit; but the limiting of quantum itself is such that quantum is explicitly indifferent to its limit, and hence to other quanta and to its *beyond*. In quantum, finitude and infinity (the spurious infinity supposedly separate from the finite) each already has within it the moment of the other.

124. Plutarch, "The Obsolescence of Oracles," 22, *Moralia*, 421-22; Kalt-wasser, IV, pp. 120-21; Loeb, V, pp. 414-15:

But when Heracleon inquired in what way this was related to Plato and how he had given the key-note for this topic, Cleombrotus said, "You well remember that he summarily decided against an infinite number of worlds, but had doubts about a limited number; and up to five he conceded a reasonable probability to those who postulated one world to correspond to each element, but, for himself, he kept to one. This seems to be peculiar to Plato, for the other philosophers conceived a fear of plurality, feeling that if they did not limit matter to one world, but went beyond one, an unlimited and embarrassing infinity would at once fasten itself upon them."

125. See, for example, Adolph Peter Adler, *Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik* (Copenhagen: 1842; ASKB 383), pp. 21, 25-26.

126. See p. 1.51 and note 78.

127. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the

following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.38 (*Pap.* VI B 39:6).

128. The Danish *Tanke-Experiment* is defined in ODS as an experiment that can be carried out only in thought by supposing something as actual and imagining the consequences. Poul Martin Møller had employed the unusual expression. See “*Nogle Betragtninger over populære Ideers Udvikling*,” *Efterladte Skrifter*, I-III (Copenhagen: 1839-43; ASKB 1574-76), II, p. 17.

129. See p. 1.14 and note 22.

130. See Supplement, p. 2.38 (*Pap.* VI B 39:7).

131. See J. L. Heiberg, *Recensenten og Dyret*, 3, *Skuespil af Johan Ludvig Heiberg*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1833-41, ASKB 1553-59), III, p. 202 (ed. tr) (Trop, a perpetual student, speaking): “I can at any time obtain a testimonial to the fact that I have almost been close to taking my law examination.” See also *Anxiety*, p. 31, KW VIII (SV IV 303).

132. This is an allusion to Hegel’s view, in his criticism of Kant’s antinomies, that thought is a unity of opposites. and that events proceed through contradictions in a progressive unity of opposites. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 217, *J.A.*, IV, p. 227; *Science of Logic*, p. 191: “But profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical nature of reason demonstrates *any* Notion whatever to be a unity of opposed moments to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given.” See also *Fragments*, p. 6, KW VII (SV IV 177).

133. See Heinrich Theodor Rotscher, *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter. Eine philologisch-philosophische Abhandlung zur Alterthumsforschung* (Berlin: 1827), pp. 31-37.

134. See Rotscher, *Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung*, II, *Cyclus dramatischer Charaktere*, I-II (Berlin: 1841-46; ASKB 1391, 1802-03), IP, pp. 99-132.

135. See note 10 above.

136. A primary issue between Hegel and Schelling was the nature of the beginning of philosophy. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 60, *J.A.*, IV, p. 70; *Science of Logic*, pp. 67-68:

But the modern perplexity about a beginning proceeds from a further requirement of which those who are concerned with the dogmatic demonstration of a principle or who are sceptical

about finding a subjective criterion against dogmatic philosophizing, are not yet aware, and which is completely denied by those who begin, like a shot from a pistol, from their inner revelation, from faith, intellectual intuition, etc., and who would be exempt from *method* and logic. If earlier abstract thought was interested in the principle. only as content, but in the course of philosophical development has been impelled to pay attention to the other side, to the behaviour of the cognitive process, this implies that the *subjective* act has also been grasped as an *essential* moment of objective truth, and this brings with it the need to unite the method with the content, the form with the principle. Thus the principle ought also to be the beginning, and what is the first for thought ought also to be the first in the process of thinking.

See also *The Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures*, with *Irony*, pp. 335-39, KW II (*Pap.* III C 27 [XIII, pp. 254-58]), *Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est*, pp. 144-56, KW VII (*Pap.* IV B 1, pp. 126-39).

137. See, for example, Trendelenburg, *Die logische Frage in Hegel's System* (Leipzig: 1843; ASKB 846), pp. 23-25. The first edition of Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* was published in 1807, the second edition (in *Werke*, 1 ed., ASKB 550) in 1832, and the third edition (in *Werke*, 2 ed.) in 1841.

138. Presumably a reference to Sibbern's long series of articles on Hegel. See note 109 above.

139. See, for example, J. G. Fichte, *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschafts lehre*, *Johann Gottlieb Fichte's sämtliche Werke*, I-VIII, ed. Immanuel Hermann Fichte (Berlin, Bonn: 1845-46; ASKB 492-99), I, p. 94; *Fichte: Science of Knowledge*, tr. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York: Meredith, 1970), pp. 95-96:

Thus the self asserts, by means of X, that *A exists absolutely for the judging self, and that simply in virtue of its being posited in the self as such*; which is to say, it is asserted that within the self—whether it be specifically positing, or judging, or whatever it may be—there is something that is permanently uniform, forever one and the same; and hence the X that is absolutely posited can also be expressed as $I = I$; I am I.

See also *Irony*, pp. 272-74 and note 66, *KW II* (SV XIII 345-46); *Anxiety*, p. 153, *KW VIII* (SV IV 418-19).

140. See *Fragments*, pp. 72-88, *KW VII* (SV IV 235-51).

141. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-86 (242-49).

142. A traditional figure based on historical elements in the Old Testament.

143. See, for example. *Fragments*, p. 80 ("prophet in reverse"), *KW VII* (SV IV 243), *JP* I1030 (*Pap.* IV A 164).

144. See *JP* V 5406 (*Pap.* II A 534).

145. Frater Taciturnus in *Stages on Life's Way*, p. 231, *KW XI* (SV VI 218).

146. See Plato, *Symposium*, 199 e-200 b; *Opera*, III, pp. 492-93; Heise, II, pp. 57-58; *Dialogues*, p. 552:

Well, then, Socrates went on, I want you to look at Love from the same point of view. Is he the love of something, or of nothing?

Of something, naturally.

And now, said Socrates, bearing in mind what Love is the love of, tell me this. Does he long for what he is in love with, or not?

Of course he longs for it.

And does he long for whatever it is he longs for, and is he in love with it, when he's got it, or when he hasn't?

When he hasn't got it, probably.

Then isn't it probable, said Socrates, or rather isn't it certain that everything longs for what it lacks, and that nothing longs for what it doesn't lack? I can't help thinking, Agathon, that that's about as certain as anything could be. Don't you think so?

Yes, I suppose it is.

See also note 58 above.

147. See *Plutarch*, "Solon," 31, *Lives*; Tetens, I, pp. 364-65; Klaiber, II, pp. 271-72; Loeb, I, pp. 494-97:

Now Solon, after beginning his great work on the story or fable of the lost Atlantis, which, as he had heard from the learned men of Saïs, particularly concerned the Athenians, abandoned it, not for lack of leisure, as Plato says, but

rather because of his old age, fearing the magnitude of the task. For that he had abundant leisure, such verses as these testify:—

“But I grow old ever learning many things;”

and again,

“But now the works of the Cyprus-born goddess are
dear to my soul,
Of Dionysus, too, and the Muses, which impart
delights to men.”

148. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.38 (*Pap.* VI B 39:9).

149. Possibly an allusion to Franz v. Baader, *Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel'schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christentum* (Stuttgart: 1839, ASKB 416). “Busy trifler” is an allusion to Ludvig Holberg’s drama *Den Stundesløse*, *Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination; *The Fussy Man*, *Four Plays by Holberg*, tr. Henry Alexander (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1946), pp. 1-61.

150. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.38 (*Pap.* VI B 98:30).

151. Originally *Kjeldermænd* referred merely to someone who lived or operated a small business in a cellar of a building. By extension it came to mean an uninformed, ignorant person.

152. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.38-39 (*Pap.* VI B 98:31).

153. See Supplement, p. 2.39 (*Pap.* VI B 98:32).

154. See Supplement, p. 2.39 (*Pap.* VI B 98:33).

155. See Luke 15:7.

156. With reference to the following seven sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.39 (*Pap.* VI B 19:2).

157. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.39 (*Pap.* VI B 19:4).

158. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.40 (*Pap.* VI B 19:5).

159. A street in the center of Copenhagen, named in commemoration of the Swedish attack on February 11, 1669.

160. Cf. *Practice*, pp. 233-34, KW XX (SV XII 213-14).

161. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.40 (*Pap.* VI B 40:2).

162. See Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke*, IX, p. 136; *J.A.*, XI, pp. 163-64; *The Philosophy of History* (tr. of P.G., 2 ed, 1840; Kierkegaard had 1 ed., 1837), tr. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 116:

With the Empire of China History has to begin, for it is the oldest, as far as history gives us any information; and its *principle* has such substantiality. that for the empire in question it is at once the oldest and the newest. Early do we see China advancing to the condition in which it is found at this day; for as the contrast between objective existence and subjective freedom of movement in it, is still wanting, every change is excluded, and the fixedness of a character which recurs perpetually, takes the place of what we should call the truly historical. China and India lie, as it were, still outside the World's History, as the mere presupposition of elements whose combination must be waited for to constitute their vital progress.

See also *Fragments*, p. 78 fn., *KW* VII (*SV* IV 242).

163. See John 14:6.

164. See *Fragments*, pp. 72-88, *KW* VII (*SV* IV 235-51).

165. See Supplement, p. 2.40 (*Pap.* VI B 40:3).

166. The source has not been located.

167. Cf. Matthew 25:30, Luke 17 10.

168. See Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244 b-d, 256 a-b; *Opera*, I, pp. 164-67, 192-93; *Dialogues*, pp. 491-92, 501-02 (Socrates speaking):

It was when they were mad that the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona achieved so much for which both states and individuals in Greece are thankful; when sane they did little or nothing. As for the Sibyl and others who by the power of inspired prophecy have so often foretold the future to so many, and guided them aright, I need not dwell on what is obvious to everyone. Yet it is in place to appeal to the fact that madness was accounted no shame nor disgrace by the men of old who gave things their names; otherwise they would not have connected that greatest of arts, whereby the future is discerned, with this very word "madness," and named it

accordingly. No, it was because they held madness to be a valuable gift, when due to divine dispensation, that they named that art as they did, though the men of today, having no sense of values, have put in an extra letter, making it not *manic* but *mantic*. That is borne out by the name they gave to the art of those sane prophets who inquire into the future by means of birds and other signs, the name was “*oionoistic*,” which by its components indicated that the prophet attained understanding and information by a purely human activity of thought belonging to his own intelligence, though a younger generation has come to call it “*oionistic*,” lengthening the quantity of the *o* to make it sound impressive. You see then what this ancient evidence attests. Corresponding to the superior perfection and value of the prophecy of inspiration over that of omen reading, both in name and in fact, is the superiority of heaven-sent madness over man-made sanity.

And so, if the victory be won by the higher elements of mind guiding them into the ordered rule of the philosophical life, their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and concord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected, and the power of goodness liberated; they have won self mastery and inward peace. And when life is over, with burden shed and wings recovered they stand victorious in the first of the three rounds in that truly Olympic struggle; nor can any nobler prize be secured whether by the wisdom that is of man or by the madness that is of god.

169. See, for example, *Either/Or*, I, p. 3, KW III (SKI v).

170. See, for example, Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger, *Aladdin, eller Den forunderlige Lampe*, Adam Oehlenschlägers *Poetiske Skrifter*, I-II (Copenhagen: 1805; ASKB 1597-98), II, pp. 273-74; *Aladdin or the wonderful lamp*, tr. Henry Meyer (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1968), pp. 169-70.

171. See Matthew 10:30; Luke 12:7.

172. See Genesis 22:17; Romans 9:27.

173. Frater Taciturnus in *Stages*, pp. 444-45, 470-71, 477, KW XI (SV VI 414-15, 437-38, 443); *Eighteen Discourses*, p. 381, KW V (SV V 152), *Works of Love*, KW XVI (SV IX 344) See also JP II 1142, 1402, IV 4937; V 5792, 5961 (*Pap.* X⁴ A 114, X² A 494, X⁴ A 290, VI B 18, VII¹ A 221).

174. Johann Christoph Friedrich v. Schiller, “Resignation,” 17, 5, *Schillers sämtliche Werke*, I-XII (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1838, ASKB 1804-15), I, p. 95; *Schiller’s Works*, I-IV, ed. J. G. Fischer (Philadelphia: 1883), I, p. 35. Cf. also *Practice*, pp. 182-83, KW XX (SV XII 170).

175. An insignificant person in J. L. Heiberg, *Kong Salomon og Jørgen Hat-temager, Skuespil*, II, pp. 303-400.

176. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.40-41 (*Pap.* X² A 482).

177. A Danish expression used by Jens Christian Hostrup as the title of the student comedy *En Spurv i Tranedands* (Copenhagen: 1846).

178. Schiller, “Die Gotter Gnechenlands,” 14, 7, *Werke*, I, p. 103, *Works*, p. 37.

179. Plutarch, “On the Control of Anger,” 16, *Moralia*, 464, Kaltwasser, IV, p. 291; Loeb, VI, pp. 156-57: “Fast from evil.”

180. J. H. Wessel, *Stella*, I, 1, *Johan Herman Wessels samtlige Skrifter*, I-II (Copenhagen: 1787), I, p. 198 (ed. tr.): “What the wild German does not do for money!”

181. An allusion to Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, who wrote numerous books on world history and mythology. See, for example: *Brage-Snak om Græske og Nordiske Myther og Oldsagn for Damer og Herrer* (Copenhagen: 1844; ASKB 1548), *Nordens Mythologi eller Sindbilled-Sprog historisk-poetisk udviklet og oplyst* (Copenhagen: 1832; ASKB 1949), *Udsigt over Verdens-Krønten fornemmelig i det Lutherske Tidsrum* (Copenhagen: 1817; ASKB 1970), *Haandbog i Verdens-Historien*, I—III (Copenhagen: 1833-43).

182. The printed text has a relative pronoun and *for* but no verb (“*der for at opdage*”) The final manuscript has “*der troer at opdage*,” which has been followed in the present translation.

183. See JP V 5457 (*Pap.* III A 57).

184. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.41 (*Pap.* VI B 40:4).

185 See K F Becker, *Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbejdet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann*, I-XII, ed. and tr. Johan Christian Riise (Copenhagen: 1822-29; ASKB 1972-83), VII, p. 303. King Henry IV of France is quoted as saying (ed. tr.), “Since I have the love of my subjects I can demand as much of them as I wish. But I nevertheless hope that, if God will preserve my life for some time yet, I shall bring things so far that there shall not be one

peasant in my kingdom who at least on Sunday does not have a chicken in his pot. ”

186. See Plutarch, “On the Sign of Socrates,” XX, 20, *Moralia*, 589; Kalt-wasser, V, p. 169; Loeb, VII, pp. 456-59:

In popular belief, on the other hand, it is only in sleep that men receive inspiration from on high; and the notion that they are so influenced when awake and in full possession of their faculties is accounted strange and incredible. This is like supposing that a musician uses his lyre when the strings are slack, but does not touch or play it when it has been adjusted to a scale and attuned. This belief arises from ignorance of the cause of this insensibility: the inner lack of attunement and the confusion in the men themselves. From this my friend Socrates was free, as is shown by the oracle delivered to his father when Socrates was yet a boy. It bade him let the child do whatever came into his mind, and not do violence to his impulses or divert them, but allow them free play, taking no further trouble about him than to pray to Zeus Agoraeus and the Muses, surely implying by this that he had a better guide of life in himself than a thousand teachers and attendants.

See also *Irony*, p. 159, KW II (SV XIII 244).

187. See Plato, *Apology*, 36 a, *Opera*, VIII, pp. 142-43; *Dialogues*, p. 21 *Platons Werke*, I—III, tr. Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (Berlin: 1817-28, ASKB 1158-63), I², p. 220, also has “three votes” [*drei Stimmen*]. Now the reading is more commonly “thirty votes” See also *Fear and Trembling*, p. 117, KW VI (SV III 163).

188. *Ad se ipsum* is a phrase from the Latin title of Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus’s *Meditations* ASKB lists *M. Antoninus Commentarii libri XII*, ed Johann M. Schultz (Leipzig: 1829, ASKB 1218), and *Marc Aurel. Antonin’s Unterhaltungen mit sich selbst*, tr. Johann M. Schultz (Schleswig: 1799, ASKB 1219). The phrase appears at the beginning of Kierkegaard’s journal notebook EE (February 1, 1839). See JP V 5365 (*Pap.* II A 340), *Either/Or*, I, p. 17, KW III (SV I 1).

189. See, rather, Plato, *Gorgias*, 473 e-474 a, *Opera*, I, pp. 326-37, Heise, III, pp. 68-69, *Dialogues*, p. 256.

SOCRATES: I am no politician, Polus, and last year when I

became a member of the Council and my tribe was presiding and it was my duty to put the question to the vote, I raised a laugh because I did not know how to. And so do not on this occasion either bid me put the question to those present, but if you can contrive no better refutation than this, then leave it to me in my turn, as I suggested just now, and try out what I consider the proper form of refutation. For I know how to produce one witness to the truth of what I say, the man with whom I am debating, but the others I ignore. I know how to secure one man's vote, but with the many I will not even enter into discussion.

190. An allusion to a play by Augustin Eugène Scribe, translated by J L Heiberg under the Danish title *Et Glas Vand*. The play revolves around the story that the fall of the Duke of Marlborough came about because his wife spilled a glass of water on Queen Anne's dress. The play was presented in Copenhagen six times in 1845, the year before the publication of *Postscript*.

191. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 70-74, *J.A.*, IV, pp. 80-84; *Science of Logic*, pp. 75-78, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, *Werke*, II, pp. 39-40; *J.A.*, II, pp. 47-48, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (tr. based primarily on 3 ed. of P.G. in 2 ed. of *Werke*, 1841; Kierkegaard had 2 ed. in 1 ed. of *Werke*, 1832), tr. J. B. Baillie (New York: Harper, 1967), pp. 108-09:

Instead of the inner activity and self-movement of its own actual life, such a simple determination of direct intuition (*Anschauung*)—which means here sense-knowledge—is predicated in accordance with a superficial analogy, and this external and empty application of the formula is called “construction” The same thing happens here, however, as in the case of every kind of formalism. A man's head must be indeed dull if he could not in a quarter of an hour get up the theory that there are enervating, innervating, and indirectly enervating diseases and as many cures, and who could not—since not so long ago instruction of that sort sufficed for the purpose—in as short a time be turned from being a man who works by rule of thumb into a theoretical physician. Formalism in the case of speculative Philosophy of Nature (*Naturphilosophie*) takes the shape of teaching that understanding is electricity, animals are

nitrogen, or equivalent to South or North and so on. When it does this, whether as badly as it is here expressed or even conformed with more terminology, such forceful procedure brings and holds together elements to all appearance far removed from one another; the violence done to stable inert sense-elements by connecting them in this way, confers on them merely the semblance of a conceptual unity, and spares itself the trouble of doing what is after all the important thing—expressing the notion itself, the meaning that underlies sense-ideas. All this sort of thing may strike anyone who has no experience with admiration and wonder. He may be awed by the profound genius he thinks it displays, and be delighted at the happy ingenuity of such characterizations, since they fill the place of the abstract notion with something tangible and sensuous, and so make it more pleasing; and he may congratulate himself on feeling an instinctive mental affinity for that glorious way of proceeding. The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is easy to practise. Its repetition, when once it is familiar, becomes as boring as the repetition of any bit of sleight-of-hand once we see through it.

See *JP* III 2346 (*Pap.* V C 2).

192. See Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, I, *Werke*, XIII, pp. 138-44; *J.A.*, XVII, pp. 154-60; *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, I-III (tr. of G.P., 2 ed., 1840-44; Kierkegaard had 1 ed., 1833-36), tr., E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), I, pp. 120-25, where Confucius and Lao-tse are briefly considered. See also note 162 above.

193. A region in southeast Africa on the lower Zambezi River and the Sofala coast.

194. See Holberg, *Jule-Stue*, 12, *Danske Skue-Plads*, II, no pagination; *The Christmas Party, Seven One-Act Plays by Holberg*, tr. Henry Alexander (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1950), pp. 97-98: "For just as the phoenix, that lives in Arabia, lives a thousand years alone and sets fire to himself as soon as he produces his offspring, because he will not live together with others of his kind, so we human beings, on the other hand, should get together and have fun so as to show

we are not related to such a brute beast.”

195. With reference to the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.41-42 (*Pap.* VI B 40:5).

196. Cf. John 2:14-16.

197. This statement has not been found in Shakespeare’s presentations of Falstaff.

198. A German word with a Danish ending.

199. See Supplement, p. 2.42 (*Pap.* VI B 40:6).

200. See Aesop, “The Dog Carrying a Piece of Meat across the River”; *Phaedri Augusti Liberti fabularum Aesopiarum Libri V*, ed. Christian H. Weise (Leipzig: 1828), I, 4, pp. 3-4; *Babrius and Phaedrus*, tr. B. E. Perry (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 196-97. “A dog, while carrying a piece of meat across a river, caught sight of his own image floating in the mirror of the waters and, thinking that it was another prize carried by another dog, decided to snatch it. But his greed was disappointed: he let go the meal that he held in his mouth, and failed besides to grasp the meal for which he strove.”

201. Hans Ancher Kofod, *Historiens vigtigste Begivenheder* (Copenhagen: 1808). See *Utters*, Document V, p. 5 (Kofoed), KW XXV.

202. See Supplement, pp. 2.42-43 (*Pap.* VI B 98:34).

203. See Matthew 22:32.

204. See, for example, “An Occasional Discourse,” *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits*, KW XV (SV VIII 217-18).

205. See Genesis 22:17; Romans 9:27.

206. See note 248 below.

207. An allusion to J.L. Heiberg and his serious hobby of astronomy. See, for example, “*Det astronomiske Aar*,” *Urania. Aarbog for 1844* (Copenhagen. 1845; ASKB U 57), pp. 77-160; *Repetition*, Supplement, pp. 281-319 and notes 14, 16, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 101-02, 105, 108-11, 116-17); *Prefaces*, IV, KW IX (SV V 27-30).

208. Plutarch, “On Moral Virtue,” 1, *Moralia*, 440; Kaltwasser, IV, p. 194; Loeb, VI, pp. 18-19.

209. Cf. Martin Luther, *Die Auslegungen des Evang. Johannis* . . , III, 199, *D. Martin Luthers . . . Sämtliche Schriften*, I-XXIII, ed. Johann Georg Walch (Halle: 1739-53), VIII, col. 608-09; *Geist aus Luther’s Schriften oder Concordanz der Ansichten und Urtheile des grossen Reformators* ..., I-IV, ed. F. W. Lomler et al. (Darmstadt: 1828-31;

ASKB 317-20), II, p. 67.

210. Attributed to the English actor David Garrick (1717-1779). The source has not been located.

211. See Genesis 19:22,26.

212. Cf. Judges 9:8-15.

213. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.43 (*Pap.* VI B 40:9).

214. Cf. *Letters*, Letters 81, 186, KW XXV .

215. See Supplement, p. 2.43 (*Pap.* VI B 98:35).

216. With reference to the remainder of the sentence and the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.43 (*Pap.* VI B 40:10).

217. In Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* (IV, 3), Juliet drinks a potion that puts her to sleep and makes her appear to be dead. Later (V, 3), Romeo, thinking her dead, takes a poison. Juliet, upon seeing him dead, draws his dagger and stabs herself.

218. The velvet on the gown of a bishop or doctor of theology.

219. Salomon Soldin (1774-1837), an absentminded bookseller on Pilestræde in Copenhagen. Once when a customer entered the bookstore, Soldin was standing on a ladder reaching for a book. Imitating the voice of Soldin, the customer said a few words to the bookseller's wife. Turning on the ladder, Soldin said, "Rebecca, is it I who is speaking?" See *Anxiety*, p. 51, KW VIII (SV IV 322); *JP* II 1541, V 5186 (*Pap.* I A 340, 333).

220. See Holberg, *Diderich Menschen-Skræk*, 20 (in which Diderich, a boastful officer, is beaten by his wife), *Danske Skue-Plads*, IV, no pagination; *Diderich the Terrible, Seven One-Act Plays*, pp. 129-30.

221. See, for example, Poul Martin Møller, "Tanker over Muligheden af Beviser for Menneskets Udødelighed, med Hensyn til den nyeste derhen hørende Literatur," *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, XVII, 1837, pp. 1-72, 422-53; *Efterladte Skrifter*, I-III (Copenhagen: 1839-43; ASKB 1574-76), II, pp. 158-272; *Anxiety*, p. 153, KW VIII (SV IV 419); *JP* V 5201 (*Pap.* II A 17).

222. J. L. Heiberg, *En Sjæl efter Døden, Nye Digte* (Copenhagen. 1841; ASKB 1562), pp. 29-158. See *Repetition*, p. 182 and note 11, Supplement, p. 285 and note 40, KW VI (SV III 217, *Pap.* IV B 110, p. 260); *Anxiety*, p. 153 and note 62, KW VIII (SV IV 418).

223. Eggert Christopher Tryde's review of *En Sjæl efter Døden*, *Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik*, V, 1841, pp. 174-95.

224. See note 221 above.

225 See P. M. Møller, “*Tanker over Muligheden af Beviser for Menneskets Udø delighed*,” *Skrifter*, II, pp. 270-71, where an unspecified work by a Dr. Hubert-Becker is discussed.

226. See Schiller, *Wilhelm Tell*, I, 3, *Werke*, VI, pp. 25-26; *Wilhelm Tell*, tr. Gilbert J Jordan (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. 33 (town crier speaking about Gessler, the governor):

Look at this hat, you men of Uri, look!
It will be raised upon a towering pole
In Altdorf, at the highest spot in town
And this is what the governor decrees:
Give honor to the hat as though to him;
By kneeling down and taking off your hats
Show that you honor it. By this the king
Will see just how obedient you are
If any one of you defies this order,
His life and goods are forfeit to the king

227. Vigilius Haufniensis, the pseudonymous author of *The Concept of Anxiety*. See *Anxiety*, pp. 139-40, KW VIII (SV IV 405-06).

228. Cf. Philippians 4 6 See *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 31-48, 125-58, KW V (SV III 35-52, IV 24-53).

229. See note 52 above.

230. The Danish liturgy included a special prayer of thanksgiving on the second Sunday in Lent and on Good Friday.

231. See Romans 12:15.

232. Cf. Cicero, *Orator*, III, 12, *M. Tullii Ciceronis opera omnia*, I-IV and index, ed. Johann August Ernesti (Halle: 1756-57, ASKB 1224-29), I, p. 656 (“*primum impressa sunt vestigia*”), Cicero, V, *Brutus*, *Orator*, tr. G L Hendrickson and H. M. Hubbell (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 312-15; “There indeed is the field for manifold and varied debate, which was first trodden by the feet of Plato.”

233. Cf. *Stages*, p. 106, KW XI (SV VI 102).

234. Clerical gowns were lined with artificial silk; professors’ gowns were made of silk.

235. “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage,” *Either/Or*, II, pp. 3-154, KW IV (SV II 3-140), “Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections,” *Stages*, pp. 87-184, KWXI (SV VI 85-174).

236. Cf. Ephesians 2 14.

237. In a copy of *Postscript*, *Samvittighed* [conscience] was changed by Kierkegaard to *Samtidighed* [contemporaneity]. See *Pap.* VII¹ B 85:9.

238. See Plato, *Apology*, 34 b-d, *Opera*, VIII, pp. 138-41, *Dialogues*, pp. 19-20 (Socrates speaking).

There, gentlemen, that, and perhaps a little more to the same effect, is the substance of what I can say in my defense. It may be that some one of you, remembering his own case, will be annoyed that whereas he, in standing his trial upon a less serious charge than this, made pitiful appeals to the jury with floods of tears, and had his infant children produced in court to excite the maximum of sympathy, and many of his relatives and friends as well, I on the contrary intend to do nothing of the sort, and that, although I am facing, as it might appear, the utmost danger. It may be that one of you, reflecting on these facts, will be prejudiced against me, and being irritated by his reflections, will give his vote in anger. If one of you is so disposed—I do not expect it, but there is the possibility—I think that I should be quite justified in saying to him. My dear sir, of course I have some relatives. To quote the very words of Homer, even I am not sprung ‘from an oak or from a rock,’ but from human parents, and consequently I have relatives—yes, and sons too, gentlemen, three of them, one almost grown up and the other two only children—but all the same I am not going to produce them here and beseech you to acquit me.

239. Literally, *Hjortespring* means “deer-leap”; it is also the name of the aphrodisiac *elaphomyces cervinus* or “false truffle.” See Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 98:36). In his “*Autobiographiske Fragmenter*,” Heiberg writes of sitting in his room in a Hamburg hotel “with Hegel on my table and Hegel in my thoughts” Then came a “sudden inner vision, like a flash of lightning, which instantly illuminated the whole region for me and awakened in me the central thought hitherto hidden from me” (*Johan Ludvig Heibergs Prosaiske Skrifter*, I-XI [Copenhagen: 1861-62], XI, p. 500 [ed. tr.]) The major portion of the autobiographical fragments, written at the urging of Christian Molbech, was used by Molbech in his *Dansk poetisk Anthologie*, I-IV (Copenhagen: 1830-40), IV, pp.

243-59. The original version, with additions, was published later in Heiberg's *Prosaiske Skrifter* See *Repetition*, Supplement, pp. 324-25, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 124); JP III 2347 (*Pap.* V C 3).

240. See Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 98:37).

241. See, for example, Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, II, *Werke*, XII, p. 323; *J.A.*, XVI, p. 323; *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, I-III (tr. of 2 ed. of P.R., 1840; Kierkegaard had this edition in *Werke*, 1 ed.), tr. E. B. Speirs and J. Burdon Sanderson (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), III, p. 116:

What is the kind of interest that can here any longer attach to this working of miracles? The relative element could have an interest or importance only for those who stood outside, for the instruction of Jews and heathen. But the Spiritual Community, which has taken a definite form, no longer stands in need of this relative kind of proof, it has the Spirit in itself, which leads into all truth, and which, by means of its truth as Spirit, exercises upon Spirit the true kind of force, a power in which Spirit has left to it its absolute freedom. The miracle represents a force which influences the natural connections of things, and is consequently a force which is exercised only upon Spirit when it is confined within the consciousness of this limited connection between things. How is it possible that the eternal Idea itself could reach consciousness through the conception of a force of this kind?

242. See Acts 9:1-9.

243. See Johann Wolfgang v. Goethe, *Faust*, I, 737-84, *Goethe's Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe letzter Hand*, I-LX (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1828-42; ASKB 1641-68 [I-LV]), XII, p. 44; *Faust*, tr. Bayard Taylor (New York: Random House, 1950), pp. 27-28.

244. See Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 98:38).

245. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 40:14).

246. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 98:39).

247. See Supplement, p. 2.44 (*Pap.* VI B 98:40).

248. A large park west of central Copenhagen. A royal residence named after Frederik VI (1768-1839) is within the area, as is the café (Josty's).

249. Queen Marie Sophie Frederikke (1767-1852).

250. See Supplement, p. 2.45 (*Pap.* VI B 98:41).

251. Presumably an allusion to J. L. Heiberg's *Perseus*, *Journal for den speculative Idee*, I-II, 1837-38 (ASKB 569). See *Prefaces*, VIII, KW IX (SV V 51-70); "Public Confession," *Corsair Affair*, pp. 5-6, KW XIII (SV XIII 399-400).

252. The incidental polishing of the old lamp to prepare it for sale called forth the powerful, obedient spirit of the lamp. See Oehlenschläger, *Aladdin*, II, *Poetiske Skrifter*, II, p. 139; Meyer, *Aladdin*, p. 63.

253. See Mark 15:13, Luke 23 21.

254. A play on the Danish *Underholdning*, which means "entertainment," "diversion," and "support," "livelihood." Kierkegaard paid for the printing of *Postscript* (1846), and before that he had defrayed the entire cost of producing the seventeen books already published in editions of 525 copies (*Anxiety*, 250 copies), none of which had been sold out in the period from 1838 to 1845. In 1845, the stock of six volumes of upbuilding discourses (1843-44) was remaindered (see *Letters*, Letter 119, KW XXV), and when all other remainders were sold to Carl A. Reitzel in August 1847 (see Letter 152) only *Either/Or* had been sold out. Through honoraria in the later years, Kierkegaard eventually came out ahead on the book publishing but received almost nothing for his undiverted time and work as a writer. Fortunately, his inheritance made the phenomenal enterprise possible. Søren Kierkegaard and his brother Peter each inherited a substantial sum from their father following his death on August 9, 1838. Together the two brothers bought the family house at the liquidation auction, and Søren later purchased Peter's share. During the next ten years, Kierkegaard lived on this money and paid the full publication costs of his first books. Frithiof Brandt and Else Rammel, in *Søren Kierkegaard og Pengene* (Copenhagen. Levin & Munksgaard, 1935), pp. 14 and 54, point out that Kierkegaard received a writer's honorarium from Reitzel after August 1847 and reckon that Kierkegaard's total net from sales and honoraria was an average of 300 rix-dollars per year over seventeen years (1838-1855). This they calculate as equaling approximately 1,500 Danish crowns in 1935, or approximately \$300 annually, which in 1973 money would be roughly \$1,500. In 1846, Kierkegaard entertained the idea of seeking a state grant (*JP* V 5881 [*Pap.* VII¹ B 211]), which was not

uncommon as patronage of the arts and letters. He did not pursue this notion. In December 1847, Kierkegaard sold the house (Nytorv 2, Copenhagen). He put part of the proceeds into Danish government bonds—"the most stupid thing I ever did and which I probably should regard as a lesson" (JP VI 6268 [Pap. IX A 375, 1848])—which deteriorated during the time of the Slesvig War and internal political unrest (1848-1849). Part was put into stock shares and part kept in cash, which also deteriorated because of inflation.

In the later years of his life, Kierkegaard became more stringent about his expenses. He placed what funds he had in the custody of his brother-in-law Henrik Ferdinand Lund of the National Bank and drew out a portion periodically. A few months before his death he drew out the last portion. See Troels Troels-Lund, *Et Liv, Barndom og Ungdom* (Copenhagen: Hagerups, 1924), pp. 212-13.

255. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.45 (Pap. VI B 40:17).

256. Cf. *Prefaces*, I, KW IX (SV V 17).

257. With reference to the two headings, see Supplement, pp. 2.45, 2 51 (Pap. VI B 40:18, 98 42, VII¹ A 31).

258. On the phrase "for himself," see *Sickness unto Death*, p. 14 and note 6, KW XIX (SV XI 128).

259. On this important concept, see JP III 3660-64 and pp. 908-09, also 3665-96 and pp. 910-11, VII, p. 80.

260. See Adler, KW XXIV (Pap. VII² B 235, p. 73), JP III 3170, IV 4539 (Pap. X⁵ A 10, VI A 64).

261. See Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, III, 1, 56; Foersom and Wulff, I, p. 97; Orllepp, I, p. 289; Schlegel and Tieck, VI, p. 63; Kittredge, p. 1167: "To be, or not to be—that is the question."

262. John 18 38, "What is truth?."

263. An allusion to Descartes, *A Discourse on Method*, II, IV, *Renati Des-Cartes opera philosophica* (Amsterdam 1685, ASKB 473 [1678]), pp. 7, 20; *A Discourse on Method and Selected Writings*, tr. John Veitch (New York: Dutton, 1951), pp. 9, 27.

I was then in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country, which have not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the army from the coronation of the emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a locality where, as I found no society to interest me,

and was besides fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion¹ with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts. . . . I had long before remarked that, in relation to practice, it is sometimes necessary to adopt, as if above doubt, opinions which we discern to be highly uncertain, as has been already said; but as I then desired to give my attention solely to search after truth, I thought that a procedure exactly the opposite was called for, and that I ought to reject as absolutely false all opinions in regard to which I could suppose the least ground for doubt, in order to ascertain whether after that there remained aught in my belief that was wholly indubitable.

¹ Literally, in a room heated by means of a stove.—Tr.

See, for example, *Johannes Climacus*, pp. 133-59, KW VII (*Pap.* IV B 1, pp. 116-41); *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 5-6, KW VI (SV III 57-58).

264. See Supplement, p. 2.45 (*Pap.* VI B 40:21).

265. *Døbler* in the text may be the name of the maker of a walking stick that talks, or it may be Danish for “dowels” or “pins,” which in a barrel organ are the parts that actuate the valves. See note 266 below. The first is perhaps the case here, but verification has not been found.

266. For continuation of the sentence and with reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.45 (*Pap.* VI B 40:21) The Danish word for a barrel organ, “*et Positiv*,” contains a double entendre in alluding to the positive, “*det Positive*.” See pp. 1.80-81.

267. See note 52 above; Holberg, *Mester Gert Westphaler eller Den meget talende Barbeer*, 8, *Danske Skue-Plads*, I, no pagination, *Seven One-Act Plays*, pp. 29-30.

268. Cf. Romans 8:19.

269. In Greek mythology, Zeus punished Ixion for making love to Hera (Roman Juno) by sending him a cloud resembling Hera. From this union came the centaurs. See Paul Friedrich A. Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Wörterbuch*, I-II, rev. Friedrich Gotthilf Klopfer (Leipzig, Sorau: 1821; ASKB 1944-45), II, pp. 122-23. See also Faust’s attempted union with Helena, *Faust*, II, 3, 9939-54, *Werke*, XLI, pp. 244-45; Taylor, p. 183.

270. For continuation of the sentence and paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.45-46 (*Pap.* VI B 40:22).

271. See p. 1.33 and note 35.

272. In Kierkegaard's time, matriculating university students took the *Examen Artium*, or "first examination." After a semester they took the "second examination," frequently called the great *Philosophicum* of which Part One covered Latin, Greek, history, and mathematics. Part Two, taken after an additional semester, covered physics, advanced mathematics, and philosophy.

273. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.46 (*Pap.* VI B 19:6).

274. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.46 (*Pap.* VI B 19:7,8).

275. With reference to the following note, see Supplement, p. 2.46 (*Pap.* VI B 40:23).

276. See, for example, *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 67, 116 fn., *KW* XIX (SV XI 178, 226).

277. See, for example, Plato, *Apology*, 40 c-41 a; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 154-55; *Dialogues*, p. 25; *Phaedo*, 91 b; *Opera*, I, pp. 554-55; Heise, I, pp. 69-70; *Dialogues*, p. 73.

Death is one of two things. Either it is annihilation, and the dead have no consciousness of anything, or, as we are told, it is really a change—a migration of the soul from this place to another. Now if there is no consciousness but only a dreamless sleep, death must be a marvelous gain. I suppose that if anyone were told to pick out the night on which he slept so soundly as not even to dream, and then to compare it with all the other nights and days of his life, and then were told to say, after due consideration, how many better and happier days and nights than this he had spent in the course of his life—well, I think that the Great King himself, to say nothing of any private person, would find these days and nights easy to count in comparison with the rest. If death is like this, then, I call it gain, because the whole of time, if you look at it in this way, can be regarded as no more than one single night. If on the other hand death is a removal from here to some other place, and if what we are told is true, that all the dead are there, what greater blessing could there be than this, gentlemen? If on arrival in the other world, beyond the reach of our so-called justice, one will find there the true judges who are said to preside in those courts, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus

and Triptolemus and all those other half-divinities who were upright in their earthly life, would that be an unrewarding journey? Put it in this way. How much would one of you give to meet Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I am willing to die ten times over if this account is true.

If my theory is really true, it is right to believe it, while, even if death is extinction, at any rate during this time before my death I shall be less likely to distress my companions by giving way to self-pity, and this folly of mine will not live on with me—which would be a calamity—but will shortly come to an end.

278. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.47 (*Pap.* VI B 40:24).

279. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.11 (*Pap.* VI B 17).

280. *Stages*, pp. 471-72, KW XI (SV VI 438).

281. With reference to the following three paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.47 (*Pap.* VI B 18).

282. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.47-48 (*Pap.* VI B 18, 19.3, 10).

283. With reference to the following fourteen pages, see Supplement, pp. 2.48-51 (*Pap.* VI B 40:26).

284. Cf. *Fragments*, p. Ill, KW VII (SV IV 272).

285. See Supplement, p. 2.51 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 31).

286. See *Fragments*, pp. 9-14, KW VII (SV IV 179-84).

287. See, for example, Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 428 a; *Rhetoric*, 1355 a, *Aristoteles graece*, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), I, p. 428; II, p. 1355; *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, I-II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Oxford tr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), I, p. 681; II, p. 2153. "But opinion involves belief [πίστις] (for without belief in what we opine we cannot have an opinion), and in the brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief." "It is clear, then, that the technical study of rhetoric is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Now persuasion [πίστῆς] is a sort of demonstration . . ." See also *JP* I 628; III 3300; IV 4107; V 5779 (*Pap.* VI A 19; V A 98; VI A 1, C 2).

288. See *Fragments*, p. 15, KW VII (SV IV 184-85).

289. See, for example, *Anxiety*, pp. 25-51, KW VIII (SV IV

297-322).

290. Danish: *er til*. Although the English translation is usually “exists,” the meaning here is simply “is” or “has being” but not in the sense of temporal-spatial historical existence. See, for example, *Fragments*, p. 87, KW VII (SV IV 250-51).

291. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.51-52 (*Pap.* VI B 98:43).

292. See *Fragments*, pp. 81-82, KW VII (SV IV 245).

293. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the five following paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.52 (*Pap.* VI B 42).

294. A play (1828) by Thomas Overskou (1798-1873), *Comedier*, I-V (Copenhagen: 1850-51), II, pp. 135-80.

295. See *Fragments*, pp. 66-71, 89-105, KW VII (SV IV 230-34, 252-67).

296. With reference to the following four paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.52-53 (*Pap.* VI B 43).

297. See I Corinthians 1.23.

298. See, for example. *Fragments*, pp. 13-16, 51-52, KW VII (SV IV 183-85, 218).

299. See Holberg, *Mester Gert Westphaler Eller Den meget talende Barbeer* (original five-act play), IV, 10; *Hans Mikkelsens Comoedier Sammenskrefne for Den nye oprettede Danske Skue-Plads*, I-II (n p.: 1723-24), I, no pagination.

300. See I Corinthians 1:23, 4:10.

301. See Matthew 13:45-46.

302. Possibly an allusion to Hans Lassen Martensen, *Grundrids til Moral-philosophiens System* (Copenhagen: 1841; ASKB 650), or to Rasmus Nielsen, *Den speculative Logik i dens Grundtræk*, fascicles 1-4 (Copenhagen: 1841-44, incomplete), which begins with § 11. The overleaf reads: “This outline is to be regarded as a fragment of a philosophical methodology.” See also “Public Confession,” *Corsair Affair*, p. 8, KW XIII (SV XIII 402-03).

303. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.53 (*Pap.* VI B 40:27).

304. See, for example, *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 99, 117, 121-22, 126, 127-28, and Supplement, p. 143, KW XIX (SV XI 209-10, 227, 231, 235, 237; *Pap.* VIII² B 168:2); *JP* III 3645-50; VII, p. 78.

305 Possibly an allusion to, for example, David Friedrich Strauss, *Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet*, I-II (Tübingen; 1835), and to Andreas Frederik Beck, *Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse*

Form (Copenhagen: 1843, ASKB 424).

306. See note 34 above. In addition to a play on *Aufhebung* [raising, annulment] in Hegel's writings, there is a play on the action of yeast in dough. See p. 1.220.

307. Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, prop III, XIV, Appendix, *Opera*, pp. 288, 293, 305; *Works*, pp. 410, 420, 439; "If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other" "Except God, no substance can be or be conceived." "With these [demonstrations] I have explained God's nature and properties: that he exists necessarily; that he is unique; that he is and acts from the necessity alone of his nature; that (and how) he is the free cause of all things; that all things are in God and so depend on him that without him they can neither be nor be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by God, not from freedom of the will or absolute good pleasure, but from God's absolute nature, or infinite power ".

308. See JP III 2341 (*Pap.* V A 74).

309. Cf. Galatians 4:4.

310. See I Peter 1:8.

311. See J L Heiberg, *Recensenten og Dyret*, 15, *Skuespil*, III, p. 239, JPV 5831, p. 285 (*Pap.* VI B 233, p. 287).

312. With reference to the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.53 (*Pap.* VI B 40:29).

313. See note 34 above.

314. See note 34 above.

315. Cf, for example, John 14:6; I Timothy 2:4; I John 1; Revelation 1:8.

316. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.53-54 (*Pap.* VI B 45).

317. The Romans, under Cornelius Scipio Africanus, were victorious over Hannibal's army at Zama in northern Africa (202 B.C.) in the Second Punic War. Climacus apparently confuses the report of this battle and conditions with some other account, perhaps that of the battle at Cannae in South Italy (216 B.C.), where, however, the Romans were defeated by Hannibal's army. See, for example, Livy, *From the Founding of the City* (*History of Rome*), XXII, 46, T. *Livii Patavini historiarum libri*, I-V, ed. August Wilhelm Ernesti (Leipzig: 1801-04; ASKB 1251-55), II, pp. 111-12; *Livy*, I-XIV, tr. B. O. Foster et al. (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1935-67), V, pp. 352-53: "The sun—whether they

had so placed themselves on purpose or stood as they did by accident—was, very conveniently for both sides, on their flanks, the Romans looking south, the Phoenicians north. A wind—which those who live in those parts call Voltumnus—beginning to blow against the Romans carried clouds of dust right into their faces and prevented them from seeing anything. “.

318. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.54 (*Pap.* VI B 40:31).

319. Vigilius Haufniensis, pseudonymous author of *Anxiety*. See p. 95, KW VIII (SV IV 365). The line from *Anxiety* is freely quoted. See Matthew 5:13; Luke 14:14.

320. See Supplement, p. 2.54 (*Pap.* VI B 98:44).

321. The subtitle of *Fragments*.

322. See Revelation 3:15-16.

323. See John 18:38.

324. See Matthew 27:19.

325. Cf. Matthew 27:24.

326. See Supplement, pp. 2.54-55 (*Pap.* VI B 40:32).

327. Cf. Luke 9:62.

328. Cf. I Corinthians 6:20, 7:23.

329. Cf. Matthew 25:31-33.

330. Cf. Luke 18:11.

331. Sophocles. See Cicero, *On Old Age*, VII, 22-23; *Opera*, IV, pp. 938-39; Cicero, XX, *De Senectute*, *De Amicitia*, *De Divinatione*, tr. William Armistead Falconer (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 30-31.

Sophocles composed tragedies to extreme old age; and when, because of his absorption in literary work, he was thought to be neglecting his business affairs, his sons haled him into court in order to secure a verdict removing him from the control of his property on the ground of imbecility, under a law similar to ours, whereby it is customary to restrain heads of families from wasting their estates. Thereupon, it is said, the old man read to the jury his play, *Oedipus at Colonus*, which he had just written and was revising, and inquired; “Does that poem seem to you to be the work of an imbecile?” When he had finished he was acquitted by the verdict of the jury.

See also Lessing, “*Leben des Sophokles*,” *Zur Geschichte, Sprache*,

Litteratur und Kritik, XVI, *Schriften*, X, pp. 133-34.

332. See Luke 14:16-20.

333. See Supplement, p. 2.55 (*Pap.* VI B 98:45).

334. With reference to the remainder of the sentence up to the dash, see Supplement, pp. 2.55-56 (*Pap.* VI B 40:33).

335. Possibly a double allusion: to Grundtvig ("prophetic," "matchless future" [see p. 1.36 and note 44]) and to the distinctions among Christ's three offices (prophet, priest, and king [judge]). See Karl Hase, *Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche* (Leipzig: 1839; ASKB 581), 99-102, pp. 241-56; *Hutterus redivivus eller den Evangelisk-Lutherske Kirkes Dogmatik*, tr. Andreas Lauritz Carl Listow (Copenhagen: 1841), pp. 249-65; Supplement, pp. 55-56 (*Pap.* VI B 40:33).

336. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.56 (*Pap.* VI B 40:34).

337. See pp. 1.185-87.

338. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.56-57 (*Pap.* VI B 49).

339. The source of the Niger River, near the Sierra Leone frontier, was not discovered until 1879.

340. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.57 (*Pap.* VI B 40:35).

341. Cf. Genesis 42 38.

342. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.57-59 (*Pap.* VI B 40:36).

343. See Supplement, p. 2.59 (*Pap.* VI B 98:46).

344. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, II, 1, 114-36; Foersom and Wulff, I, p. 42. Cf. Kittredge, p. 1089:

No, not an oath. . . .

Swear priests and cowards and men cautelous,
Old feeble carrions and such suffering souls
That welcome wrongs; unto bad causes swear
Such creatures as men doubt; but do not stain
The even virtue of our enterprise,
Nor th' insuppressive mettle of our spirits,
To think that or our cause or our performance
Did need an oath. . . .

345. The final copy, in Kierkegaard's handwriting, reads: "det er *Sandhed i ham hvad han siger* [what he says is truth in him]"; and the first Danish edition reads "*der er Sandhed i hvad han siger* [there is truth in what he says]."

346. See, for example, "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle," under the pseudonym of H. H., in *Without Authority*, KW XVIII (SV XI 93-109).

347. Danish *Fuglekonge*, literally, "bird king".

348. See Plato, *Phaedo*, 111 a-b, *Opera*, I, pp. 602-03, Heise, I, p. 110; *Dialogues*, p. 92: "In a word, as water and the sea are to us for our purposes, so is air to them, and as air is to us, so the æther is to them."

349. Ephesians 2:12.

350. See Xenophon, *Symposium*, V, *Xenophontis opera graece et latine*, I-IV, ed. Carl August Thieme (Leipzig; 1801-04; ASKB 1207-10), IV, pp. 471-74; *Xenophon I-VII*, IV, *Symposium and Apology*, tr. O. J. Todd (Loeb, Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 598-603.

351. See John 1:29.

352. See, for example, *JP* IV 4246 (*Pap.* III B 30).

353. The Friendship Society (Copenhagen), organized in 1783, held social events arranged by a dance director.

354. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.57-60 (*Pap.* VI B 40:38).

355. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.60, 2.61-62 (*Pap.* VI B 40:39, 45).

356. On Hamann, see *JP* II 1539-60 and pp. 574-76; VII, pp. 43-44.

357. See Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, I-II (Berlin: 1837-38; ASKB 678-79), I, pp. 302-18.

358. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), German philosopher. See note 15 above. See also *Fragments*, p. 84, KW VII (SV IV 247); *JP* I 810, 1033; II 1113; V 5728, 5733 (*Pap.* V A 35, 30, 40, 21, C 13).

359. *Either/Or*, I-II, was published February 20, 1843.

360. The page references are to the Danish first editions. See *Either/Or*, I, p. 19, KW III (SV I 3); II, pp. 210, 354, KW IV (SV II 188-89, 318).

361. See note 360 above; *Either/Or*, II, pp. 157-219, 230ff, 322, KW IV (SV II 143-96, 207ff., 289).

362. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.60 (*Pap.* VI B 40:41).

363. Cf. 1 Peter 3.4.

364. See, for example, *Johannes Climacus*, pp. 113-72, KW VII (*Pap.* IV B 1).

365. The great library in Alexandria, Egypt, with approximately 700,000 rolls of papyrus in many languages, was burned accidentally in 47 B.C. when the Romans, under Julius Caesar, occupied the city. Climacus apparently conflates that event with the story of a later burning (A.D. 642) by order of the Mohammedan caliph Omar I.

366. *Two Upbuilding Discourses in Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 1-48, KW V (SV III 7-52) was published May 16, 1843.

367. *Three Upbuilding Discourses*, *ibid.*, pp. 49-101 (265-315) was published October 16, 1843.

368. *Ibid.*, p. 53 (271).

369. See, for example, Kts (Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster), “*Kirkelig Pole-mile*,” *Intelligensblade*, ed. J. L. Heiberg, IV, 41-42, January 1, 1844, p. 112. See also note 377 below.

370. Cf. Philippians 2.10.

371. With reference to the following two paragraphs and the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.60 (*Pap.* VI B 40:43).

372. See Luke 2:19.

373. See JP II 1251 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 181), which the Italian scholar Cornelio Fabro has called the most important page of writing from the nineteenth century.

374. *Fear and Trembling* was published October 16, 1843.

375. With reference to the remainder of the sentence and the following three sentences, see Supplement, pp. 2.60-61 (*Pap.* VI B 40:44).

376. See Supplement, p. 2.61 (*Pap.* VI B 98:49).

377. Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster’s pseudonym, formed from the initial consonant of the second syllable of each name. “Firm” [*Firma*], a term borrowed from the business world, here means “author.”

378. See Kts, “*Kirkelig Polemik*,” p. 105. Mynster does not say this about *Fear and Trembling* but links to the work an expression by Jacobi. See Jacobi, *Jacobi an Fichte, Werke*, III, p. 37 (ed. tr.):

“Ja, ich bin der Atheist und Gottlose, der . . . lügen will, wie Desdemona sterbend log [Yes, I am the atheist and non-believer who . . . wants to lie, as Desdemona dying lied] “.

379. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.61 (*Pap.* VI B 98:50).

380. *Repetition* was published on the same day as *Fear and Trembling* and *Three Upbuilding Discourses*, October 16, 1843.

381. See *Repetition*, Supplement, p. 324, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 120) Vigilius Haufniensis calls it a “droll book” in *Anxiety*, p. 17 fn, KW VIII (SV IV 290).

382. See p. 1.11 and note 19.

383. A play on *Prøvelse* [ordeal] and *paa Prøve* [on trial], as in “on approval” or “on trial” when one makes a conditional purchase.

384. The subtitle of *Repetition* is “A Venture in Experimenting Psychology [*Et Forsøg i den eksperimenterende Psychologi*]”, “‘Guilty?’/‘Not Guilty?’,” part three of *Stages*, p. 185, KW XI (SV VI 175), has the subtitle “An Imaginary Psychological Construction [*Psychologisk Experiment*]” On *Experiment*, see *Repetition*, Historical Introduction, pp. xxi-xxxi, 357-62, KW VI.

385. Literally, “being between,” by extension, “outstanding account,” “difference” Cf. *Fear and Trembling*, Supplement, p. 243 and note 5, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 78). See also p. 1.136, where *Mellemværende* is rendered as “account “.

386. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, pp. 2.61-62 (*Pap.* VI B 40:45).

387. *Stages*, pp. 437-46, KW XI (SV VI 407-15).

388. See note 263 above.

389. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.62 (*Pap.* VI B 41:2).

390. See Matthew 5:32, 19:9; I Corinthians 6:16.

391. With reference to the note, see Supplement, p. 2.62 (*Pap.* VI B 41:1).

392. See “‘Guilty?’/‘Not Guilty?’,” *Stages*, pp. 185-494, KW XI (SV VI 175-459).

393. On January 5, 1842, a second criminal court was established in Copenhagen with the power to detain suspicious characters.

394. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.63 (*Pap.* VI B 41:3).

395. See Genesis 22:1; *Fear and Trembling*, p. 9 and note 2, KW VI (SV III 61). See also p. 1.11 and note 19.

396. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.63 (*Pap.* VI B 98:51).

397. See Romans 6:20, 7:3; I Corinthians 9:21.

398. With reference to the following five paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.63 (*Pap.* VI B 41:4).

399. See *Either/Or*, II, pp. 239-40, KW IV (SV II 214-15).

400. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 335-54 (301-18).

401. See *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 60-61, KW VI (SV III 110-11).

402 *The Concept of Anxiety*, by the pseudonymous Vigilius Haufniensis, was published June 17, 1844.

403. Danish *friste* See p. 1.11 and note 19.

404. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.63 (*Pap.* VI B 41:5).

405. See Genesis 25:23.

406. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.63 (*Pap.* VI B 41:6).

407. *Prefaces* (KW IX [SV V 3-71]) was published June 17, 1844.

408. The actual sequence was that *Fragments* (June 13, 1844) preceded *Anxiety* and *Prefaces* (both June 17, 1844).

409. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.63-64 (*Pap.* VI B 41:7).

410. *Four Upbuilding Discourses*, in *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 291-401, KW V (SV V 73-168) was published August 31, 1844.

411. Cf. *Fragments*, title page, p. 1, KW VII (SV IV 173).

412. See, for example, Plato, *Apology*, 31 c-d; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 132-33, *Dialogues*, p. 17 (Socrates speaking):

It may seem curious that I should go round giving advice like this and busying myself in people's private affairs, and yet never venture publicly to address you as a whole and advise on matters of state. The reason for this is what you have often heard me say before on many other occasions—that I am subject to a divine or supernatural experience, which Meletus saw fit to travesty in his indictment. It began in my early childhood—a sort of voice which comes to me, and when it comes it always dissuades me from what I am proposing to do, and never urges me on.

See also note 31 above.

413. A more idiomatic expression in card playing is “laid is played.”

414. *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 109-24, KW V (SV IV 9-23).

415. See note 369 above.

416. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.64 (*Pap.* VI B 98:52).

417. See *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 5, 53, 107, 179, 231, 295, KW V (SV III 11, 271, IV 7, 73, 121; V 79); *JP* VI 6431, 6438 (*Pap.* X' A 510, 529).

418. With reference to the following five sentences, see Supplement, pp. 2.64-65 (*Pap.* VI B 41:8).

419. Anonymous (Andreas Frederik Beck) review of *Fragments in Neues Repertorium für die theologische Literatur und kirchliche Statistik* (Berlin), II, 1, April 30, 1845, pp. 44-48.

420. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.65 (*Pap.* VI B 52).

421. Cf. *Anxiety*, pp. 139-40, KW VIII (SV IV 406).

422. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.65-66 (*Pap.* VI B 51).

423. See, for example, Plato, *Gorgias* 464 b-466 a; *Opera*, I, pp. 300-05; Heise, III, pp. 44-47; *Dialogues*, pp. 246-48.

424. The Russian field marshal Prince Grigori Aleksandrovich Potemkin (1739-1791) was governor-general of the southern provinces and received funds and materials from Catherine the Great for development projects. Having appropriated some funds for himself, he resorted to constructing facade villages in the distance and gathering people and cattle along Catherine's route when she visited a region. See Becker, *Verdenshistorie*, X, pp. 420-23; *Either/ Or*, II, p. 114, KW IV (SV II 104).

425. With reference to the following two paragraphs and the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.66 (*Pap.* VI B 53:3).

426. See Matthew 27:51-52.

427. An allusion to H. L. Martensen. See his review of J. L. Heiberg's “*Indlednings-Fordrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole*” in *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, XVI, 1836, pp. 515-28. See *Anxiety*, Supplement, p. 207, KW VIII (*Pap.* V B 60, p. 137); *JP* II 1738; V 5200 (*Pap.* IV C 108; II A 7).

428. Peder Eriksen in Holberg, *Den Stundesløse*, *Danske Skue-*

Plads, V, no pagination. In sc. 11 (*Four Plays*, pp. 22-23), Peder is characterized as one who “is a second Alexander the Great in fractions and arithmetic. . . . Who knows his one-times-one like his *Our Father*.”

429. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.66 (*Pap.* VI B 53:4).

430. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.66 (*Pap.* VI B 419).

431. See, for example, *Fear and Trembling*, p. 8, KW VI (SV III 59-60); *Repetition*, p. 226, KW VI (SV III 260); *Stages*, p. 191, KW XI (SV VI 181).

432. Theophrastus (c. 372-288 B.C.) was Aristotle’s successor as leader of the Peripatetic school. Zeno (c. 342-270 B.C.) founded the Stoic school of philosophy.

433. Plutarch, “On Praising Oneself Inoffensively,” 17, *Moralia*, 545; Kaltwasser, IV, p. 625; Loeb, VII, pp. 154-57.

434. *Fragments*, p. 109, KW VII (SV IV 270).

435. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 398, 485, KW XI (SV VI 371, 450-51).

436. See Supplement, pp. 2.66-67 (*Pap.* VI A 78).

437. See, for example, *Corsair Affair*, pp. 22-23, and Supplement, pp. 156-57, KW XIII (SV XIII 416-17, *Pap.* VI B 185).

438. See Supplement, p. 2.66 (*Pap.* VI B 53:6).

439. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 28, 118, KW XI (SK VI 32, 114).

440. See Plato, *Gorgias* 490 e-491 a; *Opera*, I, pp. 372-73; Heise, III, pp. 111-12; *Dialogues*, p. 273. See also *Fragments*, p. 72, KW VII (SV IV 236).

441. Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger, *Axel og Valborg, Oehlenschlägers Tragødier, I-X* (Copenhagen: 1841-49; ASKB 1601-05 [I-IX]), V, pp. 3-111; *Axel and Valborg*, tr. Frederick Strange Kolle (New York: Grafton, 1906).

442. Oehlenschläger, *Hagbarth og Signe, Tragødier*, II, pp. 3-104.

443 Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part One*, *Henry IV, Part Two*, and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*.

444. *Stages*, p. 8, KW XI (SV VI 14) See “The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician,” *Corsair Affair*, p. 40, KW XIII (SV XIII 424).

445. *Stages*, p. 21, KW XI (SV VI 25).

446. See Supplement, p. 2.67 (*Pap.* VI B 53:9).

447. *Either/Or*, I-II, was printed in an edition of 525 copies. A

second edition was published May 14, 1849. See *JP* V 5997 (*Pap.* VIII¹ A 84).

448. See *Prefaces*, III, *KW* IX (*SV* V 25-26).

449. Copenhagen's now-famous amusement park opened August 15, 1843.

450. See Supplement, p. 2.67 (*Pap.* VI B 53:10), and note 441 above.

451. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 347, 474, *KW* XI (*SV* VI 325, 440).

452. See *Stages*, p. 474, *KW* XI (*SV* VI 440).

453. An allusion to Holberg, *Gert Westphaler*, 7, ("Trapezund eller Catte-zund"), *Gert Westphaler* (original version), II, 3 "Bordeus [Bordeaux] og Røven [Rouen] Trapezund eller Catesund."

454. With reference to the following eleven paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.68-70 (*Pap.* VI B 41:10).

455. See Supplement, pp. 2.68-70 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:1, 83, 84).

456. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 454-65, 460, *KW* XI (*SV* VI 423-33, 428).

457. *Ibid.*, p. 444(414).

458. See note 173 above.

459. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 437, 441, *KW* XI (*SV* VI 407, 411).

460. *Ibid.*, pp. 437-46 (407-15).

461. *Ibid.*, pp. 402-03, 437 (375-76, 407).

462. *Ibid.*, pp. 365, 422 (341, 393).

463. *Ibid.*, p. 193 (183).

464. See *ibid.*, p. 194 (184). See also *JP* VI 6154 (*Pap.* IX A 48).

465. See Supplement, p. 2.70 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:2).

466. *Stages*, pp. 416-37, *KW* XI (*SV* VI 388-407).

467. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 69, *KW* VI (*SV* III 118).

468. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.70 (*Pap.* VI B 53:13).

469. See Matthew 18:3, 19:14; Mark 10:14-15; Luke 18:16-17.

470. With reference to the following phrase, see Supplement, p. 2.70 (*Pap.* VI B 98:54).

471. See I Corinthians 1:23.

472. See Virgil, *Aeneid*, VI, 426-29, *P. Virgilii Maronis opera*, I-II, ed. Jacob Baden (Copenhagen: 1780), II, p. 85; *Virgils Aeneide*, I-II, tr. Johan Henrik Schønheyder (Copenhagen: 1812), I, p. 274 (VI, 562-66); *Virgil*, I-II, tr. H. Rushton Fairclough (Loeb, Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1978), I, pp. 534-37 “At once are heard voices and wailing sore—the souls of infants weeping, whom, on the very threshold of the sweet life they shared not, torn from the breast, the black day swept off and plunged in bitter death.” See also *Either/Or*, I, p. 40, KW III (SV I 24).

473. Cf. Romans 2:5.

474. See *Irony*, p. 209, KW II (SV XIII 289), *The Moment and Late Writings*, XXIII (SV XIV 24, 262); JP VII, p. 79.

475. Cf. J. L. Heiberg, *Kong Salomon og jørgen Hattemager*, 26, *Skuespil*, II, p. 382.

476. See *Either/Or*, II, p. 8, KW IV (SV II 8), freely quoted.

477. *Ibid.*, p. 17 (16).

478. *Either/Or*, I, p. 14, KW III (SV I xv-xvi).

479. See, for example. *Stages*, pp. 441-43, KW XI (SV VI 411-12), *Either/ Or*, I, pp. 3-4, KW III (SV I v-vi).

480. See *Either/Or*, I, p. 3 and note 2, KW III (SV I v).

481. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 119-23, KW XI (SV VI 115-18).

482. *Ibid.*, p. 123 (118).

483. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36 (130).

484. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46 (139-40).

485. *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17 (112-13).

486. An allusion to J. L. Heiberg's *Urania*, an annual with an ornate cover. See *Prefaces*, IV, KW IX (SV V 27).

487. See *Stages*, pp. 79-80, KW XI (SV VI 77-78).

488. See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1007 b, 1009 a; Bekker, II, pp. 1007, 1009; *Aristoteles Metaphysik*, I-II, tr. Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg (Bonn: 1824; ASKB 1084), I, pp. 65, 69; Works, II, pp. 1591, 1593.

Again, if all contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall, and a man, if it is equally possible to affirm and to deny anything of anything, —and this premise must be accepted by those who share the views of Protagoras. For if any one thinks that the man is not a trireme, evidently he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme, if, as they say, the contradictory is true.

Again, from the same opinion proceeds the doctrine of

Protagoras, and both doctrines must be alike true or alike untrue. For on the one hand, if all opinions and appearances are true, all statements must be at the same time true and false.

489. See *Stages*, p. 132, KW XI (SV VI 126).

490. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.70-71 (*Pap.* VI B 53:16).

491. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.71 (*Pap.* VI B 53:17).

492. See Supplement, p. 2.71 (*Pap.* VI B 98:56).

493. See Supplement, p. 2.71 (*Pap.* VI B 98:57).

494. With reference to the following line, see Supplement, p. 2.71 (*Pap.* VI B 54:2).

495. See Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, I, pp. 51-59.

496. Hegel, *Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 1, *Die Logik*, 123, *Werke*, VI, p. 250 (ed. tr.), J.A. (*System der Philosophie*), VIII, p. 288, cf. *Hegel's Logic* (tr of L, 3 ed, 1830; Kierkegaard had the same text, plus *Zusätze*, in 1 ed, *Werke*, 1840), tr. William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 179.

497. See Holberg, *Barselstuen*, III, 5, *Danske Skue-Plads*, II, no pagination.

498. Probably an allusion to Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben* (Berlin 1844).

499. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I-II, *Werke*, III, p. 67, V, pp. 262-63, 351-52; J.A., IV, p. 77; V, pp. 262-63, 351-52, *Science of Logic*, pp. 73, 775, 842-43:

Pure knowing yields only this negative determination, that the beginning is to be *abstract* If pure being is taken as the *content* of pure knowing, then the latter must stand back from its content, allowing it to have free play and not determining it further. Or again, if pure being is to be considered as the unity into which knowing has collapsed at the extreme point of its union with the object, then knowing itself has vanished in that unity, leaving behind no difference from the unity and hence nothing by which the latter could be determined. Nor is there anything else present, any content which could be used to make the beginning more determinate.

Life is the immediate Idea, or the Idea as its *Notion* not yet realized in its own self. In *its judgement*, the Idea is *cognition* in general.

The Notion is, as Notion, *for itself* in so far as it *freely* exists as abstract universality or as genus. As such, it is its pure self-identity, which inwardly differentiates itself in such a manner that the differentiated moment is not an *objectivity*, but is likewise liberated into subjectivity or the form of simple self-likeness, and hence the object of the Notion is the Notion itself. Its *reality* in general is the *form of its determinate being*, and the point of interest is the determination of this form; on this determination rests the difference between what the Notion is in *itself* or as *subjective*, and what it is when submerged in objectivity, and then in the Idea of life. In the latter it is indeed distinguished from its external reality and posited *for itself*, yet this its being-for-self it possesses only as the identity that is a relation to itself as submerged in its subjugated objectivity, or to itself as indwelling, substantial form. The elevation of the Notion above life means that its reality is the Notion form liberated into universality. Through this judgement the Idea is duplicated into the subjective Notion whose reality is the Notion itself, and into the objective Notion that is in the form of life. *Thinking, spirit, self-consciousness*, are determinations of the Idea where it has itself for object, and its determinate being, that is, the determinateness of its being, is its own difference from itself.

Thus then logic, too, in the absolute Idea, has withdrawn into that same simple unity which its beginning is; the pure immediacy of being in which at first every determination appears to be extinguished or removed by abstraction, is the Idea that has reached through mediation, that is, through the sublation of mediation, a likeness correspondent to itself. The method is the pure Notion that relates itself only to itself; it is therefore the *simple self-relation* that is *being*. But now it is also *fulfilled being*, the *Notion that comprehends* itself, being as the *concrete* and also absolutely *intensive* totality. In conclusion, there remains only this to be said

about this Idea, that in it, first, the *science of logic* has grasped its own Notion. In the sphere of *being*, the beginning of its *content*, its Notion appears as a knowing in a subjective reflection external to that content. But in the Idea of absolute cognition the Notion has become the Idea's own content. The Idea is itself the pure Notion that has itself for subject matter and which, in running itself as subject matter through the totality of its determinations, develops itself into the whole of its reality, into the system of the science [of logic], and concludes by apprehending this process of comprehending itself, thereby superseding its standing as content and subject matter and cognizing the Notion of the science.

500. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 271-72 (*Pap.* VI B 54:3).

501. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 57-73, esp. 59, 62-63; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 535-51, esp. 537, 540-41; *Science of Logic*, pp. 431-43, esp. 433, 435:

Contradiction resolves itself. In the self-excluding reflection we have just considered, positive and negative, each in its self-subsistence, sublates itself; each is simply the transition or rather the self-transposition of itself into its opposite. This ceaseless vanishing of the opposites into themselves is the *first unity* resulting from contradiction; it is the null.

The resolved contradiction is therefore ground, essence as unity of the positive and negative. In opposition, the determination has attained to self-subsistence, but ground is this completed self-subsistence; in it, the negative is self-subsistent essence, but as a negative; as self-identical in this negativity, ground is just as much the positive. Opposition and its contradiction is, therefore, in ground as much abolished as preserved. Ground is essence as positive identity-with-self, which, however, at the same time relates itself to itself as negativity, and therefore determines itself and converts itself into an excluded positedness; but this positedness is the whole self-subsistent essence, and essence is ground, as self-identical and positive in this its negation. The self-contradictory, self-subsistent opposition was

therefore already itself ground; all that was added to it was the determination of unity-with-self, which results from the fact that each of the self-subsistent opposites sublates itself and makes itself into its opposite, thus falling to the ground [*zugrunde geht*], but in this process it at the same time only unites with itself; therefore, it is only in falling to the ground [in *seinem Unter gange*], that is, in its positedness or negation, that the opposite is really the essence that is reflected into and identical with itself.

See also Hegel, *Encyclopadie*, I, *Logik*, 119, *Werke*, VI, p. 242, *J.A.*, VIII, p. 280, *Hegel's Logic*, p. 174.

Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world: and it is ridiculous to say that contradiction is unthinkable. The only thing correct in that statement is that contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself. But contradiction, when canceled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The proximate result of opposition (when realized as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposited to elements in the completer notion.

See also *Either/Or*, II, pp. 170-71, 223, *KW IV (SV II 154-55, 200)*, *Fragments*, pp. 108-09, *KW VII (SV IV 270)*.

502. See, for example, Hegel, *Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilo-sophie der Subjektivität*, *Werke*, I, pp. 3-157; *J.A.*, I, pp. 277-433; *Faith & Knowledge* (tr of *G W* in 1 ed of *Werke*, Kierkegaard had this ed.), tr. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977); *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, *Werke*, XV, pp. 328-534; *J.A.* XIX, pp. 328-534; *History of Philosophy*, III, pp. 217-408.

503. See *Irony*, p. 81 and note 221, *KW II (SV XIV 173)*.

504. See Jens Immanuel Baggesen, "*Kallundborgs Krønike eller Censurens Oprindelse*," *Jens Baggesens Danske Værker*, I-XII (Copenhagen: 1827-32: ASKB 1509-20), I, pp. 235-43.

505. See Supplement, p. 2.72 (*Pap.* VI B 54:4, 98:58).

506. See Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Worterbuch*, I, p. 211.

507. A twofold theory of truth was held in various forms, but not as flat contradiction, by the Muslim Averroes (c. 1126-c.

1198), later Averroists, and some Ockhamists in their attempts to relate theology and Aristotelian natural philosophy. In the philosophy of William of Ockham (c. 1290-c. 1349), natural philosophy and systematic theology (*logica naturalis* and *logica fides*) are totally independent realms. See *JP* III 3245 (*Pap.* I A 94).

508. The drawing of a parallel between Heraclitus and Hegel has not been located. See, for example, Diogenes Laertius, IX, 8; *Vitis*, II, p. 134, Riisbrigh, I, p. 404; Loeb, II, pp. 414-15: "All things come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things flows like a stream." See also note 518 below.

509. See, for example, Aristotle(?), *On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias*, 977 a; Bekker, II, p. 977; *Works*, II, p. 1545.

Xenophanes declares that if anything is, it cannot possibly have come into being, and he argues this with reference to God, for that which has come into being must necessarily have done so either from that which is similar or from that which is dissimilar; and neither alternative is possible. For it is no more possible for like to have been begotten by like than for like to have begotten like (for since they are *equal*, all the same qualities inhere in each and in a similar way in their relations to one another), nor could unlike have come into being from unlike. For if the stronger could come into being from the weaker, or the greater from the less, or the better from the worse, or conversely worse things from better, then what is not could come to be from what is, or what is from what is not; which is impossible. Accordingly for these reasons God is eternal.

See also, for example. *Repetition*, pp. 131, 148, KW VI (SV III 73, 189).

510. On Pythagorean discipline and purification, see, for example, Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 13-19; *Vitis*, II, pp. 96-98; Riisbrigh, I, pp. 369-72, Loeb, II, pp. 333-39.

Some say it was a certain trainer named Pythagoras who instituted this diet, and not our Pythagoras, who forbade even the killing, let alone the eating, of animals which share with us the privilege of having a soul. This was the excuse put forward; but his real reason for forbidding animal diet was to practise people and accustom them to simplicity of life, so that they

could live on things easily procurable, spreading their tables with uncooked foods and drinking pure water only, for this was the way to a healthy body and a keen mind. . . .

The following were his watchwords or precepts: don't stir the fire with a knife. . . .

This is what they meant. Don't stir the fire with a knife: don't stir the passions or the swelling pride of the great. Don't step over the beam of a balance: don't overstep the bounds of equity and justice. Don't sit down on your bushel: have the same care of to-day and the future, a bushel being the day's ration. By not eating your heart he meant not wasting your life in troubles and pains. By saying do not turn round when you go abroad, he meant to advise those who are departing this life not to set their hearts' desire on living nor to be too much attracted by the pleasures of this life. The explanations of the rest are similar and would take too long to set out.

Above all, he forbade as food red mullet and blacktail, and he enjoined abstinence from the hearts of animals and from beans, and sometimes, according to Aristotle, even from paunch and gurnard. Some say that he contented himself with just some honey or a honeycomb or bread, never touching wine in the daytime, and with greens boiled or raw for dainties, and fish but rarely. His robe was white and spotless, his quilts of white wool, for linen had not yet reached those parts. He was never known to over-eat, to behave loosely, or to be drunk. He would avoid laughter and all pandering to tastes such as insulting jests and vulgar tales.

511. See, for example, Plato, *Phaedo*, 67 b-e, *Opera*, I, pp. 496-97; Heise, I, pp. 20-22; *Dialogues*, p. 50.

Very well, then, said Socrates, if this is true, there is good reason for anyone who reaches the end of this journey which lies before me to hope that there, if anywhere, he will attain the object to which all our efforts have been directed during my past life. So this journey which is now ordained for me carries a happy prospect for any other man also who believes that his mind has been prepared by

purification.

It does indeed, said Simmias.

And purification, as we saw some time ago in our discussion, consists in separating the soul as much as possible from the body, and accustoming it to withdraw from all contact with the body and concentrate itself by itself, and to have its dwelling, so far as it can, both now and in the future, alone by itself, freed from the shackles of the body. Does not that follow?.

Yes, it does, said Simmias.

Is not what we call death a freeing and separation of soul from body? Certainly, he said.

And the desire to free the soul is found chiefly, or rather only, in the true philosopher. In fact the philosopher's occupation consists precisely in the freeing and separation of soul from body. Isn't that so?.

Apparently.

Well then, as I said at the beginning, if a man has trained himself throughout his life to live in a state as close as possible to death, would it not be ridiculous for him to be distressed when death comes to him?.

It would, of course.

Then it is a fact, Simmias, that true philosophers make dying their profession, and that to them of all men death is least alarming.

512. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.72-73 (*Pap.* VI B 54:7).

513. Possibly an allusion to Kierkegaard's first book, *From the Papers of One Still Living* (in *Early Polemical Writings*, pp. 53-102, KW I [SV XIII 43-92]), published September 7, 1838.

514. See *Johannes Climacus*, pp 113-72, KW VII (*Pap.* IV B 1, pp. 103-50).

515. Steel pens instead of quills were used in Denmark from 1830 on. See *The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars*, in *Early Polemical Writings*, pp 113-14, KW I (*Pap.* II B 16, pp. 294-95).

516. See *Fragments*, pp. 37 and note 2, 39, KW VII (SV IV 204, 206).

517. For continuation of the sentence and with reference to the

remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.73 (*Pap.* VI B 54:8).

518. See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1010 a; Bekker, II, p. 1010; Hengstenberg, I, pp. 71-72; *Works*, II, pp. 1594-95:

And again, they held these views because they saw that all this world of nature is in movement, and that about that which changes no true statement can be made; at least, regarding that which everywhere in every respect is changing nothing could truly be affirmed. It was this belief that blossomed into the most extreme of the views above mentioned, that of the professed Heracliteans, such as was held by Cratylus, who finally did not think it right to say anything but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step twice into the same river; for *he* thought one could not do it even once.

See also Plato, *Cratylus*, 402 a, *Opera*, III, pp. 158-59; *Dialogues*, p. 439; Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I-XI (Leipzig: 1798-1819; ASKB 815-26), I, p. 220.

519. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 123, KW VI (SV III 168).

520. The Danish word *Maal* is ambiguous. On the one hand, it designates a measure, a measuring device, a criterion. On the other hand, it designates a goal, a final end. The latter meaning is synonymous with *Formaal* [purpose] and *Hensigt* [aim]. See also *Irony*, p. 207 fn, KW II (SV XIII 287), *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 79-80, KW XIX (SV XI 191-92).

521. See, for example, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1072 b; Bekker, II, p. 1072, Hengstenberg, I, p. 243; *Works*, II, pp. 1694-95:

That that for the sake of which is found among the unmovables is shown by making a distinction; for that for the sake of which is both that *for* which and that *towards* which, and of these the one is unmovable and the other is not. Thus it produces motion by being loved, and it moves the other moving things. Now if something is moved it is capable of being otherwise than as it is. Therefore if the actuality of the heavens is primary motion, then in so far as they are in motion, in *this* respect they are capable of being otherwise,—in place, even if not in substance. But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved,

existing actually, this can in no way be otherwise than as it is. For motion in space is the first of the kinds of change, and motion in a circle the first kind of spatial motion; and this the first mover *produces*. The first mover, then, of necessity exists; and in so far as it is necessary, it is good, and in this sense a first principle. For the necessary has all these senses—that which is necessary perforce because it is contrary to impulse, that without which the good is impossible, and that which cannot be otherwise but is *absolutely* necessary.

See also, for example, *Fragments*, p. 24, KW VII (SV IV 193), JP II 1332 (*Pap.* IV A 157).

522. Cf, for example, H. L. Martensen, “*Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust*,” *Perseus*, I, 1837, p. 98; P. M. Møller, “Om Udødeligheden,” *Skifter*, II, p. 217 (ed. tr.): “‘True art is an anticipation of the blessed life.’ ” The idea, though not formulated as in the text, can be found in Johann Christoph Friedrich v. Schiller, “*Das Ideal und das Leben*,” *Werke*, I, pp. 341-47; *Works*, I, pp. 96-97. See also *Anxiety*, p. 153, KW VIII (SV IV 418-19), *Pap.* V B 60.

523. See Immanuel Kant, *Critik der Urtheilskraft* (Berlin 1793, ASKB 594), pp. 5-7, *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911), pp. 42-44:

*The delight which determines the judgement of taste is
independent of all interest.*

. . . . Every one must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste. One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste.

This proposition, which is of the utmost importance, cannot be better explained than by contrasting the pure disinterested delight which appears in the judgement of taste with that allied to an interest.

See also *Anxiety*, p. 18 fn, KW VIII (SV IV 290).

524. Ibid.

525. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 433 a; Bekker, I, p. 433; *Works*, I, p. 688:

These two at all events appear to be sources of movement: appetite and thought (if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking; for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge, and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination).

Both of these then are capable of originating local movement, thought and appetite: thought, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs from speculative thought in the character of its end); while appetite is in every form of it relative to an end; for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of practical thought; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action.

526. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.73 (*Pap.* VI B 54:9).

527. See *Johannes Climacus*, pp. 170-71, *KW* VII (*Pap.* IV B 1, pp. 148-49), *JP* I 197, II 2283 (*Pap.* IV C 100, 99).

528. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 202, 204-05; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 680, 682-83; *Science of Logic*, pp. 542, 544:

A. CONTINGENCY, OR FORMAL ACTUALITY, POSSIBILITY, AND NECESSITY

1. Actuality is formal in so far as, being primary actuality, it is only *immediate, unreflected* actuality, and hence is only in this form-determination but not as the totality of form. As such it is nothing more than a *being* or *Existence* in general. But because it is *essentially* not a mere immediate Existence but exists as form-unity of being-within-self or inwardness and outwardness, it immediately contains the *in-itself* or *possibility*. *What is actual is possible.*

3. This actuality is not the primary but the reflected actuality, *posited as unity* of itself and possibility. The actual as such is possible; it is in immediate positive identity with possibility; but this has determined itself as *only* possibility; thus the actual too, is determined as *only a possible*. And immediately because possibility is *immediately* contained in actuality, it is contained in actuality as sublated, as *only* possibility. Conversely, actuality which is in unity with possibility is only sublated immediacy; or because formal actuality is only *immediate*, primary actuality, it is only a moment, only sublated actuality, or only *possibility*.

529. Cf. *Anxiety*, p. 111, KW VIII (SV IV 379).

530. See, for example, *Fragments*, pp. 79-86, KW VII (SV IV 242-49).

531. See JP I 1033 (*Pap* V A 30).

532. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.73 (*Pap*. VI B 54:10).

533. See Supplement, p. 2.74 (*Pap*. VI B 98:59).

534. See Supplement, p. 2.74 (*Pap*. VI B 54:12).

535. See Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451 a-b; Bekker, II, p. 1451; *Works*, II, pp. 2322-23:

From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. The distinction between historian and poet is not in the one writing prose and the other verse—you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it would still be a species of history; it consists

really in this, that the one describes the thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars.

536. See Supplement, p. 2.74 (*Pap.* VI B 54:13).

537. See Matthew 10:30.

538. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.74-75 (*Pap.* VI B 54:14).

539. See note 360 above; *Stages*, p. 439, KW XI (SV VI 409).

540. Matthew 7:1.

541. See note 360 above; *Stages*, p. 440, KW XI (SV VI 410).

542. See *JP* II 1745 (*Pap.* VI A 38).

543. See note 360 above; *Stages*, pp. 438-39, KW XI (SV VI 408-09).

544. See Diogenes Laertius, II, 20-21; *Vitis*, I, pp. 70-71; Riisbrigh, I, p. 66; Loeb, I, pp. 150-51:

Demetrius of Byzantium relates that Crito removed him from his workshop and educated him, being struck by his beauty of soul; that he discussed moral questions in the workshops and the market-place, being convinced that the study of nature is no concern of ours; and that he claimed that his inquiries embraced.

Whatso'er is good or evil in an house;
that frequently, owing to his vehemence in argument, men set upon him with their fists or tore his hair out; and that for the most part he was despised and laughed at, yet bore all this ill-usage patiently.

545. See, for example, Kant, *Critik der reinen Vernunft* (Riga: 1794; ASKB 595), pp. xxv-xxvii; *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (tr. of C. V., 2 ed., 1787; Kierkegaard had 4 ed. with the same pagination), tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1950), p. 27:

That space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and so only conditions of the existence of things as appearances; that, moreover, we have no concepts of understanding, and consequently no elements for the knowledge of things, save in

so far as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts; and that we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself [an *sich*], but only in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance—all this is proved in the analytical part of the Critique. Thus it does indeed follow that all possible speculative knowledge of reason is limited to mere objects of *experience*. But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely, that though we cannot *know* these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to *think* them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.

546. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.75 (*Pap.* VI B 54:16).

547. See, for example, Hegel, *Encyclopadie*, I, *Logik*, 51, *Werke*, VI, p. 112; *J. A.*, VIII, p. 150; *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 84-85:

The uniformly favourable reception and acceptance which attended Kant's criticism of the Ontological proof was undoubtedly due to the illustration which he made use of. To explain the difference between thought and being, he took the instance of a hundred sovereigns, which, for anything it matters to the notion, are the same hundred whether they are real or only possible, though the difference of the two cases is very perceptible in their effect on a man's purse. Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think or conceive is not on that account actual; that mental representation, and even notional comprehension, always falls short of being. Still it may not unfairly be styled a barbarism in language, when the name of notion is given to things like a hundred sovereigns. And, putting that mistake aside, those who perpetually urge against the philosophic Idea the difference between Being and Thought might have admitted that philosophers were not wholly ignorant of the fact. Can there be any proposition more trite than this? But after all, it is well to remember, when we speak of God, that we have an object of another kind than any hundred sovereigns, and unlike any one particular notion, representation, or however else it

may be styled. It is in fact this and this alone which marks every-thing finite: its being in time and space is discrepant from its notion. God, on the contrary, expressly has to be what can only be 'thought as existing', his notion involves being. It is this unity of the notion and being that constitutes the notion of God.

548. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, p. 70; *J.A.*, IV, p. 548; *Science of Logic*, p. 441:

If the contradiction in motion, instinctive urge, and the like, is masked for ordinary thinking, in the simplicity of these determinations, contradiction is, on the other hand, immediately represented in the *determinations of relationship*. The most trivial examples of above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on *ad infinitum*, all contain opposition in each term. That is above, which is *not* below; 'above' is specifically just this, not to be 'below', and only is, *in so far as* there is a 'below', and conversely, each determination implies its opposite. Father is the other of son, and son the other of father, and each only *is* as this other of the other; and at the same time, the one determination only is, in relation to the other; their being is a *single* subsistence.

549. See, for example, Plato, *Republic*, 597 c-d; *Opera*, V, pp. 54-55; Heise, VI, pp. 121-22; *Dialogues*, p. 822 (Socrates speaking with Glaucon):

Now God, whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only, the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being. How so? he said.

Because, said I, if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two.

Right, he said.

God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the

real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinetmaker, produced it in nature unique.

So it seems.

Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?

That would certainly be right, he said, since it is by and in nature that he has made this and all other things.

550. For continuation of the sentence and with reference to the following three paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.75 (*Pap.* VI B 54:17).

551. An unusual phrase attributed to the exhibitor of the *Fredriksstens Fæstning* (model of Fredrikssten fortress at Fredrikshald, Halden, Norway) at the summer amusement park Dyrehavsbakken: "Yet they [the wounded] are happy, for they have recovered from their victory [*thi de have forvundet deres Sejr*]." See Oscar Arlaud, *Bevingede Ord. De i daglig Tale og i Skriftsproget hyppigst anvendte Citater* (Copenhagen: 1906), p. 420. If the prefix "for" is interpreted as analogous to the prefix in, for example, *fordreije* [distort] and *forlægge* [mislay], Seier *forvundet* means a victory that has miscarried and has thereby become a loss, here a loss of existence.

552. See Steen Steensen Blicher, *Fjorten Dage i Jylland, Samlede Noveller*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1833-44; ASKB 1521-23 [I-VI]), V, p. 212.

553. See Deuteronomy 28:37; I Kings 9:7.

554. See *JP* I 1038 (*Pap.* VI A 140).

555. Cf. *JP* II 1605 (*Pap.* V A 73).

556. See Gotthilf Heinrich v Schubert, *Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Na-turwissenschaft* (Dresden: 1818), p. 376; *Die Symbolik des Traumes* (Bamberg: 1821; ASKB 776), p. 38 See also *Irony*, p. 254, *KW* II (SV XIII 329); *Fragments*, p. 108 and note 43, *KW* VII (SV IV 269).

557. Cf., for example, P. M Møller, "Forsøg til et Himmelbrev i Grundtvigs nye, historiske Smag fundet af Poul Møller," *Skrifter*, I, pp. 195-200.

558. Cf. *JP* III 3306 (*Pap.* VI A 145).

559. An allusion to Anselm's ontological argument for the existence of God. See *JP* I 532, II 1423; III 3615 (*Pap.* X⁴ A 212,

211, 210).

560. See, for example, Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, *Werke*, XV, p. 332; *J.A.*, XIX, p. 332; *History of Philosophy*, III, pp. 221, 223.

This simple thought appeared in the form of the determinate, clear understanding, and it cannot thus be called speculative thought or speculative reason. There are fixed determinations from which Descartes proceeds, but only of thought, this is the method of his time.

Descartes sets to work in a quite simple and childlike manner, with a narration of his reflections as they came to him [This sentence is from 2 ed. of *G P.* (1840-44), 2 ed. of *Werke*, XIX, p. 334].

561. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 184-243; *J. A.*, IV, pp. 662-721; *Science of Logic*, pp. 529-71.

562. See note 108 above; *Anxiety*, p. 11, KW VIII (SV IV 283).

563. See note 191 above.

564. See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, 14; *Sexti Empirici opera quae extant graece et latine* (Avreliana: 1621, ASKB 146), p. 4; *Sextus Empiricus*, I-IV, tr. R. G. Bury (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961-67), I, pp. 10-11:

Moreover, even in the act of enunciating the Sceptic formulae concerning things non-evident—such as the formula “No more (one thing than another),” or the formula “I determine nothing,” or any of the others which we shall presently mention,—he does not dogmatize. For whereas the dogmatizer posits the things about which he is said to be dogmatizing as really existent, the Sceptic does not posit these formulae in any absolute sense; for he conceives that, just as the formula “All things are false” asserts the falsity of itself as well as of everything else, as does the formula “Nothing is true,” so also the formula “No more” asserts that itself, like all the rest, is “No more (this than that),” and thus cancels itself along with the rest. And of the other formulae we say the same.

See also Diogenes Laertius, “Pyrrho,” IX, 74-75; *Vitis*, II, p. 166; Riisbrigh, I, pp. 434-35; Loeb, II, pp. 488-89:

Thus by the expression “We determine nothing” is indicated their state of even balance; which is similarly indicated by the other expressions, “Not more (one thing than another),” “Every saying has its corresponding opposite,” and the like. But “Not more (one thing than another)” can also be taken positively [θετικῶς], indicating that two things are alike; for example, “The pirate is no more wicked than the liar.” But the Sceptics meant it not positively but negatively, as when, in refuting an argument, one says, “Neither had more existence, Scylla or the Chimaera.”

See also *Fragments*, p. 83, KW VII (SV IV 246-47).

565. The poet Simonides. See Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*, I, 60; *Opera*, IV, pp. 487-88; Cicero, XIX, *De Natura Deorum, Academica*, tr. H. Rackham (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 58-59:

Inquire of me as to the being and nature of god, and I shall follow the example of Simonides, who having the same question put to him by the great Hiero, requested a day's grace for consideration; next day, when Hiero repeated the question, he asked for two days, and so went on several times multiplying the number of days by two; and when Hiero in surprise asked why he did so, he replied, 'Because the longer I deliberate the more obscure the matter seems to me.'

566. *Varietas delectet* (change may please). See, for example, “Author's Prologue” to Book Two, *Phaedri Augusti Liberti Fabularum Aesopiarum Libri V*, p. 16; Loeb, pp. 232-33.

567. See p. 1.40 and note 56.

568. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.75-76 (*Pap.* VI B 54:19).

569. Cf. Exodus 20:5.

570. Cf. Luke 10:30-32; *Anxiety*, p. 160, KW VIII (SV IV 426).

571. The first imperial assembly called by Charles V, to which Luther was summoned for a hearing (April 16-26, 1521). Asked to revoke his teachings condemned by the pope, Luther, after a day of meditation, refused. For a week, various theologians contested his position, but Luther did not yield.

572. See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1312 a; Bekker, II, p. 1312; *Works*, II,

Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in a different way as well as in those already mentioned. There are men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honours however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous and notable in the world; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom, but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fails. He must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius, took with him very few troops, saying 'that whatever measure of success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to him'. But this is a temper to which few can attain.

573. Cf., for example, Hegel, *Encyclopadie*, I, *Logik*, 50, *Werke*, VI, pp. 109-10; *J.A.*, VIII, pp. 147-48; *Hegel's Logic*, pp. 82-83:

The absolute Substance of Spinoza certainly falls short of absolute spirit, and it is a right and proper requirement that God should be defined as absolute spirit. But when the definition in Spinoza is said to identify the world with God, and to confound God with nature and the finite world, it is implied that the finite world possesses a genuine actuality and affirmative reality. If this assumption be admitted, of course a union of God with the world renders God completely finite, and degrades Him to the bare finite and adventitious congeries of existence. But there are two objections to be noted. In the first place Spinoza does not define God as the unity of God with the world, but as the union of thought with extension, that is, with the material world. And secondly, even if we accept this awkward popular statement as to this unity, it would still be true that the system of Spinoza was not Atheism but Acosmism, defining the world to be an appearance lacking in true reality.

574. See Nicolai Edinger Balle, *Lærebog i den Evangelisk-christelige Religion, indrettet til Brug i de danske Skoler*, I, 2 (Copenhagen: 1824, ASKB 183), p. 5.

575. See, for example, Aristotle, *Physics*, 200 b-201 a; Bekker, I, pp. 200-01; *Works*, I, pp. 342-43:

Nature is a principle of motion and change, and it is the subject of our inquiry. We must therefore see that we understand what motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown. . . .

We have distinguished in respect of each class between what is in fulfilment and what is potentially; thus the fulfilment of what is potentially, as such, is motion—e.g. the fulfilment of what is alterable, as alterable, is alteration; of what is increasable and its opposite, decreasable (there is no common name for both), increase and decrease; of what can come to be and pass away, coming to be and passing away; of what can be carried along, locomotion.

See Tennemann, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, pp. 125-27 (ed. tr.):

The word κίνησις had already been used by Plato in a broader and in a narrower sense, namely, for any change and for motion in space. Aristotle uses it in the broader sense. He, of course, had every right to designate all changes with one word, *motion*, because he really treats the science of natural entities that exist in space and to which every change happens in space. Therefore he declares that motion in space is the basis of every other motion. . . . Thus it should not appear strange that he sometimes regards *production* and *passing away* (γενεσις, φθορά) as kinds of motion. . . . *Change takes place only with actual objects*. Everything that is is either *possible* or *actual*, and the actual can be considered as substance of a specific quantity and quality etc in keeping with the remaining categories. Everything that changes changes with regard to *the subject*, with regard to its *quantity* and *quality*, or with regard to *place*. There are no other kinds of change. Because in everything possibility and actuality are distinguishable, the change, then, really is *the actualization of the possible*. . . . The transition, then, from possibility to actuality is change, κίνησις. One could express this more accurately by saying: *change*, motion, is the *actualization of the possible insofar as it is possible*, because Aristotle uses the expressions ενεργεια [energy] and εντελεχεια [entelechy], both of which mean *actualization* as

well as *action through which something becomes actual*.

See also *Fragments*, pp. 73-75, KW VII (SV IV 236-39).

576. The draft (Pk. 22, *Kierkegaard Arkivet*, Royal Library, Copenhagen) has *Overgang* [transition] instead of *Mulighed* [possibility], as in the Danish first edition and in SV. Presumably there was an error in transcription, because “transition” fits the context better.

577. *Fragments*, pp. 76-78, KW VII (SV IV 240-42).

578. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.76 (*Pap VI B 54:21*).

579. See Supplement, p. 2.76 (*Pap VI B 98:60*).

580. An allusion to Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz, *Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist* (Königsberg: 1837; ASKB 744), for example, pp. xxv-xxvi.

581. Cf. Luke 15:7.

582. See Hegel, *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*, 161-69, *Werke*, VIII, pp. 223-33; *J. A.*, VII, pp. 239-49; *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (tr. of P. R., 1 ed., 1821; Kierkegaard had 2 ed., 1833), tr. T M Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 111-16.

583. See *JP I 452* (*Pap. V A 10*).

584. See, for example. *Fear and Trembling*, p. 118, KW VI (SV III 118).

585. See *Stages*, p. 483, KW XI (SV VI 449).

586. See Philippians 4:8.

587. Virgil, *Eclagues*, VIII, 63 (quoting Lucilius); *P. Virgilii Maronis opera*, I, p. 59; Loeb, I, pp. 60-61 (“*non omnia possumus omnes*”).

588. See Supplement, p. 2.76 (*Pap. VI B 98:61*).

589. Often attributed to Martin Luther.

590. See *Fragments*, p. 86 fn and note 61, KW VII (SV IV 249-50).

591. P. M. Møller, *Strøtanker, Skrifter*, III, p. 177.

592. See Holberg, *Den Stundesløse*, II, 2, *Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination; *Four Plays*, p. 28.

593. Pyrrho rather than Zeno. See Diogenes Laertius, IX, 66; *Vitis*, II, p. 162; Riisbrigh, I, p. 431; Loeb, II, pp. 478-79:

They say he showed his indifference by washing a porker. Once he got enraged in his sister's cause (her name

was Philista), and he told the man who blamed him that it was not over a weak woman that one should display indifference. When a cur rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human weakness; but one should strive with all one's might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in word.

594. Cf. Juvenal, *Satires*, I, 22-30, *Die Satiren des Decimus Junius Juvenalis*, tr. F. G. Findeisen (Berlin, Leipzig: 1777; ASKB 1250), pp. 6-9; *Juvenal and Persius*, tr. G. G. Ramsay (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 4-5:

When a soft eunuch takes to matrimony, and Maevia, with spear in hand and breasts exposed, to pig-sticking in Etruria; when a fellow under whose razor my stiff youthful beard used to grate challenges, with his single wealth, the whole nobility; when a guttersnipe of the Nile like Crispinus — a slave-born denizen of Canopus—hitches a Tyrian cloak on to his shoulder, whilst on his sweating finger he airs a summer ring of gold, unable to endure the weight of a heavier gem—it is hard *not* to write satire.

595. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.76 (*Pap.* VI B 54:25).

596. See Terence, *Phormio*, II, 265; *P Terentii Afri comoediae sex*, ed. M. B. Friedrich Schmieder and Friedrich Schmieder (Halle: 1819; ASKB 1291), p. 431 (“*unum cognoris, omnes noris*”); *Terentses Skuespil*, I-II, tr. Frederik Hoegh Guldberg (Copenhagen: 1805; ASKB 1293-94), II, p. 264; *Terence*, I-II, tr. John Sargeaunt (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983-86), II, pp. 32-33 (“*unum quom noris omnis noris*”) See also *Anxiety*, p. 79 fn., KW VIII (SV IV 347-48).

597. See *Fragments*, p. 10 fn., KW VII (SV IV 180).

598. With reference to the remainder of the sentence and the following three sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.77 (*Pap.* VI B 54:26).

599. See Adolphe Thiers, *Den franske Revolutions Historie*, I-VII, tr. Frederik Carl Rosen (Copenhagen: 1842-45), VII, p. 291; *Geschichte der franzostschen Revolution*, I-V, tr. Ferdinand Philippi (Leipzig: 1836; ASKB 2024-28), V, p. 318.

600. See Supplement, p. 2.77 (*Pap.* VI B 98:62).

601. See, for example, Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, *Werke*, XV, pp. 610-11; J A., XIX, pp. 610-11; *History of Philosophy*, III, pp. 477-78:

But besides the general idea of synthetic judgments *a priori*, a universal which has difference in itself, Kant's instinct carried this out in accordance with the scheme of triplicity, unspiritual though that was, in the whole system into which for him the entire universe was divided. This he not only practised in the three critiques, but he also followed it out in most of the sub-divisions under the categories, the ideas of Reason, &c. Kant has therefore set forth as a universal scheme the rhythm of knowledge, of scientific movement; and has exhibited on all sides thesis, antithesis and synthesis, modes of the mind by means of which it is mind, as thus consciously distinguishing itself. The first is existence, but in the form of Other-Being for consciousness; for what is only existence is object. The second is Being-for-self, genuine actuality; here the reverse relation enters in, for self-consciousness, as the negative of Being-in-itself, is itself reality. The third is the unity of the two; the absolute, self-conscious actuality is the sum of true actuality, into which are re-absorbed both the objective and the independently existent subjective. Kant has thus made an historical statement of the moments of the whole, and has correctly determined and distinguished them: it is a good introduction to Philosophy. The defect of Kant's philosophy consists in the falling asunder of the moments of the absolute form; or, regarded from the other side, our understanding, our knowledge, forms an antithesis to Being-in-itself; there is lacking the negative, the abrogation of the "ought," which is not laid hold of. But thought and thinking had become once for all an absolute requisite that could no longer be set aside.

602. See Plutarch, "Themistocles," 3, *Lives*; Tetens, II, p. 7; Klaiber, VI, p. 317; Loeb, II, pp. 10-11:

It is said, indeed, that Themistocles was so carried away by his desire for reputation, and such an ambitious lover of

great deeds, that though he was still a young man when the battle with the Barbarians at Marathon was fought and the generalship of Miltiades was in everybody's mouth, he was seen thereafter to be wrapped in his own thoughts for the most part, and was sleepless o' nights, and refused invitations to his customary drinking parties, and said to those who put wondering questions to him concerning his change of life that the trophy of Miltiades would not suffer him to sleep.

603. Cf. I Corinthians 13:1.

604. See Supplement, p. 2.77 (*Pap.* VI B 54:27).

605. See Supplement, p. 2.77 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 81:3).

606. See Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, pp. 148-49, 150-51; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 158-59, 160-61; *Science of Logic*, pp. 138, 139-40:

The Notion of the infinite as it first presents itself is this, that determinate being in its being-in-itself determines itself as finite and transcends the limitation. It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite. . . . But the finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an alien force; on the contrary, it is its nature to be related to itself as limitation, —both limitation as such and as an ought—and to transcend the same, or rather, as self-relation to have negated the limitation and to be beyond it. It is not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature to become itself the infinite.

The infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation wherein they are as qualitatively distinct others, is to be called the *spurious infinite*, the infinite of the understanding, for which it has the value of the highest, the absolute Truth. The understanding is satisfied that it has truly reconciled these two, but the truth is that it is entangled in unreconciled, unresolved, absolute contradiction; it can only be brought to a consciousness of this fact by the contradictions into which it falls on every side when it ventures to apply and to explicate these its

categories.

This contradiction occurs as a direct result of the circumstance that the finite remains as a determinate being opposed to the infinite, so that there are *two* determinatenesses; *there are* two worlds, one infinite and one finite, and in their relationship the infinite is only the *limit* of the finite and is thus only a determinate infinite, an *infinite which is itself finite*.

607. A common Danish expression about any extraordinary situation or imminent overwhelming event. See, for example, Holberg, *Jule-Stue*, V, and *Hexerie Eller Blind Allarm*, I, 3, *Danske Skue-Plads*, II, IV, no pagination. See also *Johannes Climacus*, p. 117, KW VII (*Pap.* IV B1, p 104).

608. Until 1860, Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig book fair catalogs appeared regularly.

609. See Supplement, p. 2.77 (*Pap.* IX A 461).

610. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following four paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.77-78 (*Pap.* VI B 54:30).

611. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.78 (*Pap.* VI B 98:63).

612. Luther had begun to prepare for a career in law. A shock—a fearful thunderstorm (July 2, 1505) and a friend's sudden death (not in that storm)—was a factor in his decision to become a monk.

613. Martin Luther, *Luthers Werke Vollständige Auswahl seiner Hauptschriften*, I-X, ed Otto v. Gerlach (Berlin: 1840-41; ASKB 312-16); cf. *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*, tr. A.T.W. Steinhauser, rev. Frederick C. Ahrens and Abdel Ross Wentz, *Three Treatises* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), p. 256. See II Timothy 3:7; Supplement, pp. 2.78-79 (*Pap.* VI A 141).

614. See Supplement, p. 2.79 (*Pap.* VI B 98:65).

615. See *Fragments*, pp. 96-97, KW VII (SV IV 259-60); *JP* I 452 (*Pap.* V A 10).

616. Compulsory Baptism [*Tvangsdaab*] was abolished by a change in Danish law March 4, 1857.

617. With reference to the heading, see Supplement, p. 2.79 (*Pap.* VI B 54:31).

618. For continuation of the paragraph and the text, see

Supplement, pp. 2.79-80 (*Pap.* VI B 54:32).

619 For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.80 (*Pap.* VI B 54:33).

620. A royal decree (October 7, 1795) established a public conciliation board to hear disputes before the initiation of any court proceedings.

621. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.81 (*Pap.* VI B 54:34).

622. With reference to the following five paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.81 (*Pap.* VI B 54:35).

623. In Greek mythology, a multiheaded dog, with a mane of snakes and a dragon tail, that watched the gates of Hades One of Hercules' twelve labors was to capture Cerberus Honey cakes placed with a corpse were supposed to quiet Cerberus See Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Worterbuch*, I, p. 486.

624. In Roman military language, the expression used in reporting for military service.

625. Cf. Acts 26 28.

626. In early Greek philosophy, the Eleatics emphasized being (no becoming, no motion) and Heraclitus stressed the very opposite.

627. An old designation of logic because it is the instrument of all the other sciences.

628. The residents on the Mols peninsula near Aarhus, Denmark, have been the proverbial butt of stones of density and folly akin to tales about the Gothamites The particular story is in *Beretning om de vidtbekiendte Molboers vise Gierninger og tapre Bedrivter* This anonymous pamphlet has appeared in numerous editions since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

629. See *Fragments*, title page, p. 1, KW VII (SV IV 173).

630. See pp. 1.363-68.

631. See Supplement, pp. 2.81-87 (*Pap* VI B 55-57, A 150-52) At this point (1.383:14) of the draft manuscript page, entry VI B 55 begins The top marginal heading reads: "The Issue Is the Issue of the Introduction not to Christianity but to *Becoming a Christian*." Most of *Pap.* VI B 55-57 and A 150-52 was not used in *Postscript*. The elements that were used appear piecemeal in various parts of *Postscript*. See, for example, pp. 1.415, 1.459, 1.477-80. At the end of VI A 151, Division 2 (p. 1.385) begins.

632. Plato(?), *Greater Hippias*; *Opera*, IX, pp. 1-67; *Dialogues*, pp.

1534-59.

633. Plato(?), *Greater Hippias*, 304 e; *Opera*, IX, pp. 66-67; *Dialogues*, p. 1559: "I think now I appreciate the true meaning of the proverb, 'All that is beautiful is difficult.'"

634. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.87 (*Pap.* VI B 19:9).

635. See note 347 above.

636. See I Corinthians 15 19.

637. See II Corinthians 11:23-27.

638. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.87 (*Pap.* VI B 58:4).

639. See Supplement, p. 2.87-88 (*Pap.* VI B 98:66).

640. See P. M. Møller, "Om Udødeligheden," *Skrifter*, II, p. 179. Holberg, *Den Stundesløse*, I, 6, *Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination; *Four Plays*, pp. 10-14.

641. See Matthew 25:1-13.

642. Cf. I Corinthians 9:26.

643. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following four paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.88 (*Pap.* VI B 58:5).

644. And in the outcome good luck always plays an important part See Adolphe Thiers, *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, I-XXI (Paris: 1845-74), I, p. 249, II, p. 254; *Consulatets og Ketserdømmets Historie*, I-XVII, tr. Jacob Johannes Carl Magnus (Copenhagen: 1845-60; ASKB 2016-23 [I-VII]), I, p. 237, II, p. 243 (ed. tr.): "and finally one must have good luck, which is always necessary"; "fortune always plays a role in military undertakings."

645. A German word with a Danish ending.

646. See Matthias Claudius, *ASMUS omnia sua SECUM portans, oder Sammtliche Werke des Wandsbecker Bothen*, *Werke*, I-IV (in 8 parts with separate pagination) (Hamburg: 1838; ASKB 1631-32), I, frontispiece and dedication, p. v. See also *Fragments*, p. 27, KW VII (SV IV 196).

647. Pp. 1.196-98.

648. For interpolation in the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.88 (*Pap.* VI B 58:6).

649. Presumably *Den bestandig borgerlige Selskab*, founded in 1798, which included dramatic entertainment in its program.

650. See Knud Gad, *Hvor skal jeg sætte min Søn i Skole* (Copenhagen: 1833); J. L. Heiberg, *Valgerda*, II, 2, *Johan Ludvig*

Heibergs Poetiske Skrifter, I-XI (Copenhagen: 1862), V, p. 73.

651. With reference to the following five paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.88 (*Pap.* VI B 58:8).

652. Millenarianism (or chiliasm), the belief, held by several sects and rather common in continental Pietism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that Christ will return and reign upon earth for one thousand years before the last judgment. See I Corinthians 15:20-28; Revelation 20:2-6.

653. See Matthew 7:13-14.

654. A committee founded in 1841 by Henrik Nicolai Clausen (1793-1877), professor of theology at the University of Copenhagen and politician.

655. See Holberg, *Henrich og Pernille*, III, 7, *Danske Skue-Plads*, IV, no pagination.

656. See, for example, Terence, *The Lady of Andros*, I, 61; Schmieder, p. 11; Guldberg, I, p. 21; Loeb, I, pp. 10-11: "moderation in all things".

657. The source of the quotation has not been located. See *Practice*, pp. 43-44, KW XX (SV XII 42).

658. Cf., for example, Exodus 34:6-7; Jonah 4:2; Matthew 18:26-27; Romans 11:33.

659. See Lessing, "Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet. Eine Untersuchung," *Schriften*, III, p. 88, and the accompanying engraving of the angel of death looking at the torch resting on the corpse.

660. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following two paragraphs, see Supplement, p. 2.88 (*Pap.* VI B 58:9).

661. See Luke 16:26.

662. See *JP* I 1001 (*Pap* X⁴ A 571).

663. Cf. *JP* I 1030 (*Pap.* IV A 164).

664. See Supplement, pp. 2.88-89 (*Pap.* VI B 58:10).

665. See, for example, *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 99, 117, 121-22, and Supplement, p. 143, KW XIX (SV XI 209-10, 227, 231, *Pap.* VIII² B 168:2).

666. See Gustav Weil, *Biblische Legenden der Muselmänner* (Frankfurt am Main. 1845; ASKB 865), p. 186 fn.; *Mohammedanernes Bibelske Legender*, tr. Christian Gotfred Weber Faber (Odense: 1855), p. 134 fn.

667. See, for example. *For Self-Examination*, pp. 40-43, KW XXI

(SV XII 328-30).

668. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.89 (Pap. VI B 98:67).

669. See I Corinthians 13:13.

670. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.89 (Pap. VI B 98:68).

671. See, for example, Hegel, "*Die Existenz*," *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 120-44; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 598-622; *Science of Logic*, pp. 481-98.

672. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, IV, pp. 73-74; *J.A.*, IV, pp. 551-52; *Science of Logic*, p. 444.

Essence determines itself as ground.

Just as *nothing* is at first in simple immediate unity with *being*, so here too the simple identity of essence is at first in immediate unity with its absolute negativity. Essence is only this its negativity, which is pure reflection. It is this pure negativity as the return of being into itself; as such, it is *determined in itself*, or for us, as ground in which being is dissolved. But this determinateness is not posited *by essence itself*, in other words, essence is not ground except in so far as it has itself posited this its determinateness. Its reflection, however, consists in its *positing* and *determining* itself as that which it is *in itself*, as a negative. The positive and negative constitute that determination of essence in which essence is lost in its negation. These self-subsistent determinations of reflection sublate themselves, and the determination that has fallen to the ground [*zugrunde gegangene*] is the true determination of essence. . . .

In so far as the determination of a first, an immediate, is the starting point of the advance to ground (through the nature of the determination itself which sublates itself or falls to the ground), ground is, in the first instance, determined by that first.

See also *Fragments*, p. 39 and note 12, KW VII (SV IV 206).

673. See *Either/Or*, I, p. 56 and note 13, KW III (SV I 40).

674. Danish: *Landsoldater*. Until 1849, military duty was required only of farmers and other country dwellers [*Landbostand*] without occupational exemption. Universal military conscription

was introduced in Denmark in 1849 after the change from absolute monarchy to a democratic parliamentary form of government.

675. Cf. Luke 16:26.

676. See Matthew 13:45-46.

677. See, for example, Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke*, II, pp. 22-23; *J.A.*, II, pp. 30-31; *Phenomenology of Mind*, p. 89:

The task of conducting the individual mind from its unscientific standpoint to that of science had to be taken in its general sens; we had to contemplate the formative development (*Bildung*) of the universal [or general] individual, of self-conscious spirit. As to the relation between these two [the particular and general individual], every moment, as it gains concrete form and its own proper shape and appearance, finds a place in the life of the universal individual. The particular individual is incomplete mind, a concrete shape in whose existence, taken as a whole, one determinate characteristic predominates, while the others are found only in blurred outline. In that mind which stands higher than another the lower concrete form of existence has sunk into an obscure moment; what was formerly an objective fact (*die Sache selbst*) is now only a single trace: its definite shape has been veiled, and become simply a piece of shading. The individual, whose substance is mind at the higher level, passes through these past forms, much in the way that one who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory forms of knowledge, which he has long made his own, in order to call up their content before him; he brings back the recollection of them without stopping to fix his interest upon them. The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and levelled out.

678. Denmark in 1813 was bankrupt because of the Napoleonic Wars. A monetary reform reduced the old rix-dollar to one-tenth of its former value. State bonds were also reduced 3.5:2. Timely purchasing and selling of bonds were advantageous for some; for others the bond market was a disaster.

679. See, for example, *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 14, 124, 131, KW XIX (SV XI 128, 233, 241).
680. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, pp. 289-90 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 20, 249:3).
681. With reference to the following clause, see Supplement, p. 2.90 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:4).
682. See Matthew 11:30.
683. With reference to the following subheading, see Supplement, p. 2.90 (*Pap.* VI B 59:2).
684. Cf. notes 518 and 521 above.
685. See *The Changelessness of God*, in Moment, KW XXIII (SV XIV 277-94).
686. An allusion to Napoleon.
687. An allusion to Jørgen Hattemager in J. L. Heiberg, *Kong Salomon og Jørgen Hattemager*, *Skuespil*, II, pp. 303-400.
688. See Weil, *Biblische Legenden*, p. 209; *Bibelske Legender*, p. 150.
689. An allusion to the examination in Hebrew and in patristics and the final examination taken by theological students at the University of Copenhagen.
690. A play on two meanings of “call” [*Kald*] a call [*vocatio*] to the life vocation and a particular invitation to a clerical appointment.
691. See Matthew 4:19, 13:47; Luke 5:10.
692. For interpolation in the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.90 (*Pap.* VI B 98:69).
693. See Matthew 11:28; *Practice*, title page, K W XX (SV XII).
694. August Heinrich Julius Lafontaine (1758-1831), prolific German writer of sentimental novels. Cf. “On the Polemic of *Fædrelandet*” and *From the Papers*, in *Early Polemical Writings*, pp. 26, 75, KW I (SV XIII 25, 67).
695. Cf. Romans 7:24.
696. See JP V 5840 (*Pap.* VI A 103).
697. See Isaiah 57:15.
698. See Job 8:9.
699. Heinrich Theodor Röttscher, *Seydelmanns Leben und Wirken* (Berlin: 1845), p. 126. Karl Seydelmann (1795-1843) was a famous German actor.
700. Cf. Sirach 7:36.
701. Prince Frederik Ferdinand (1792-1863), son of Crown

Prince Frederik (1753-1805) and Princess Sophie Frederikke (1758-1794).

702. In 1807, during the Napoleonic Wars, the British navy bombarded Copenhagen.

703. The source of the allusion has not been identified.

704. *Den Frisindede* was a Liberal Copenhagen weekly paper edited by Caspar Claudius Rosenhoff (1804-1869) and published 1835-1846.

705. *Der Freischutz* was a Hamburg weekly paper begun in 1839.

706. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.91 (*Pap* VI B 59:9).

707. See Acts 5:41.

708. Gaius Mucius, a young Roman noble whose plan to assassinate Lars Porsinna, leader of the Etruscans who were besieging Rome (500 B c.), miscarried. After being captured, he spoke daringly and threateningly to Porsinna and, to demonstrate the valor of Roman youth, he put his right hand into a fire. He was released by Porsinna and thereafter was called Scaevola ("Left-handed"). See Livy, *From the Founding of the City*, II, 12-13; *T. Patavini Livii historiarum*, I, pp. 84-87; Loeb, I, pp. 254-61.

709. See "The Difference between a Genius and an Apostle," in *Without Authority*, KW XVIII (SV XI 93-109); Adler, KW XXIV (*Pap*. VII² B 235, pp. 137-50).

710. See II Corinthians 12:7.

711. See II Corinthians 12:2-4.

712. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.91 (*Pap*. VI B 59:10). Later, Kierkegaard used Inter et Inter as the name for the pseudonymous author of *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress*, with *Christian Discourses*, KW XVII (SV X 319-44).

713. See Galatians 3:28.

714. Cf., for example, *JP* V 6135 (*Pap*. VIII¹ A 650).

715. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.91 (*Pap*. VI B 60:1).

716. See Supplement, p. 2.91 (*Pap*. VI B 98:70).

717. Presumably an allusion, for example, to the burlesque of Virgil by Paul Scarron (1610-1660) and of Homer by Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de Marivaux (1688-1763).

718. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, the following two paragraphs, and the following sentence, see

Supplement, pp. 2.91-92 (*Pap.* VI B 60:2).

719. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 341, note 2, KW VI.

720. With reference to the following three clauses, see Supplement, p. 2.92 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:5).

721. See p. 1.415. Cf. Matthew 17:4.

722. Probably Johann Arndt, *Sämtliche geistreiche Bücher vom wahren Christenthum* (Tübingen: n.d.; ASKB 276); *Fire Bøger om den sande Christendom*, tr. anon. (Christiania: 1829; ASKB 277); *True Christianity: A Treatise on Sincere Repentance, True Faith, The Holy Walk of the True Christian, Etc. . . .*, rev. and ed. Charles F. Schaeffer (Philadelphia: General Council Publication House, 1917).

723. See Joachim Heinrich Campe, *Robinson den Yngre* (Copenhagen: 1814), tr. by Frederik Høegh-Guldberg of the famous German adaptation of Defoe's work, pp. 234-56; *Robinson the Younger*, tr. C. Will (Copenhagen: 1830, pp. 209-27); Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, ed. James Sutherland (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), pp. 165-69.

724. With reference to the remainder of the sentence and the following two sentences, including the note, see Supplement, p. 2.92 (*Pap.* VI B 60:3).

725. See "To Need God Is a Human Being's Highest Perfection," *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 321-26, KW V (SVV 102-05).

726. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.92-93 (*Pap.* VI B 98:71). See also *Anxiety*, p. 95, KW VIII (SV IV 365).

727. Deer Park [*Dyrehaven*] is a large wooded park north of Copenhagen. Part of it is *Dyrehavsbakken*, a carnival-type amusement park that operates from May through September, earlier and later than the original traditional period called *Dyrehavstiden*, Midsummer Day (June 24, *Sankt Hans Dag*) to Visitation Day (July 2, *Mariæ Besøgelsesdag*). See *Fragments*, p. 6, KW VII (SV IV 177).

728. The four city gates and the adjoining customhouses or octroi-houses were closed from midnight until sunrise. The walls around Copenhagen were removed in 1857.

729. In 1843, Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster had published an appendix to the 1798 hymnbook then in use. The appendix was rejected by the Copenhagen Pastoral Convention, which then had a provisional hymnbook prepared for publication in 1845. The Roskilde Pastoral Convention also formed a commission for the

preparation of a new hymnbook, which was printed in 1850 and authorized in 1855. In 1837, Grundtvig had already begun the publication of a collection of hymns, *Sang-Værk til den Danske Kirke*, I-V (Copenhagen: 1837-70; ASKB 201 [I]). See JP III 3469 (Pap. VI A 152).

730. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.93 (Pap. VI B 98:72).

731. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.93 (Pap. VI B 98:74).

732. An allusion to some independent congregations within the Church of Denmark, such as Grundtvig's in Vartov in central Copenhagen.

733. See Holberg, *Hexerie Eller Blind Allarm*, IV, 4, *Danske Skue-Plads*, IV, no pagination.

734. In Greek mythology, the giants (not the Titans), who wanted to storm Olympus, were punished by Zeus by being imprisoned under Mt. Aetna and other volcanoes. See Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Wörterbuch*, I, p. 752.

735. See Matthew 21:13.

736. See Exodus 33:20, Judges 13:22, Isaiah 6:5.

737. Ecclesiastes 5:4.

738. See John 11:4. *Sickness unto Death* by Anti-Climacus was published July 30, 1849.

739. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.93 (Pap. VI B 64).

740. Cf. *Anxiety*, p. 84 fn., KW VIII (SV IV 353-54); *Adler*, XXIV (Pap. VII² B 235, pp. 163-64).

741. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.93 (Pap. VI B 66).

742. Cf. *Fragments*, pp. 26-30, KW VII (SV IV 195-98).

743. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.93-94 (Pap. VI B 63:2).

744. See Ecclesiastes 5:1.

745. See *Either/Or*, II, p. 322, KW IV (SV II 289) See also *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 82-88, KW VI (SV III 130-35).

746. See *Stages*, pp. 420-22, KW XI (SV VI 392-93).

747. See *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 38-41, 46-50, 74-81, KW VI (SV III 89-92, 96-99, 123-28).

748 See note 384 above.

749. Danish: *sætte sammen*, which, among its various

nineteenth-century meanings, also means “to incite,” “to provoke,” “to tease.”

750. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.94 (*Pap.* VI B 98:76).

751. See Supplement, p. 2.35 (*Pap.* VI B 35:24); *Irony*, KW II (SV XIII 95-393); *JP* IV 4281 (*Pap.* X³ A 477).

752. See, for example, Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, 75, *Zusatz*, 272, *Zusatz*, *Werke*, VIII, 117, 353-54; *J.A.*, VII, pp. 133, 369-70; *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 242, 285:

The rational end of man is life in the state, and if there is no state there, reason at once demands that one be founded. Permission to enter a state or leave it must be given by the state; this then is not a matter which depends on an individual's arbitrary will and therefore the state does not rest on contract, for contract presupposes arbitrariness. It is false to maintain that the foundation of the state is something at the option of all its members. It is nearer the truth to say that it is absolutely necessary for every individual to be a citizen. The great advance of the state in modern times is that nowadays all the citizens have one and the same end, an absolute and permanent end; it is no longer open to individuals, as it was in the Middle Ages, to make private stipulations in connexion with it.

The state is the world which mind has made for itself, its march, therefore, is on lines that are fixed and absolute. How often we talk of the wisdom of God in nature! But we are not to assume for that reason that the physical world of nature is a loftier thing than the world of mind. As high as mind stands above nature, so high does the state stand above physical life. Man must therefore venerate the state as a secular deity, and observe that if it is difficult to comprehend nature, it is infinitely harder to understand the state.

753. See Supplement, p. 2.94 (*Pap.* VI B 98:77).

754. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, “*Sensus Communis*, An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour” (1709), *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, I-III (London: 1714), I, p. 61:

Truth, 'tis suppos'd, may bear *all* Lights, and *one* of those principal Lights or natural Mediums, by which Things are to be view'd, in order to a thorow Recognition, is *Ridicule* itself, or that Manner of Proof by which we discern whatever is liable to just Raillery in any Subject. So much, at least, is allow'd by All, who at any time appeal to this *Criterion*. The gravest Gentlemen, even in the gravest Subjects, are suppos'd to acknowledg this, and can have no Right, 'tis thought, to deny others the Freedom of this Appeal; whilst they are free to censure like other Men, and in their gravest Arguments make no scruple to ask, *Is it not ridiculous?*

Of this Affair, therefore, I design you shou'd know fully what my Sentiments are And by this means you will be able to judg of me, whether I was sincere the other day in the Defence of *Raillery*, and can continue still to plead for those ingenious Friends of ours, who are often censur'd for their Humour of this kind, and for the Freedom they take in such an airy way of Conversation and Writing.

Climacus probably has in mind, for example, J. G. v. Herder, "*Shaftesbury Geist und Frohsinn*," *Adrastea und das achtzehnte Jahrhundert*, 14, *Zur Philosophie und Geschichte*, I-XXII, *Johann Gottfried von Herder's sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Johann Georg v. Mýller, I-LX and suppl. vol. (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1827-30, ASKB 1676-1705 [I-LX]), XI, pp. 175-82.

755. See, for example, Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik*, III, *Werke*, X³, pp. 579-80; *J.A.*, XIV, pp. 579-80; *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, I-IV (tr. of VA, 1 ed, 1835-38, Kierkegaard had this ed.), tr. F.P.B. Osmaston (London: Bell, 1920), IV, pp. 348-49:

Having completed our review of the types under which comedy is elaborated we have at last reached the absolute conclusion of our scientific inquiry We started with symbolical art, in which the ideality of the human soul struggles to discover itself as content and configuration, and, in a word, to become an object to itself We passed on to the plastic of classical art, which displays to human vision that which has become unveiled to itself as substantive being in man's vital personality We reached our conclusion in the romantic art of the individual soul-life,

that inward world united to the absolute medium of its self-conscious energy, which expatiates unfettered within its own ideal life of Spirit, and which, content with that realm, no longer unites itself with what is objective and particularized, and finally makes itself aware of the negative significance of such a resolution in the humour of the comic Spirit Nevertheless we find that in this very consummation it is Comedy which opens the way to a dissolution of all that human art implies For the aim of all art is nothing else than that identity asserted and displayed by the human Spirit, in which the eternal, the Divine, the essential and explicated truth is unfolded in the forms and phenomenal presence of the objective world to the apprehension of our external senses and our emotional life and imagination If, however, as is the fact, comedy merely enforces this unity under a mode that annihilates it, inasmuch as the absolute substance, which strives here to enforce its realized manifestation, perceives that this realization is,—through the instrumentality of those interests which have now secured an independent freedom within the embrace of the objective world of Nature, and are as such exclusively directed to what is contingent and personal to the soul,—itself shattered, it follows that the presence and activity of the Absolute is no longer truly asserted in positive coalescence with the individual characters and ends of existing objective reality, but rather solely gives effect to itself in the negative form that everything which does not correspond with itself is thereby cancelled, and all that remains is the presence of this free personal activity of soul-life which is displayed in and along with this dissolution as aware of itself and self-assured.

756. See Aristotle, *Parts of Animals*, 673 a; Bekker, I, p. 673; *Works*, I, p. 1049: “That man alone is affected by tickling is due firstly to the delicacy of his skin, and secondly to his being the only animal that laughs.”

757. Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1449 a; Bekker, II, p. 1449; *Works*, II, p. 2319.

758. See note 763 below.

759. “The busy trifler” (Vielgeschrey) is the main character in

Holberg, *Den Stundesløse, Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination.

760. See Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, III, 2, 348-49; Schlegel and Tieck, VI, p. 79 (“*bet diesen beiden Diebeszangen*”); Kittredge, p. 1172 (“by these pickers and stealers”). The German *Diebeszangen* (literally, thief tongs, thief pincers) may have prompted the erroneous use of the Danish *Ildtang* [fire tongs], which is not in the translation by Foersom and Wulff, I, p. 125.

761. See p. 1.298.

762. See Holberg, *Ulysses von Ithaca, Eller En Tydsk Comoedie*, II, 5, *Danske Skue-Plads*, III, no pagination. Ulysses’ ambassador, Chilian, in speaking with Helen before the siege of Troy, emphasizes the height of Ulysses’ general, Holophernes.

763. See J. L. Heiberg, *Recensenten og Dyret, Skuespil*, III, pp. 185-288 Throughout the play, Pryssing in addressing Trop uses the third person singular pronoun “he” instead of the second person “you,” a form of address commonly used with servants Trop replies in the first person. See also the next paragraph (“No, mother, she . . .”).

764. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.94-95 (*Pap.* VI B 70:2).

765. With reference to the following two paragraphs and the first sentence of the next, see Supplement, p. 2.95 (*Pap.* VI B 70:4).

766. An allusion to the pre-Socratic philosopher Thales (640-546 B.C.). See Diogenes Laertius, I, 34, *Vitis*, I, p. 15; Rusbrigh, I, p. 14; Loeb, I, pp. 34-35. “It is said that once, when he was taken out of doors by an old woman in order that he might observe the stars, he fell into a ditch, and his cry for help drew from the old woman the retort, ‘How can you expect to know all about the heavens, Thales, when you cannot even see what is just before your feet?’”

767. A play on the Danish *Flæsk* [pork] and the German *Fleisch* [flesh]. See John 1.14 “And the Word became flesh (Danish *Kød*; German: *Fleisch*) and dwelt among us.”

768. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.95 (*Pap.* VI B 70:10).

769. The editor of *Stages* is named Hilarius Bookbinder See Corsair *Affair*, p. 289, note 94, KW XIII.

770. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.95 (*Pap.* VI B 70:13).

771. See Supplement, p. 2.96 (*Pap.* VI B 98:78).

772. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.96 (*Pap.* VI B 70:14).

773. Perhaps an allusion to Meïr Aaron Goldschmidt (1819-1897), owner and editor of *Corsaren*. See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. vii-xxxiii, esp. p. viii, KW XIII.

774. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.96 (*Pap.* VI B 70:15).

775. On “despair over” and “despair of,” see *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 60-61 fn., KW XIX (SV XI 172-73).

776. See note 759 above.

777. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1419 b; Bekker, II, p. 1419; *Works*, II, p. 2268.

778. Probably a quotation from, or paraphrase of, Grundtvig or a follower, but the source has not been located.

779. Gorgias (c. 480-c. 380 B. C.) was a Greek sophist and teacher of rhetoric.

780. In Greek mythology, Icarus was the son of Daedalus, with whom he fled on wax wings from Crete. When he came too close to the sun, his wings melted and he fell into the sea. See Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Wörterbuch*, II, p. 16.

781. See, for example, Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, I, *Werke*, III, p. 64, J.A., IV, p. 74; *Science of Logic*, p. 71: “It must be admitted that it is an important consideration—one which will be found in more detail in the logic itself—that the advance is a *retreat into the ground*, to what is *primary* and *true*, on which depends and, in fact, from which originates, that with which the beginning is made.”

782. The *Bhagavad Gita* is part of the *Mahabharata*. The summary is in Karl Wilhelm Friedrich v. Schlegel, *Ueber die Sprache und Wetsheit der Indier Etn Beitrag zur Begrundung der Alterthumskunde* (Heidelberg: 1808; ASKB 1388), pp. 284-307.

783. An allusion to an expression used in playing cards: *Bordet fanger* [Laid is played].

784. Cf., for example, Aristotle, *Politics*, 1253 a; Bekker, II, p. 1253; *Works*, II, p. 1988.

Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part, for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except homony-mously, as we

might speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are defined by their function and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they are homonymous. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole.

785. See, for example, Hase, *Hutterus redivivus*, 132, pp. 341-46; Listow, pp. 350-54 See also *JP* III 3633; IV 4014 (*Pap* VI A 62; VIII¹ A 662).

786. See pp. 1.204-07.

787. See pp. 1.556-61.

788. See pp. 1.581-86.

789. An allusion to the Danish law of April 11, 1840, which modified the more rigorous penal code in force since 1789.

790. See *JP* I 946 (*Pap* VIII¹ A 223).

791. A Latin phrase according special citation for a university examination.

792. See p. 1.54 and note 84.

793. In Greek mythology, a multi-faceted goddess who presided over the proper order of things, judged the behavior of human beings, and visited retribution on violators. Combining elements of justice, revenge, fate, and good fortune, she symbolizes the distribution of goods by the divine hand. See, for example, *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 144 and note 227, *KW* XIII. See also Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Wörterbuch*, II, pp. 304-09.

794. In Greek mythology, the Furies (Erinyes, Eumenides) were avenging spirits, snake-haired women who tormented evildoers and inflicted madness and plagues. See Nitsch, *neues mythologisches Wörterbuch*, I, pp. 738-40.

795. An Assyrian general. See *Judith* 2:4.

796. Certain dignitaries of the Ottoman empire were preceded by a banner bearing three horsetails. See *Either/Or*, I, p. 22, *KW* III (SV I 6).

797. See, for example, Luther's explanation of the commandments, esp. the First Commandment, *Morten Luthers liden Catechismus* (Copenhagen: 1849; ASKB 189), p. 6; *The Small Catechism of Dr. Martin Luther* (Decorah, Iowa: Lutheran Publishing

House, 1879), p. 7: "We should fear, love, and trust in God above all things."

798. Danish: *Bølgepige*, not the more customary *Havfrue*. See JP IV 4394 (*Pap* I A 319) in which Kierkegaard discusses mermaids [*Wellenmädchen*] as represented in an etching in Wilhelm Vollmer, *W. Vollmer's Mythologie. Abbildungen* (Stuttgart: 1836; ASKB 1943), plate CXV. For the text related to the etching, see Vollmer, *Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen* (Stuttgart: 1836; ASKB 1942), p. 1537. See also *Irish Elfennä rchen* (Thomas Crofton Croker, *Fairy Legends and Traditions of the South of Ireland* [London: 1825]), tr. Jakob Ludwig Karl and Wilhelm Karl Grimm (Leipzig: 1826; ASKB 1423), p. 182.

799. Perhaps an echo of Poul Martin Møiler, "Om *Udødeligheden*," *Skrifter*, II, p. 196 (ed. tr.): "a vanishing ripple in the ocean of thought, whose undulation is determined by an unalterable necessity."

800. See Supplement, p. 2.96 (*Pap*. VI B 98:80).

801. See, for example, *Fragments*, pp. 39-44, 87, KW VII (SV IV 207-11, 250).

802. See, for example, *Works of Love*, KW XVI (SV IX 112-14).

803. For the opening lines of the note, see Supplement, p. 2.97 (*Pap*. VI B 71:3).

804 On irony and humor, see, for example, *Irony*, pp. 328-29, KW II (SV XIII 392-93).

805. Cf. Ecclesiastes 1 13-14, 4 8.

806. See Corsair *Affair*, Supplement, p. 165, KW XIII (*Pap*. VII¹ B 11, p. 176) The source of this superb and very typical Socratic item has not been located.

807. Georges-Louis Leclerc, Count of Buffon (1707-1788), writer and researcher of natural history, whose *Histoire naturelle* was translated into many languages.

808. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, pp. 2.97 (*Pap*. VI B 71:4).

809. With reference to the following sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.97 (*Pap* VI B 72).

810. The dialectical in first place is the dialectical in the sphere of immanence, including Religiousness A, "in second place" refers to the new dialectic after the breach with immanence, that is, in Religiousness B See Supplement, pp. 2.97-98 (*Pap*. VII² B 235, p. 200).

811. See Johann Georg Hamann, *Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten für die lange Weile des Publicums zusammengetragen von einem Liebhaber der langen Weile...*, *Hamann's Schriften*, I-VIII, ed. Friedrich Roth and G. A. Wiener (Berlin, Leipzig: 1821-43; ASKB 536-14), II, p. 12; *Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia*, tr. James C O'Flaherty (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 143: "Socrates was, gentlemen, no mean critic. He distinguished in the writings of Heraclitus what he did not understand from what he understood, and drew a very proper and modest inference from the comprehensible to the incomprehensible." See Plato, *Apology*, 21 c-d; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 108-09, *Dialogues*, pp. 7-8.

Well, I gave a thorough examination to this person—I need not mention his name, but it was one of our politicians that I was studying when I had this experience—and in conversation with him I formed the impression that although in many people's opinion, and especially in his own, he appeared to be wise, in fact he was not. Then when I began to try to show him that he only thought he was wise and was not really so, my efforts were resented both by him and by many of the other people present. However, I reflected as I walked away, Well, I am certainly wiser than this man. It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate it seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not think that I know what I do not know.

See also *Anxiety*, p. 3 and epigraph note, p. 222, KW VIII (SV IV 276), *Pap.* IV B 128; *JP* II 1553-55 (*Pap.* V B 43-45).

812. See Supplement, p. 2.98 (*Pap.* VI B 98:81).

813. Cf. *Fragments*, p. 51, KW VII (SV IV 217).

814. Cf. I Corinthians 11:4-5.

815 Cf. Matthew 7:14.

816. See Genesis 3:5.

817. With reference to the following three paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.98-99 (*Pap.* X²A 354).

818. See, for example, *Fragments*, p. 101, KW VII (SV IV 263-64); *JP* I 7 (*Pap.* X² A 354).

819. See pp. 1.579-81 fn.

820. The Socratic dictum in the inscription on the temple at Delphi See note 596 above.

821. Pp. 1.315-17.

822. See Luke 14:26.

823. See II Corinthians 5:17.

824. See Supplement, pp. 2.99-100 (*Pap.* VI B 98:82).

825. For example, p. 1.45.

826. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.100 (*Pap.* VI B 98:83).

827. Cf. Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christenthums* (Leipzig: 1843; ASKB 488), p. xIII, *The Essence of Christianity*, tr. George Eliot (New York: Harper, 1957), p. xxxvii: "the true sense of Theology is Anthropology."

828. See I Corinthians 2:9; *Fragments*, p. 36, KW VII (SV IV 203), *Sickness unto Death*, pp. 84, 118, KW XIX (SV XI 195, 228).

829. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.100-01 (*Pap.* VI B 98:84).

830. See JP II 1251 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 181).

831. See *Fragments*, pp. 11-21, KW VII (SV IV 181-90).

832. Cf., for example, *Either/Or*, II, p. 217, KW IV (SV II 195).

833. See Matthew 7:14.

834. See Luke 14:26.

835. Probably references to characters in children's books such as Johann Christian Grote's *Onkel Franz' Reise durch alle fünf Erdteile* (1827) (in Danish translation, *Onkel Frants's Reise gennem alle fem Verdensdele*) and M K Traugott Thieme's *Gutmann oder der danische Kinderfreund* (1798) (in Danish translation, *Godmand eller den danske Børneven*) See JP I 265, pp. 114-15 (*Pap.* II A 12, pp. 10-11).

836. See Mark 10:17-22.

837. See Mark 5:17.

838. See Galatians 4:4.

839. With reference to the following two sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.101 (*Pap.* VI B 98:85).

840. See Matthew 19:14.

841. See, for example, *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 54-67, KW VI (SV III 104-16).

842. See Luke 22:61.

843. See John 3:4-10.

844 With reference to the following nine paragraphs, see Supplement, pp. 2.101-02 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 161; IX A 460).

845. With reference to the following three sentences, see Supplement, p. 2.102 (*Pap.* VI B 77).

846. See Luke 2:7.

847. See Philippians 2:7; *Fragments*, pp. 31-34, 55-56, 63-65, 103-04, KW VII (SV IV 199-201, 221-22, 228-30, 266).

848. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.102 (*Pap.* VI B 74:6).

849. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.102 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 249:6).

850. For continuation of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.102 (*Pap.* VI B 74:7).

851. See I Corinthians 1:23.

852. See Supplement, p. 2.102 (*Pap.* VI B 98:86).

853. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.103 (*Pap.* VI B 74:8).

854. Cf. *Fragments*, p. 64, KW VII (SV IV 229).

855. See Genesis 19:26.

856. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.103 (*Pap.* VI B 78).

857. An allusion to Grundtvig See, for example, *Nordens Mythologi eller Sindbittled-Sprog*, pp. 45-46; *Om Nordens historiske Forhold* (Copenhagen: 1843), P. 19.

858. Cf. Romans 8 16.

859. In 1825, Denmark floated a large loan from the Wilson banking house in England When Wilson went bankrupt in 1837, the Lionel Nathan Rothschild firm of London took over the bonds.

860. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.103 (*Pap.* VI B 74:11).

861. With reference to the remainder of the sentence, see Supplement, p. 2.103 (*Pap.* VI B 82).

862. Probably an allusion to Feuerbach, *Wesen des Christenthums*, see note 827 above See also *Stages*, p. 452, KW XI (SV VI 421).

863. See, for example, Plato, *Gorgias*, 448 d-e; *Opera*, I, pp. 260-61, Heise, III, pp. 7-8, *Dialogues*, p. 232 Cf. *Fragments*, p. 72 and note 3, KW VII (SV IV 236).

864. Cf. John 10:11,15.

865. With reference to the following note, see Supplement, p.

2.103 (*Pap.* VI B 74:13).

866. See *Adler*, *KW XXIV* (*Pap VII*² B 235, p. 158).

867. See p. 1.69.

868. With reference to the heading, see Supplement, p. 2.104 (*Pap.* VI B 83:1, 86 1).

869. Cf. Luke 18:13.

870 For the opening of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.104 (*Pap.* VI B 83:2).

871. With reference to the following paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.104-05 (*Pap.* VI B 83:3).

872. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.105-06 (*Pap.* VI B 87, 98:87).

873. See p. 1.8, *JP V* 6134 (*Pap.* VIII¹ A 64) and note 1796.

874. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.106 (*Pap.* VI B 83:4).

875. A compaction of two sentences See pp. 1.7-8.

876. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.106 (*Pap.* VI B 88).

877. With reference to the following paragraph and the first sentence of the next, see Supplement, pp. 2.106-07 (*Pap.* VI B 84).

878. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.107 (*Pap.* VI A 140).

879. See II Corinthians 11:23-27.

880. See Holberg, *Jacob von Tyboe Eller Den stortalende Soldat*, III, 5, *Danske Skue-Plads*, III, no pagination.

881. With reference to the following six sentences, see Supplement, pp. 2.107-08 (*Pap.* VI B 94).

882. Probably an allusion to the Danish philologist Johan Nicolai Madvig (1804-1886).

883. Probably an allusion to Bishop Jakob Peter Mynster (1775-1854).

884. Probably an allusion to the poet Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger (1779-1850) or to the literary critic and dramatist Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860).

885. See *JP III* 3299 (*Pap.* V A 46).

886. *Une Chaîne* (Danish: *En Lænke*), tr. Thomas Overskou (Copenhagen: 1832), IV, 1, p. 29 (ed. tr.): "I know everything—I will see you no more."

887. Probably an allusion to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Theodicy*, 8; *God. Gutl. Letbmtit opera philosophica...*, I-II, ed. Johann

Eduard Erdmann (Berlin 1840; ASKB 620), II, p. 506; *Theodicy* (tr. of T. in *Philosophische Schriften*, I-VII, ed. C. J. Gerhardt, 1875-90), ed. Austin Farrer, tr. E. M. Huggard (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 128: “. . . there is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs have chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with supreme reason.”

A FIRST AND LAST EXPLANATION

1. With reference to the following “Explanation,” see Supplement, pp. 2.108-12, 115 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:1, VI B 99; VII¹ B 74, 75, 81:4, A 3).
2. “A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg” See *Corsair Affair*, pp. 17-21, KW XIII (SV XIII 411-15).
3. “The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician” and “The Dialectical Result of a Literary Police Action,” in *Corsair Affair*, pp. 38-46, 47-50, KW XIII (SV XIII 422-31, 432-35).
4. See Supplement, pp. 2.112-13 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 76).
5. For continuation of the paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.113 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:2).
6. *Stages*, pp. 7-86, KW XI (SV VI 13-83).
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-494 (175-459).
8. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph and the following paragraph, see Supplement, p. 2.114 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 78).
9. With reference to the following clause, see Supplement, p. 2.114 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:4).
10. Cf. *Letters*, Letter 133, p. 189, KW XXV.
11. With reference to the remainder of the paragraph, see Supplement, pp. 2.114-15 (*Pap.* VII¹ B 80:5).
12. See *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays*, in *Without Authority*, KW XVIII (SV XII 267).
13. The Danish *Halvbefaren* [literally, “half-traveled one”] is an old term for “ordinary seaman” (one who has sailed eighteen months and has made two long journeys), as distinguished from *Helbefaren* [literally, “fully-traveled one”], “able seaman.”

SUPPLEMENT

1. Pseudonymous author of *Fear and Trembling*.
2. *Aristoteles Rhetorik*, *Aristoteles Werke*, *Schriften zur Rhetorik und Poetik*, I-II, tr. Karl Ludwig Roth (Stuttgart: 1833; ASKB 1092),

II, p. 197.

3. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1399 a; *Aristoteles græce*, I-II, ed. Immanuel Bekker (Berlin: 1831; ASKB 1074-75), p. 1399; *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, I-II, ed. Jonathan Barnes (rev. Oxford tr., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), II, pp. 2229-30: "For instance, the priestess enjoined upon her son not to take to public speaking: 'For', she said, 'if you say what is right, men will hate you; if you say what is wrong, the gods will hate you'. The reply might be, 'On the contrary, you *ought* to take to public speaking: for if you say what is right, the gods will love you; if you say what is wrong, men will love you.'"

4. See JP V 5801, 5813-17 (*Pap.* VI A 31, 55-59).

5. See JP V 5759 (*Pap.* VI B 194).

6. See *Fragments*, p. 3, KW VII (SV IV 174).

7. Johan Nicolai Madvig (1804-1886), Danish philologist and politician.

8. See *Fragments*, pp. 89-110, KW VII (SV IV 252-71).

9. See Friedrich Lücke, *Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes* (Leipzig: 1838; ASKB 110).

10. For the omitted portion, see Supplement, p. 2.27 (*Pap.* VI B 30).

11. In *Kirkens Gjenmæle mod Professor Theologtæ Dr. H. N. Clausen* (Copenhagen: 1825) Grundtvig attacked Clausen for statements in *Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus* (Copenhagen: 1825) Clausen brought civil suit, and on October 30, 1826, the court held that the offensive statements were "dead and powerless" and levied a small fine on Grundtvig.

12. See Poul Martin Møller, "*Forsøg til et Himmelsbrev, i Grundtvigs nye, historiske Smag, fundet af Poul Møller,*" *Efterladte Skrifter*, I-III (Copenhagen: 1839-43; ASKB 1574-76), I, pp. 195-200.

13. See Christian Sigfred Ley, articles in *Nordiske Kirke-Tidende*, 47, 1834; 4-5, 1836; 27, 1838.

14. In Norse mythology, Asa was any of the Aesir who dwelt in Asgaard. See note 15 below.

15. See Grundtvig, *Skov-Hornets Klang mellem Skamlings-Bankerne* (Copenhagen: 1844; ASKB U 45), p. 7. Dalby, near Lund in southern Skaane (now part of Sweden), has rich Danish historical significance.

16. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, 1404 b; Bekker, II, p. 1404; Roth, II,

p. 224; *Works*, II, p. 2240.

17. The passage has not been located.

18. Henrich Steffens, *Indledning til filosofiske Forelæsninger* (Copenhagen: 1803), p. 150 (Cato, not Brutus).

19. See Esther 3:1-15 (Haman); *JP* I 752 (*Pap.* II A 654).

20. See Grundtvig, *Bøn og Begreb om en Dansk Høiskole i Soer* (Copenhagen: 1840). Grundtvig was the originator of the idea behind the folk academy or folk high school movement, which is still very much alive in Denmark.

21. See, for example, *Either/Or*, I, pp. 3-4 and note 2, *KW* III (*SV* I v-vi).

22. Presumably a reference to Adolph Peter Adler (1812-1869), the subject of Kierkegaard's *Adler*, *KW* XXIV (*Pap.* VII² B 235-70) Cf. Kierkegaard's account of Adler's visit as told by Hans Brøchner, *Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard* (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1953), 20, pp. 34-35.

23. Friedrich Adolph Trendelenburg, *Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik* (Berlin: 1842; ASKB 845).

24. Holger the Dane is a Danish folk hero celebrated particularly in late medieval poetry beginning with the French chivalric poetry about *Ogter le Danois* or *Ogier de Danemarche* in the legend cycle about Charlemagne (742-814).

25. A mountain in Galilee, Palestine, a symbol of transfiguration and celestial rapture. See, for example, Jeremiah 46:18; Matthew 17:1-8; Mark 9:2-8; Luke 9:28-36.

26. See Ludvig Holberg, *Erasmus Montanus*, I, 3 (ed. tr.): "Do you want fine sand or Just plain dirt?" *Den Danske Skue-Plads*, I-VII (Copenhagen: 1798; ASKB 1566-67), V, no pagination; *Comedies by Holberg*, tr. Oscar James Campbell, Jr., and Frederic Schenck (New York: American-Scandinavian Foundation, 1935), p. 124.

27. See Hans Lassen Martensen, *Den christelige Daab betragtet med Hensyn paa det baptistiske Spørgsmaal* (Copenhagen: 1843; ASKB 652), pp. 66-71.

28. Well-known proprietor of a restaurant on Allégade. His patrons were particularly writers and students.

29. Cf. Matthew 10:24; Luke 6:40.

30. Hans Friedrich Helweg (1816-1901), Danish pastor and theological-historical writer. See "*Orest og Ødip eller Collisionen*," *For Literatur og Kritik. Et Fjerdingaarsskrift udgivet af Fyens Stifts literære Selskab*, III, 1845, pp. 55-60. Socrates is presented as "the

historical Oedipus” devoid of irony.

31. Aristophanes, *The Clouds*, I, 6, 373, *Aristophanes's Komедier*, tr. Johan Krag (Odense: 1825; ASKB 1055), pp. 167-68; *Des Aristophanes Werke*, I-III, tr. Johann Gustav Droysen (Berlin: 1835-38, ASKB 1052-54), III, p. 49; *Aristophanes I-III*, tr. Benjamin Bickley Rogers (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), I, pp. 300-01: “Yet before, I had dreamed that the rainwater streamed from Zeus and his chamber-pot sieve.”

32. See note 31 above.

33. See Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, II, 21; *Dtogens Laertii de vitis philosophorum*, I-II (Leipzig: 1833, ASKB 1109), I, p. 70; *Diogen Laertses filosofiske Historie*, I-II, tr. Børge Riisbrigh (Copenhagen: 1812; ASKB 1110-11), I, p. 66; *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, I-II, tr. R. D. Hicks (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), I, pp. 150-51.

34. See Julius Müller, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde*, I-II (Breslau: 1849, ASKB 689-90), II, pp. 310-48, esp. p. 335.

35. See Immanuel H. Fichte, *Satze zur Vorschule der Theologie* (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1826; ASKB 501), p. 214.

36. See *Fragments*, pp. 74-76, KW VII (SV IV 238-40).

37.. See note 33 above.

38. See *Repetition*, Supplement, p. 281 and notes 14, 15, KW VI (*Pap.* IV B 101); J. L. Heiberg, “*Gjensvar paa Herr Professor Hauchs Svar*,” I, IV, *Kjøbenhavns flyvende Post*, 37, 41, 1830.

39. See Caspar Claudius Rosenhoff's review of “*Stjemehtmlen*,” by J. L. Heiberg, *Intelligensblade*, 14, October 1, 1842; *Den Frisindede*, 117, October 4, 1842, and 148, December 19, 1843.

40. A tower (designed by King Christian IV) on Købmagergade in central Copenhagen. It is the tower of Trinitatis Church (built 1637-1656) and was originally used as an observatory.

41. Rasmus Nielsen (1809-1844), professor of philosophy. University of Copenhagen. For a time it seemed as if Nielsen would be allowed to become in a sense Kierkegaard's successor. See, for example, *JP* VI 6239, 6246, 6301, 6302, 6341, 6342, 6402-06, 6574 (*Pap.* IX A 229, 258, X¹ A 14, 15, 110, 111, 343; X⁶ B 83-86, 121), *Pap.* IX A 228, *Letters*, Letter 257, KW XXV.

42. Eggert Christopher Tryde (1781-1860), dean of the diocese of Copenhagen and Sjælland and writer on philosophical and ecclesiastical issues.

43. Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, *Meister Floh*, 6, *E.T.A.*

- Hoffmann's *ausgewählte Schnflen*, I-X (Berlin 1827-28, ASKB 1712-16), X, pp. 240-42. See JP V 5162, 5177 (*Pap.* I A 244, 280).
44. See Andreas Justinus Kerner, *Die Reiseschatten*, VIII, 3, *Die Dichtungen von Justinus Kerner* (Stuttgart, Tübingen: 1834, ASKB 1734), pp. 441-42.
45. See Frans Hemsterhuis, *Vermischte Schriften des H. Hemsterhuis aus dem Franzosischen übersetzt*, I-III (Leipzig: 1782-97; ASKB 573-75), II, pp. 127-28, 185-88, 216-18, 236-39.
46. See, for example, pp. 1.140, 204, 232; *Stages*, pp. 444-45, KWXI (SV VI 414).
47. Benedict Spinoza, *Ethics*, I, 36, Appendix; *Benedicti de Spinoza opera philosophica omnia*, ed. August Gfroerer (Stuttgart: 1830; ASKB 788), p. 308, *The Collected Works of Spinoza*, I-II, ed. and tr. Edwin Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985-), I, p. 443.
48. The allusion may be to Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, 5; *Opera*, p. 310; *Works*, p. 447.
49. See *Fragments*, pp. 102-04, KW VII (SV IV 265-66).
50. *Ibid.*, p. 87 (250-51).
51. An allusion to Moses. See Deuteronomy 34:4.
52. Cf. Ephesians 3:15. King James and RSV have "family" for πατριά (literally, "fatherhood") Kierkegaard follows the literal translation in the Danish Bible of 1824 (ASKB 6-7).
53. Cf. Acts 4:12.
54. Plato, *Phaedo*, 115 b; *Platonis quae exstant opera*, I-XI, ed. Friedrich Ast (Leipzig: 1819-32; ASKB 1144-54), I, pp. 610-13; *Udvalgte Dialoger af Platon*, I-VIII tr. Carl Johan Heise (Copenhagen; 1830-59; ASKB 1164-67, 1169 [I-VII]), I, pp. 118-19; *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 95.
55. See *Fear and Trembling*, p. 11, KW VI (SV III 64).
56. See *Fragments*, pp. 46, 56-59, KW VII (SV IV 213, 222-25).
57. See Carl Ludwig Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, I-II (Berlin: 1837-38; ASKB 678-79), I, pp. 301-18.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 339-86.
59. *Author of Prefaces* (Copenhagen: 1844), KW IX (SV V 3-71).
60. *Four Upbuilding Discourses* (1844) was published August 31, 1844.

61. See *Repetition*, pp. 197-213, KWVI (SV III 231-46).
62. The first discourse in *Four Upbuilding Discourses* (1843), which was published December 6, 1843.
63. *Philosophical Fragments*, which was published June 13, 1844.
64. See pp. 1.223-24.
65. See *Stages*, p. 28, KWXI (SV VI 32).
66. *Ibid.*, p. 118(114).
67. *Ibid.*, p. 494 (459).
68. Among Kierkegaard's secretaries or amanuenses, particularly during the period of the series of pseudonymous works ending with *Postscript*, was Israel Salomon Levin (1810-1883), who became a philologist and writer. ASKB lists *Album af nulevende danske Mænds og Qvinders Haandskrifter i lithographerede Facsimiler* (Copenhagen: 1846; ASKB 1955), *Neologerne og de fremmede Ord* (Copenhagen: 1849; ASKB U76); *En Brevvexling* (Copenhagen: 1850, ASKB 972).
69. Freely quoted, but substantially correct.
70. *Stages*, p. 311, KW XI (SV VI 291), freely quoted, but substantially correct.
71. See *JP* V 5628 (*Pap.* IV A 215).
72. According to Erasmus of Rotterdam, Socrates was supposed to have said this to a boy. See Erasmus, *Apophthegmata*, III, 70; *Opera Omnia*, I-VIII (Basel: 1538-40), IV, p. 148 (ed. tr.):

Quum diues quidam filium adolescentulum ad Socratem misisset, ut indolem illius inspiceret, ac paedagogus diceret, Pater ad te, O Socrates, misit filium, ut eum videres: tum Socrates ad puerum, Loquere igitur, inquit, adolescens, ut te videam: significans, ingenium hominis non tam in vultu relucere, quam in oratione, quod hoc sit certissimum [When a certain wealthy man had sent his very young son to Socrates to observe his talent, and his slave said, "His father sent his son to you so that you might see him, Socrates" thereupon Socrates said to the boy, "Speak, lad, so that I may see you": thus signifying that the character of a man comes to light not so much in his countenance as in his manner of speaking, a thing which is most certain].

73. See Frederik Christian Olsen, "*Poul Martin Møllers Levnet*" Poul Martin Møller, *Efterladte Skrifter*, III, p. 109 fn. (separate

pagination).

74. See Augustin Eugène Scribe and Aimé Honoré Joseph Duveyrier (Melesville), *Oscar*, III, 7, tr A V Guntelberg, *Det Kongelige Theaters Repertoire*, 153 (1844), p. 20. The maid Manette says, "I tell everything " See p. 1.623.

75. See Christian Molbech, *Om Udgivelsen af Anders Vedels danske Saxo, og om Samfundet til den danske Litteratur Fremme* (Copenhagen: 1846).

76. See p. 1.361.

77. See Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III, 6; *Xenophontis opera graece et latine*, I-IV, ed. Carl August Thieme (Leipzig: 1801-04; ASKB 1207-10), IV, pp. 157-63, *Memorabilia Socratis et eiusdem apologiam continuens*, ed. Friedrich August Bornemann (Leipzig: 1829; ASKB 1211), pp. 193-202; *Xenophons Sokratiske Mærkværdigheder*, tr. Jens Bloch (Copenhagen: 1802), (III, 7) pp. 253-57; *Xenophon I-VII, IV, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus*, tr. E. C. Marchant (Loeb, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 203-13.

78. See I Peter 3 15.

79. See Plato (pseudo), *Atcibiades*, I, 117 e-118 a; *Opera*, VIII, pp. 240-41; *The Dialogues of Plato*, I-II, tr. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), I, pp. 750-51.

80. See p. 1.383 and note 631.

81. Cyprianus's Book or Black Book, a common name for handbooks of magic formulas. According to legend, Cyprian was a pagan magician who was persuaded to Christianity by the steadfast Justina and who as bishop of Antioch was martyred in 290. In Germany, such books were attributed to Dr. Faustus.

82. See, for example, Aristotle (pseudo). *On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias*, 980 b; Bekker, II, p. 980; *Works*, II, p. 1551: "Thus nothing exists; and even if anything were to exist, nothing is knowable; and even if anything were knowable, no one could indicate it to another, firstly because things are not words, and secondly because no one can have in his mind the same thing as someone else."

83. See Augustin Eugène Scribe, *Les Premières Amours ou Les Souvenirs d'enfance; Den første Kjærlighed*, tr. J. L. Heiberg, 12, *Repertoire*, 45 (1832), p. 9.

84. Carl Friedrich Flögel, *Geschichte der komischen Litteratur*, I-IV (Liegnitz, Leipzig: 1784-87; ASKB 1396-99).

85. *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie*, ed

Immanuel Hermann Fichte (ASKB 877-911).

86. Adolph Helfferich, *Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwicklung und in ihren Denkmälern*, I-II (Gota: 1842; ASKB 571-72).

87. See Holberg, *Erasmus Montanus*, I, 4, *Danske Skue-Plads*, V, no pagination; *Comedies*, p. 126.

88. Friedrich Gustav Lisco, *Das christliche Kirchenjahr*, I—II (Berlin: 1843; ASKB 629-30).

89. See JP II 1114 (*Pap.* V C 13 4).

90. "Another Defense of Woman's Great Abilities," "The Morning Observations in *Kjøbenhavnsposten* No 43," and "On the Polemic of *Fædrelandet*," in *Early Polemical Writings*, pp. 3-5, 6-11, 12-23, KW I (SV XIII 5-8, 9-15, 16-27).

91. "Who Is the Author of *Either/Or*," in *Corsair Affair*, pp. 13-16, KW XIII (SV XIII 407-10).

92. "A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in *Don Giovanni*," in *Corsair Affair*, pp. 28-37, KW XIII (SV XIII 445-56).

93. "A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg," in *Corsair Affair*, pp. 17-21, KW XIII (SV XIII 411-15).

94. "The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician," and "The Dialectical Result of a Literary Police Action," in *Corsair Affair*, pp. 38-46, 47-50, KW XIII (SV XIII 422-31, 432-35).

95. See *Fragments*, p. 39 and note 12, KW VII (SV IV 206).

96. See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. vu-xxxi, KWXIII.

97. See Historical Introduction, pp. 2 xi-xii.

98. See Historical Introduction, pp. 2 xi-xv.

99. *Postscript* was published February 27, 1846.

100. *To Tidsaldre* (1845), by Thomasine Gyllembourg-Ehrensverd (1773-1856), popular Danish author and mother of J L Heiberg Kierkegaard's review of the work was published March 30, 1846 See *Two Ages*, KW XIV.

101. *Corsaren (The Corsair)*, 284, February 27, 1846, col 5, *Corsair Affair*, p. 130, KW XIII.

102. *The Corsair* See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. ix-x, KW XIII.

103. In *Kjøbenhavnsposten*, 73, 74, March 27, 28, 1846, there appeared a review of *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* by Prosper naturahs de mohnasky (P L Møller) Later it was included in Møller's *Kritiske Skizzer fra Aarene 1840-47*, I-II (Copenhagen 1847), II, pp. 253-68 See also *Corsair Affair*, Historical

Introduction, pp. xxxiv-xxxv, *KW* XIII.

104. "The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician," *Fædrelandet*, December 27, 1845, col 2078, *Corsair Affair*, pp. 38-46, *KW* XIII (SV XIII 422-31).

105. See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. x-xIII, xxiv-xxv, *KW* XIII.

106. See note 100 above.

107. Jens Finsteen Giødwad (1811-1891), editor of *Fædrelandet* and Kierkegaard's middleman in the publication of the pseudonymous works.

108. Peder Ludvig Møller, "Et Besøg i Sorø," *Gæa* (1846), pp. 144-87, *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, pp. 96-104, *KW* XIII.

109. Cf. "The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician," *Corsair Affair*, p. 45, *KW* XIII (SV XIII 430), freely quoted.

110. See *The Corsair*, 285, March 6, 1846, col 8-9, *Corsair Affair*, Supplement, p. 132, *KW* XIII.

111. See "An Explanation and a Little More," *Fædrelandet*, May 9, 1845, col 1883; *Corsair Affair*, p. 26, *KW* XIII (SV XIII 421).

112. *Berlingske Politiske og Avertissements-Tidende*, 108, May 6, 1845, col 3-4, *Corsair Affair*, pp. 24, 274-75, *KW* XIII (SV XIII 418).

113. Pp. 1.5-8.

114. Pp. [1.625-30].

115. Pp. [1.625-30].

116. *Two Ages* was published March 30, 1846 See note 100 above.

117. See Historical Introduction, *Corsair Affair*, pp. xix-xxi, *KW* XIII.

118. See *Point of View*, *KW* XXII (SV XIII 543-44).

119. See Historical Introduction, pp. 2 xi-xiv.

120. See anon, "Kjøbenhavnspostens Anmeldelse af Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift" and "Afsluttende uvidenskabeligt Efterskrift," *Aftenbladet*, 75, 76, March 30, 31, 1846 See also note 103 above.

121. Mendel Levin Nathanson (1780-1868), editor of *Berlingske Tidende*. See Supplement, p. 2.118 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 26).

122. See Peter Vilhelm Christensen, "Troen og Dialektiken Imod S Kierkegaard" and "Troens Dialektik," *Dansk Kirketidende*, I, 29, 52, March 29, September 20, 1846 Christensen was Kierkegaard's secretary at one time See *JP* V 5688 (*Pap.* IV A 141) Kierkegaard's

reply was not published.

123. With reference to Andreas Frederik Beck, see *Corsair Affair*, p. 6 and note 12, KW XIII (SV XIII 400), to Peder Ludvig Møller, *ibid*, Historical Introduction, pp. x-xxix, to Torkild Baden, *ibid*, Supplement, pp. 114-15 and note 109 (*The Corsair*, 277, January 9, 1846, col 3).

124. *Dansk Kirketidende*, 52, 1846, col 845.

125. *Ibid.*, 29, 1846, col 477.

126. See *Either/Or*, II, p. 22, KW IV (SV II 21).

127. See note 122 above.

128. See, for example, JP V 5890 (*Pap.* VII¹ A 103).

129. Dr. H. Martensens trykte moralske Paragrafer, eller det saakaldte “Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System af Dr. Hans Martensen”, i dets forvirrede, idea-listisk-metaphysiske og phantastisk-speculative, Religion og Christendom undergravende, fatalistiske, pantheistiske og selvforguderske Væsen, belyst og bedømt af Magnús Eiriksson, *Cand. theol.* was advertised in *Adresseavisen*, 274, 275, November 19, 20, 1846.

130. Christen Niemann Rosenkilde (1786-1861), well-known Danish actor.

131. In English, there is no direct equivalent of *Privatdocent* (often translated as “assistant professor”), a title used in Scandinavia and Germany for one who assists by lecturing or tutoring (therefore *Docent*) without university appointment (therefore *Privat*). In ODS, the illustration is from *Postscript*.

132. An allusion to the main character in Holberg, *Den Politiske Kandestøber*, *Danske Skue-Plads*, I, no pagination; *The Political Tinker*, *Comedies*, pp. 51-118.

133. See *Stages*, p. 456, KW XI (SV VI 424).

134. See Plato, *Theaetetus*, 150, b-d; *Opera*, II, pp. 26-29; *Dialogues*, p. 855 (Socrates speaking):.

My art of midwifery is in general like theirs; the only difference is that my patients are men, not women, and my concern is not with the body but with the soul that is in travail of birth. And the highest point of my art is the power to prove by every test whether the offspring of a young man’s thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth. I am so far like the midwife that I cannot myself give birth to wisdom, and the common reproach is true, that,

though I question others, I can myself bring nothing to light because there is no wisdom in me. The reason is this. Heaven [ὁ θεός, “the god” in *Theaetetus*, *The Dialogues of Plato*, I-II, tr. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), II, p. 152] constrains me to serve as a midwife, but has debarred me from giving birth. So of myself I have no sort of wisdom, nor has any discovery ever been born to me as the child of my soul. Those who frequent my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent, but, as we go further with our discussions, all who are favored by heaven make progress at a rate that seems surprising to others as well as to themselves, although it is clear that they have never learned anything from me. The many admirable truths they bring to birth have been discovered by themselves from within. But the delivery is heaven’s work and mine.

135. *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress*, by the pseudonymous Inter et Inter, *Fædrelandet*, 188-91, July 24, 25, 26, 27, 1848; col. 1485-90, 1493-1506, 1509-16; with *Christian Discourses*, KW XVII (SV X 319-44).

136. See note 41 above.

137. *Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits* (March 13, 1847), KW XV (SV VIII 109-416); *Works of Love* (September 29, 1847), KW XVI (SV IX); *Christian Discourses* (April 26, 1848), KW XVII (SVX 3-317).

138. See note 135 above.

139. *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (May 16, 1843), in *Eighteen Discourses*, pp. 1-48, KW V (SV III 7-52).

140. See note 137 above.

141. Two notes constitute the appendix to *Point of View* (written 1846-48, published posthumously), KW XXII (SV XIII 583-610) Note three became the Preface to *Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays* (August 7, 1851), in *Without Authority*, KW XVIII (SV XII 267).

142. See, for example, pp. 1.358-59, 539-40.

143. See note 137 above.

144. See “*En Cyclus ethisk-religieuse Afhandlinger*,” Pap IX B 1-6. Numbers 1, 2, 4, 5 became *The Book on Adler*, which was not published Numbers 3 and 6 were published as *Two Ethical-Religious*

Essays, by H.H., May 19, 1849.

145. See note 141 above.

146. P. [1.626], freely quoted.

147. Pp. 1.251-300.

148. *Works of Love*, KW XVI (SV IX 352, 354).

149. See *Two Ages*, pp. 93-95, KW XVI (SV VIII 87-89).

150. See *Corsair Affair*, Historical Introduction, pp. xxi-xxII, KW XIII, Index, "trousers," p. 318.

151. Here the name of the author of *Postscript* designates the book.

152. Cf. *On My Work as an Author*, in *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 489-509).

153. In *On My Work* and *Point of View*.

154. Cf., for example, *Fear and Trembling*, p. 121, KW VI (SV III 166).

155. See note 150 above.

156. "Discourses at the Communion on Fridays," Part Four of *Christian Discourses*, published April 26, 1848, KW XVII (SV X 248-317).

157. Published May 16, 1843, about three months after *Either/Or*.

158. Rasmus Nielsen, *Mag. S. Kierkegaards "Johannes Climacus" og Dr. H. Martensens "Christelige Dogmatik."* En undersøgende Anmeldelse (Copenhagen: 1849; ASKB 701).

159. See, for example, *On My Work*, with *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 507); *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 544).

160. Cf. I Corinthians 4:10.

161. See *Stages*, p. 493, KW XI (SV VI 458).

162. See note 158 above.

163. Hans Lassen Martensen, *Den christelige Dogmatik* (Copenhagen: 1849; ASKB 653), pp. i-iv.

164. "Public Confession," *Corsair Affair*, pp 3-12, KW XIII (SV XIII 397-406).

165. See note 158 above.

166. See pp. 1.200, 1.203, 1.205; Supplement, p. 2.51 (*Pap. VII¹* A 31).

167. Magnus Eiríksson, *Speculativ Rettroenhed, fremstillet efter Dr. Martensens "christelige Dogmatik", og Geistlig Retfærdighed, belyst ved en Biskops Deeltagelse i en Generalfiskal-Sag* (Copenhagen: 1849).

168. *Ibid.*, p. 108.

169. Pp. [1.625-30].

170. P. 1.617.

171. See Supplement, p. 2.163 (*Pap.* X⁶ B 68).

172. See *Fear and Trembling*, pp. 34-37, 40-41, 46-59, KW VI (SV III 85-88, 91, 96-109).

173. The pseudonymous author of *Fear and Trembling*.

174. The page numbers in the entry are to the Danish first edition.

175. See note 108 above.

176. See *The Corsair*, 269, November 14, 1845, col. 14; *Corsair Affair*, p. 96, KW XIII.

177. P. [1.626].

178. See *On My Work*, with *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 494-98).

179. *Thomas à Kempis, om Christi Efterfølgelse*, tr. Jens Albrecht Leonhard Holm (Copenhagen: 1848; ASKB 273), X, XXVI, p. 131 (“defended [*for-svarede*] himself only by patience and humility . . . he sometimes answered [*svarede*]”); *Of the Imitation of Christ*, tr. anon. (New York: Appleton: 1896), p. 175.

180. P. [1.627].

181. *On My Work*, with *Point of View*, KW XXII (SV XIII 495).

182. *Practice*, p. 7, KW XX (SV XII xv).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

For general bibliographies of Kierkegaard studies, see:

Jens Himmelstrup, *Søren Kierkegaard International Bibliografi*.
Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck, 1962.

Aage Jørgensen, *Søren Kierkegaard-litteratur 1961-1970*. Aarhus:
Akademisk Boghandel, 1971. *Søren Kierkegaard-litteratur
1971-1980*. Aarhus: privately published, 1983.

François H. Lapointe, *Søren Kierkegaard and His Critics: An
International Bibliography of Criticism*. Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1980.

International Kierkegaard Newsletter, ed. Julia Watkin.
Copenhagen: 1979-.

Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Josiah Thompson.
New York: Doubleday (Anchor Books), 1972.

Kierkegaardiana, XII, 1982.

Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, I, ed. and tr. Howard V.
Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.

For topical bibliographies of Kierkegaard studies, see *Søren
Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers*, I-IV, 1967-75.

INDEX

- Abraham, 1.434;
 and the ethical, 1.268;
 and faith, 2.163–64;
 and Isaac, 2.163–64;
 temptation of, 1.267
- absoluteness, the absolute: categories of, 2.22;
 and decision, 1.488;
 and the dialectical, 1.490–91;
 duty as, 1.267;
 the ethical as, 1.142;
 and the finite, 1.483–84;
 Grundtvig and, 2.17–20, 2.22–25;
 individual and, 1.483–88, 1.541;
 vs. the relative, 1.547
- abstraction: and actuality, 1.301–02, 1.314–18;
 as beginning of system, 1.114;
 vs. concretion, 1.190, 1.533;
 and contradiction, 1.305;
 vs. either/or, 1.305;
 and the ethical, 1.307, 1.426;
 and eudaemonism, 1.426;
 vs. existence, 1.301–18, 1.331, 1.526–28, 1.556, 2.38, 2.73;
 and immortality, 1.302;
 individual and, 1.302–04;
 and the infinite, 1.114–15;
 and irony, 1.521;
 language of, 1.301, 1.304–08, 1.332, 1.342;
 and leap, 1.342;
 and mediation, 1.198–99;
 and movement, 1.342;
 and possibility, 1.314–18;
 and the religious, 1.307;

and thinking, 1.301–18, 1.399, 2.72–73
absurdity, the absurd, 1.262;
and approximation, 2.52;
and Christianity, 1.429, 1.557–58;
and contradiction, 1.211–12;
and earnestness, 1.210;
and faith, 1.210–12, 1.611;
and the historical, 1.385;
and paradox, 2.98–100, 2.163–64;
and reason, 2.98–99. *See also* comedy; humor; irony; jest
accidental, the: and the ethical, 1.135;
and suffering, 1.445–51;
and world history, 1.134–35
acosmism, 1.341–42
action: and actuality, 1.338–43;
in existence, 1.431–33;
in the external, 1.432;
individual and, 1.339–43, 1.432–33;
and pathos, 1.390;
as possibility, 1.340–43;
religious, 1.340;
religious discourse and, 1.442, 1.556;
and thought, 1.338–43
actor, actress: and existence, 1.444;
poet and, 1.444. *See also* analogy
actuality, the actual: and abstraction, 1.301–02, 1.314–18;
and action, 1.338–43;
and admiration, 1.358–60;
and being, 2.73;
and Christianity, 1.326–27;
clergy and, 1.442;
and deception, 1.323;
and the esthetic, 1.322;
and the ethical, 1.319–25, 1.341–43, 1.575;
and existence, 1.301–02, 1.304, 1.314–17, 1.358–60, 1.571;
and faith, 1.326–27, 1.581;
and god, 1.326–27;

Hegel and, 1.332–33;
I and, 1.318;
 and idea, 1.387;
 and ideality, 1.324–25, 1.387–88;
 and imaginary construction, 1.501;
 individual and, 1.302–04, 1.314–18, 1.339–42;
 and intellectuality, 1.322–27;
 and knowledge, 1.316;
 language of, 1.315;
 monastic life and, 1.319–20;
 of the other, 1.321–27, 1.359, 1.580;
 and pathos, 1.443;
 poet and, 1.388–89, 2.114;
 and poetry, 1.318–19;
 and possibility, 1.314–43, 1.358–60, 1.580–81, 2.41, 2.71, 2.73–74;
 pseudonymous authors and, [1.627–30], 2.110, 2.113–14;
 vs. reality, 2.205;
 religious discourse and, 1.481;
 and self-reflection, 2.75;
 and suffering, 1.443–56;
 and thinking, 1.301–60, 2.74–75
 address, *see* discourse
 Adler, Adolph Peter, 2.273;
 Populaire Foredrag over Hegels objective Logik, 2.213
 admiration: and actuality, 1.358–60;
 author and, 1.6–8;
 vs. imitation, 2.140–41;
 literary, 1.6–8;
 and the universal, 1.358–59
 admission, 1.51
Adrastea und das achtzehnte Jahrhundert, *see* Herder, Johann Gottfried
Adresseavisen, 1.78, 1.248, 1.446, 1.477, 2.128–29
ad se ipsum, 1.147
 adultery: and marriage, 1.265
 Aesop: “The Dog Carrying a Piece of Meat across the River,” 2.221;

Phaedri Augusti Liberti fabularum Aesopiarum Libri V, 2.221, 2.250
 Africa, 1.287, 1.426, 2.221;
 Napoleon in, 1.355;
 Niger River, 1.237
 “Afslottende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift,” 2.119
Aftenbladet, 2.119–25;
 “Afslottende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift,” 2.119
 age(s): in life, 1.348. *See also* present age
 Aladdin, 1.186, 1.435
 Alcibiades, 1.84
 Alexander the Great, 2.43;
 Lessing on, 1.96
 Alexander VI (pope), 2.194
 Alexandria: library in, 1.256
 Alexius, 1.366
 Allah: Muslim and, 2.17
Allgemeines Repertorium für Theologie und kirchliche Statistik, *see*
 Neues Repertorium für die theologische und kirchliche Statistik
 amusement park, 1.472, 1.475–77, 1.492–93;
 Johannes Climacus and, 1.499;
 religious person and, 1.494–97
 Anabaptism, Anabaptist(s), 1.365
 analogy: actress, 1.289–90;
 arithmetic, 1.143;
 disloyal official, 1.395–96;
 divorce, 2.78;
 drunken tailor, 2.43;
 emperor clad in poverty, 2.137;
 examination, 1.164;
 flute-playing, 1.51;
 girl in love, 1.35, 1.74, 1.88–89, 1.202, 1.231, 1.414–15, 1.543–
 44, 2.33, 2.147;
 Jew and lieutenant, 1.510;
 king, 1.137, 1.140, 1.260, 1.298, 1.364, 1.376, 1.383, 1.395–96,
 1.410, 1.545–55, 1.596–97;
 laborer and princess, 1.493–94;
 lacemaker, 1.303;

letter from heaven, 1.333;
 love, 1.425;
 lover, 1.455, 2.136;
 lunatic and truth, 1.194–95;
 man concerned for his honor, 1.577;
 marketplace loafer, 2.119;
 married couple, 1.54;
 medicine, 1.187–88;
 mirror, 1.153;
 Molboer and tree, 1.378;
 nettle, 1.47;
 North America, 1.8;
 pearl, 1.425–26;
 Pegasus and old nag, 1.311–12;
 physician, 1.302, 1.450, 1.536, 1.539, 2.113;
 poor lodger, 1.63–64;
 reaper's scythe, 1.282;
 rich match, 1.457;
 royal theater, 1.157–58;
 sawing wood, 1.57;
 sick child, 1.414–15;
 toy cane, 1.296;
 train, 1.165;
 trees, 1.163, 1.378;
 Wandering Jew, 2.55–56, 2.147;
 wig, 1.69, 1.615–16;
 woman and god, 1.490–91;
 woman in love, 1.576–77
 Andersen, Hans Christian: "Magic Galoshes," 2.192;
Tre Digtninger, 2.192
Anfægtelse, 2.185. *See also* spiritual trial; temptation
 animal: and species, 1.345
 Anselm, 2.249
an sich, 1.328, 2.75
 anxiety, 1.269
 apologetics: and faith, 1.15
 apostle: and becoming a Christian, 1.605;

- and eternal happiness, 1.387;
- and externality, 1.506;
- and God, 1.605;
- and joy, 1.452–53;
- and other people, 1.605;
- and suffering, 1.452–54

Apostles' Creed, 1.37;

- and Baptism, 1.610;
- and Bible, 1.40–43;
- and the historical, 1.43;
- as Living Word, 1.40–43

appropriation: and Baptism, 1.366;

- and Christianity, 1.366–67, 1.608–11;
- and erotic love, 1.609;
- and faith, 1.609;
- and inwardness, 1.242;
- and knowledge, 1.79;
- Luther and, 1.366;
- pathos of, 1.609;
- and truth, 1.21–22, 1.77–80, 1.192

approximation: and the absurd, 2.52;

- and certainty, 1.38;
- vs. decision, 1.37, 1.40;
- and eternal happiness, 1.23–24, 1.30, 1.40, 1.43–44, 1.574–78;
- vs. faith, 1.11, 1.211;
- Fragments* on, 1.212;
- and historical knowledge, 1.23–25, 1.30–31, 1.81;
- and Living Word, 1.41;
- Socrates and, 2.52;
- and truth, 1.200–01;
- and world history, 1.149–54

Archimedean point, 1.65, 1.102, 1.419

Aristophanes: Lessing and, 2.37;

- The Clouds*, 2.37;
- Werke*, 2.274

Aristotle: and the comic, 1.513;

- and compound words, 2.20;

on faith, 1.207;
 and irony, 1.521;
 on χίνησις, 1.342;
 μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, 1.98;
 on spoken vs. written word, 2.22;
 and thinking, 2.x;
 Trendelenburg and, 1.110;
 and unmoved mover, 1.312;
Aristoteles graece, 2.193;
Complete Works, 2.182;
Metaphysics, 2.238, 2.243–44, 2.244;
Nicomachean Ethics, 1.56;
On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, 2.241–42, 2.276–77;
On the Soul, 1.313, 2.229;
Parts of Animals, 2.265;
Physics, 2.251;
Poetics, 1.318, 1.514, 2.246;
Politics, 1.341, 2.266;
Posterior Analytics, 2.205;
Rhetoric, 1.6, 1.521, 1.523, 2.7–8, 2.20, 2.98, 2.229
 arithmetic, *see* analogy
 Arndt, Johann, *True Christianity: A Treatise on Sincere Repentance, True Faith, The Holy Walk of the True Christian, Etc....* 2.261
 art: and the eternal, 1.313
 assistant professor(s), 1.84, 1.202, 1.210, 1.220–21, 1.270;
 becoming, 1.612–13;
 and cane, 2.45;
 and Christianity, 1.231–32;
 and the comic, 1.281;
 in Denmark, 2.162;
 and didactics, 1.280;
 and faith, 1.609;
 in Germany, 2.162;
 and humanity in general, 1.344, 2.34;
 imaginary construction and, 1.613;
 and immortality, 1.172;
 and inwardness, 1.299;

- and irony, 1.277;
- and suffering, 2.71;
- and system, 1.195;
- and the world-historical, 1.150. *See also Privatdocent*
- astronomy, 1.161, 2.81–82;
 - Heiberg and, 2.41, 2.44;
 - at Round Tower, 2.42;
 - Socrates and, 2.40–41;
 - Tivoli and, 2.41
- ataraxia, 1.318;
 - in Greece, 1.399
- Atonement, 1.381, 2.141
- Aufhebung*, 1.222–23
- aut/aut*, *see Either/Or*
- author: of authors, [1.625–30], 2.xi, 2.110, 2.113–14, 2.125, 2.181;
 - and direct communication, 2.148;
 - Johannes Climacus as, 1.185–88, 1.250, 1.618, 2.56, 2.60, 2.121, 2.135, 2.155–56;
 - Johannes de Silentio as, 2.60;
 - Kierkegaard as, 2.xi–xiii, 2.110–16, 2.119, 2.137–55, 2.165–68, 2.181;
 - and life-view, [1.627];
 - and literary admiration, 1.6–8;
 - and reader, 1.9, 1.263–64, 1.296–99, 1.620–23, 2.28;
 - and reviewers, 1.6–10
- authority: and the dialectical, 1.24;
 - and faith, 1.24
- Averröes, 2.241

- Baader, Franz v., *Revision der Philosopheme der Hegel'schen Schule bezüglich auf das Christentum*, 2.216
- Baden, Torkild: and Madvig, 2.125
- Baggesen, Jens Immanuel: *Danske Værker*, 2.182;
 - “Kallundborgs Krønike eller Censurens Oprindelse,” 1.305;
 - “Thomas Moore, eller Venskab's Seier over Kiærlighed,” 1.6
- Balle, Nicolai Edinger, *Lærebog i den Evangelisk-christelige Religion*,

in-drettet til Brug i de danske Skoler, 2.251

- Baptism, 1.43–45;
of adults, 1.366;
and Apostles' Creed, 1.610;
and appropriation, 1.366;
and becoming a Christian, 1.381–84, 2.100;
and Christianity, 1.363–68, 1.418, 2.78;
and child, 1.595, 1.601;
and confirmation, 2.77;
and eternal happiness, 1.43–45, 1.381;
and eternity, 1.367–68;
and faith, 1.45;
and Hegelian philosophy, 2.77–78;
of infants, 1.363–68, 1.372–74, 1.381, 1.418–19, 1.593, 2.77–78, 2.99–100;
Martensen on, 2.29–30;
and orthodoxy, 1.610;
and parents, 1.367;
and possibility, 1.366;
and spirit, 1.610
- Baptist(s), 1.477
- Bayer, Karl, “*Der Begriff der sittlichen Gemeinschaft*,” 2.90
- Beck, Andreas Frederik: on *Fragments*, 1.274–77, 2.65–66;
and Mynster, 2.125;
Begrebet Mythus eller den religiøse Form, 2.230
- Becker, Karl Friedrich, *Karl Friedrich Beckers Verdenshistorie, omarbejdet af Johan Gottfried Woltmann*, 2.219, 2.236
- becoming: assistant professors, 1.612–13;
and beginning, 1.189–90;
and being, 1.189, 1.420–21;
Christian, 1.371–74, 1.377, 1.379, 1.381–84, 1.557, 1.585, 1.587–88, 1.591, 1.601–02, 1.605–12, 2.100–01;
and the comic, 1.89–92;
and the eternal, 1.89, 1.306–08;
and ethics, 1.421;
and existence, 1.73, 1.80–81, 1.86, 1.91–93, 1.196, 1.198–99, 1.583;

Hegel and, 1.80, 1.307;
a human being, 1.602;
individual and, 1.73, 1.80, 1.91, 1.420–21, 1.602;
objective, 1.560;
and pathos, 1.89–92;
vs. result, 1.73, 1.78;
and striving, 2.35;
and subjectivity, 1.73, 2.54–55;
and thinking, 1.91;
and truth, 1.189–90;
vs. the world-historical, 1.307

beginning, 2.38;
absolute, 1.112–16;
with abstraction, 1.114;
and becoming, 1.189–90;
and decision, 1.488;
dialectics of, 1.111–17;
and existence, 1.488–89;
and faith, 1.189;
and God-relationship, 1.488;
individual and, 1.138–39;
and leap, 1.115;
and mediation, 1.420;
with nothing, 1.114–15, 1.188;
and reflection, 1.150;
and resolution, 1.138–39, 1.189;
of system, 1.111–17;
and task, 1.526–27;
Word in, 2.24

Behrend, Israel Joachim: and umbrella, 1.108

being: and actuality, 2.73;
and becoming, 1.189, 1.420–21;
individual and, 1.420–21;
vs. non-being, 1.80;
pure, 1.304–08, 1.570–71, 1.603;
and speculative thought, 1.570–71, 1.603;
vs. thinking, 1.189–91, 1.196–98, 1.302–08, 1.328–35, 2.73. *See*

also existence; life

*Beretning om de vidtbekjendte Molboers vise Gierninger og tapre
Bedrivter*, 2.256

Berlingske Tidende, 2.118, 2.278

Beständig borgerlige Selskab, 2.257

“*Bhagavad Gita*,” see *Mahabharata*

BIBLE, 1.267

on adultery, 1.265

Apocrypha:

Sirach 7:36, 1.449; 43:27, 2.210

and Apostles' Creed, 1.40–43

canonicity of particular books, 1.24–25, 1.27–28

vs. Church, 1.34–46, 1.608

contradiction in, 1.28

Cromwell and, 1.604

and the dialectical, 1.27–29, 1.37–38

and faith, 1.28–31

on God's patience, 1.406

Grundtvig on, 1.36–46, 2.27

as historical document, 1.23–34, 1.38

inspiration of, 1.25, 1.28

interpretation of, 1.603–04

and Living Word, 2.21

on marriage, 1.265

New Testament: and Christianity, 2.80;

and Church, 1.38;

as historical, 1.38;

and speculative thought, 1.369;

on suffering, 1.452–53;

two paths in, 1.403

Acts 1:16, 1.137; 4:12, 2.275; 5:41, 1.452–53; 9:1–9, 2.225;
26:28, 2.256

Colossians 3:11, 2.205

I Corinthians 1:23, 2.229, 2.237, 2.270; 2:7–9, 2.208; 2:9,
2.269; 4:10, 2.229, 2.280; 6:16, 2.234; 6:20, 2.231; 7:23,
2.231; 9:21, 2.234; 9:26, 2.257; 11:4–5, 2.268; 12:13,
2.205; 13:1, 2.254; 13:8–13, 2.186; 13:13, 2.258; 15:19,

2.256; 15:20–28, 2.257

II Corinthians 1:19, 1.279–80; 5:17, 2.269; 11:23–27, 2.256, 2.271; 12:2–4, 1.454; 12:7, 1.454

Ephesians 2:12, 2.232; 2:14, 2.223; 3:15, 2.275

Galatians 3:24, 2.186; 3:28, 2.205, 2.261; 4:4, 2.230, 2.269

John, 2.24; 1:14, 2.265; 1:31, 1.599, 2.52; 1:33, 1.599, 2.52; 1:36, 1.599; 1:42, 1.599; 2:14–16, 2.193, 2.221; 3:4–10, 2.269; 4:23, 2.197; 5:4, 2.202; 5:44, 1.31; 10:11, 2.270; 10:15, 2.270; 11:4, 2.262; 14:6, 2.217, 2.230; 18:38, 2.226, 2.231

I John 1, 2.230; 1:29, 2.232

Luke 2:7, 2.270; 2:19, 2.233; 5:10, 2.260; 6:15, 2.186; 6:40, 2.273; 9:28–36, 2.273; 9:62, 2.231; 10:30–32, 1.339–40; 12:7, 2.218; 14:16–20, 2.231; 14:26, 2.184, 2.269; 15:7, 2.252; 16:26, 2.258, 2.259; 17:10, 2.217; 18:8, 1.32; 18:11, 2.200, 2.231; 18:13, 2.270; 18:16–17, 2.237; 22:61, 2.269; 23:1–12, 2.209; 23:21, 2.225; 23:34, 2.191

Mark 1:16–20, 2.186; 5:17, 2.269; 9:2–8, 2.273; 10:13, 1.593; 10:14–15, 2.237; 10:17–22, 2.269; 11:15, 2.193; 11:23, 2.186; 15:13, 2.225

Matthew 4:18–22, 2.186; 4:19, 2.260; 5:32, 2.234; 6:17, 2.202; 7:1, 2.246; 7:13–14, 2.257; 7:14, 2.269; 10:24, 2.273; 10:30, 2.218, 2.246; 11:28, 1.437; 11:30, 2.259; 13:45–46, 2.229, 2.259; 13:47, 2.260; 17:1–8, 2.273; 17:4, 2.261; 18:2, 1.593; 18:3, 2.237; 18:26–27, 2.257; 19, 1.592–95; 19:4, 1.595; 19:9, 2.234; 19:12, 1.592; 19:14, 1.592–95, 1.603, 2.237; 19:24–25, 1.592; 19:29, 1.592; 20:3–4, 2.197; 21:12, 2.193; 21:13, 2.262; 21:21, 2.186; 22:21, 2.183; 22:32, 2.221; 23:10, 2.27; 23:31–33, 2.231; 25:1–2, 1.16–17; 25:1–13, 1.396; 25:30, 2.217; 27:19, 2.231; 27:24, 2.231; 27:51–52, 2.236

I Peter 1:8, 2.230; 3:4, 2.233; 3:15, 2.276

Philippians 2:7, 2.270; 2:10, 2.233; 4:6, 2.223; 4:8, 2.252

Revelation 1:8, 2.230; 3:15–16, 2.231; 20:2–6, 2.257

Romans 2:5, 2.238; 6:20, 2.234; 7:3, 2.234; 7:24, 2.260; 8:16, 2.270; 8:19, 2.227; 8:26, 2.202; 9:7, 2.191; 9:27, 2.218, 2.221; 10:12, 2.205; 12:15, 2.223

I Timothy 2:4, 2.230; 3:9, 1.466

II Timothy 3:7, 2.255; 3:16, 2.186

Old Testament:

Daniel 5:27, 2.191

Deuteronomy 28:37, 2.249; 34:4, 2.275

Ecclesiastes 1:13–14, 2.268; 4:8, 2.268; 5:1, 2.262; 5:4, 1.488

Esther 3:1–15, 2.273

Exodus 20:5, 2.250; 20:7, 2.186; 33:20, 2.262; 34:6–7, 2.257

Genesis 1:27, 2.191; 3:5, 2.269; 4:7, 2.186; 19:22, 2.222;
19:26, 2.270; 22:1, 1.267, 2.234; 22:17, 2.218, 2.221;
25:23, 2.235; 42:38, 2.232

Isaiah 6:5, 2.262; 53:2–4, 1.599, 2.103; 57:15, 1.445

Jeremiah 46:18, 2.273

Job 8:9, 2.260

Jonah 4:2, 2.257

Judges 9:8–15, 2.222; 13:22, 2.262

Judith 2:4, 2.267; 10:10, 1.336

I Kings 9:7, 2.249

Psalms 51:12, 2.193

scholarship about, 1.25–32

theory, 1.608

Bjørn, Nicolai, *Dumriana eller Indfald, Anecdoter og Characteertræk*
Claus Dumrians Levnet, 2.209

Blicher, Steen Steensen: *Fjorten Dage i Jylland*, 2.249;

Samlede Noveller, 2.249

body: vs. spirit, 1.444–45

bourgeois-philistinism: and irony, 1.547

Brandt, Frithiof, and Else Rammel, *Søren Kierkegaard og Pengene*,
2.225–26

Brøchner, Hans, *Erindringer om Søren Kierkegaard*, 2.273

Brorson, Hans Adolph: “Jeg gaaer i Fare, hvor jeg gaaer,” 2.186;
Psalmer og aandelige Sange, 2.186

Brutus, 2.20, 2.58;

and oath, 1.240

busy trifler, 1.514–15, 1.520, 1.523–24, 2.216

Caesar, Julius, 1.256, 1.324

Campe, Joachim Heinrich, *Robinson the Younger*, 2.261

cane, 2.93;

assistant professor and, 2.45;
toy, *see* analogy
capability, 1.470–72;
 of nothing, 1.461–78, 1.481–83, 1.486, 1.496, 1.506
caricature: and the comic, 1.517
Cataline, 1.531
category, 2.7;
 of absoluteness, 2.22;
 of totality, 1.537–38, 1.541, 2.91
Catherine the Great, 1.278
Cato Uticensis, 1.70–71
Cerberus, 1.372
certainty, certitude: *vs.* approximation, 1.38;
 vs. doubt, 1.335–36;
 of erotic love, 1.455–56;
 of eternal happiness, 1.422–31, 1.455;
 and the ethical, 1.152–54;
 vs. faith, 1.29, 1.211–12, 1.455, 1.490–91, 1.506, 2.100;
 finite, 2.33;
 and future, 1.424;
 of God-relationship, 1.454–56;
 of the historical, 1.211–12, 1.576–77;
 and immortality, 1.201–02;
 and miracle, 2.100;
 and present, 1.424;
 religious person and, 1.507;
 scholarship and, 1.575;
 sensate, 1.81;
 and subjective passion, 1.576–77;
 of suffering, 1.458;
 and venture, 1.424–31. *See also* uncertainty
Ceylon: nature sounds on, 1.333
change: God and, 1.432;
 vs. repetition, 1.286–87
Chaos, 1.92
child, childhood, children: *vs.* adult, 1.413;
 and Baptism, 1.595, 1.601;

- and becoming a Christian, 2.101;
- and Christ, 1.592–95, 1.599;
- and Christianity, 1.292–93, 1.345, 1.363–68, 1.589–603;
- and Christmas, 1.598–99, 2.101;
- and the comic, 1.515;
- disciples and, 1.593–94;
- and fairy tale, 1.397–99;
- and father, 1.589–90, 1.604, 2.93;
- happiness of, 1.551;
- and innocence, 1.591–92, 1.602;
- Jewish, 1.601;
- and kingdom of heaven, 1.592–95;
- and mother, 2.59;
- and old man, 1.237–41, 1.461, 2.57–58;
- and other child, 2.94–95;
- as paradigm, 1.594;
- and paradox, 1.596;
- and parental love, 1.591;
- and permission, 1.473–74, 1.604;
- and piety, 1.591;
- and promise, 1.238–39, 2.58;
- and punishment, 1.550–52;
- and recollection, 1.540, 1.602–03;
- and religiousness, 1.473–74;
- and sin, 1.591–92. *See also* analogy; Baptism
- childishness, childlikeness: and Christianity, 1.595, 1.598, 2.101–02;
- and comparative guilt-consciousness, 1.531;
- and faith, 1.598;
- and humor, 1.550–52;
- and orthodoxy, 1.596–600;
- and piety, 1.412;
- and self-inflicted penance, 1.550
- chiliasm, 1.402
- China, 1.133, 1.154, 1.259, 1.428, 1.464, 1.469, 1.498, 1.545;
- Canton, 1.281;
- Peking, 1.281;

and the world-historical, 1.150, 1.307, 1.351
choice: individual and, 1.134
cholera, 1.306–07
Christ, 2.142;
 birth of, 1.596–97;
 and child, 1.592–95, 1.599;
 clergy and, 1.248, 1.599–600;
 crucified, 1.229;
 and disciples, 1.593–94, 1.599;
 faith and, 1.599–600;
 and honesty, 1.588;
 imitation of, 2.141;
 as mythological figure, 1.600;
 name of, 1.237–38, 1.272, 1.283, 1.535, 1.540, 1.562, 1.572,
 1.613, 2.57;
 and orthodoxy, 1.596–600;
 and paradox, 1.596–98;
 and salvation, 1.237–38;
 suffering of, 1.597–98
Christendom, 2.90;
 vs. Christianity, 1.367–68, 1.384, 1.612–13, 2.79, 2.81, 2.142,
 2.144–46;
 and paganism, 1.368;
 Romans and, 1.608;
 Russians and, 1.608;
 Turks and, 1.608;
 and thinking, 1.308
Christensen, Peter Vilhelm; as Grundtvigian, 2.126;
 and Johannes Climacus, 2.125;
 and Kierkegaard, 2.125–28;
 on *Postscript*, 2.xviii–xix, 2.125–27;
 “*Troen og Dialektiken. Imod S. Kierkegaard*,” 2.125;
 “*Troens Dialektik*,” 2.125
Christianity, Christian(s), 2.31;
 and the absurd, 1.429, 1.557–58;
 and actuality, 1.326–27;
 apostles and, 1.605;

and appropriation, 1.366–67, 1.608–11;
assistant professors and, 1.231–32;
and Baptism, 1.363–68, 1.381–84, 1.418, 2.78, 2.100;
becoming, 1.371–74, 1.377, 1.379, 1.381–84, 1.557, 1.585,
1.587–88, 1.591, 1.601–02, 1.605–12, 2.100–01;
child and, 1.292–93, 1.345, 1.363–68, 1.589–603, 2.101;
childlike, 1.595, 1.598, 2.101–02;
vs. Christendom, 1.367–68, 1.384, 1.612–13, 2.79, 2.81, 2.142,
2.144–46;
clergy and, 1.292, 1.418;
and communication, 1.379–81, 1.383, 1.614;
and contemporaneity, 1.372–74;
and culture, 1.606–07;
and death, 1.588–89;
and decision, 1.272, 1.365–66, 1.372–74, 1.382–84, 1.602,
1.610–11;
and demonstrations, 1.47;
in Denmark, 2.153;
difficulty of, 1.383–84, 1.428–31, 1.557, 1.587, 1.606–07;
as doctrine, 1.379–83, 1.579, 1.607–10;
and doubt, 1.336;
Eiriksson on, 2.163;
and eloquence, 1.47–49;
and the esthetic, 1.539–40, 1.562;
and eternal happiness, 1.369, 1.577–78;
and eternity, 2.49;
and existence, 1.213–34, 1.249, 1.292–94, 1.353–54, 1.370–74,
1.378–81, 1.383, 1.559–61, 1.571–72, 1.576, 2.49;
as existence-communication, 1.559, 1.562–64, 1.570–72, 1.579,
1.606–08;
and faith, 1.21, 1.326, 1.372, 1.609, 2.49;
in *Fragments*, 1.367;
as a given, 1.21, 1.50–52;
and god, 1.326–27;
going beyond, 1.361, 1.370–71, 1.466, 1.581, 1.587–88;
Hegel and, 2.55;
and highest good, 1.381;

and the historical, 1.15, 1.17, 1.23–50, 1.53–54, 1.577–78;
 and hope, 2.70;
 human being and, 1.557–61;
 and humor, 1.271–72, 1.531–32, 1.602, 2.157–58;
 individual and, 1.15–17, 1.21, 1.49, 1.365–69, 1.576–78, 1.587–92, 2.49;
 individuality and, 2.78;
 and infinite passion, 1.216;
 and intellectuality, 1.326–27;
 introduction into country, 1.433;
 and inward deepening, 1.52;
 and inwardness, 1.215, 1.278–79, 1.534–35, 1.571–72, 1.605–06, 1.610–11, 1.615–16;
 and irony, 1.271–72, 1.274–77;
 Jean Paul on, 2.10;
 Johannes Climacus and, 1.466, 1.617, 1.619, 2.56, 2.58, 2.64–65, 2.101–02, 2.146–47, 2.163;
 Kierkegaard and, 2.138, 2.144–46, 2.147, 2.152–53, 2.166–67;
 and knowledge, 1.215, 1.274–75, 1.283, 1.371–75, 1.608, 2.50;
 Lessing and, 1.65–67;
 and life-view, 1.588, 2.101;
 and marriage, 2.158;
 and martyrdom, 1.232–34;
 and mediation, 1.369–70, 1.374–81, 2.80;
 and mystery, 1.213–14;
 vs. myth, 1.580;
 nature of, 1.369–81;
 and *ne quid nimis*, 1.404;
 and newness, 1.539;
 and New Testament, 2.80;
 vs. objectivity, 1.19–21, 1.32, 1.37, 1.42–43, 1.47, 1.51–54, 1.57, 1.279, 1.371, 1.577–78, 1.607–13, 2.9–11;
 and observation, 1.57;
 and offense, 1.292–93, 1.539–40, 1.585;
 and orthodoxy, 1.595–600, 1.613;
 and paganism, 1.279, 1.361–62, 1.375, 1.429–31, 1.579–81;
 and paradox, 1.95, 1.104–05, 1.213–34, 1.540, 1.562, 1.580,

2.37, 2.49–51, 2.54, 2.102;
 and passion, 1.216, 1.611–13;
 as possibility, 1.580;
Postscript and, 2.139, 2.156–59;
 and predestination, 1.582;
 present age and, 1.195, 1.215–16, 1.293–94;
 in pseudonymous writings, 2.160;
 and reflection, 1.607;
 relative, 1.228–29, 1.294;
 and religiousness, 1.531–32;
 and Religiousness A, 1.555, 1.557;
 revivalist and, 1.614–15;
 and scholarship, 2.155–58;
 and sin-consciousness, 2.139;
 single individual and, 1.16–17, 1.51, 1.129–31, 1.383;
 and speculative thought, 1.50–57, 1.215–50, 1.272–73, 1.291,
 1.361–81, 1.561, 2.49–50, 2.52–53, 2.64–65, 2.80;
 and subjectivity, 1.25, 1.129–31, 1.213, 1.224, 1.230, 1.279–80,
 1.282, 1.300, 1.371, 1.577–78, 1.608–11;
 and suffering, 1.582;
 task of, 1.377, 1.379–81, 1.383;
 terror of, 2.144;
 traitors to, 2.146;
 and truth, 1.15, 1.46–49, 1.213, 1.256, 1.371, 1.430, 2.49–51,
 2.64–65;
 and understanding, 1.557–60, 1.567–69, 2.70;
 upbringing in, 1.589–92, 1.601, 2.55
 Christmas, 2.101–02;
 and childhood, 1.598–99, 2.101
 church: deception in, 1.417–18;
 vs. everyday life, 1.179, 1.415, 1.440, 1.442, 1.459, 1.464–82,
 1.492, 1.496, 1.513, 1.535, 1.541, 2.82–86
 Church: vs. Bible, 1.34–46, 1.608;
 and contemporaneity, 1.39;
 and historicity, 1.39;
 invisible, 1.54, 1.364–65;
 Lindberg on, 1.38–41;

Living Word in, 1.37, 1.40–41, 2.21;
and New Testament, 1.38;
and state, 2.144;
theory, 1.608;
visible, 1.364–65

Cicero, 1.25;
On Old Age, 2.231;
On the Nature of Gods, 2.250;
Opera omnia, 2.182;
Orator, 2.223;
Philippics, 2.182

Claudius, Matthias: *ASMUS omnia sua SECUM portans, oder
Sämmtliche Werke des Wandsbecker Bothen*, 2.257;
Werke, 2.257

Clausen, Henrik Nicolai, 2.257;
and Grundtvig, 2.272–73;
“*Belysning af de seneste af Mag. Lindberg fremførte Beskyldninger,
anførte under 29 forskellige Punkter*,” 2.191;
Catholicismens og Protestantismens Kirkeforfatning, Lære og Ritus,
2.272;
*Den theologiske Partieaand, dens Character og Stridsmaade oplyst
ved Exempler*, 2.191

clergy, 2.89;
and absolute paradox, 1.563;
and actuality, 1.442;
on being capable of nothing, 1.467–78;
and Christ, 1.248, 1.599–600;
and Christianity, 1.292, 1.418;
and the comic, 1.515, 1.518;
and conventions, 1.478–80;
and dabbling, 1.446;
on danger, 1.416–17;
and deception, 1.417–18;
and demonstration, 1.422–23;
and eternal happiness, 1.422–23;
on everyday life, 1.487;
and existence, 2.82–86;

and faith, 1.132, 1.418–19, 2.63;
and guilt, 1.530–31;
and individuality, 1.439;
and inwardness, 1.247–48;
and listener, 1.442;
on Matthew 19:4, 1.595;
and miracle, 2.100;
and misfortune, 1.438;
and monastery, 1.416–17;
and new hymn-book, 1.478–80, 2.86–87;
vs. poets, 1.439–47, 2.40;
as police, 1.538;
and prayer, 1.487–88;
and present age, 1.480–82;
and the religious, 1.482, 2.85;
on Saturday, 2.85;
and sermon, 1.467–78, 2.100;
and solemnity, 2.82–86;
and spiritual trial, 1.459;
and spy, 1.478–80;
and subjectivity, 1.132;
on suffering, 1.445–47, 1.460;
on Sunday, 1.531, 1.535;
and task, 1.482, 2.85;
and thanksgiving, 1.177–79;
in tragedy, 1.441;
on two paths, 1.403–04. *See also* pastor(s)
comedy, the comic: abstract thinker and, 1.302–04;
Aristotle and, 1.513;
and assistant professors, 1.281;
and becoming, 1.89–92;
caricature and, 1.517;
child and, 1.515;
clergy and, 1.515, 1.518;
and contradiction, 1.31, 1.461–62, 1.499–500, 1.514–25;
definition of, 1.514–19;
and despair, 1.520;

and double-reflection, 1.87–90;
and earnestness, 1.523;
in erotic love, 1.543–44;
and the eternal, 1.89;
and the ethical, 1.504–05, 2.96;
and existence, 1.89–92, 1.462;
Gorgias and, 1.523–24;
Hegel and, 1.281, 2.71;
Hegelian philosophy and, 1.34, 1.512–13;
and hidden inwardness, 1.511, 1.522, 1.554–55;
as the highest, 1.462;
and humor, 1.282, 1.521;
and the immediate, 1.281–82, 1.520–21;
individual and, 1.86–92, 1.508;
and insanity, 1.196;
and irony, 1.520–21;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.519;
and laughter, 1.518–19, 2.96;
Lessing and, 1.91;
life and, 1.513–14;
as misrelation to the objective, 1.43, 1.54–55, 1.124–25;
and morality, 1.518;
and movement, 2.97;
and pain, 1.514–16;
and passion, 1.35;
and pathos, 1.87–92;
philosopher and, 1.352–53;
and the pitiful, 1.514;
poetry and, 1.457;
in *Postscript*, 2.145;
prayer and, 1.90–91;
present age and, 1.281–82;
pseudonymous authors and, 1.281;
and Quidam, 1.291;
and reflection, 1.281;
and relativity, 1.515, 1.554–55;
and the religious, 1.461–63, 1.483, 1.487, 1.508, 1.513, 1.521–

25;
 and repentance, 1.518–19, 1.524;
 and resolution, 1.462–63;
 and the sophistical, 1.523–24;
 speculative thought and, 1.120;
 and striving, 1.91–92;
 and suffering, 1.483, 1.514–15;
 and totality, 2.97;
 vs. the tragic, 1.290–92, 1.514–18. *See also* absurdity; humor;
 irony; jest
 comfort: despair and, 1.441;
 religious speaker and, 1.441;
 and suffering, 1.489–90
 communication: in *Anxiety*, 1.269–70;
 authorship and, 2.148;
 Christianity and, 1.379–81, 1.383, 1.559, 1.562–69, 1.570–72,
 1.579, 1.606–08, 1.614;
 and contradiction, 1.73–74, 1.77–78, 1.262;
 dialectics of, 1.72–80;
 and difficulty, 1.276;
 direct, 1.73–80, 1.262, 1.269–70, 1.614, 2.61–62, 2.148, 2.168;
 direct vs. indirect, 1.70, 1.80, 1.82–84, 1.242–50, 1.260, 1.325,
 2.xiii;
 and double-reflection, 1.70, 1.73–80, 1.250, 1.263–64, 2.33,
 2.166–67;
 and existence, 1.83–88, 1.357–60, 1.379–81, 1.383, 1.559,
 1.562–64, 1.570–72, 1.579, 1.606–08;
 expression of, 1.76–80;
 and fear and trembling, 1.262;
 in *Fragments*, 1.274–78;
 and god, 1.278;
 God and, 1.243, 2.11;
 and God-relationship, 1.73–80;
 Greek, 1.327–28;
 Hegel and, 1.70;
 imaginary construction and, 1.80, 1.263–64, 2.61–62;
 and immediacy, 1.74;

- indirect, 1.274–77;
- individual and, 1.72–80;
- and inwardness, 1.77–80, 1.259–61, 1.277–78;
- and knowledge, 1.274–77;
- Lessing and, 1.72–80;
- the negative in, 1.76;
- in *Practice*, 2.168;
- pseudonyms and, 2.161, 2.166–67;
- and reader, 1.358–59;
- and receiver, 1.76, 1.260, 1.274–77, 2.65–66;
- and secrecy, 1.78–80;
- Socrates and, 1.70, 1.80, 1.277–78;
- subjective thinker and, 1.357;
- and thinking, 1.73–76, 1.79;
- of truth, 1.77–80, 1.242–50, 1.260–61, 1.277–78
- community: dialectic of, 2.89–90;
 - individual and, 2.89–90
- concretion: vs. abstraction, 1.190, 1.533;
 - and existence, 1.357–58;
 - subjective thinker and, 1.357
- confirmation: and infant Baptism, 2.77
- congregation: and new hymnbook, 1.479–80;
 - and sermon, 1.374
- contemporaneity: and Christianity, 1.372–74;
 - Church and, 1.39;
 - existential, 1.348–49;
 - vs. follower, 2.11;
 - in *Fragments*, 1.38, 1.96–98;
 - and the historical, 2.36;
 - individual and, 1.348;
 - Lessing on, 1.96–98;
 - vs. noncontemporaneity, 1.98;
 - vs. speculative thought, 1.343–49;
 - of subjective elements, 1.343–49, 1.354;
 - as task, 1.348–49
- continuity: and the eternal, 1.312–13;
 - individual and, 1.313

contradiction, 1.570–73;
 and abstraction, 1.305;
 and the absurd, 1.211–12;
 in Bible, 1.28;
 and the comic, 1.31, 1.461–62, 1.499–500, 1.514–25;
 between communication and inwardness, 1.73–74, 1.77–78,
 1.262;
 between deliberation and inspiration, 1.26;
 and despair, 1.26–27;
 dialectical, 1.574–79;
 and double-reflection, 1.74–75;
 between the eternal and the historical, 1.578–79;
 between eternal happiness and the historical, 1.574–78;
 between eternal happiness and objective thought, 1.55–57;
 of eternal happiness in time, 1.570;
 between existence and the eternal, 1.571;
 faith as, 1.26, 1.225;
 Hegel and, 1.421;
 in humor, 1.505;
 vs. identity, 1.421;
 within immanence, 1.579;
 and immediacy, 1.433;
 of motion, 1.516–17;
 principle of, 1.203, 1.304–05, 1.421;
 and repentance, 1.518;
 and thinking, 1.347, 1.351;
 and the tragic, 1.514
 Cooper, Anthony Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury: “*Sensus Communis;
 An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor*,” 1.512;
 Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, I–III, 1.512
 Copenhagen, 1.175, 1.403, 1.530, 2.133
 buildings and institutions:
 Frue Church, 2.140, 2.154, 2.167
 Josty’s Café, 2.225
 Round Tower, 2.42
 Trinitatis Church, 2.274
 environs:

Deer Park, 1.472, 2.261–62
Frederiksberg, 1.161, 2.104;
Frederiksberg Garden, 1.185–88
and Køge, 1.547
streets and quarters: Købmagergade, 2.274
Stormgade, 1.132
Vartov, 2.262
Corinth: Paul in, 1.279
Corsair, 2.xi, 2.115, 2.145, 2.153;
and Kierkegaard, 2.xvi–xvii, 2.117–19;
and *Postscript*, 2.116
Corsaren, see *Corsair*
court: and guilt, 1.530;
and sin, 1.530
crescendo: vs. decrescendo, 2.136
critic(s), see reviewer(s)
Crito: Socrates and, 2.59
Croesus: and Solon, 2.188
Croker, Thomas Crofton, *Fairy Legends and Traditions of the South of Ireland*, 2.267
Cromwell, Oliver: and Bible, 1.604
crowd: vs. single individual, 1.546
culture: Christianity and, 1.606–07;
Greek, 2.81
Cyprianus's Book, 2.86

dabbling: clergy and, 1.446;
religion and, 1.439
Daedalus, 2.266
Dalby mill, 2.20
danger: clergy on, 1.416–17;
and existence, 1.535;
in life, 1.416–17;
in mediation, 1.416–17
Dansk Kirketidende, 2.125–28
Davidsen, Jakob, *Fra det gamle Kongens Kjøbenhavn*, 2.209
death, the dead, dying, 2.43, 2.57–58;

and Christianity, 1.588–89;
dialectic of, 1.167–70;
and idea, 1.168–70;
individual and, 1.82, 1.165–70;
of Juhet, 1.446–47;
vs. the living, 1.156–58;
in Pythagorean sense, 1.309;
sickness unto, 1.488;
sleep of, 1.485;
Socrates and, 1.89, 1.309;
and subjectivity, 1.169;
uncertainty of, 1.166–70;
vs. world history, 1.166–70
deception, 2.54, 2.60–61;
and actuality, 1.323;
and clergy, 1.417–18;
vs. faith, 1.238
decision: absolute, 1.488;
and absolute τέλος, 2.88;
vs. approximation, 1.37, 1.40;
and becoming a Christian, 1.382–84;
and beginning, 1.488;
and Christianity, 1.272, 1.365–66, 1.372–74, 1.602, 1.610–11;
and the eternal, 1.270–73, 1.341;
and eternal happiness, 1.40, 1.116, 1.270–71, 2.46, 2.80–81;
and the ethical, 1.497;
and existence, 1.488–89;
external vs. eternal, 1.341;
and faith, 1.21, 1.31;
before God, 1.497;
and God-relationship, 1.271;
individual and, 1.23, 1.31, 1.341, 1.365–66, 2.46–47;
and inwardness, 1.382;
and leap, 1.99, 1.105, 1.381, 1.384, 2.35–36;
Pilate and, 1.230;
and possibility, 1.365;
relative, 1.221–23;

religious person and, 1.497;
single individual and, 1.129;
and striving, 2.47;
and subjectivity, 1.33, 1.116, 1.129, 1.230, 2.46–47;
in time, 2.80–81
decrecendo: vs. crescendo, 2.136
Defoe, Daniel, *Robinson Crusoe*, 2.261
Delbruck, Johann Friedrich Ferdinand, 1.36, 2.16;
Philip Melanch-thon, der Glaubenslehrer. Eine Streitschrift, 2.190
Delphi, 1.404
democracy: vs. monarchy, 1.620–21
demonstration(s): of Christianity, 1.47;
and clergy, 1.422–23;
of eternal happiness, 1.422–24;
and existence, 1.39–41;
vs. faith, 1.30–32;
of God, 1.334, 1.545–46, 1.552–53;
of immortality, 1.174, 1.201–02;
individuality and, 1.439;
and miracles, 1.96–97;
of resurrection, 1.429–30;
on wishes, 1.439;
vs. worship, 1.546
Denmark, the Danish, 1.172–73, 1.251, 1.518, 2.29, 2.145;
and assistant professors, 2.162;
as Christian state, 2.153;
dogmatics in, 2.24;
and English three percent loan, 1.612;
and Europe, 1.310–11;
and Germany, 1.436, 2.133, 2.162;
government, 1.612;
Køge, 1.547;
literary controversy in, 2.xii;
Sjælland, 2.viii;
and speculative thought, 2.162;
woods, 2.85
depression: *Either/Or* on, 1.253

Descartes, René: *cogito ergo sum*, 1.317, 1.318;

A Discourse on Method, 2.226–27;

Opera philosophica, 2.226

Desdemona, 1.262

despair: and comfort, 1.441;

and the comic, 1.520;

and contradiction, 1.26–27;

in *Either/Or*, 1.253–54, 1.257–58, 1.268;

and existence, 1.535;

and faith, 1.200, 1.372;

guilt, 1.554;

and immanence, 1.262;

misfortune and, 1.439–40;

and offense, 1.372;

and passion, 1.200;

poet and, 1.439–40;

and repetition, 1.263;

in *Sickness unto Death*, 2.266

dialectics, the dialectical, 1.299, 2.83;

and the absolute, 1.490–91;

and appropriation, 1.45;

and authority, 1.24;

of becoming, 1.80;

of beginning, 1.111–17;

and Bible, 1.27–29, 1.37–38;

of communication, 1.72–80;

of community, 2.89–90;

and contradiction, 1.574–79;

of death, 1.167–70;

and difficulty, 1.429–31;

vs. eloquence, 1.12–13;

and eternal happiness, 1.34–35, 1.385;

and the ethical, 1.153;

and existence, 1.385–87, 2.79;

and existential pathos, 1.535–36;

and faith, 1.11–14, 1.24;

in first place, 2.98;

and fortune vs. misfortune, 1.444;
Fragments on, 1.561, 1.569;
Greek, 1.333, 2.72;
of guilt, 1.537;
and immanence, 1.535–36, 1.569;
of immortality, 1.171–77;
individual and, 1.433–35, 1.490–91, 1.572;
of the infinite, 1.86;
and inward deepening, 1.556;
and inwardness, 2.94;
Johannes Climacus and, 2.181;
Lessing and, 1.68–69;
and passion, 1.385–87;
and pathos, 1.385–87, 1.555–56, 1.581;
qualitative, 1.388–89, 1.436, 1.563;
religious discourse and, 1.555–56;
and Religiousness A, 1.581;
and Religiousness B, 1.556, 1.559–60;
in second place, 1.556–57, 1.559–60, 2.98;
vs. speculative thought, 1.13–15;
subjective thinker and, 1.350–51, 1.357;
as superstition, 1.44;
and thinking, 1.86;
and understanding, 1.569;
of world history, 1.141–49
didactics: and assistant professors, 1.280;
in Germany, 1.280;
in present age, 1.280–81
Diedrich Menschenschreck, 1.167
difficulty: of becoming a Christian, 1.383–84, 1.557, 1.587;
in Christianity, 1.428–31, 1.606–07;
of communication, 1.276;
and the dialectical, 1.429–31;
and eternal happiness, 2.81;
of existence, 1.301–09, 1.315–16, 1.353–54;
and faith, 1.596;
individual and, 1.430;

- of the religious, 1.481–82;
- of task, 1.481–82;
- of way, 1.428–29
- Diogenes Laertius: *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 1.327, 2.200, 2.241, 2.242, 2.250, 2.253, 2.265, 2.274;
- “Pyrrho,” 2.250;
- “Socrates,” 1.83, 2.200;
- De vitis philosophorum*, 2.200
- Dion: and Dionysius, 1.341
- Dionysius: and Dion, 1.341
- disciple(s): and children, 1.593–94;
- and Christ, 1.593–94, 1.599;
- in Gethsemane, 2.93–94
- discourse(s): and action, 1.442, 1.556;
- and the comic, 1.513;
- and the dialectical, 1.555–56;
- didactic, 2.159–60;
- and enthusiasm, 1.440;
- esthetic, 1.437;
- and existence, 1.444;
- vs. fairy tale, 1.438;
- on Job, 2.64;
- and life-view, 1.435, 2.92;
- making way difficult, 1.428–31, 2.90;
- religious, 1.418–19, 1.427–28, 1.435–47, 1.453, 1.458–60, 1.481–83, 1.487, 1.513, 1.530–31, 1.537–38, 1.555–56, 2.90–93;
- for Religiousness *B*, 1.562–64;
- vs. sermons, 1.256–57, 1.273, 2.64;
- and understanding, 1.562–64;
- upbuilding, 1.256–57, 1.270–73, 1.435–36, 1.481, [1.627], 2.64, 2.149 *See also* speaker
- disjunction, 1.350
- disloyal official, *see* analogy
- divorce, *see* analogy
- Døbler, 1.196
- doctrine: Christianity as, 1.379–83, 1.579, 1.607–10;

- of Eleatics, 1.307, 1.376, 1.380;
- and intellect, 1.326;
- teacher and, 1.326–27;
- and understanding, 1.371
- dogmatics: in Denmark, 2.24;
- and Living Word, 2.24–25
- Don Quixote: and lunacy, 1.195;
- and nisse, 1.140;
- and romanticism, 1.35;
- and world history, 1.140
- double-reflection: and comic, 1.87–90;
- and communication, 1.70, 1.73–80, 1.250, 1.263–64, 2.33, 2.166–67;
- and contradiction, 1.74–75;
- and imaginary construction, 1.263, 2.68;
- and inwardness, 1.73–80;
- Johannes de Silentio and, 2.60–61;
- and pathos, 1.87–90. *See also* reflection
- doubt: vs. certainty, 1.335–36;
- Christianity and, 1.336;
- imaginary construction and, 2.32
- drunken tailor, *see* analogy
- duty: as the absolute, 1.267
- Duveyrer, Aimé Honoré Joseph, and Augustin Eugène Scribe, *Oscar*, 2.76
- dying to: immediacy, 1.460–63, 1.483, 1.499, 1.507, 1.526;
- oneself, 1.472;
- and suffering, 1.472
- earnestness: vs. the absurd, 1.210;
- and the comic, 1.523;
- in *Fragments*, 1.276–77;
- and imaginary construction, 1.264;
- and individuality, 1.137–38;
- vs. irony, 1.276–77;
- and jest, 1.69–71, 1.87–89, 1.102–03, 1.131, 1.210, 1.255, 1.282, 1.290, 1.456, 1.462, 1.471–72;

Lessing and, 1.69–71;
 Münch-hausen and, 2.36;
 and pathos, 1.525;
 and the religious, 1.472, 1.495;
 and religious paradigm, 1.263
 Earth, 1.92
 Easter, 1.184
 Eiriksson, Magnus (pseud. Theophilus Nicolaus), 2.xix;
 and Christianity, 2.163;
 and Johannes Climacus, 2.161–65;
 and Martensen, 2.125, 2.128–35, 2.161;
 on *Postscript*, 2.129–37, 2.161–65;
Dr. H. Martensens trykte moralske Paragrapher, eller det saakaldte
“Grundrids til Moralphilosophiens System af Dr Hans
Martensen”, i dets for-virrede, idealistisk-metaphysiske og
phantastisk-speculative, Religion og Christendom
undergravende, fatali-stiske, pantheistiske og selvforguderske
Væsen, belyst og bedømt af Magnus Eiriksson, Cand. theol,
 2.128–29;
Er Troen et Paradox og “I Kraft af det Absurde”? et Spørgsmaal
foranledigt ved “Frygt og Bæven, af Johannes de silentio”,
besvaret ved Hjælp af en Troes-Ridders fortrolige Meddelelser til
fælles Opbyggelse for Jøder, Christne og Muhamedanere, 2.163;
Speculativ Rettroenhed, fremstillet efter Dr. Martensens “christelige
Dogmatik”, og Geistlig Retfærdighed, belyst ved en Biskops
Deeltagelse i en Generalfiskal-Sag, 2.161
 either/or: and abstraction, 1.305;
 and existence, 1.305;
 Hegelian philosophy and, 1.304–07
 Eleatics: doctrine of, 1.307, 1.376, 1.380;
 and Heraclitus, 1.376;
 and speculative thought, 1.376, 1.380
 eloquence: and Christianity, 1.47–49;
 and dialectic, 1.12–13;
 Jacobi’s, 1.101–03
 Elysium, 1.292–93
 Empedocles, 1.143
 emperor, see analogy

engagement: broken, 1.265–66, 2.62;
Constantin Constantius on, 1.265;
and erotic love, 2.62;
Frater Taciturnus on, 1.265–66

England, English, 1.615;
and Denmark, 1.612;
three percent loan, 1.612;
tunnel, 1.25

enthusiasm, 1.299;
and the ethical, 1.568–69;
individuality and, 1.568–69;
poet and, 1.440;
religious discourse and, 1.440;
and understanding, 1.568–69

equality: before God, 1.228;
in love, 1.492

Erasmus of Rotterdam: *Apophthegmata*, 2.276;
Opera omnia, 2.276

Eros, 1.92

erotic love: and appropriation, 1.609;
certainty of, 1.455–56;
and the comic, 1.543–44;
and engagement, 2.62;
and God-relationship, 1.53;
and inwardness, 1.73, 1.259–60;
object of, 1.613;
Plato on, 1.92, 1.121;
and relativity, 1.509;
and subjectivity, 1.132;
system and, 1.344;
wedded matron and, 2.47 *See also* love

Esau: and Jacob, 1.269

esse, *see* actuality

essence: vs. existence, 1.39

esthetic(s), the esthetic: and actuality, 1.322;
and Christianity, 1.539–40, 1.562;
discourse for, 1.437;

in *Either/Or*, 1.252–56;
 and eternal happiness, 1.391–94;
 and the ethical, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.294–300, 1.322–25,
 1.350–51, 1.388–93, 1.428–29, 1.441–42, 1.501–02, 1.572,
 2.141;
 and existence, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.295–98, 1.387–90, 1.431–
 33;
 French poetry and, 1.457;
 God-relationship and, 1.560–61;
 and guilt, 1.537;
 and hiddenness, 1.254, 1.268;
 and illusion, 1.457;
 individual and, 1.433;
 individuality and, 1.252–56, 1.454;
 and intellectual ideality, 1.322–25;
 and irony, 1.501–02;
 Judge William and, 1.295–96;
 Kierkegaard and, 2.154;
 and passion, 1.350–51;
 and path, 1.428;
 and pathos, 1.387–91, 1.431–33;
 poet and, 1.388–90;
 vs. the religious, 1.434–38, 1.441–42, 1.445–47, 1.501–02,
 1.524–25, 1.537, 2.154;
 religious speaker and, 1.445–47;
 subjective thinker and, 1.350–51, 1.357;
 and suffering, 1.429, 1.445–47, 1.451
 eternal happiness: as absolute good, 1.387–92;
 as absolute τέλος, 1.385, 1.452–56, 1.559;
 apostle and, 1.387;
 and approximation, 1.23–24, 1.30, 1.40, 1.43–44, 1.574–78;
 and Baptism, 1.43–45, 1.381;
 certainty of, 1.422–31, 1.455;
 and Christianity, 1.369, 1.577–78;
 clergy and, 1.422–23;
 and contradiction, 1.23, 1.26;
 and decision, 1.40, 1.116, 1.270–71, 2.46, 2.80–81;

demonstration of, 1.422–24;
and the dialectical, 1.34–35, 1.385;
and difficulty, 2.81;
and the esthetic, 1.391–94;
vs. eternal un-happiness, 1.94–95, 2.36;
and existence, 1.362, 1.368, 1.387–93, 1.483, 1.533, 1.535,
1.559;
expectancy of, 1.402;
and faith, 1.455;
and *Fragments*, 1.93, 1.362, 1.369, 1.380–81;
and guilt-consciousness, 1.527–37;
and the historical, 1.10–11, 1.15, 1.23–24, 1.93–98, 1.270,
1.362, 1.369, 1.380–81, 1.385–87, 1.573–79, 1.582, 1.586,
2.36, 2.79–81, 2.83;
human being and, 1.581–82, 2.81–82;
humor, 1.554;
imaginary construction and, 1.542–43;
individual and, 1.15–17, 1.21–27, 1.29–34, 1.43, 1.47, 1.52–56,
1.271, 1.343–44, 1.369, 1.385, 1.387–431, 1.452–56,
1.483, 1.527–37, 1.557, 1.576, 2.87;
individuality and, 1.389;
and infinite, impassioned interestedness, 1.15–17, 1.21–27,
1.29–34, 1.43, 1.52;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.15–16, 1.617;
and knowledge, 1.15, 1.30, 1.93–98;
and mediation, 1.395;
objectivity vs., 1.32–34;
and paradox, 1.368;
and passion, 1.44, 1.47, 1.385, 1.576, 2.30;
and pathos, 1.385–94, 1.533, 1.535;
recollecting, 1.554;
as relative, 1.391–96, 1.426–31;
and religious individuality, 1.389–90;
and Religiousness A, 1.556, 1.559, 1.574, 1.578;
and Religiousness B, 1.556;
and scholarship, 1.25–26, 1.30;
single individual and, 1.130;

and speculative thought, 1.54–57, 1.361–62, 2.80;
 and subjectivity, 1.116, 1.130, 1.163;
 and suffering, 1.443, 1.452, 1.532;
 thinking and, 1.347;
 and time, 1.368–69, 1.570, 2.36. *See also* τέλος, absolute
 eternity, the eternal: art and, 1.313;
 and Baptism, 1.367–68;
 and becoming, 1.89–92, 1.306–08;
 Christianity and, 2.49;
 and the comic, 1.89;
 and continuity, 1.312–13;
 and decision, 1.270–73, 1.341;
 and existence, 1.92, 1.122, 1.207–26, 1.312–13, 1.411, 1.488,
 1.532, 1.570–71, 1.573, 1.578–79, 2.53;
 vs. future, 1.306–07, 1.424;
 Greeks and, 2.54;
 and guilt, 1.533–41, 1.550–55;
 Hegel and, 2.48;
 and the historical, 1.93–98, 1.578–79, 1.584, 2.34;
 and individual, 1.95, 1.301–02, 1.341, 1.369, 1.570, 1.573–74,
 1.583–84, 2.53;
 individuality and, 1.153–54;
 and moment, 1.573;
 and motion, 1.312–13;
 and paradox, 2.48;
 poetry and, 1.313;
 and punishment, 1.95, 1.530;
 and recollection, 1.208–09, 1.270–73, 1.424, 1.533–41, 1.550–
 55;
 and Religiousness A, 1.579, 1.584;
 and Religiousness B, 1.571, 1.579;
 and sin, 1.583;
 speculative thought and, 1.578–79, 2.52–53;
 vs. the temporal, 1.56, 1.192, 1.271–72, 1.301–02, 1.411, 1.491,
 1.532, 1.570, 1.573, 1.578–79, 1.583–85, 2.47–48, 2.64;
 and truth, 1.21, 1.47, 1.93–98, 1.192, 1.205, 1.213, 1.271–72,
 2.48–51, 2.54

ethics, the ethical: Abraham and, 1.268;
as absolute, 1.142;
and abstraction, 1.307, 1.426;
and the accidental, 1.135;
and actuality, 1.319–25, 1.341–43, 1.575;
and becoming, 1.421;
and certainty, 1.152–54;
and the comic, 1.504–05, 2.96;
and decision, 1.497;
and dialectic, 1.153;
as a doing, 1.160–61;
in *Either/Or*, 1.252–56, 1.503;
and enthusiasm, 1.568–69;
and the esthetic, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.294–300, 1.322–25,
1.350–51, 1.388–93, 1.428–29, 1.441–42, 1.501–02, 1.572,
2.141;
and eudaemonism, 1.423, 1.426, 1.602;
and existence, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.295, 1.309, 1.315;
and faith, 1.323–24;
and God, 1.137–41, 1.156–58, 1.244;
and God-relationship, 1.140, 2.93;
Hegelian philosophy and, 1.119, 1.296–97, 1.306, 1.310–11,
1.503;
and human being, 1.137;
and humor, 1.502;
and ideality, 1.318, 1.322–27;
and immortality, 1.175–77;
individual and, 1.133–41, 1.141–49, 1.155–65, 1.266–68, 1.315,
1.320–25, 1.341–44, 1.346, 1.356, 1.546–47;
individuality and, 1.37–38, 1.147–48, 1.152–53, 1.155–57,
1.252–56, 1.258–59, 1.306, 1.309, 1.568–69;
and infinity, 1.138, 1.143, 1.266–68, 1.502;
and the inner vs. the outer, 1.296–97;
and the intellectual, 1.322–25, 1.338;
and intention, 1.155–56;
and inwardness, 1.141–43, 1.546–47, 2.94;
and irony, 1.153, 1.501–02, 1.521;

and jest, 1.135–39;
and judgment, 1.322;
and knowledge, 1.52, 1.160–62, 1.198, 1.317;
and life-view, 1.474;
and Living Word, 2.23;
marriage and, 2.62;
and mediation, 1.396, 1.399–401;
and observation, 1.141–44, 1.319–20, 1.359;
and ordeal, 1.263, 1.266;
and the other, 1.321–27;
and passion, 1.350–51;
and path, 1.428;
and pathos, 1.153, 1.390;
poet and, 1.388–90;
and possibility, 1.320–25, 1.359–60;
and present age, 1.144–46;
and pride, 1.148;
and prototype, 1.359;
and the psychological, 2.23;
and pure thinking, 1.309;
and reflection, 1.421, 2.72;
and the religious, 1.294, 1.307, 1.359, 1.388–89, 1.396, 1.426,
1.428, 1.441–42, 1.476, 1.501–02;
requirement of, 1.309, 1.349, 1.421, 1.502;
and resignation, 1.396;
and result, 1.135–36, 1.297;
and scholarship, 2.42;
and sin, 1.267;
single individual and, 1.144, 1.149, 1.151–54, 1.319–20, 2.42;
and sobriety, 1.143;
Socrates and, 1.161–62, 1.247, 1.317, 1.503;
and speculative thought, 1.151, 1.474;
and spiritual trial, 1.458–59, 2.185;
in *Stages*, 1.503;
and striving, 1.138–40;
and subjectivity, 1.133–41, 1.301, 1.316, 1.341, 1.350–51,
1.357–60;

system and, 1.119, 1.121, 1.145, 1.307, 1.327, 1.346;
 as task, 1.144, 1.145, 1.151–54, 2.42;
 teleological suspension of, 1.266–70, 1.592;
 and temptation, 1.262, 1.267;
 and thinking, 1.341–44, 1.350–51, 1.357–60, 1.497;
 and understanding, 1.568–69;
 and venture, 1.149;
 and will, 1.135–36;
 vs. world-history, 1.134–41, 1.141–49, 1.151–61
 eudaemonism: and abstraction, 1.426;
 and the ethical, 1.423, 1.426, 1.602;
 and the religious, 1.426
 Europe, 2.144;
 Denmark and, 1.310–11
 evil: vs. good, 1.134, 1.142, 1.156, 1.339, 1.420–21;
 individual and, 1.420–21;
 misfortune as, 1.446;
 Socrates and, 1.161–64;
 and thinking, 1.339–40
Examen Artium, 2.227
 examination, *see* analogy
 existence: and absolute τέλος, 1.387–432;
 and abstraction, 1.301–18, 1.331, 1.526–28, 1.556, 2.38, 2.73;
 and action, 1.431–33;
 actor and, 1.444;
 and actuality, 1.301–02, 1.304, 1.314–17, 1.358–60, 1.571;
 annulment of, 1.315;
 and anxiety, 1.269;
 and becoming, 1.73, 1.80–81, 1.86, 1.91–93, 1.196, 1.198–99,
 1.583;
 and beginning, 1.488–89;
 and being capable of nothing, 1.469–78;
 and Christianity, 1.213–34, 1.249, 1.292–94, 1.353–54, 1.370–
 74, 1.378–81, 1.383, 1.559–61, 1.562–64, 1.570–72, 1.576,
 1.579, 1.606–08, 2.49;
 clergy and, 2.82–86;
 and the comic, 1.89–92, 1.462;

and communication, 1.83–88, 1.357–60, 1.379–81, 1.383, 1.559,
1.562–64, 1.570–72, 1.579, 1.606–08;
and concretion, 1.357–58;
and contemporaneity, 1.348–49;
danger in, 1.535;
and decision, 1.488–89;
and demonstrations, 1.39–41;
and depression, 1.253;
and despair, 1.535;
and the dialectical, 1.385–87, 1.535–36, 2.79;
difficulty of, 1.301–09, 1.315–16, 1.353–54;
discourse and, 1.444;
duplexity of, 1.75;
and either/or, 1.305;
Either/Or on, 1.253–56;
vs. essence, 1.39;
and the esthetic, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.295–98, 1.387–90,
1.431–33;
and the eternal, 1.92, 1.122, 1.207–26, 1.312–13, 1.411, 1.488,
1.532, 1.570–71, 1.573, 1.578–79, 2.53;
and eternal happiness, 1.362, 1.368, 1.387–93, 1.483, 1.533,
1.535, 1.559;
and the ethical, 1.251–58, 1.287–89, 1.295, 1.309, 1.315;
and faith, 2.156;
and the finite, 1.92, 1.420;
and god, 1.578, 1.583, 2.54;
God and, 1.210–11, 1.334, 1.472–78, 1.545–46, 1.552–53, 2.54;
and God-relationship, 1.262, 1.474;
and the good, 1.330;
Greek philosophy and, 1.309, 1.318, 1.331, 1.352–54, 2.73;
and guilt, 1.526–55;
Hegelian philosophy and, 1.306, 1.310, 1.327;
and “here and hereafter,” 1.570;
and history, 1.81;
qua human being, 1.85, 1.302–18;
and humor, 1.449–51, 1.521;
idea-, 1.330–31;

and idealism, 1.352–53;
 illusiveness of, 1.83, 1.123;
 imaginary construction and, 2.65;
 and immanence, 1.532;
 and the immediate, 1.112;
 and immortality, 1.175–77, 1.302;
 individual and, 1.73, 1.80–93, 1.119–25, 1.193, 1.254–64,
 1.274, 1.302, 1.314–18, 1.326, 1.329–33, 1.343–49, 1.355–
 60, 1.385, 1.387–435, 1.443–56, 1.488–513, 1.523, 1.526–
 55, 1.559, 1.570–78, 1.581–86, 2.48–51, 2.53, 2.61, 2.72,
 2.93;
 individuality and, 1.252, 1.258–59, 1.261–62, 1.264, 1.269,
 1.287, 1.295, 1.309, 2.46, 2.60–63;
 and the infinite, 1.82–93, 1.420;
 and inwardness, 1.255, 1.385–87, 1.433, 1.571–72, 2.79;
 and irony, 1.521;
 as *joining together*, 1.530–31, 1.535–36;
 and knowledge, 1.81, 1.197–200, 1.297, 1.348, 2.x, 2.65;
 and leap, 1.124, 1.342;
 learner of, 1.622–23, 2.ix–x;
 and logic, 2.55;
 and mediation, 1.399–422;
 and motion, 1.308–09, 1.312–13, 1.342, 1.413;
 and necessity, 1.98;
 the negative in, 1.81–90;
 and objectivity, 1.123–25, 1.194;
 and paradox, 1.230, 1.270–71, 1.531–32, 2.53;
 and passion, 1.197, 1.311–13, 1.350–51, 1.385–87;
 and past, 1.118;
 and pathos, 1.89–93, 1.385–94, 1.431–33, 1.443, 1.526–27,
 1.533, 1.535–38, 1.559, 1.583–85;
 poet and, 1.443–47;
 and possibility, 1.358–59;
 present age and, 1.263, 1.355–56, 2.77, 2.82;
 and reflection, 1.421, 2.72;
 and relative τέλος, 1.393–94;
 and the religious, 1.267–72, 1.287–89, 1.482–501, 1.513;

religious speaker on, 1.466, 1.482–83;
and Religiousness A, 1.570–74, 1.579, 1.581–82;
and Religiousness B, 1.570–73, 1.579;
and scholarship, 1.344–49;
and sin, 1.208, 1.267–72, 1.583–86, 2.63;
single individual and, 1.319, 1.490;
Socrates on, 1.92–93, 1.204–10, 2.77;
vs. speculative thought, 1.196–99, 1.209, 1.212–34, 1.456,
1.570–72, 2.54, 2.60–62, 2.72, 2.76;
vs. speech, 1.463;
Spinoza and, 2.51;
and spirit, 1.180;
stages of, 1.520;
and striving, 1.91–93, 1.121–22;
and subject-object, 1.192–93;
and subjectivity, 1.123, 1.350–60, 2.34, 2.48;
and suffering, 1.431–33, 1.443–63, 1.483–501, 1.526–28;
and system, 1.109–25, 1.145;
and task, 1.379–81, 1.383;
teacher of, 1.622–23, 2.107–08;
and the temporal, 1.92, 1.206–21, 1.294–95, 1.368, 1.526;
and thinking, 1.73, 1.80–86, 1.91–93, 1.123–25, 1.253–56,
1.307–18, 1.328–35, 1.343–60, 1.399, 1.527, 2.34, 2.72–
75, 2.82–83, 2.86;
and truth, 1.189–251, 1.255–61. *See also* being;
life

Existents, *see* existence

expectancy: of eternal happiness, 1.402;

five foolish maidens and, 1.16–17

experience: vs. idea, 1.150

Experiment, 2.234

externality, the external: action in, 1.432;

apostle and, 1.506;

and decision, 1.341;

and guilt, 1.541, 1.554;

individual and, 1.406–09, 1.432–33;

and inwardness, 1.382, 1.413–14;

- monastic movement and, 1.406–07, 1.472;
- power and, 1.507;
- religiousness and, 1.522
- Fædrelandet*, [1.625], 2.xii, 2.117, 2.122, 2.279
- fairy tale: child and, 1.397–99;
 - vs. religious discourse, 1.438
- faith, 2.102;
 - Abraham and, 2.163–64;
 - and the absurd, 1.210–12, 1.611;
 - and actuality, 1.326–27, 1.581;
 - and apologetics, 1.15;
 - and appropriation, 1.609;
 - vs. approximation, 1.11, 1.211;
 - in Aristotle, 1.207;
 - assistant professors and, 1.609;
 - and authority, 1.24;
 - and Baptism, 1.45;
 - and beginning, 1.189;
 - and Bible, 1.28–31;
 - and certitude, 1.29, 1.211–12, 1.455, 1.490–91, 1.506, 2.100;
 - childlike, 1.598;
 - in Christ, 1.599–600;
 - and Christianity, 1.21, 1.326, 1.372, 1.609, 2.49;
 - and clergy, 1.132, 1.418–19, 2.63;
 - and contradiction, 1.26, 1.225;
 - vs. deception, 1.238;
 - and decision, 1.21, 1.31;
 - vs. demonstration, 1.30–32;
 - and despair, 1.200, 1.372;
 - and the dialectical, 1.11–14, 1.24;
 - and difficulty, 1.596;
 - and direct recognizability, 1.600;
 - and eternal happiness, 1.455;
 - and the ethical, 1.323–24;
 - and existence, 2.156;
 - in *Fear and Trembling*, 1.500, [1.626];
 - as a given, 1.14–15, 1.17;

and god, 1.326–27;
going beyond, 1.291–94, 2.156–57;
and humor, 1.291–92;
and illusion, 1.580;
and immediacy, 1.262, 1.347, 1.500;
individual and, 1.21–22, 1.31;
and intelligence, 1.377;
and inwardness, 1.209–10, 1.214, 1.218, 1.224–28, 1.233,
1.611;
Johannes Climacus and, 2.163–64;
Johannes de Silentio and, 2.163–64;
knight of, 1.500, [1.626]; and knowledge, 1.29;
martyrdom of, 1.559, 2.15;
and miracle, 2.100;
object of, 1.613–14;
and objective uncertainty, 1.204–05, 1.209–10;
and objectivity, 1.215;
and observation, 1.21–22;
and offense, 1.372, 1.585;
orthodoxy and, 1.595–96, 1.599;
and paradox, 1.224–28, 1.233, 1.580–81, 1.611, 2.54, 2.99;
and passion, 1.11, 1.14, 1.16–17, 1.29–34, 1.52, 1.204, 1.209–
10, 1.233, 1.563, 1.565, 1.576, 1.606, 2.49–51;
Paul and, 2.81;
in *Postscript*, 2.155;
and probability, 1.232–33;
and reason, 2.98–99;
religious discourse and, 1.418–19;
and risk, 1.204, 1.210;
and scholarship, 1.11–12, 1.25–34, 2.155–57;
single individual and, 1.419;
Socrates and, 1.205–10, 1.322, 1.566;
speculative thought and, 1.14–15, 1.55, 1.241–42, 2.48–49;
subjective thinker and, 1.351;
and subjectivity, 1.132–33;
and temptation, 1.11, 1.21;
as truth, 2.49;

and understanding, 1.564–69, 1.579–81
 Falstaff, 1.285, 2.221
 fate: and misfortune, 1.434
 father: and child, 1.589–90, 1.604, 2.93;
 Kierkegaard and, [1.629];
 love, 1.591, 2.101
 Faust, 1.184
 fear and trembling: and direct communication, 1.262
 Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas, *The Essence of Christianity*, 2.269,
 2.270
 Fichte, Immanuel H., 2.90;
 Sätze zur Vorschule der Theologie, 2.40
 Fichte, J. G.: *Science of Knowledge*, 2.214–15;
 Werke, 2.215
 finite, the: and absoluteness, 1.483–84;
 and existence, 1.92, 1.420;
 God and, 1.473;
 individual and, 1.410–11, 1.413–14, 1.420, 1.453;
 and the infinite, 1.89–92, 1.233, 1.268, 1.391, 1.394–95, 1.453,
 1.502, 2.35, 2.56–57;
 and power-lessness, 1.484–86;
 and the religious, 1.483–84;
 and resignation, 1.410–11;
 and τέλος, 1.394, 1.410–11
 flesh: thorn in, 1.454
 Flógel, Carl Friederich, *Geschichte der komischen Litteratur*, 2.89
 flute-playing, *see* analogy
Flyveposten, 2.108–09, 2.145, 2.153
 folk academy: Grundtvig on, 2.20
 follower(s), 1.75, 1.540;
 vs. contemporaneity, 2.11
 foolishness: to the Greeks, 1.598–99, 1.605;
 maidens and, 1.16–17
 forgiveness, 1.524, 1.538–39
*For Literatur og Kritik. Et Fjerdingsaarsskrift udgivet af Fyens Stifts
 literære Selskab*, 2.201, 2.274;
 as paradox, 1.224–28, 2.53–54

Fortegnelse over Dr. Søren A. Kierkegaards efterladte Bogsamling,
2.196

fortune: as a good, 1.446;
humorist and, 1.447–49;
and immediacy, 1.433–34, 1.436;
and jest, 1.438;
and life-view, 1.433;
vs. misfortune, 1.433, 1.436–49, 1.453–54;
poet and, 1.434;
religious address on, 1.436–47. *See also* misfortune

France, the French, 1.259;
poetry, 1.457

Frederik (crown prince of Denmark), 1.449

Frederik Ferdinand (prince of Denmark), 1.449

Frederik VI (king of Denmark), 1.169

freedom: and guilt, 1.533–34

Freischutz, 1.451

Friday: and Robinson Crusoe, 1.460

Friendship Society, 1.248

Frisindede, 1.451, 2.274;

on *Postscript*, 2.xviii

Furies: visibility of, 1.541–42

future: and certainty, 1.424;

vs. eternity, 1.306–07, 1.424;

matchless, 2.28;

and present, 1.424

Fyenske Tidsskrift, 1.83

Gad, Knud, *Hvor skal jeg sætte min Søn i Skole*, 2.257

Gæ a, 2.117, 2.165

Gaius Mucius, 2.260

Garrick, David, 2.222

gate: narrow, 1.403, 1.585

Germany, German(s), 1.516, 1.518, 2.132–33;

and assistant professors, 2.162;

Berlin, 1.446, 2.viii;

and Denmark, 1.436, 2.133, 2.162;

and didactics, 1.280;
and Greeks, 2.21;
Grundtvig and, 2.21;
Hamburg, 1.184–85;
and mediation, 1.411;
and speculative thought, 1.191, 2.162;
and truth, 1.191;
and the world-historical, 1.150;
Worms, Diet of, 1.341

Gert Westphaler, 1.214

Gessler's hat, 1.174

Gethsemane: disciples in, 2.93–94

Giødwad, Jens Finsteen, 2.117

girl: seducing of, 2.69. *See also* analogy

Gleim, Johann Wilhelm Ludwig: and Jacobi, 1.104;
and Lessing, 1.104

gnosticism, 1.341

god, the: actuality of, 1.326–27;
and Christianity, 1.326–27;
and communication, 1.278;
crucified, 1.279;
in existence, 1.578, 1.583, 2.54;
and faith, 1.326–27;
Fragments on, 1.573;
and the historical, 1.578;
in human form, 1.38, 2.59–60;
and inwardness, 1.615;
Johannes Climacus and, 2.190;
and mortal woman, 1.490;
Plato and, 2.190;
and sin-consciousness, 1.584;
single individual and, 1.584;
as teacher, 1.573;
in time, 1.573, 1.578, 1.583–84;
witness and, 2.52

God: apostle and, 1.605;
and change, 1.432;

and communication, 1.243, 2.11;
decision before, 1.497;
demonstration of, 1.334, 1.545–46, 1.552–53;
equality before, 1.228;
and the ethical, 1.137–41, 1.156–58, 1.244;
and everyday life, 1.489;
and existence, 1.210–11, 1.334, 1.472–78, 1.545–46, 1.552–53,
2.54;
and the finite, 1.473;
good from, 1.177–79;
and guilt, 1.530, 1.542–46;
and human being, 1.136–41, 1.141, 1.260–61, 1.412–14, 1.489–
94, 1.580–81, 1.604, 2.55;
in human form, 1.217, 1.246, 1.596, 2.53, 2.55;
as ideal, 1.412;
illusiveness of, 1.243–46;
and immanence, 1.156–57;
individual and, 1.144, 1.162–63, 1.199–201, 1.483–88, 1.530,
1.546, 1.560, 2.90;
and individuality, 1.156–57;
and infinite passion, 1.200–01;
invisibility of, 1.245, 1.263;
Kant and, 1.552–53;
knowledge of, 1.199–201;
as Lord, 1.156;
and love, 1.137;
omnipresence of, 1.245, 1.263;
and paganism, 1.243–47;
patience of, 1.406;
perfection of, 1.334;
and the pious, 1.506–07;
and pledge, 1.488;
and prayer, 1.162–63;
and the religious, 1.66;
and sin, 1.530;
single individual and, 1.149, 1.543–44;
and sparrow, 1.412;

and subjectivity, 1.200–01;
and system, 1.118–19;
and temptation, 1.267;
thanksgiving to, 1.177–79, 1.446, 2.108;
and time, 1.449–50;
trust in, 1.467;
and truth, 1.243–47;
as unmoved mover, 1.312;
and world, 1.355–56;
and world history, 1.141, 1.156–59. *See also* god; God-relationship

God-conception, 1.544;
and humor, 1.505;
individual and, 1.483–88;
and prayer, 1.487;
religious person and, 1.505;
and resolution, 1.486–87

God-relationship, 1.90, 1.231;
and beginning, 1.488;
certainty of, 1.454–56;
and communication, 1.73–80;
and decision, 1.271;
direct, 1.560;
and erotic love, 1.53;
and the esthetic, 1.560–61;
and the ethical, 1.140, 2.93;
and existence, 1.262, 1.474;
human being and, 1.101, 1.243–47;
humorist and, 1.448, 1.505;
individual and, 1.156, 1.199, 1.474–75, 1.560;
and inwardness, 1.77, 1.243–47;
Kierkegaard and, 2.150;
Lessing and, 1.67;
and misfortune, 1.445–46;
religious person and, 1.491–97, 1.505–12;
revivalist and, 1.454;
and self-annihilation, 1.461;

Socrates and, 1.90;
and spirituality, 1.245–47;
and spiritual trial, 1.458;
and suffering, 1.445, 1.453–56;
and thanksgiving, 1.177–79;
uncertainty of, 1.446 *See also* God

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: characters by, 1.420;
Faust, 1.184, 2.227;
Die Leiden des jungen Werther, 1.288;
Werke, 2.225

Goeze, Johann Melchior: and Lessing, 1.91, 1.107

going beyond, going further than: Christianity, 1.361, 1.370–71,
1.466, 1.581, 1.587–88;
faith, 1.291–94, 2.156–57;
Hegel, 1.370;
Johannes Climacus as, 1.617;
paradox, 1.216;
the religious, 1.512;
Socrates, 1.204, 1.206–13;
speculative thought and, 1.216, 2.65

Goldschmidt, Meir Aaron, 2.165, 2.266

good, the: absolute, 1.387–92, 1.428;
acquisition of, 1.428;
and Christianity, 1.381;
and eternal happiness, 1.387–92;
vs. evil, 1.134, 1.142, 1.156, 1.339, 1.420–21;
and existence, 1.330;
fortune as, 1.446;
from God, 1.177–79;
highest, 1.381;
individual and, 1.387–431;
path to, 1.428;
and thinking, 1.339–40, 1.342–43;
willing, 1.342–43

Good Friday, 2.223

Goodman, 1.588

Gorgias, 2.88;

on the comic, 1.523–24
 Governance, [1.628];
 Kierkegaard and, 2.111, 2.138, 2.148–51;
 and striving, 1.139–40
 government, 2.103;
 Danish, 1.612
 graveyard: Johannis Climacus in, 1.235–40, 2.57–59, 2.104
 Greece, Greek, 1.38, 1.81, 1.191, 1.545, 2.20–21;
 and ataraxia, 1.399;
 and Christianity, 1.292–93;
 culture, 2.81;
 dialectic, 1.333, 2.72;
 dialogue, 1.327–28;
 and eternal truth, 2.54;
 and existence, 1.309, 1.318, 2.73;
 foolishness to, 1.213, 1.219, 1.292–93, 1.598–99, 1.605;
 Germans and, 2.21;
 Grundtvig and, 2.21;
 Icelanders and, 2.21;
 and intellectuality, 1.368;
 and Jew(s), 1.213, 1.219, 1.292–93, 1.598–99, 1.605;
 Kierkegaard and, 2.21;
 language, 2.100;
 and mediation, 1.411;
 and Middle Ages, 1.402;
 philosophy, 1.99, 1.309, 1.328, 1.331, 1.352–54;
 and scholarship, 2.162;
 skepticism, 1.38, 1.81, 1.316, 1.335;
 and sobriety, 2.76;
 and thinking, 1.303, 1.308, 1.311, 2.73;
 Trendelenburg and, 2.76
 Grimm, Jakob Ludwig Karl and Wilhelm Karl, *Irische Elfenmarchen*,
 2.267
 Grote, Christian, *Onkel Franz' Reise durch alle fünf Erdteile*, 2.269
 Grundtvig, Nicolai Frederik Severin, 2.231;
 and absoluteness, 2.17–20, 2.22–25;
 and Aristotle, 2.20;

Asa-strength of, 2.19, 2.25;
 and Bible, 1.36–46, 2.27;
 Christensen and, 2.126;
 and Clausen, 2.272–73;
 and compound words, 2.20–21;
 and folk academy, 2.20;
 as genius, 2.17–18, 2.28–29;
 and Germany, 2.21;
 and Greeks, 2.21;
 and Haman, 2.20;
 and italicizing, 2.19;
 and Lessing, 1.36;
 and Ley, 2.19;
 and Lindberg, 1.38–39, 1.46, 2.xviii, 2.29;
 and Living Word, 1.40, 1.44, 1.46, 2.21–25, 2.190;
 and “matchless discovery,” 1.36, 1.40–41, 2.17–18;
 and matchless future, 2.28;
 and mother tongue, 2.23;
 and Norse mythology, 2.20, 2.26;
 and Møller (P.M.), 2.19;
 on Mynster, *Om Begrebet af den christelige Dogmatik*, 2.189;
 as poet, 2.16–17;
 as poet-individuality, 2.27;
 and present age, 2.26, 2.28;
 as prophet, 2.28;
 and reader, 2.28;
 and relativity, 2.19;
 as religious individuality, 2.27;
 and Romans, 2.20–21;
 significance of, 2.16–18;
 and Socrates, 2.21;
 style of, 2.18–21, 2.30–31;
 as thinker, 2.17, 2.28–29;
 and thought development, 2.24;
Bøn og Begreb om en Dansk Høiskole i Soer, 2.20;
*Brage-Snak om Græske og Nordiske Myther og Oldsagn for Damer
 og Herrer*, 2.218;

Haandbog i Verdens-Historien, efter de bedste Kilder, 2.190;
Kirkens Gjenmæle mod Professor Theologiæ Dr. H.N. Clausen,
2.272;

*Nordens Mythologi eller Sindbilled-Sprog historisk-poetisk udviklet og
oplyst*, 2.218, 2.270;

Om Nordens historiske Forhold, 2.270;

Sang-Værk til den Danske Kirke, 2.262;

Skov-Homets Klang mellem Skamlings-Bankerne, 2.273;

Udsigt over Verdens-Krøniken fornemmelig i det Lutherske Tidsrum,
2.218

guilt: and childishness, 1.531;

clergy and, 1.530–31;

comparative, 1.530;

consciousness of, 1.527–42, 1.546, 1.550–55, 1.560, 1.583–85;

court and, 1.530;

and despair, 1.554;

dialectic of, 1.537;

and the esthetic, 1.537;

and eternal happiness, 1.527–37;

and eternity, 1.533–41, 1.550–55;

and existence, 1.526–55;

and existential pathos, 1.526–27, 1.533;

and externality, 1.541, 1.554;

and freedom, 1.533–34;

God and, 1.530, 1.542–46;

and humor, 1.550–55;

imaginary construction and, 1.542–43;

and immanence, 1.532–33;

individual and, 1.527–55;

vs. intention, 1.155–56;

and inwardness, 1.541–42, 1.550, 1.554;

lower conceptions of, 1.539–47;

and mediation, 1.541;

and Nemesis, 1.541–42;

in the particular, 1.528–29;

and penance, 1.542–50;

and punishment, 1.541–47;

recollection of, 1.533–41, 1.550–55;
and relativity, 1.554–55;
religious discourse and, 1.530–31;
and Religiousness A, 1.560;
vs. sin, 1.583–85;
single individual and, 1.529, 1.554;
and suffering, 1.532–34, 1.543;
totality of, 1.528–29, 1.536–38, 1.549, 1.553–55, 1.560

Gyldendal Forlag, 2.xvii

Gyllembourg-Ehrensward, Thomasine: *En Hverdags Historie*, 2.117;
To Tidsaldre, 2.xi, 2.116, 2.118, 2.143;

Kierkegaard on, 2.xi, 2.116–18, 2.143

half measures: and honesty, 1.588–89

halvbefaren, 2.272

Haman, 2.20

Hamann, Johann Georg: and Socrates, 1.558;

and system, 1.250, 2.62;

Schriften, 2.268;

*Sokratische Denkwürdigkeiten für die lange Weile des Publicums
zusammengetragen von einem Liebhaber der langen Weile*,
2.268

Hamilton, Andrew, *Sixteen Months in the Danish Isles*, 2.vii

Hamlet, 1.163, 1.193, 1.514

Hase, Karl August v., *Hutterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der
evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, 2.193, 2.231, 2.267

Hegel, 2.133;

and actuality, 1.332–33;

and becoming, 1.180, 1.307;

and Christianity, 2.55;

and the comic, 1.281, 2.71;

and contradiction, 1.421;

and dialectics of becoming, 1.80–81;

and direct communication, 1.70;

Dr. Hjortespring and, 1.184;

and essence, 2.73;

and the eternal, 2.48;

and ethics, 1.119, 1.503;

and existence, 1.327;
 going beyond, 1.370;
 and Heraclitus, 1.307;
 and idealism, 1.328;
 on immortality, 1.171;
 and intellectual intuition, 1.105, 1.335;
 and inwardness, 2.70–72;
 Johannes Climacus and, 1.622, 2.74, 2.163;
 and Kant, 1.328, 2.75;
 and Kierkegaard, 2.184;
 and Lessing, 1.70;
 logic of, 1.109–18, 1.310;
 vs. Møller (P.M.), 1.34;
 present age and, 1.355;
 and presuppositionlessness, 2.183–84;
 and Schelling, 1.105, 1.335, 2.214;
 and skepticism, 1.33;
 vs. Socrates, 1.34, 1.70, 1.333, 2.184;
 and spurious infinity, 1.112–13;
 and thinking, 1.80–81, 1.328–37, 1.561, 2.70–72;
 and Trendelenburg, 1.110, 1.301, 2.184;
 and truth, 1.33;
 and the world-historical, 1.150–54, 1.307, 2.40;
 and youth, 1.118;
Faith and Knowledge, 2.241;
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 2.221, 2.249, 2.253–54;
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 2.224–25;
Logic, 2.183, 2.187, 2.239, 2.241, 2.247–48, 2.251;
The Phenomenology of Mind, 1.117, 2.220, 2.259;
The Philosophy of Fine Art, 2.264–65;
The Philosophy of History, 2.187, 2.216–17;
Philosophy of Nature, 2.187;
Philosophy of Right, 2.252, 2.263;
Science of Logic, 1.301, 1.332–35, 2.183, 2.186–87, 2.191–92,
 2.193, 2.197–200, 2.208–09, 2.209–10, 2.210, 2.211–13,
 2.214, 2.220, 2.239–41, 2.245–46, 2.248, 2.254–55, 2.258,
 2.266;

“Über: ‘Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi’s Werke’ Dritter Band 2.206;
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, 2.196;
Werke, 2.183, 2.196 See also Hegelian philosophy; speculation;
system

Hegelian philosophy: and the comic, 1.34, 1.512–13;
and contradiction, 1.304–08;
and either/ or, 1.304–07;
and the ethical, 1.296–97, 1.306, 1.310–11;
and existence, 1.306, 1.310;
Frater Taciturnus on, 1.296–97;
Heiberg and, 1.184, 2.44;
and the immediate, 1.114;
individuality and, 1.306;
and infant Baptism, 2.77–78;
and the inner vs. the outer, 1.54, 2.24;
Kierkegaard and, 2.35;
and Mynster, 1.305;
and pure thinking, 1.309, 1.314–18;
and reflection, 1.115–16;
and skepticism, 1.33;
and Tryde, 2.42–43;
and youth, 1.310–11. See also Hegel; speculation; system

Heiberg, Johan Ludvig, 2.45, 2.158, 2.271, 2.277;
and astronomy, 2.41, 2.44;
and Hegelian philosophy, 1.184, 2.44;
and Martensen, 2.72, 2.236;
and Møller (P.L.), 2.125;
and Rosenhoff, 2.41;
and Tryde, 1.171–72;
“*Det astronomiske Aar*,” 2.221–22;
“*Autobiographiske Fragmenter*,” 2.224;
Gjensvar paa Herr Professor Hauchs Svar, 2.41;
“*Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske
Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Heiskole*,” 2.236;
Kong Salomon og Jørgen Hattemager, 1.141, 2.182, 2.238, 2.260;
Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, 2.225, 2.244;
Prosaiske Skrifter, 2.224;

Recensenten og Dyret, 2.213–14, 2.230, 2.265;
 Samlede Skrifter, 2.182;
 En Sjæl efter Døden, 1.171–72;
 “Stjer-nehimlen,” 2.41;
 Urania. Aarvog for 1844, 2.221–22, 2.238
 Helfferich, Adolph, *Die christliche Mystik in ihrer Entwicklung und in ihren Denkmalen*, I-II, 2.98
 hell, 1.530
 Helweg, Hans Friedrich, 2.34;
 “Orest og Ødip eller Collisionen,” 2.201, 2.274
 Hemsterhuis, Frans, 2.46;
 Vermischte Schriften des H. Hemsterhuis aus dem Französischen
 übersetzt, 2.274–75
 Henry IV (king of France), 1.146
 Heraclitus, 1.312;
 and Eleatics, 1.376;
 Hegel and, 1.307;
 and speculative thought, 1.376
 Hercules: and giant, 1.305
 Herder, Johann Gottfried: *Adrastea und das achtzehnte Jahrhundert*,
 2.264;
 Sämmtliche Werke, 2.264
 “*Shaftesbury. Geist und Frohsinn*,” 2.264
 hermit: and actuality, 1.319–20
 Herodotus, *History*, 2.188
 Herr Professor, 1.122, 1.145;
 and paradox, 1.220;
 and speculative thought, 1.191
 Hesiod: *Theogony*, 1.92
 hiddenness: of the esthetic, 1.254, 1.268;
 and the ethical, 1.254;
 in *Fear and Trembling*, 1.261–62
 history, the historical, historicity: and the absurd, 1.385;
 and Apostles’ Creed, 1.43;
 and approximation, 1.23–25, 1.30–31, 1.81;
 and Bible, 1.23–34, 1.38;
 and certainty, 1.211–12, 1.576–77;

and Christianity, 1.15, 1.17, 1.23–50, 1.53–54, 1.577–78;
and Church, 1.39;
and contemporaneity, 2.36;
vs. the eternal, 1.93–98, 1.578–79, 1.584, 2.34;
and eternal happiness, 1.10–11, 1.15, 1.23–24, 1.93–98, 1.270,
1.362, 1.369, 1.380–81, 1.573–79, 1.582, 1.586, 2.36,
2.79–81, 2.83;
and existence, 1.81;
in *Fragments*, 1.24;
and god, 1.578;
and ideality, 1.324–25;
individual and, 1.81;
individuality and, 1.148;
and knowledge, 1.81, 1.316, 1.324–25, 1.574–78;
and Living Word, 2.25;
and New Testament, 1.38;
speculative thought and, 1.53–54, 1.578–79;
and subjective passion, 1.575–76;
and truth, 1.21, 1.93–98

Hjortespring, Dr.: and Hegel, 1.184

Hoffmann, Ernst Theodor Amadeus: *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 2.274;
Leiden eines armen Theaterdirectors, 1.288;
Meister Floh, 2.43

Holberg, Ludvig, 2.132–33;

and *Magister*, 2.133;

Barselstuen, 1.302;

The Christmas Party, 1.151;

Den Danske Skue-Plads, 2.182;

Diderich the Terrible, 2.222;

Erasmus Montanus or Rasmus Berg, 2.188, 2.194, 2.273, 2.277;

The Fussy Man, 2.186, 2.216, 2.236, 2.252, 2.257;

*Hans Mikkelsens Comoedier Sam-menskrefne for Den nye oprettede
Danske Skue-Plads*, 2.229;

Henrik og Pernille, 2.257;

Hexerie Eller Blind Allarm, 2.182, 2.255, 2.262;

Jacob von Tyboe Eller Den stortalende Soldat, 2.271;

Jule-Stue, 2.255;

Mester Gert Westphaler eller Den meget talende Barbeer, 2.227,
2.237;
The Peasant in Pawn, 2.182;
The Political Tinker, 2.279;
Ulysses von Ithaca, Eller En Tydsk Comoe-dte, 2.265

Holger the Dane, 2.26
 Holophernes, 1.514, 1.543
 Holy Spirit: personality of, 1.42
 Homer, 2.261;
 Illiad, 2.197;
 Odyssey, 2.196
 honesty: and Christ, 1.588;
 and half measures, 1.588–89;
 Johannes Climacus and, 1.622
 hope: and Christianity, 2.70
 Horace: *Epistles*, 2.196;
 Opera, 2.196
 Hostrup, Jens Christian, *En Spurv i Tranedands*, 2.218
 Hugo de St. Victor, 2.98–99
 human being(s): and becoming, 1.602;
 capable of nothing, 1.467–78, 1.481–82, 1.486, 1.496;
 and Christianity, 1.557–61;
 and eternal happiness, 1.581–82, 2.81–82;
 and the ethical, 1.137;
 and existence, 1.85, 1.302–18;
 god as, 1.38, 2.59–60;
 and God, 1.136–41, 1.141, 1.260–61, 1.412–14, 1.489–94,
 1.580–81, 1.604, 2.55;
 God as, 1.217, 1.246, 1.596, 2.53, 2.55;
 and God-relationship, 1.101, 1.243–47;
 and ideal, 1.548;
 Johannes Climacus as, 2.121;
 lowliness of, 1.490–92;
 and paradox, 1.566;
 and poetry, 1.348;
 vs. saints, 2.82–86;
 as single individual, 1.149;
 and speculative thought, 2.49;
 as synthesis of the finite and the infinite, 2.56–57;
 as synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, 1.56, 1.579, 2.47;
 and system, 1.311. *See also* individual; individuality; single

individual

- human race: assistant professors and, 1.344, 2.34;
and immortality, 1.172;
vs. individual, 1.154–61, 1.343–46, 1.350–56, 1.428, 1.554,
2.90;
vs. individuality, 1.503;
single individual and, 1.584;
and speculative thought, 1.343–49;
task of, 1.151;
τέλος for, 1.155;
and the world-historical, 1.151, 1.154–61
- Hume, David, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 2.xix
- humility: as absolute difference, 1.492;
and humanness, 1.493;
in monastic movement, 1.492–93;
and religiousness, 1.493–95
- humor, humorist, 1.299;
and childlikeness, 1.550–52;
and Christianity, 1.271–72, 1.531–32, 1.602, 2.157–58;
and the comic, 1.282, 1.521;
and contradiction, 1.505;
and eternal happiness, 1.554;
and the ethical, 1.502;
and existence, 1.449–51, 1.521;
and faith, 1.291–92;
and fortune, 1.447–49;
in *Four Upbuilding Discourses* (1844), 2.63–64;
Frater Taciturnus and, 1.290–92, 1.500;
and God-conception, 1.505;
and God-relationship, 1.448, 1.505;
and guilt-consciousness, 1.550–55;
in “‘Guilty?’/ ‘Not Guilty?’ ” 1.290;
imaginary construction and, 2.129, 2.160;
and immanence, 1.270–72, 1.291;
as incognito, 1.500, 1.504–09, 1.521, 1.531–32, 1.599;
and inwardness, 2.94;
and irony, 1.271, 1.448, 1.551–53;

and jest, 1.447–48, 1.505, 1.531–32, 1.552–53;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.501, 1.617–19, 2.ix, 2.157, 2.160;
on life, 1.449–51;
and misfortune, 1.447–49;
and observation, 1.508;
and pain, 1.551–53;
and paradox, 1.291–92, 1.532;
and recollection, 1.554, 2.103;
and religiousness, 1.179, 1.447, 1.451, 1.500–01, 1.504–08,
1.521–22, 1.531–32;
and revocation, 2.104;
and speculative thought, 1.272–73;
and suffering, 1.447–51;
and time, 2.64;
and upbuilding discourses, 1.270;
women and, 1.553. *See also* absurdity; comedy; irony; jest
hymnbook: new, 1.478–80, 2.86–87;
Pastoral Convention on, 1.478–80;
present age and, 2.86

I, 1.197;
and actuality, 1.318;
and *I-I*, 1.117;
individual and, 1.545;
Lessing and, 1.69;
personal, 1.503;
pure, 1.317

Icarus, 1.527

Iceland, Icelanders: Greeks and, 2.21

idea: and actuality, 1.387;
and death, 1.168–70;
and existence, 1.330–31;
vs. experience, 1.150;
and pathos, 1.387;
and possibility, 1.387;
word and, 2.84

ideal, ideality: and actuality, 1.324–25, 1.387–88;

esthetic, 1.322–25;
ethical, 1.318, 1.322–27;
and “excuse,” 1.549;
and history, 1.324–25;
human being and, 1.548;
individual and, 1.418, 1.543;
intellectual, 1.318, 1.322;
and inwardness, 1.546;
and judgment, 1.548–49;
and knowledge, 1.324–25;
poet and, 1.388;
poetic, 1.318;
and possibility, 1.322, 1.325, 1.387–88;
requirement of, 1.358–59;
and silence, 1.548–49
idealism: and existence, 1.352–53;
 Hegel and, 1.328;
 vs. skepticism, 1.352–53
identity: and contradiction, 1.421
idolatry, 1.246–47
ignorance: and infinity, 1.84;
 Postscript on, 2.51;
 and sin, 1.339;
 Socrates and, 1.84, 1.202, 1.204–10, 1.566, 2.50;
 Spinoza on, 2.51
I-I: and empirical I, 1.117;
 fantastical, 1.193, 1.196–97, 2.49, 2.80;
 individual as, 2.49;
 pure, 1.117, 1.190, 1.306, 2.80;
 and speculative thought, 1.196–97; 2.50
illusion, 2.11;
 and the esthetic, 1.457;
 and faith, 1.580;
 of immediacy, 1.457, 2.91;
 of obtuseness, 1.457;
 and poetry, 1.457;
 religiousness as, 1.456–57;

religious person and, 1.486–87

imaginary construction, 1.64, 1.114, 1.244, 1.498, 1.587, 2.64;
and actuality, 1.501;
and assistant professors, 1.613;
and communication, 1.80, 1.263–64, 2.61–62;
and double-reflection, 1.263–64, 2.68;
and doubt, 2.32;
and earnestness, 1.264;
and *Either/Or*, 2.68–70;
and eternal happiness, 1.542–43;
and existence, 2.65;
Fragments as, 1.361–62;
Frater Taciturnus and, 1.501;
and guilt, 1.542–43;
and humor, 2.129, 2.160;
inwardness in, 1.263–64, 1.289;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.511–12, 1.617, 2.160;
and the psychological, 292;
Quidam and, 1.289–91, 1.501, [1.626], 2.67–69;
and reader, 1.289;
and recipient, 1.264;
and the religious, 2.32;
and religious person, 1.511–12;
and “The Seducer’s Diary,” 2.68;
and the Socratic, 1.206–07

imagination: vs. immediacy, 1.443;
and passion, 1.440;
poet and, 1.440, 1.443–44;
poetry and, 1.348, 1.357;
religious poet and, 1.580;
religious speaker and, 1.440;
subjective thinker and, 1.357

imitation: vs. admiration, 2.140–41

immanence: break with, 1.571–72, 1.576;
contradiction within, 1.579;
and despair, 1.262;
and the dialectical, 1.535–36, 1.569;

- and existence, 1.532;
- God and, 1.156–57;
- and guilt-consciousness, 1.532–33;
- and humor, 1.270–72, 1.291;
- and leap, 1.295;
- vs. paradox, 1.256;
- and recollection, 1.206;
- and Religiousness A, 1.572–73;
- and Religiousness B, 1.572–73;
- and repetition, 1.263;
- and sin, 1.583;
- and speculative thought, 1.148–49;
- and upbuilding discourses, 1.270;
- and world history, 1.156

immediacy, the immediate: and absolute τέλος, 1.431;

- break with, 1.532;
- and the comic, 1.281–82, 1.520–21;
- and communication, 1.74;
- and contradiction, 1.433;
- dying to, 1.460–63, 1.483, 1.499, 1.507, 1.526;
- and existence, 1.112;
- and faith, 1.262, 1.347, 1.500;
- and finite common sense, 1.520;
- and fortune, 1.433–34, 1.436;
- and guilt-consciousness, 1.532–33;
- Hegelian logicians and, 1.114;
- illusion of, 1.457, 2.91;
- vs. imagination, 1.443;
- incapability of, 1.461;
- individual and, 1.394–95, 1.431–36, 1.443, 1.453–54, 1.460–63, 1.495–96;
- and irony, 1.520–21;
- life-view of, 1.433;
- and misfortune, 1.433–34, 1.436, 1.443;
- pathos of, 1.609;
- poet and, 1.434;
- and reflection, 1.112–14, 2.149;

- and religiousness, 1.436, 1.460–63, 1.495–96;
- and resignation, 1.395;
- and suffering, 1.460–63;
- and system, 1.111–14;
- temptation of, 1.472;
- and thinking, 1.347
- immorality: of present age, 1.544
- immortality: and abstraction, 1.302;
 - assistant professors and, 1.172;
 - and certainty, 1.201–02;
 - demonstration of, 1.174, 1.201–02;
 - dialectic of, 1.171–77;
 - and the ethical, 1.175–77;
 - and existence, 1.175–77;
 - Hegel and, 1.171;
 - “if” of, 1.429;
 - human being and, 1.302;
 - of human race, 1.172;
 - and indefiniteness, 1.176–77;
 - individual and, 1.302;
 - inwardness, 1.173;
 - Møller (P.M.) on, 1.172;
 - and Socrates, 1.201–02;
 - soul and, 1.171–79;
 - and subjectivity, 1.173–77;
 - vs. system, 1.171–74;
 - vs. world history, 1.177
- Imprimatur*, 1.198, 2.42
- Incarnation, 1.381, 2.98
- incognito: humor as, 1.500, 1.504–09, 1.521, 1.531–32, 1.599;
 - irony as, 1.503–04, 1.521, 1.531;
 - of looking just like everyone else, 1.410, 1.500, 1.504, 1.506;
 - servant as, 1.599
- independence, 1.260
- individual: and absolute good, 1.387–431;
 - and absoluteness, 1.483–88, 1.541;
 - and absolute τέλος, 1.313, 1.400–13, 1.422, 1.431–32, 1.443,

1.452–56, 1.459, 1.525;
and abstraction, 1.302–04;
and action, 1.339–43, 1.432–33;
and actuality, 1.302–04, 1.314–18, 1.339–42;
and amusement park, 1.494–97;
and becoming, 1.73, 1.80, 1.91, 1.420–21, 1.602;
and beginning, 1.138–39;
and being, 1.420–21;
capable of nothing, 1.461–78, 1.486, 1.506;
and choice, 1.134;
and Christianity, 1.15–17, 1.21, 1.49, 1.365–69, 1.576–78,
1.587–92, 2.49;
and the comic, 1.86–92, 1.508;
and communication, 1.72–80;
and community, 2.89–90;
and contemporaneity, 1.348;
and continuity, 1.313;
and death, 1.82, 1.165–70;
and decision, 1.23, 1.31, 1.341, 1.365–66, 1.497, 2.46–47;
and the dialectical, 1.433–35, 1.490–91, 1.572;
and difficulty, 1.430;
and the esthetic, 1.433;
and the eternal, 1.95, 1.301–02, 1.341, 1.570, 1.573–74, 1.583–
84, 2.53;
and eternal happiness, 1.15–17, 1.21–27, 1.29–34, 1.43, 1.47,
1.52–56, 1.271, 1.343–44, 1.369, 1.385, 1.387–431, 1.452–
56, 1.483, 1.527–37, 1.557, 1.576, 2.87;
and ethics, 1.133–41, 1.141–49, 1.155–65, 1.266–68, 1.315,
1.320–25, 1.341–44, 1.346, 1.356, 1.546–47;
and everyday life, 1.464–78;
and evil, 1.420–21;
and existence, 1.73, 1.80–93, 1.119–25, 1.193, 1.254–64, 1.274,
1.302, 1.314–18, 1.326, 1.329–33, 1.343–49, 1.355–60,
1.385, 1.387–435, 1.443–56, 1.488–513, 1.523, 1.526–55,
1.559, 1.570–78, 1.581–86, 2.48–51, 2.53, 2.61, 2.72, 2.93;
as existing spirit, 1.189–93, 1.345–46;
and externality, 1.406–09, 1.432–33;
and faith, 1.21–22, 1.31;

and the finite, 1.410–11, 1.413–14, 1.420, 1.453;
and God, 1.144, 1.162–63, 1.199–201, 1.483–88, 1.530, 1.546,
1.560, 2.90;
and God-relationship, 1.156, 1.199, 1.474–75, 1.491–97, 1.560–
61;
and guilt, 1.527–55;
and historical knowledge, 1.81;
vs. human race, 1.154–61, 1.343–46, 1.350–56, 1.428, 1.554,
2.90;
and I, 1.545;
and ideal, 1.418, 1.543;
and I-I, 2.49;
and illusion, 1.486–87;
and immediacy, 1.394–95, 1.431–36, 1.443, 1.453–54, 1.460–
63, 1.495–96;
and immortality, 1.302;
and the infinite, 1.420, 1.423–24;
and interiority, 1.406–09;
and inwardness, 1.73, 1.385–87, 1.433–34, 1.436–39, 1.475,
1.506–12, 1.522–23, 1.544, 1.546–47;
and life, 1.389–90, 1.464–78;
and mediation, 1.399, 1.406–22;
and misfortune, 1.433–40, 1.443;
on Monday, 1.531;
and observation, 1.21–22, 1.501;
and paradox, 1.580–81, 2.48–51, 2.53;
and party, 2.18;
and passion, 1.399, 1.509–11, 1.544, 1.575–78;
and pathos, 1.87–92, 1.387–91, 1.557, 1.559, 1.581;
and prayer, 1.162–63;
present age and, 1.355–56;
and reflection, 1.115–16;
and relative ends, 1.400–01, 1.422, 1.431, 1.502, 1.525;
and the religious, 1.66–67, 1.432–64, 1.484–513, 1.522–23,
1.544, 1.581–82;
and repentance, 1.545;
and Religiousness A, 1.556;

and Religiousness B, 1.556;
 and resignation, 1.395–96, 1.400–02, 1.406–07, 1.410–11;
 and resolution, 1.138–39, 1.462–63;
 and sickness, 1.485–86, 1.488–89;
 and sin, 1.208–09, 1.583–85;
 vs. single individual, 2.182;
 and speculative thought, 1.53–57, 1.343–49;
 and spiritual trial, 1.458–60, 2.84–86;
 and striving, 1.91, 1.121–22;
 and subjectivity, 1.575–78;
 and suffering, 1.432–64;
 as synthesis of the finite and the infinite, 1.82–93, 1.221, 1.391, 1.453;
 and task, 1.525–28, 2.90;
 and the temporal, 1.301–02, 1.526, 1.570, 1.573;
 and temptation, 1.458–59;
 and thinking, 1.73, 1.313;
 and truth, 1.190–250, 2.48–51;
 and upbuilding, 1.560–61;
 and world history, 1.134–49, 1.154–61. *See also* human being;
 individuality; single individual
Individualitet: as level of development, 2.182. *See also* individuality
 individuality: and Christianity, 2.78;
 and demonstrations, 1.439;
 and earnestness, 1.37–38;
 and enthusiasm, 1.568–69;
 and the esthetic, 1.252–56, 1.454;
 and eternal happiness, 1.389–90;
 and eternity, 1.153–54;
 and the ethical, 1.37–38, 1.147–48, 1.152–53, 1.155–57, 1.252–56, 1.258–59, 1.306, 1.309, 1.568–69;
 and existence, 1.252, 1.258–59, 1.261–62, 1.264, 1.269, 1.287, 1.295, 1.309, 2.46, 2.60–63;
 and God, 1.156–57;
 Hegelians and, 1.306;
 historical, 1.148;
 vs. human race, 1.503;

- and inwardness, 1.258–59, 2.60;
- Lessing as, 1.66;
- and life-view, [1.625–26];
- Napoleon as, 1.462;
- old man as, 1.241;
- and others, 1.389;
- and past, 1.156–57;
- pastor and, 1.439;
- poet and, 1.439, 2.27;
- and prominence, 1.388–90;
- and pure thinking, 1.309;
- and the religious, 1.388–90, 1.430–31, 1.462, 2.27;
- and speculative thought, 1.148;
- and understanding, 1.568–69;
- and wishes, 1.439;
- world-historical, 1.146–48. *See also* human being; individual; single individual

indulgence: in Middle Ages, 1.524

infinity, the infinite: and abstraction, 1.114–15;

- dialectic of, 1.86;
- and the ethical, 1.138, 1.143, 1.266–68, 1.502;
- existence and, 1.82–93, 1.420;
- vs. finite, 1.89–92, 1.233, 1.268, 1.391, 1.394, 1.420, 1.453, 1.502, 2.35, 2.56;
- and ignorance, 1.84;
- illusiveness of, 1.82, 1.86;

individual and, 1.420, 1.423–24, 1.453;

- and irony, 1.502–05;
- movement of, 1.502;
- and passion, 1.200–04, 1.216, 1.231, 1.258–59, 1.440, 1.450;
- and pathos, 1.89–92;
- prayer and, 1.90–91;
- and reflection, 1.112–13;
- Socrates and, 1.83, 1.458;
- spurious, 1.112–13, 1.338;
- and striving, 1.91–93;
- and τέλος, 1.394

inner, the: and the outer, 1.54, 1.138, 1.296–97, 1.541–42, 2.24
innocence: child and, 1.591–92, 1.602;
 vs. sin, 1.591–92
insanity, *see* lunacy
inspiration: of Bible, 1.25, 1.28;
 vs. scholarship, 1.25–26
intellect, the intellectual, intellectuality: and actuality, 1.322–27;
 and Christianity, 1.326–27;
 and doctrine, 1.326;
 and the esthetic, 1.322–25;
 and the ethical, 1.322, 1.338;
 Greek, 1.368;
 and ideality, 1.318, 1.322–25;
 Socrates and, 1.368;
 and thinking, 1.325, 1.338–39
intelligence: and faith, 1.377
Intelligensblade, 1.273, 2.233, 2.274
intention: and the ethical, 1.155–56
interestedness; in eternal happiness, 1.15–17, 1.21–27, 1.29–34,
 1.43, 1.52;
 vs. objectivity, 1.43. *See also* passion
interiority: individual and, 1.406–09;
 monastic movement and, 1.405–09;
 pseudonyms and, 2.161
intermediary; venture and, 1.429
intuition: intellectual, 1.105, 1.150, 1.335;
 and leap, 1.150
inward deepening; and Christianity, 1.52;
 and the dialectical, 1.556;
 and Religiousness A, 1.556;
 and truth, 1.37–38
inwardness: and appropriation, 1.242–43;
 assistant professors and, 1.299–300;
 and Christianity, 1.215, 1.278–79, 1.534–35, 1.571–72, 1.605–
 06, 1.610–11, 1.615–16;
 clergy and, 1.247–48;
 and the comic, 1.511, 1.522, 1.554–55;

and communication, 1.77–80, 1.259–61, 1.277–78;
and decision, 1.382;
and the dialectical, 2.94;
and disclosure, 1.500;
and double-reflection, 1.73–80;
in *Either/Or*, 1.252–57;
and erotic love, 1.73, 1.259–60;
and the ethical, 1.141–43, 1.546–47, 2.94;
and existence, 1.255, 1.385–87, 1.433, 1.571–72, 2.79;
in expression of, 1.236–40;
and externality, 1.382, 1.413–14;
and faith, 1.209–10, 1.214, 1.218, 1.224–28, 1.233, 1.611;
feminine, 1.236, 1.291;
and the god, 1.615;
and God-relationship, 1.243–47;
and guilt, 1.541–42, 1.550, 1.554;
Hegel and, 2.70–72;
hidden, 1.475, 1.498–501, 1.504, 1.506–12, 1.522–24, 1.534–
35, 1.538–40, 1.554–55;
and humor, 2.94;
and ideality, 1.546;
in imaginary construction, 1.263–64, 1.289;
and immortality, 1.173;
individual and, 1.73, 1.385–87, 1.433–34, 1.436–39, 1.475,
1.506–12, 1.522–23, 1.544, 1.546–47;
individuality and, 1.258–59, 2.60;
and irony, 2.94;
knight of, 1.499, 1.506–12;
vs. knowledge, 1.255–56;
learner and, 1.242, 1.247–49;
and lunacy, 1.194–96;
and martyrdom, 1.507–08;
Mary and, 1.260;
in men, 1.236;
Middle Ages and, 1.413–14;
observation vs., 1.32–33, 1.52–53;
and passion, 1.199–204, 1.209–10, 1.233, 2.49–51;

- and paradox, 1.224–82;
- and pathos, 1.242, 1.385–87;
- prayer and, 1.90–91, 1.487–88;
- present age and, 1.263, 1.287;
- and pride, 1.509–10;
- and promise, 1.240;
- Quidam and, 1.291;
- reader and, 2.122;
- and recollecting, 1.554;
- and reflection, 2.x;
- of religiousness, 1.475, 1.498–501, 1.504, 1.506–12, 1.522–24,
1.534–35, 1.538–40, 1.544, 2.84, 2.92, 2.94;
- repetition of, 1.260;
- requirement of, 1.523;
- vs. results, 1.242;
- and single individual, 1.77;
- Socrates and, 1.90, 1.247–49;
- and spiritual trial, 2.84, 2.92;
- and subjectivity, 1.189–251, 2.45–46, 2.48;
- and suffering, 1.288, 1.434–39, 1.499–501, 1.615, 2.71;
- and teaching, 1.242, 1.247–49;
- and terror, 1.258–59;
- and truth, 1.189, 1.192, 1.194, 1.196, 1.199, 1.202–07, 1.209,
1.213, 1.229–31, 1.236, 1.242–45, 1.247, 1.249, 1.252–58,
2.48–50, 2.61
- irony, 1.299;
- and abstraction, 1.521;
- Aristotle and, 1.521;
- assistant professors and, 1.277;
- and bour-geois-philistinism, 1.547;
- and Christianity, 1.271–72, 1.274–77;
- and the comic, 1.520–21;
- vs. earnestness, 1.276–77;
- and the esthetic, 1.501–02;
- and the ethical, 1.153, 1.501–02, 1.521;
- and existence, 1.521;
- in *Fragments*, 2.66;

vs. humor, 1.271–72, 1.448, 1.551–53;
and immediacy, 1.520–21;
as incognito, 1.503–04, 1.521, 1.531;
and infinity, 1.502–05;
and inwardness, 2.94;
and observation, 1.502–05;
and pain, 1.551–53;
Socrates and, 1.87–88, 1.277, 1.503, 1.552–53, 2.274;
women and, 1.553. *See also* absurdity; comedy; humor; jest
Isaac: and Abraham, 2.163–64
Isis, 1.92, 2.33
isolation: and leap, 1.100–02
Italy, Italian, 1.259

Jacob: and Esau, 1.269
Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich, 2.36;
eloquence of, 1.101–03;
and Gleim, 1.104;
and leap, 1.100–05;
and Lessing, 1.70, 1.100–05, 2.37;
and Mynster, 1.262, 2.234;
and Polus, 2.37;
and Spinoza, 1.100–01;
system and, 1.250–51, 2.62;
Jacobi an Fichte, 2.234;
*Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an Herm Moses
Mendelssohn*, 2.196, 2.206, 2.207, 2.208;
Werke, 2.196

Janus, 2.202

Jean Paul, *see* Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich

Jens Skovfoged, 1.305

Jeronimus, 1.151

jest: and earnestness, 1.69–71, 1.87–89, 1.102–03, 1.131, 1.210,
1.255, 1.282, 1.290, 1.456;
ethical-religious, 1.135–39;
and fortune, 1.438;
humorist and, 1.447–48, 1.505, 1.531–32, 1.552–53;

and marriage, 1.456;
and misfortune, 1.438, 1.447–48;
and the religious, 1.70, 1.78, 1.101, 1.263, 1.438–40, 1.461–62,
1.470–72. *See also* absurdity; comedy; humor; irony
Jew(s), Jewish, 1.50, 1.210, 1.396, 1.402, 1.430, 1.450, 1.484,
2.163;
child, 1.601;
and circumcision, 1.45;
and Greek(s), 1.97, 1.213, 1.219, 1.292–93, 1.598–99, 1.605;
offense to, 1.213, 1.219, 1.292–93, 1.539, 1.598–99, 1.605;
and proverb, 1.332. *See also* analogy; Judaism
Job, 1.359;
discourse on, 2.64;
and passion, 2.64;
in *Repetition*, 2.64
John the Baptizer, 1.599
Jørgen Hattemager, 2.260
joy: and suffering, 1.452–53;
unutterable, 1.221
Judaism, 1.381. *See also* Jew(s)
Judas, 1.137
judgment: and the ethical, 1.322;
and the ideal, 1.548–49;
and silence, 1.548–49;
and world history, 1.141
Juliet, 1.165;
and death, 1.446–47;
and Romeo, 1.440–41
Jupiter, 2.37
Juvenal, *Satires*, 2.253

Kalkar, Christian Andreas Hermann, *Om Troesbekjendelsens Form i
den danske Kirke*, 2.191
Kant, Immanuel: *an sich*, 1.328, 2.75;
on existence of God, 1.552–53;
and Hegel, 1.328, 2.75;
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, 2.244–45;

Critique of Pure Reason, 2.247

Kerner, Andreas Justinus: *Die Dicht-ungen*, 2.274;

Die Reiseschatten, 2.45

Kierkegaard Arkivet, 2.252

Kierkegaard, Michael Pedersen (father): death of, 2.225

Kierkegaard, Peter Christian (brother), 2.190

KIERKEGAARD, SØREN AABYE, 2.63–64

as author, 2.xi–xiii, 2.110–16, 2.119, 2.137–55, 2.165–68, 2.181

and Christensen, 2.125–28

and Christianity, 2.138, 2.144–45, 2.147, 2.152–53, 2.166–67

and *The Corsair*, 2.xvi–xvii, 2.117–19

and dancing, 2.31

and the esthetic, 2.154

and father, [1.629]

and finance, [1.628], 2.225–26

and God-relationship, 2.150

and Governance, 2.111, 2.138, 2.148–51

and Greeks, 2.21

and Hegel, 2.184

and Hegelian philosophy, 2.35

as idler, 2.vii

and literary controversy, 2.xii

and Martensen, 2.132

and Møller (P.L.), 2.117–19

and outcome, 2.112, 2.115

as pastor, 2.xi–xiii, 2.116, 2.119, 2.141–42, 2.154–55, 2.167

as penitent, 2.145

as peripatetic, 2.vii

proposed titles and works:

Collected Works of Consummation, 2.139

“*En Cyclus ethisk-religieuse Afhandling*,” 2.143

“My Program: Either/Or,” 2.xv

“Three Notes,” 2.140, 2.143

pseudonyms, [1.625–30], 2.viii, 2.x, 2.xiii–xv, 2.61–62, 2.108–14, 2.118–19, 2.143;

and actuality, [1.627–30], 2.110, 2.113–14;

and Christianity, 2.160;

- and the comic, 1.281;
- and communication, 2.161, 2.166–67;
- and interiority, 2.161;
- Johannes Climacus on, 1.251–55, 1.261–70, 1.278–300, 2.xv, 2.149–50;
- and life-view, 2.110;
- and the maieutic, 2.167;
- on marriage, 1.265, 2.62;
- and reader, 1.298, [1.629];
- on repetition, 1.285–87;
- and reviews, 1.283, 2.66;
- on sin, 1.268;
- and subjectivity, 2.66
- A. F., 2.109
- Anti-Climacus, see Johannes Anti-Climacus
- Constantin Constantius, 1.263–68, 1.284, 1.286–87, 1.290, 1.296, 1.298, [1.625], 2.viii, 2.67–69;
- Johannes Climacus on, 1.263–68;
- on engagement, 1.265
- Fashion Designer, 1.296, 1.298
- Frater Taciturnus, 1.321, 1.324, 1.347, [1.625], 2.xii, 2.xviii, 2.67, 2.109;
- on engagement, 1.265–66;
- on Hegelian philosophy, 1.296–97;
- and humor, 1.290–92, 1.500–01;
- and imaginary construction, 1.501;
- Johannes Climacus on, 1.264–66, 1.289–300;
- and Johannes de Silentio, 1.500–01;
- and Møller (P.L.), 2.117;
- on observation, 1.501
- H. H., 2.xiii
- Hilarius Bookbinder, [1.625], 2.viii, 2.xvi, 2.265
- Inter et Inter, 2.xiv, 2.261, 2.279
- Johannes Anti-Climacus, 2.xiii, 2.262;
- vs. Johannes Climacus, 2.xiii
- Johannes Climacus, [1.625], 2.vii–X, 2.xv, 2.xviii, 2.41, 2.97, 2.118, 2.156, 2.168, 2.181;

and amusement park, 1.499;
on *Anxiety*, 1.268–70;
as author, 1.185–88, 1.250, 1.618, 2.56, 2.60, 2.121, 2.135,
2.155–56;
and Christensen, 2.125;
and Christianity, 1.466, 1.617, 1.619, 2.56, 2.58, 2.64–65,
2.101–02, 2.146–47, 2.163;
and the comic, 1.519;
on Constantin Constantius, 1.263–68;
and dialectic, 2.181;
and Eiriksson, 2.161–65;
on *Either/Or*, 1.251–56, 1.294–300;
and eternal happiness, 1.15–16, 1.617;
as existing person, 2.49;
on *Fear and Trembling*, 1.261–62, 1.264–68;
on *Fragments*, 1.270, 1.274–78, 1.283–84;
on Frater Taciturnus, 1.264–66, 1.289–300;
and god, 2.190;
and going further, 1.617;
in graveyard, 1.235–40, 2.57–59, 2.104;
and Hegel, 1.622, 2.74, 2.163;
and honesty, 1.622;
as human being, 2.121;
as humorist, 1.501, 1.617, 2.ix, 2.157, 2.160;
and imaginary construction, 1.511–12, 1.617, 2.160;
on *Irony*, 1.90;
vs. Johannes Anti-Climacus, 2.xiii;
on Johannes de Silentio, 1.262, 2.164;
and Kierkegaard, 1.90, 1.256–57, 1.261, 1.270–73, 2.159;
as learner, 1.622–23;
against majority, 1.618;
making something more difficult, 1.186–88, 1.241, 1.276,
1.381, 1.499, 2.104;
as martyr, 2.105–06;
on Nicolaus Notabene, 1.270;
and Nielsen, 2.159–61;
as pastor, 2.124;

on pseudonymous works, 1.251–58, 1.261–70, 1.278–300,
 2.xv, 2.149–50;
 and reader, 1.274–77, 1.621–23, 2.74, 2.104–07, 2.121–25;
 on reception, 1.187–88;
 on *Repetition*, 1.262–68;
 and reviewers, 1.274–77, 1.283;
 on signed works, 1.256–57, 1.270–73, 2.xv, 2.149–50;
 on *Stages*, 1.284–87, 1.294–300;
 and subjectivity, 1.187–88;
 and suffering, 1.621;
 vs. system, 1.188;
 task of, 1.186–88, 2.58;
 and thinking, 2.x;
 on *Three Upbuilding Discourses* (1843), 1.256–57;
 and truth, 2.135;
 on *Two Upbuilding Discourses* (1843), 1.256–57;
 on upbuilding discourses, 1.256–57, 1.270–73;
 on Victor Eremita, 1.252–56;
 on Young Man, 1.263
 Johannes de Silentio, 1.105–06, 1.262, 1.312, [1.625–26],
 2.vii, 2.7;
 as author, 2.60;
 and double-reflection, 2.60–61;
 and faith, 2.163–64;
 and Frater Taciturnus, 1.500–01;
 and Johannes Climacus, 1.262, 2.164
 Johannes the Seducer, 1.287, 1.296–99, [1.626], 2.168;
 and egotism, 2.68–69
 Judge William, 1.284, 1.287, [1.625–26], 2.67, 2.113;
 and the esthetic, 1.295–96;
 and woman, 1.299
 Nicolaus Notabene, 1.270, [1.625], 2.viii, 2.63
 Quidam: and the comic, 1.291;
 of imaginary construction, 1.289–91, 1.501, [1.626], 2.67–69;
 and inwardness, 1.291
 Victor Eremita, 1.284, 1.286–87, 1.296, 1.298, [1.625–26],
 2.vii, 2.xvi, 2.xviii, 2.109, 2.113;

on *Don Giovanni*, 2.67;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.252–56
 Vigilius Haufniensis, [1.625], 2.viii, 2.223, 2.231, 2.234, 2.235
 William Afham, [1.625], 2.66–67
 Young Man, 1.290, 1.297, 2.68–69;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.263
 and reader, [1.629], 2.108–12, 2.148–52
 and religiousness, 2.149–50, 2.152
 as reviewer, 2.xi, 2.116–18, 2.143
 “second authorship,” 2.xiii–xv
 and Socrates, 1.503, 2.35, 2.184
 task of, 2.109, 2.117, 2.166
 and travel, 2.143
 works cited:
 “The Activity of a Traveling Esthetician and How He Still Happened to Pay for the Dinner,” 2.xii, 2.109, 2.117–19, 2.271
 “Another Defense of Woman’s Great Abilities,” 2.109
 The Battle between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars, 2.243
 The Book on Adler, 2.97, 2.195, 2.226, 2.261, 2.262, 2.270, 2.273, 2.280
 The Changelessness of God, 2.xiv, 2.260
 Christian Discourses, 2.xii–xiv, 2.138, 2.143, 2.261, 2.279;
 “Discourses at the Communion on Fridays,” 2.153, 2.167
 The Concept of Anxiety, 1.268–70, [1.625], 2.vii, 2.182, 2.194, 2.210, 2.222, 2.223, 2.225, 2.229, 2.231, 2.234, 2.235, 2.236, 2.244, 2.245, 2.246, 2.249, 2.250, 2.253, 2.261, 2.262, 2.268;
 as direct communication, 1.269–70;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.268–70;
 on sin, 2.63
 The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates, 2.xv, 2.35, 2.189, 2.208, 2.215, 2.219, 2.238, 2.241, 2.244, 2.249, 2.268;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.90
 Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, [1.625], [1.627], 2.xii, 2.41, 2.78, 2.97–98, 2.101,

2.117–19, 2.138, 2.142–45, 2.153–59;
 Christensen on, 2.xviii–xix, 2.125–27;
 and Christianity, 2.139, 2.156–59;
 and the comic, 2.145;
 and *The Corsair*, 2.116;
 Eiriksson on, 2.129–37, 2.161–65;
 faith in, 2.155;
 and *Fragments*, 1.9–17, 1.46, 1.49, 1.53, 1.104, 1.284, 2.vii,
 2.ix, 2.xi;
Den Frisindede on, 2.xviii;
 on ignorance, 2.51;
 on lecturing, 2.133;
 Martensen and, 2.129–35, 2.161–62;
 Møller (P.L.) on, 2.xvii–xviii, 2.117–22;
 Nielsen on, 2.xix, 2.155–56, 2.159–61;
 outlines of, 2.ix, 2.7–8, 2.9–14;
 paradox in, 2.163–64;
 printing of, 2.viii;
 and reader, 1.620;
 reception of, 2.xv–xix, 2.104–05;
 reviews of, 2.xv–xix, 2.117–22, 2.125–27, 2.129–37, 2.155–
 56, 2.159–65;
 revocation of, 1.619, 1.621, 2.104–06;
 sales of, 2.xv–xvi, 2.145, 2.153, 2.156, 2.225;
 scholarship in, 2.155;
 and speculative thought, 2.x, 2.162;
 as superfluous, 1.618–20;
 title of, 2.ix–xi, 2.8–9;
 as turning point, 2.xiii–xv, 2.140;
 writing of, 2.vii–viii;
 “A First and Last Explanation,” 2.viii, 2.xvi
The Corsair Affair and Articles Related to the Writings, 2.xii,
 2.xvi, 2.225, 2.229, 2.236, 2.265, 2.266, 2.267, 2.268,
 2.271, 2.272, 2.277, 2.278, 2.280, 2.281
The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress, 2.xiii–xiv, 2.138,
 2.261
 “A Cursory Observation Concerning a Detail in *Don Giovanni*,”

2.109

“The Dialectical Result of a Literary Police Action,” 2.271–72

“The Difference Between a Genius and an Apostle,” 2.232,
2.260–61

Early Polemical Writings, 2.243, 2.260, 2.277

Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, 2.xvi, 2.218, 2.223, 2.233,
2.235, 2.261, 2.280

Either/Or, 1.181, 1.499, [1.625–26], 2.vii, 2.x, 2.xii, 2.xiv–xvi,
2.67–70, 2.109, 2.113, 2.119, 2.138–40, 2.142–44,
2.153–54, 2.158, 2.193, 2.195, 2.218, 2.219, 2.225,
2.236, 2.237, 2.238, 2.241, 2.258, 2.267, 2.269, 2.273,
2.278;

on depression, 1.253;

on despair, 1.253–54, 1.257–58, 1.268;

the esthetic in, 1.252–56;

the ethical in, 1.252–56, 1.503;

on existence, 1.253–56;

and Hegelian philosophy, 1.304–05;

and imaginary construction, 2.68–70;

inwardness in, 1.252–57;

Johannes Climacus on, 1.251–56, 1.294–300;

on marriage, 1.181, 1.254;

sales of, 1.286, 2.xv;

second edition of, 2.xiv, 2.148;

on sin, 1.268;

on speculative thought, 1.252;

and *Stages*, 1.284–87, 1.294–300;

on truth, 1.252–57;

upbuilding in, 1.268;

“The Esthetic Validity of Marriage,” 1.181;

“The Seducer’s Diary,” 1.284, 1.286, 1.295, 2.68–69

“An Explanation and a Little More,” 2.118

Fear and Trembling, 1.105–06, 1.312, [1.625–26], 2.vii, 2.163,
2.184, 2.192, 2.206, 2.207, 2.219, 2.226, 2.227, 2.234,
2.236, 2.237, 2.244, 2.261, 2.269, 2.272, 2.275, 2.280;

hiddenness in, 1.261–62;

Johannes Climacus on, 1.261–62, 1.264–68;

on knight of faith, 1.500, [1.626];

sin in, 1.268

For Self-Examination, 2.xiv, 2.185, 2.258

Four Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 2.275

Four Upbuilding Discourses (1844), 1.270, 2.viii;

humor in, 2.63–64;

“To Need God Is a Human Being’s Highest Perfection,” 2.261

From the Papers of One Still Living, 2.xv, 2.109, 2.243

Johannes Climacus, or De omnibus dubitandum est, 2.214, 2.227,
2.233, 2.243, 2.245, 2.255

Kierkegaard: Letters and Documents, 2.xiii, 2.xvi, 2.222, 2.225,
2.272

The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air, 2.xiv

The Moment, 2.xiv

The Moment and Late Writings, 2.238, 2.260

The Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures, 2.214

On My Work as an Author, 2.280;

“The Accounting,” 2.148, 2.154, 2.166, 2.167, 2.168

“On the Polemic of *Fædrelandet*,” 2.260

Philosophical Fragments or A Fragment of Philosophy, 1.46, 1.49,
1.53, 1.104, 1.133, 1.269, 1.270, 1.274–78, 1.283–84,
1.300, 1.343, 1.577, [1.625], 2.xviii, 2.41, 2.52, 2.54,
2.59, 2.64–66, 2.79–80, 2.110, 2.113, 2.185, 2.189,
2.190, 2.193, 2.194, 2.195, 2.196, 2.200, 2.207, 2.208,
2.210, 2.215, 2.217, 2.229, 2.231, 2.233, 2.243, 2.244,
2.246, 2.249, 2.252, 2.257, 2.258, 2.262, 2.267, 2.268,
2.269, 2.270, 2.272;

on approximation, 1.212;

Beck on, 1.274–77, 2.65–66;

on becoming a Christian, 1.381–84;

on Christianity, 1.367;

on contemporaneity, 1.38, 1.96–98;

on contradiction, 1.24–25;

and the dialectical, 1.561, 1.569;

on earnestness, 1.276–77;

on eternal happiness, 1.93, 1.362, 1.369, 1.380–81;

evolution of, 1.185–88;

on the god, 1.573;

and the historical, 1.24, 1.362, 1.369;

as imaginary construction, 1.361–62;
 as indirect communication, 1.274–78;
 irony in, 2.66;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.270, 1.274–78, 1.283–84;
 and learner, 1.573;
 on moment, 1.584;
 on paradox, 1.213, 1.531–32;
 on past, 1.118;
 plan of, 1.361–84;
 and *Postscript*, 1.9–17, 1.284, 2.vii, 2.ix, 2.xi;
 reception of, 1.5–6;
 reviews of, 1.274–77, 2.65–66;
 and Religiousness B, 1.579;
 Socrates in, 1.162, 1.206–07;
 and teacher, 1.573;
 “The Moral,” 1.204
The Point of View for My Work as an Author, 2.vii, 2.x, 2.xiii,
 2.xv, 2.278, 2.280;
 appendix to, 2.140, 2.143
Practice in Christianity, 2.xiii, 2.200, 2.216, 2.218, 2.257,
 2.260;
 and direct communication, 2.168
Prefaces, [1.625], 2.vii, 2.225, 2.226, 2.235, 2.237, 2.238,
 2.275
 “Public Confession,” 2.158, 2.225, 2.229
Repetition, [1.625], 2.vii, 2.68–69, 2.184, 2.196, 2.210, 2.222,
 2.224, 2.234, 2.236, 2.242, 2.274;
 and “‘Guilty?’/ ‘Not Guilty?’” 1.289–94;
 Job in, 2.64;
 Johannes Climacus on, 1.262–68;
 and reader, 2.64
Samlede Værker, 2.xvii
The Sickness unto Death, 2.xiii, 2.194, 2.200, 2.227, 2.229,
 2.244, 2.258, 2.259, 2.262, 2.269;
 despair in, 2.266
Stages on Life’s Way, 1.202, 1.264, 1.321–22, 1.500, [1.625],
 2.viii, 2.x, 2.66–69, 2.215, 2.223, 2.236, 2.237, 2.238,

2.252, 2.265, 2.270, 2.272, 2.279, 2.280;
and *Either/Or*, 1.284–87, 1.294–300;
on ethics, 1.503;
and humor, 1.290;
Johannes Climacus on, 1.284–87, 1.294–300;
and *Repetition*, 1.289–94;
“Guilty?”/“Not Guilty?” 1.287–94, [1.626], 2.67–69, 2.234;
“*In Vino Veritas*,” 1.297, 1.299, [1.626];
“Some Reflections on Marriage in Answer to Objections,”
1.181

Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, 2.viii

Three Upbuilding Discourses (1843), 2.234;

Johannes Climacus on, 1.256–57

Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review, 2.viii, 2.xi, 2.116, 2.143, 2.182, 2.278

Two Discourses at the Communion on *Fridays*, 2.140, 2.143,
2.272

Two *Ethical-Religious Essays*, 2.xiii, 2.143

Two *Upbuilding Discourses* (1843), 2.xiv, 2.138–39, 2.153–55;

Johannes Climacus on, 1.256–57;

“The Expectancy of Faith,” 2.184

Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 2.xiii, 2.138, 2.143;

“An Occasional Discourse,” 2.221

“Who Is the Author of *Either/ Or*?” 2.109

Without *Authority*, 2.232, 2.260–61, 2.272, 2.280

“A Word of Thanks to Professor Heiberg,” 2.109, 2.271

Works of Love, 2.xiii, 2.138, 2.143, 2.267

ξίνηταις: Aristotle on, 1.342. *See also* movement

king, *see* analogy

kingdom of heaven: child and, 1.592–95

Kjeldermænd, 2.216

Kjøbenhavnsposten, 2.117, 2.119–21, 2.153;

“*Kjøbenhavnspostens Anmeldelse af ‘Afsluttende uvidenskabeltg Efterskrift’*,” 2.119

knickers, 2.38. *See also* trousers

knight: of faith, 1.500, [1.626];

of hidden inwardness, 1.499, 1.506–12

knowledge, knowing: and actuality, 1.316;
and appropriation, 1.79;
and Christianity, 1.215, 1.274–75, 1.283, 1.371–75, 1.608, 2.50;
and communication, 1.274–77;
vs. doing, 1.160–61;
and eternal happiness, 1.15, 1.30, 1.93–98;
and the ethical, 1.52, 1.160–62, 1.198, 1.317;
and existence, 1.81, 1.197–200, 1.297, 1.348, 2.x, 2.65;
and faith, 1.29;
of God, 1.199–201;
historical, 1.15, 1.30, 1.81, 1.93–98, 1.316, 1.324, 1.574–78;
and ideality, 1.324–25;
vs. inwardness, 1.255;
and objectivity, 1.52–53, 1.608;
reader and, 1.274–78;
and recollection, 1.205–09;
religious, 1.198;
and scholarship, 1.347–48;
of the simple, 1.180–82;
Socrates and, 1.161–62, 1.317, 2.81;
and speculative thought, 1.206, 1.223–24;
and subjectivity, 1.316, 1.347–48;
and truth, 1.252;
vs. uncertainty, 1.87

Kofod, Hans Ancher, *Historiens vigtigste Begivenheder*, 2.221

Kts, *see* Mynster, Jakob Peter

laborer, *see* analogy

lacemaker, *see* analogy

Lafontaine, August Heinrich Julius, 1.438

Landsoldater, 2.259

language: of abstraction, 1.301, 1.304–08, 1.332, 1.342;

of actuality, 1.315;

Greek, 2.100;

and words, 2.83–84

laughter, 2.95–96, 2.103;

the comic and, 1.518–19, 2.96;

and truth, 1.512

Lavater, Johann Caspar: and Lessing, 1.70;

Physiognomische Fragmente zur Beforderung der Menschenkenntniss und Menschenliebe, 2.196;

Physiognomische Reisen, 2.196

lawyer: shyster, 1.523–24

leap, 1.12, 1.258, 1.262, 1.424;

and abstraction, 1.342;

and beginning of system, 1.115;

and decision, 1.99, 1.105, 1.381, 1.384, 2.35–36;

and existence, 1.124, 1.342;

and immanence, 1.295;

and intellectual intuition, 1.150;

and isolation, 1.100–02;

Jacobi on, 1.100–05;

Lessing on, 1.93–106, 1.115;

Mendelssohn on, 1.103–05;

qualitative, 1.338;

reflection and, 1.115–16;

and transition, 1.102–03

learner: of existence, 1.622–23, 2.ix–x;

Fragments on, 1.573;

and inwardness, 1.242, 1.247–49;

Johannes Climacus as, 1.622–23;

and teacher, 1.242, 1.247–49, 1.573, 1.622–23

Leclerc, Georges-Louis, Count of Buffon, *Histoire naturelle*, 1.553

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm: *Opera philosophica*, 2.271;

Theodicy, 2.271

Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 61–125;

on Alexander, 1.96;

and Aristophanes, 2.37;

and Christianity, 1.65–67;

and the comic, 1.91;

and communication, 1.72–80;

on contemporaneity, 1.96–98;

and the dialectical, 1.68–69;

earnestness of, 1.69–71;

and Gleim, 1.104;
 God-relationship of, 1.67;
 and Goeze, 1.91, 1.107;
 gratitude to, 1.63–71, 2.10–13, 2.32;
 and Grundtvig, 1.36;
 and Hegel, 1.70;
 and I, 1.69;
 as individuality, 1.66;
 and Jacobi, 1.70, 1.100–05, 2.37;
 and Lavater, 1.70;
 on leap, 1.93–106, 1.115;
 and Lindberg, 1.36;
 and Origen, 1.96–97;
 and present age, 1.67–68;
 and private thinker, 2.38–39;
 and reader, 2.35;
 and Reimarus, 2.202–03, 2.209;
 and the religious, 1.65–67, 1.71;
 and result, 1.65;
 and Socrates, 1.69;
 and Spinoza, 1.100–01;
 on striving, 1.80, 1.106–09, 1.121;
 style of, 1.69–70;
 as subjective thinker, 2.33–35;
 and subjectivity, 1.65–67;
 and system, 1.106, 2.38–39;
 and truth, 1.106–09, 2.34;
 as wiley, 2.32;
 “Axiomata,” 2.190;
Eine Duplik, 1.106–09;
 “Fabeln und Erzählungen,” 2.195;
 “Laocoon,” 2.194–95, 2.197;
 “Leben des Sophokles,” 2.231;
Sammliche Schriften, 2.190;
 “Über den Beweis des Getstes und der Kraft, an den Herrn Direktor Schumann,” 1.93–106;
 “Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet. Eine Untersuchung,” 2.257–58

letter from heaven, *see* analogy

Levin, Israel Salomon, 2.68;

Album af nulevende danske Mænds og Qvin-ders Haandskrifter i lithographerede Facsimiler, 2.275;

En Brevvexling, 2.275

Levy, Carl Edvard Marius: on maternity hospital, 2.41

Ley, Christian Sigfred: and Grundtvig, 2.19, 2.31

Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph, 1.285–87

lieutenant, *see* analogy

life: ages in, 1.348;

vs. church, 1.179, 1.415, 1.440, 1.442, 1.459, 1.464–82, 1.492, 1.496, 1.513, 1.535, 1.541; 2.82–86;

and the comic, 1.513–14;

and danger, 1.416–17;

everyday, 1.464–78, 1.487, 1.489;

God and, 1.489;

humorist and, 1.449–51;

individual and, 1.389–90, 1.464–78;

and meaning of, 1.449–51;

and mediation, 1.416–17;

and relativity, 1.510;

religious speaker and, 1.465–66, 1.487;

as riddle, 1.451;

spy on, 1.466–72, 1.475–78;

stages of, 1.513–14;

strenuousness of, 1.498–99;

and suffering, 1.438–39;

task of, 1.163–65, 1.167–70, 1.176, 1.179, 1.182, 1.466;

understood backward, 2.187;

venture of, 1.548. *See also* being; existence

life-view, 1.172;

author and, [1.627];

and Christianity, 1.588, 2.101;

fantastical, 1.598;

and good fortune, 1.433;

of immediacy, 1.433;

individuality and, [1.625–26];

- and misfortune, 1.433–34;
- poet and, 1.434;
- pseudonymous authors and, 2.110;
- religious, 1.439, 2.92;
- in religious address, 1.435, 2.92;
- speculative-ethical, 1.474

Lindberg, Jacob Christian, 2.25;

- and Church, 1.38–41;
- and Grundtvig, 1.38–39, 1.46, 2.xviii, 2.29;
- and Lessing, 1.36;
- “*Anledning af Hr Overlærer Kalkars Skrift om Troes-bekjendelsens Form i den danske Kirke*,” 2.191;
- “*Om den christne Troes-Bekjendelses Form i den sidste Udgave af den danske Alterbog*,” 2.190, 2.191

Lisco, Friedrich Gustav, *Das christliche Kirchenjahr*, 2.101

listener: religious speaker and, 1.418–19, 1.435–38, 1.442, 1.530–31

living, the: vs. the dead, 1.156–58

Living Word: Apostles’ Creed as, 1.40–43;

- and approximation, 1.41;
- in Church, 1.37, 1.40–41, 2.21;
- and dogmatics, 2.24–25;
- and the ethical-psychological, 2.23;
- Grundtvig and, 1.40, 1.44, 1.46, 2.21–25;
- and the historical, 2.25;
- and matchless discovery, 2.21–25;
- and the metaphysical, 2.23–24;
- and mother tongue, 2.23;
- and Scripture, 2.21;
- vs. written word, 2.22

Livy: *From the Founding of the City (History of Rome)*, 2.230, 2.260;
T. Livy Patavini historiarum libri, 2.230

logic: and existence, 2.55;

- Hegel’s, 1.109–18, 1.310;
- movement in, 1.109–10, 1.113, 1.308;
- and ontology, 2.76. *See also* system

logos, 2.25. *See also* word; Word

Lord, *see* God

Lot's wife, 1.163, 1.603

love, 1.396–97;

and absolute τέλος, 1.408–09, 2.88–89;

equality in, 1.492;

God and, 1.137;

and mediation, 1.408–09;

parental, 1.591, 2.101;

poet and, 1.388–90;

and relativity, 1.510;

and striving, 1.92;

unhappy, 2.125–28;

and venture, 1.425. *See also* analogy; erotic love

lover, *see* analogy

Lucian: "Charon, or the Inspectors," 1.86;

Schriften, 2.202

Lücke, Friedrich, 2.16;

Commentar über die Briefe des Evangelisten Johannes, 2.272

lunacy, 1.422–26, 1.458;

and the comic, 1.196;

and Don Quixote, 1.195;

and inwardness, 1.194–96;

and skepticism, 2.75;

and truth, 1.194–96

lunatic, 1.332, 1.457–58. *See also* analogy

Lund, Henrik Ferdinand, 2.226

Luno, Christian Peter Bianco, 2.68, 2.117, 2.165

Luther, Martin, 2.24, 2.78–79, 2.252;

and appropriation, 1.366;

at Diet of Worms, 1.341;

on Letter of St. James, 1.26;

on prayer, 1.163;

Die Auslegungen des Evang. Johannis, 2.222;

The Babylonian Captivity of the Church, 1.366, 2.78–79;

Geist aus Luther's Schriften oder Concordanz der Ansichten und Urtheile des grossen Reformators, 2.222;

Sammtliche Werke, 2.185;

The Small Catechism, 2.267;

“Vorrede auf das Neue Testament,” 2.185;

“Vorrede auf die Episteln S.

Jacobi und Juda,” 2.185;

Werke, 2.255

Maal, 1.312

Maanedsskrift for Christendom og Historie, 2.189, 2.236

Maanedsskrift for Litteratur, 2.209

Macbeth, Lady, 1.99

madness, *see* lunacy

Madvig, Johan Nicolai, 2.11, 2.158–59, 2.271;

and Baden, 2.125;

De finibus bonorum et malorum, 2.185

Magister: Holberg and, 2.133

Mahabharata, 1.527

man, men: and inwardness, 1.236;

vs. woman, 2.69. *See also* analogy; old man

Marie Sophie Frederikke (queen of Denmark), 2.225

Marivaux, Pierre Carlet de Chamblain de, 2.261

marketplace loafer, *see* analogy

marriage, 1.408;

and absolute τέλος, 1.411–12, 1.456;

and adultery, 1.265;

Bible on, 1.265;

Christianity and, 2.158;

Either/Or on, 1.181, 1.254;

and the ethical, 2.62;

and jest, 1.456;

pseudonymous authors on, 1.265, 2.62;

and the religious, 1.179–81;

Stages on, 1.181;

and task, 1.180;

vs. the world-historical, 1.180–81

married couple, *see* analogy

Mars: invisibility of, 1.79, 1.174

Martensen, Hans Lassen, 2.xix, 2.156;

on Baptism, 2.29–30;
 and Eiriksson, 2.125, 2.128–35, 2.161;
 and Heiberg, 2.72;
 on Heiberg, “*Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Cursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole*,” 2.236;
 and Kierkegaard, 2.132;
 and Nielsen, 2.158–59;
 on *Postscript*, 2.129–35, 2.161–62;
 as professor, 2.131–32;
 “*Betragtninger over Ideen af Faust*,” 2.244;
Den christelige Daab betragtet med Hensyn paa det baptistiske Spørgsmaal, 2.29;
Den christelige Dogmattk, 2.158;
Grundndts til Moralphilosophiens System, 2.229
 martyrdom, martyr: and Christianity, 1.232–34;
 of faith, 1.559, 2.15;
 and hidden inwardness, 1.507–08;
 Johannes Climacus and, 2.105–06;
 and joy, 1.453;
 and suffering, 1.597–98
 “matchless discovery,” 1.71;
 Grundtvig and, 1.36, 1.40–41, 2.17–18, 2.21–25;
 and Living Word, 2.21–25;
 as metaphysical, 2.23–24
 Mathiesen, Lars, 2.30
 Mcbeth, Lady, *see* Macbeth, Lady
 mediation, 1.33;
 and absolute τέλος, 1.400–01;
 and abstraction, 1.198–99;
 and beginning, 1.420;
 both-and of, 1.400–01;
 between Christianity and speculative thought, 1.369–70, 1.374–81, 2.80;
 danger in, 1.416–17;
 and eternal happiness, 1.395;
 and the ethical, 1.396, 1.399–401;
 and existence, 1.399–422;

- in Germany, 1.411;
- in Greece, 1.411;
- and guilt, 1.541;
- individual and, 1.399, 1.406–22;
- in life, 1.416–17;
- love and, 1.408–09;
- monastic movement and, 1.406–19, 2.88;
- on paper, 1.419–20;
- and relative τέλος, 1.397;
- and the religious, 1.396;
- and resignation, 1.396, 1.400–02, 1.406–07, 1.410–11;
- and thought, 1.399;
- and totality-category, 1.541;
- and truth, 1.192
- medicine, *see* analogy
- mediocrity: and silence, 1.548–49
- Mendelssohn, Moses: and leap, 1.103–05
- mermaid(s), 1.545
- μετρίως παθεῖν, 1.399
- Michelet, Carl Ludwig, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel*, I-II, 1.250, 2.62
- Middle Ages: Greece in, 1.402;
 - and indulgence, 1.524;
 - and inwardness, 1.413–14;
 - monastic movement of, 1.401–19, 1.472–74, 1.481–82, 1.542, 1.565;
 - and penance, 1.542–47;
 - vs. present age, 1.458, 1.472–74, 1.544;
 - religiousness of, 1.458, 1.472–74
- millenarianism, 2.257
- Miltiades: and Themistocles, 1.359–60
- mimetic, the: and thought, 2.24
- miracle(s): and certainty, 2.100;
 - and clergy, 2.100;
 - and demonstrations, 1.96–97;
 - and faith, 2.100;
 - vs. system, 1.184–85, 1.188

mirror, *see* analogy

misfortune: clergy and, 1.438;

and despair, 1.439–40;

as evil, 1.446;

and fate, 1.434;

vs. fortune, 1.433, 1.436–49, 1.453–54;

and God-relationship, 1.445–46;

humorist and, 1.447–49;

and immediacy, 1.433–34, 1.436, 1.443;

individual and, 1.433–40, 1.443;

and jest, 1.438, 1.447–48;

and life-view, 1.433–34;

poet and, 1.434;

religious address on, 1.436–47;

and suffering, 1.433–40, 1.453

Mohammedanism, 1.47, 1.578, 2.10, 2.163;

and Allah, 2.17

Molbech, Christian: *Dansk poetisk*

Anthologie, 2.224;

*Om Udgivelsen af Anders Vedels danske Saxo, og om Samfundet til
den danske Literaturs Fremme*, 2.77

Molboer, *see* analogy

Møller, Peder Ludvig (pseud. Prosper naturalis de molinasky),
2.120, 2.153;

Frater Taciturnus and, 2.117;

and Heiberg, 2.125;

Kierkegaard and, 2.117–19;

on *Postscript*, 2.xvii–xviii, 2.117–22;

Et Besøg i Sorø, 2.117, 2.165;

Kritiske Skizzer fra Aarene 1840–47, 2.278

Møller, Poul Martin and Grundtvig, 2.31;

vs. Hegel, 1.34;

on immortality, 1.172;

and speculative thought, 1.172;

Efterladte Skrifter, 2.222;

*Forsøg til et Himmelbrev, i Grundtvigs nye, historiske Smag, fundet af
Poul Møller*, 2.19, 2.249;

Nogle Betragtninger over populære Ideers Udvikling, 2.213;

Strøtanker, 1.351;

“*Tanker over Muligheden af Beviser for Menneskets Udødelighed, med Hensyn til den nyeste derhen hørende Literatur*,” 2.222, 2.223, 2.244, 2.257, 2.267

Mols, 1.378

moment: and the eternal, 1.573;

Fragments on, 1.584;

and time, 1.422;

woman as, 1.298–99

monarchy: vs. democracy, 1.620–21

monastery, monastic movement, monastic life: and absolute τέλος, 1.401–02, 1.405, 1.414;

and actuality, 1.319–20;

clergy and, 1.416–17;

and externality, 1.406–07, 1.472;

and humility, 1.492–93;

vs. insane asylum, 1.416;

and interiority, 1.405–09;

and mediation, 1.406–19, 2.88;

as meritorious, 1.414–15;

in Middle Ages, 1.401–19, 1.472–74, 1.481–82, 1.542, 1.565;

and passion, 1.402, 1.414;

and penance, 1.542;

religious discourse on, 1.481

Monomotapa, 1.150, 1.154

morality, the moral: and the comic, 1.518

Moses, 2.275

mother: and child, 2.59;

love, 1.591, 2.101

mother tongue: Grundtvig and, 2.23;

and Living Word, 2.23

motion, *see* movement

movement: and abstraction, 1.342;

Aristotle on, 1.342;

and the comic, 2.97;

contradiction of, 1.516–17;

- and the eternal, 1.312–13;
- and existence, 1.308–09, 1.312–13, 1.342, 1.413;
- of infinity, 1.502;
- in logic, 1.109–10, 1.113, 1.308;
- and mediation, 1.198;
- and passion, 2.73;
- and thought, 2.73;
- and time, 1.342;
- and totality, 2.97

Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus, 1.284;
Don Giovanni, 2.67

Muller, Julius, *Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde*, 2.40–41

Munchhausen, Karl Friedrich Hieronymus, Freiherr von, 1.52, 1.99,
 1.281;
 and earnestness, 2.36;
*Wunderbare Reisen zu Wasser und Lande, Feldzuge und lustige
 Abentheuer des Freyherrn von Munchhausen Aus dem
 Englischen nach der neuesten Ausgabe ubersetzt, tr. Gottfried
 August Burger*, 2.193

Mynster, Jakob Peter (pseud. Kts), [1.629], 2.61, 2.64, 2.111,
 2.120, 2.145, 2.158–59, 2.271;
 and Beck, 2.125;
 Grundtvig on, 2.189;
 Hegelians against, 1.305;
 on Jacobi, 1.262, 2.234;
 and new hymnbook, 2.262;
 “*Kirkelig Polemik*,” 1.273, 2.233, 2.233–34;
Om Begrebet af den christelige Dogmatik, 2.189;
Om de danske Udgaver af Luthers lille Katechismus, 2.191

mystery: and Christianity, 1.213–14;
 and revelation, 1.245–46, 1.263

myth: Christ as, 1.600;
 Christianity as, 1.580

mythology: Norse, 2.20, 2.26

Napoleon, 1.165, 2.43, 2.137, 2.260;
 in Africa, 1.355;

- and outcome, 1.397–99;
- as religious individuality, 1.462
- Napoleonic Wars, 2.260
- Nathanson, Mendel Levin, 2.122
- negative, the, negativity: in communication, 1.76;
 - and existence, 1.81–90;
 - vs. the positive, 1.80–86, 1.91;
 - and the religious, 1.524–25;
 - in thinking, 1.80–86, 2.34–35
- Nemesis: and guilt, 1.541–42
- Neoplatonism, 2.24
- Nero, 2.20
- nettle, *see* analogy
- Neues Repertorium fur die theologische und kirchliche Statistik, 1.274–75, 2.65–66
- Nicodemus, 1.595
- Nielsen, Rasmus, 2.138, 2.156;
 - and didactic discourse, 2.159–60;
 - and Johannes Climacus, 2.159–61;
 - and Martensen, 2.158–59;
 - on *Postscript*, 2.xix, 2.155–56, 2.159–61;
 - and scholarship, 2.158, 2.160–61;
 - and Tryde, 2.42–43;
 - Mag. S. Kierkegaards “Johannes Climacus” og Dr. H. Martensens “Chnstehge Dogmatik “En undersøgende An-meldelse, 2.xix, 2.155, 2.159–61;*
 - Den speculative Logik i dens Grundtrak, 2.229*
- nisse, 1.338;
 - and Don Quixote, 1.140;
 - and world history, 1.140
- Nitsch, Paul Friedrich A., *neues mythologisches Worterbuch*, 2.227, 2.241, 2.256, 2.262, 2.266, 2.267
- non-being: vs. being, 1.80
- Nordiske Ktrke-Tidende, 2.190, 2.191, 2.273
- North America, *see* analogy novel(s): prayer in, 1.486–87
- Nyt Aftenblad, 2.xviii

oath: Brutus and, 1.240

objectivity, 1.560;

vs. Crinstianity, 1.19–21, 1.25, 1.27, 1.32, 1.37, 1.42–43, 1.47,
1.51–54, 1.57, 1.279, 1.371, 1.577–78, 1.607–13, 2.9–11;

and the comic, 1.43, 1.54–55, 1.124–25;

vs. eternal happiness, 1.32–34;

and existence, 1.123–25, 1.194;

and faith, 1.215;

vs. interestedness, 1.43;

and knowledge, 1.52–53, 1.608;

and papacy, 1.366;

Pilate and, 1.229–30;

and reflection, 1.192–203, 2.45;

and result, 1.73;

and scholarship, 1.43;

and single individual, 1.66–67;

and speculative thought, 1.54–57;

and striving, 1.194;

vs. subjectivity, 1.17, 1.21–22, 1.31–34, 1.37–40, 1.52–54, 1.66,
1.72–80, 1.93, 1.116, 1.123, 1.129–41, 1.192–203, 1.229–
30, 1.279–80, 2.11, 2.39, 2.45;

and thinking, 1.73–76, 1.79, 1.339;

and truth, 1.199, 1.207, 1.229–30;

and uncertainty, 1.203–05, 1.209–10;

and untruth, 1.207–09

observation, 1.133;

and Christianity, 1.57;

and the ethical, 1.141–44, 1.319–20, 1.359;

and faith, 1.21–22;

Frater Taciturnus on, 1.501;

and humor, 1.508;

individual and, 1.21–22, 1.501;

vs. inwardness, 1.32–33, 1.52–53;

and irony, 1.502–05;

and the religious, 1.359, 1.501;

and the world-historical, 1.150, 1.153–55, 1.159

Oehlenschläger, Adam Gottlob: *Aladdin or the wonderful lamp*,

2.218, 2.225;
Axel og Valborg, 1.285, 2.67;
Hagbarth og Signe, 1.285;
Poetiske Skrifter, 2.218
 offense, 1.292–93;
 Christianity and, 1.292–93, 1.539–40, 1.585;
 and despair, 1.372;
 and faith, 1.372, 1.585;
 to Jews, 1.213, 1.219, 1.292–93, 1.539, 1.598–99, 1.605;
 and newness, 1.539;
 and paradox, 1.585;
 possibility of, 1.585;
 and Religiousness A, 1.585;
 and Religiousness B, 1.585
Ogter de Danemarche, 2.273
Ogier le Danois, 2.273
 old man, 2.64–65;
 and child, 1.237–41, 1.461, 2.57–58;
 as individuality, 1.241
 Olsen, Frederik Christian Martin: *Efterladte Skrifter*, 2.189;
 Poul Mollers Levnet, 1.34, 2.276
 ontology: and logic, 2.76
 ordeal: and the ethical, 1.263, 1.266;
 and terror, 1.266–67
 Origen: and Lessing, 1.96–97
 orthodoxy: and Baptism, 1.595, 1.610;
 childish, 1.595–601;
 and Christ, 1.596–99;
 and Christianity, 1.595–696, 1.613;
 and paganism, 1.599–600
 Osiris, 1.92, 2.33
 outcome, *see* result
 outer, the: and the inner, 1.54, 1.138, 1.296–97, 1.541–42, 2.24
 outwardness, *see* externality
 Overskou, Thomas: *Comedier*, 2.229;
 Misforstaaelse paa Misforstaaelse, 1.210

paganism: and Christendom, 1.368;
and Christianity, 1.279, 1.361–62, 1.375, 1.429–31, 1.579–81;
and direct recognizability, 1.600;
as direct relationship with God, 1.243–47;
orthodoxy and, 1.599–600;
and paradox, 2.50;
and truth, 2.50

pain: and the comic, 1.514–16;
in humor, 1.551–53;
and irony, 1.551–53;
of sympathy, 1.585–86

pantheism, 1.122–23;
as recollection, 1.226–27

papacy: and objectivity, 1.366

paradigm: child as, 1.594;
and earnestness, 1.263;
and prototype, 1.259, 1.262;
religious, 1.259, 1.262, 1.263

paradox: absolute, 1.561–69, 1.580–81, 1.607, 1.611;
absolute vs. relative, 1.217–34;
and the absurd, 2.98–100, 2.163–64;
of Christianity, 1.95, 1.104–05, 1.213–34, 1.540, 1.562, 1.580,
2.37, 2.49–51, 2.54, 2.102;
Christ's birth as, 1.596–97;
Christ's suffering as, 1.597–98;
clergy and, 1.563–64;
and the eternal, 2.48;
and eternal happiness, 1.368;
and existence, 1.230, 1.270–71, 1.531–32, 2.53;
and explanation, 1.218–34;
and faith, 1.224–28, 1.233, 1.580–81, 1.611, 2.54, 2.99;
forgiveness of sins as, 1.224–28, 2.53–54;
Fragments on, 1.213, 1.531–32;
going beyond, 1.216;
Herr Professor and, 1.220;
human being and, 1.566;
and humor, 1.291–92, 1.532;

vs. immanence, 1.256;
incomprehensibility of, 1.561–69;
individual and, 1.580–81, 2.48–51, 2.53;
and inwardness, 1.224–28;
and objective uncertainty, 1.209;
and offense, 1.585;
and paganism, 2.50;
and passion, 1.230–33;
in *Postscript*, 2.163–64;
and prototype, 2.141;
and reason, 2.98–99;
and the religious, 1.182, 1.554;
and the simple, 1.227–28;
and sin-consciousness, 1.534;
Socrates on, 1.204–10, 2.50–52, 2.54;
vs. speculative thought, 1.214–34, 2.49, 2.52–53;
and time, 1.299;
truth as, 1.199, 1.204–34, 2.48–51;
and understanding, 1.562–69;
and unutterable joy, 1.221;
and upbuilding, 1.561;
and the wise, 1.227–28

paradoxical religiousness, *see* Religiousness B

passion, 1.299;

absolute, 1.509–10;
and certainty, 1.576–77;
and Christianity, 1.216, 1.611–13;
and the comic, 1.35;
and despair, 1.200;
and the dialectical, 1.385–87;
and the esthetic, 1.350–51;
and eternal happiness, 1.44, 1.47, 1.385, 1.576, 2.30;
and the ethical, 1.350–51;
and existence, 1.197, 1.311–13, 1.385–87;
and faith, 1.11, 1.14, 1.16–17, 1.29–34, 1.52, 1.204, 1.209–10,
1.233, 1.563, 1.565, 1.576, 1.606, 2.49–51;
and God, 1.200–01;

- and the historical, 1.575–76;
- and imagination, 1.440;
- individual and, 1.399, 1.509–11, 1.544, 1.575–78;
- and infinity, 1.200–04, 1.216, 1.231, 1.258–59, 1.440, 1.450;
- and inwardness, 1.199–204, 1.209–10, 1.233, 2.49–51;
- Job and, 2.64;
- in monastic movement, 1.402, 1.414;
- and motion, 2.73;
- and objective uncertainty, 1.204, 1.209–10;
- and paradox, 1.230–33;
- and reflection, 1.611–12;
- and relativity, 1.509;
- and the religious, 1.440, 1.505–10, 1.544;
- subjective thinker and, 1.350–51;
- and subjectivity, 1.509, 1.575–78;
- and truth, 1.231;
- and zealotism, 1.35–36
- past: and existence, 1.118;
- Fragments* on, 1.118;
- individuality and, 1.156–57;
- and speculative thought, 1.146;
- and world history, 1.146
- pastor(s): Johannes Climacus as, 2.124;
- Kierkegaard as, 2.xi–xiii, 2.116, 2.119, 2.141–42, 2.154–55, 2.167. *See also* clergy
- Pastoral Convention, 1.478–80
- path(s): of pleasure, 1.403;
- of virtue, 1.403–04, 1.428
- pathos, 1.299;
- and action, 1.390;
- and actuality, 1.443;
- of appropriation, 1.609;
- and becoming, 1.89–92;
- and the comic, 1.87–92;
- and the dialectical, 1.385–87, 1.535–36, 1.555–56, 1.581;
- and double-reflection, 1.87–90;
- and earnestness, 1.525;

esthetic, 1.387–91, 1.431–33;
and eternal happiness, 1.385–94, 1.533, 1.535;
and the ethical, 1.153, 1.390;
and existence, 1.89–93, 1.385–94, 1.431–33, 1.443, 1.526–27,
1.533, 1.535–38, 1.559, 1.583–85;
and guilt-consciousness, 1.526–27, 1.533;
and idea, 1.387;
of immediacy, 1.609;
individual and, 1.87–92, 1.387–91, 1.557, 1.559, 1.581;
and the infinite, 1.89–92;
and inwardness, 1.242, 1.385–87;
poet and, 1.440, 2.181;
poetic, 1.388–89, 1.394;
and possibility, 1.388–90;
and the religious, 1.388–89;
religious discourse and, 1.440, 1.555–56;
sharpened, 1.583–86;
and striving, 1.91–92;
and suffering, 1.431–33;
and world history, 1.389
Paul: conversion of, 1.184;
in Corinth, 1.279;
and faith, 2.81;
and suffering, 1.454;
and Thomas à Kempis, 2.167
pearl, *see* analogy
Peder Eriksen, 2.236
Pegasus, *see* analogy
penance: and guilt, 1.542–50;
Kierkegaard and, 2.145;
in Middle Ages, 1.542–47;
monastic movement and, 1.542;
self-inflicted, 1.542–47, 1.550. *See also* punishment
Per Degn, 1.64, 1.198, 2.42;
and Greek language, 2.100
Per Eriksen, 1.31
Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee, *see* Heiberg, Johan Ludvig

Persia, the Persian, 1.259, 1.307, 1.351, 1.428, 1.464, 1.469, 1.498
Peter, 1.594
Phaedrus Augustus, *Phaedn Augustt Liberti fabularum Aesopiarum*
 Libri V, 2.221, 2.250
Philipsen, Philip G., 2.xvi
Philosophicum, 2.227
philosophy: and the comic, 1.352–53;
 Greek, 1.99, 1.309, 1.328, 1.331, 1.352–54;
 and truth, 1.21. *See also individual philosophers*; Hegelian
 philosophy
physician, *see* analogy
piety: child and, 1.591;
 childlike, 1.412
Pilate, Pontius: and decision, 1.230;
 and objectivity, 1.229–30;
 and truth, 1.195, 1.229–30
πίστις: and probability, 2.98. *See also* faith
Plato: on erotic love, 1.92, 1.121;
 on god, 2.190;
 on love, 1.121;
 and Socrates, 1.205–07;
 Alcibiades, 2.276;
 Alcibiades secundus, 1.90;
 Apology, 2.189, 2.192, 2.197, 2.219, 2.223–24, 2.227–28, 2.235,
 2.268;
 Cratylus, 2.188, 2.244;
 Gorgias, 1.278, 2.201–02, 2.206, 2.219–20, 2.236, 2.270;
 Greater Hippias, 1.3, 1.383–84, 2.9;
 Opera, 2.188;
 Phaedo, 2.59, 2.232, 2.242–43;
 Phaedrus, 2.207, 2.217–18;
 Republic, 2.248–49;
 Symposium, 1.84, 1.92, 2.35, 2.200, 2.215;
 Theaetetus, 2.188–89, 2.279
playing cards, 2.266
pleasure: path of, 1.403
pledge: broken, 1.265–66, 2.62;

God and, 1.488;

and terror, 1.265–66. *See also* promise

Plenty, 1.92

Plutarch: and compound words, 2.20;

“Cato the Elder,” 2.196;

“Eudamidas,” 1.33;

“Isis and Osiris,” 1.92, 1.110;

Lives, 2.195, 2.215, 2.254;

“Marcellus,” 2.195;

Moralta, 1.33, 1.70–71, 2.20, 2.189, 2.196, 2.202, 2.213, 2.219;

“The Obsolescence of Oracles,” 1.113;

“On Moral Virtue,” 1.161–62;

“On Praising Oneself Inoffensively,” 1.283, 2.66;

“On the Control of Anger,” 1.143;

“On the Sign of Socrates,” 2.219;

“The Oracles at Delphi No Longer Given in Verse,” 2.202;

Sayings of Kings and Commanders, 2.189;

Sayings of Romans, 2.196;

“Solon,” 2.215;

“Themistocles,” 2.254

poet: and actor, 1.444;

and actuality, 1.388–90, 2.114;

and despair, 1.439–40;

and enthusiasm, 1.440;

and existence, 1.443–47;

and fortune, 1.434;

Grundtvig as, 2.16–17, 2.27;

and hymns, 1.580;

and ideality, 1.388;

and imagination, 1.440, 1.443–44, 1.580;

and immediacy, 1.434;

individuality and, 1.439, 2.27;

and life-view, 1.434;

and love, 1.388–90;

vs. mime, 2.181;

and misfortune, 1.434;

and passion, 1.440;

- vs. pastor, 1.439–47, 2.40;
- and pathos, 1.440, 2.181;
- and possibility, 1.388–90;
- and the religious, 1.388–89, 1.443–47, 1.580;
- and Religiousness *B*, 1.580;
- vs. religious speaker, 1.435–47;
- and suffering, 1.434, 1.443–47;
- vs. upbuilding speaker, 1.257;
- on wishes, 1.439

poet-existence, 1.390

poetry, the poetic;

- and actuality, 1.318–19;
- and the comic, 1.457;
- and the eternal, 1.313;
- French, 1.457;
- and human being, 1.348;
- and ideality, 1.318;
- and illusion, 1.457;
- and imagination, 1.348, 1.357;
- and pathos, 1.388–89, 1.394;
- and possibility, 1.318–19;
- and the religious, 1.457;
- subjective thinker and, 1.357;
- and subjectivity, 1.131–32

political tinker, 2.133

Polus: Jacobi and, 2.37;

- and Socrates, 1.614, 2.37

poor lodger, *see* analogy

popinjay shooting club, 1.401

positive, the: vs. the negative, 1.80–86, 1.91;

- and thinking, 1.80–86

posse, *see* possibility

possibility: and abstraction, 1.314–18;

- action as, 1.340–43;
- and actuality, 1.314–43, 1.358–60, 1.580–81, 2.41, 2.71, 2.73–74;
- and Baptism, 1.366;

- and Christianity, 1.580;
- and decision, 1.365;
- and the ethical, 1.320–25, 1.359–60;
- and existence-communication, 1.358–59;
- and ideality, 1.322, 1.325, 1.387–88;
- of offense, 1.585;
- and the other, 1.321–27;
- and pathos, 1.388–89;
- poet and, 1.388–90;
- in poetry, 1.318–19;
- and thinking, 1.339–40, 1.342

Potemkin, Grigori Aleksandrovich, 1.278

Poverty, 1.92

power: directed externally, 1.507

powerlessness: the finite and, 1.484–86

prayer, praying: and the comic, 1.90–91;

- and God-conception, 1.487;

- individual and, 1.162–63;

- and the infinite, 1.90–91;

- and inwardness, 1.90–91, 1.487–88;

- Luther on, 1.163;

- in novels, 1.486–87;

- pastor and, 1.487–88;

- Socrates and, 1.90;

- and striving, 2.47

predestination: Christianity and, 1.582

present: and certainty, 1.424;

- vs. future, 1.424

present age: and Christianity, 1.195, 1.215–16, 1.293–94;

- and clergy, 1.480–82;

- and the comic, 1.281–82;

- and didactics, 1.280–81;

- and the ethical, 1.144–46;

- and existence, 1.263, 1.355–56, 2.77, 2.82;

- and great men, 2.106;

- Grundtvig and, 2.26, 2.28;

- and Hegel, 1.355;

- immorality of, 1.544;
- and individual, 1.355–56;
- and inwardness, 1.263, 1.287;
- Lessing and, 1.67–68;
- vs. Middle Ages, 1.458, 1.472–74, 1.544;
- and new hymnbook, 2.86;
- and religiousness, 1.458, 1.472–74, 1.478–82;
- and speculative thought, 1.617;
- and time, 1.405–06;
- and truth, 1.195, 1.202;
- and world history, 1.134–35, 1.144–46
- presupposition: and speculative thought, 1.377–78;
- and system, 1.14–16
- presuppositionlessness, 1.113;
- Hegel and, 2.183;
- and “nothing,” 2.183–84
- pride: and the ethical, 1.148;
- and hidden inwardness, 1.509–10
- princess, *see* analogy, laborer and princess
- principle of contradiction, *see* contradiction
- Privatdocent*: and system, 2.133–34. *See also* assistant professor
- probability: and faith, 1.232–33;
- and πίστις, 2.98
- promise: child and, 1.238–39, 2.58;
- and inwardness, 1.240. *See also* pledge
- Prosper naturalis de mohnasky, *see* Møller;
- Peder Ludvig Protagoras, 1.33
- Protestantism, 1.401
- prototype: ethical, 1.359;
- human, 2.140–41;
- and paradox, 2.141;
- religious, 1.359;
- and religious paradigm, 1.259, 1.262
- proverb(s): Jews and, 1.322;
- ne quid nimis*, 1.404, 1.524;
- Qui s’excuse s’accuse*, 1.529
- Pryssing: and Trop, 1.515

punishment, 1.297;

child and, 1.550–52;

eternal, 1.95, 1.530;

guilt and, 1.541–47, 1.550;

and sin, 1.530. *See also* penance

Pyrrho, 2.253

Pythagoras, Pythagorean: and dying, 1.309

Rammel, Else, and Frithiof Brandt, *Seren Kierkegaard og Pengene*,
2.225–26

reader: and author, 1.9, 1.263–64, 1.296–99, 1.620–23, 2.28;

and communication, 1.358–59;

Grundtvig and, 2.28;

and imaginary construction, 1.289;

imagined, 1.620–21;

and inwardness, 2.122;

Johannes Climacus and, 1.274–77, 1.621–23, 2.74, 2.104–07,
2.121–25;

Kierkegaard and, [1.629], 2.108, 2.148–52;

knowing, 1.274–78;

Lessing and, 2.35;

and negative thinker, 2.34–35;

Postscript and, 1.620;

pseudonymous authors and, 1.298, [1.629]

and repetition, 1.284–87;

Repetition and, 2.64;

subjective existing thinker and, 2.34

reaper's scythe, *see* analogy

reason: and faith, 2.98–99;

pure, 2.99

recollection, recollecting: child and, 1.540, 1.602–03;

and eternal happiness, 1.554;

and eternity, 1.208–09, 1.270–73, 1.424, 1.533–41, 1.550–55;

of guilt, 1.533–41;

and hidden inwardness, 1.554;

and humor, 1.554, 2.103;

and immanence, 1.206;

- and knowing, 1.205–09;
- pantheism as, 1.226–27;
- Socrates and, 1.205–09
- redoubling: truth as, 1.190–92
- reduplication, 1.333;
 - and truth, 1.191–92, 1.243
- reflection: and beginning, 1.150;
 - and Christianity, 1.607;
 - and the comic, 1.281;
 - and ethics, 1.421, 2.72;
 - and existence, 1.421, 2.72;
 - Hegelian philosophy and, 1.115–16;
 - and the immediate, 1.112–14, 2.149;
 - individual and, 1.115–16;
 - infinity of, 1.112–13;
 - of inwardness, 2.x;
 - and leap, 1.115–16;
 - objective vs. subjective, 1.192–203, 2.45;
 - and passion, 1.611–12;
 - and resolution, 1.113;
 - and subjectivity, 1.116, 1.192–203;
 - and suffering, 1.443–44;
 - surmounting, 1.421;
 - and system, 1.112–16;
 - and truth, 1.192–203. *See also* double-reflection, self-reflection
- Reimarus, Elise, 1.103
- Reimarus, Emilie, *see* Reimarus, Elise
- Reimarus, Hermann Samuel: and Lessing, 2.202–03, 2.209;
 - Von dem Zwecke Jesu und seiner Junger. Noch ein Fragment des Wolfenbütterschen Ungenannten*, 2.202–03, 2.209
- Reitzel, Carl A., 2.xvi
- religion, the religious, religiousness: and abstraction, 1.307;
 - and action, 1.340, 1.556;
 - and actuality, 1.481;
 - and amusement park, 1.494–97;
 - and being capable of nothing, 1.482–83, 1.486, 1.506;
 - and captivity, 1.483–84;

and certainty, 1.507;
child and, 1.473–74;
Christianity and, 1.531–32;
clergy and, 1.482, 2.85;
and comfort, 1.441;
and the comic, 1.461–63, 1.483, 1.487, 1.508, 1.513, 1.521–25;
and dabbling, 1.439;
and decision, 1.497;
difficulty of, 1.481–83;
and direct expression, 1.510–11;
discourse(s) for, 1.418–19, 1.427–28, 1.435–47, 1.453, 1.458–60, 1.481–83, 1.487, 1.513, 1.530–31, 1.537–38, 1.555–56, 2.90–93;
and earnestness, 1.263, 1.472, 1.495;
and enthusiasm, 1.440;
vs. the esthetic, 1.434–38, 1.441–42, 1.445–47, 1.501–02, 1.524–25, 1.537, 2.154;
and the ethical, 1.294, 1.307, 1.359, 1.388–89, 1.396, 1.426, 1.428, 1.441–42, 1.476, 1.501–02;
and eudaemonism, 1.426;
and everyday life, 1.465–66, 1.487;
and everything, 1.427–28;
and existence, 1.267–72, 1.287–89, 1.482–501, 1.513;
and externality, 1.522;
and faith, 1.418–19;
and the finite, 1.483–84;
and fortune, 1.436–47;
God and, 1.66;
and God-conception, 1.505;
and God-relationship, 1.491–97, 1.505–12;
going further than, 1.512;
Grundtvig and, 2.27;
and guilt, 1.530–31;
human being and, 1.348;
and humility, 1.493–95;
and humor, 1.179, 1.447, 1.451, 1.500–01, 1.504–08, 1.521–22;
and hymns, 1.580;

as illusion, 1.456–57, 1.486–87;
imaginary construction and, 1.511–12, 2.32;
and immediacy, 1.436, 1.460–63, 1.495–96;
individual and, 1.66–67, 1.432–64, 1.484–513, 1.522–23, 1.544,
1.581–82;
individuality and, 1.388–90, 1.430–31, 1.462, 2.27;
and the inner vs. the outer, 1.297;
and inwardness, 1.475, 1.498–501, 1.504, 1.506–12, 1.522–24,
1.534–35, 1.538–40, 2.84, 2.92, 2.94;
and jest, 1.70, 1.78, 1.101, 1.135–39, 1.263, 1.438–40, 1.461–
62, 1.470–72;
Kierkegaard and, 2.149–50, 2.152, 2.154;
and knowledge, 1.198;
Lessing and, 1.65–67, 1.71;
and life, 1.447;
and life-view, 1.435, 1.439, 2.92;
making way difficult, 1.428–31, 2.90;
and marriage, 1.179–81;
and mediation, 1.396;
of Middle Ages, 1.458, 1.472–74;
and misfortune, 1.436–47;
and monastery, 1.481;
and the negative, 1.524–25;
and *ne quid nimis*, 1.404, 1.524;
and objective thinking, 1.76;
and observation, 1.359, 1.501;
and paradigm, 1.259, 1.262, 1.263;
and paradox, 1.182, 1.554;
and passion, 1.440, 1.505–10, 1.544;
and path, 1.428;
and pathos, 1.388–89, 1.440, 1.555–56;
poet and, 1.388–89, 1.443–47, 1.580;
and poetry, 1.457;
present age and, 1.458, 1.472–74, 1.478–82;
and prominence, 1.388–89;
and prototype, 1.259, 1.262, 1.359;
and relativity, 1.509–11;

- and repentance, 1.524;
- requirement of, 1.466;
- and resignation, 1.396;
- and result, 1.442;
- revivalist and, 1.512;
- rigor of, 1.444;
- and sickness, 1.485–86, 1.488–89;
- Simonides and, 1.337;
- and simplicity, 1.180–82;
- and sin, 1.267–72;
- and single individual, 1.66–67, 1.480;
- speaker for, 1.418–19, 1.435–47, 1.465–66, 1.482–83, 1.530–31, 2.91–93;
- and spiritual trial, 2.92;
- and subjectivity, 1.66–67;
- and suffering, 1.287–89, 1.432–64, 1.483–501, 1.524, 2.92;
- task of, 1.481–82;
- and totality-category, 1.537–38, 2.91;
- uncertainty of, 1.446;
- and venture, 1.427–28;
- and world history, 1.182–84

Religiousness A: and Christianity, 1.555, 1.557;

- and the dialectical, 1.581;
- and the eternal, 1.579, 1.584;
- and eternal happiness, 1.556, 1.559, 1.574, 1.578;
- and existence, 1.570–74, 1.579, 1.581–82;
- and guilt-consciousness, 1.560;
- and “here and hereafter,” 1.570;
- and immanence, 1.572–73;
- individual and, 1.556;
- and inward deepening, 1.556;
- and offense, 1.585;
- vs. Religiousness B, 1.556–61, 1.582, 2.97;
- and self-annihilation, 1.572;
- and time, 1.573;
- and upbuilding, 1.560

Religiousness B: and the dialectical, 1.556, 1.559–60;

discourse for, 1.562–64;
 and the eternal, 1.571, 1.579;
 and eternal happiness, 1.556;
 and existence, 1.570–73, 1.579;
Fragments on, 1.579;
 and “here and hereafter,” 1.570;
 and immanence, 1.572–73;
 individual and, 1.556;
 and offense, 1.585;
 vs. Religiousness A, 1.556–61, 1.582, 2.97;
 religious poet and, 1.580;
 and understanding, 1.562–64;
 and upbuilding, 1.561
 repentance: and the comic, 1.518–19, 1.524;
 and contradiction, 1.518;
 individual and, 1.545;
 and the religious, 1.524;
 temptation and, 1.341
 repetition: vs. change, 1.286–87;
 and despair, 1.263;
 and immanence, 1.263;
 of inwardness, 1.260;
 pseudonymous authors on, 1.285–87;
 reader and, 1.284–87
 requirement: absolute, 1.503;
 ethical, 1.309, 1.349, 1.421, 1.502;
 of ideality, 1.358–59;
 of inwardness, 1.523;
 of religiousness, 1.466
 resignation: and absolute τέλος, 1.400, 1.410–11;
 and the ethical, 1.396;
 and the finite, 1.410–11;
 and immediacy, 1.395;
 individual and, 1.395–96, 1.400–02, 1.406–07, 1.410–11;
 and mediation, 1.396, 1.400–02, 1.406–07, 1.410–11;
 and the religious, 1.396
 resolution: and beginning, 1.138–39, 1.189;

and the comic, 1.462–63;
and God-conception, 1.486–87;
individual and, 1.138–39, 1.462–63;
and reflection, 1.113

respicere finem, 1.449

restraint: and task, 1.164–65

result(s): vs. becoming, 1.73, 1.78;
and the ethical, 1.135–36, 1.297;
and human will, 1.135–36;
vs. inwardness, 1.242–44;
Kierkegaard and, 2.112, 2.115;
Lessing and, 1.65;
Napoleon and, 1.397–99;
and objectivity, 1.73;
religious speaker and, 1.442;
speculative, 1.81;
striving vs., 1.85;
and subjectivity, 1.73;
and thinking, 1.84–85;
and truth, 1.78

resurrection: demonstration of, 1.429–30

revelation: and mystery, 1.245–46, 1.263

review(s): of *Fragments*, 1.274–77; 2.65–66;

of Gyllembourg-Ehrens-värd, *En Hverdags Historie*, 2.117;

of Gyllembourg-Ehrens-värd, *To Tidsaldre*, 2.xi, 2.116, 2.118,
2.143;

of Heiberg, “*Inlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte
logiske Coursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole*,” 2.236;

of Heiberg, *En Sjæl efter Døden*, 1.171–72;

of Heiberg, “*Stjemehimlen*,” 2.41;

of Mynster, *Om Begrebet af den christelige Dogmatik*, 2.189;

of *Postscript*, 2.xv–xix, 2.117–22, 2.125–27, 2.129–37, 2.155–56;
2.159–65;

pseudonyms and, 1.283, 2.66

reviewer(s): author and, 1.6–10;

Beck as, 1.274–77, 2.65–66;

Christensen as, 2.xviii–xix, 2.125–27;

Eiriksson as, 2.129–37, 2.161–65;
 Grundtvig as, 2.189;
 Kierkegaard as, 2.xi, 2.116–18, 2.143;
 Martensen as, 2.236;
 Møller (P.L.) as, 2.xvii–xviii, 2.117–22;
 Nielsen as., 2.xix, 2.155–56, 2.159–61;
 Rosenhoff as, 2.41;
 Tryde as, 1.171–72
 revivalist(s), 1.505–07, 1.549;
 arrogation of, 1.565–67;
 and Christianity, 1.614–15;
 and God-relationship, 1.454;
 and the religious, 1.512
 rich match, *see* analogy
 Richter, Johann Paul Friedrich (pseud. Jean Paul), 1.47;
 on Christianity, 2.10;
 Jean Paul's sämtliche Werke, 2.191;
 Vorschule der Aesthetik, 2.191
 risk: and faith, 1.204, 1.210
 Robinson Crusoe: and Friday, 1.460
 romanticism: Don Quixote and, 1.35
 Rome, Roman(s), 1.545;
 and Christendom, 1.608;
 Grundtvig and, 2.20–21;
 at Zama, 1.224–25
 Romeo: and Juliet, 1.440–41
 Rosenhoff, Caspar Claudius, 2.260;
 on Heiberg, “*Stjemehimlen*,” 2.41
 Rosenkilde, Christen Niemann, 2.130
 Rosenkranz, Johann Karl Friedrich: *Encyclopädie der theologischen Wissenschaften*, 2.185;
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's Leben, 2.239;
 Psychologie oder die Wissenschaft vom subjectiven Geist, 2.252
 Rothschild, Lionel Nathan: and English three percent loan, 1.612
 Röscher, Heinrich Theodor: *Aristophanes und sein Zeitalter. Eine philologisch-philosophische Abhandlung zur Alterthumsforschung*, 1.116;

Cyclus dramatischer Charaktere, 2.214;

Die Kunst der dramatischen Darstellung, 2.214;

Seydelmanns Leben und Wirken, 1.446

royal theater, *see* analogy

Russia, Russians(s): and Christendom, 1.608

sacrament(s), 1.37
 Saint George: battle with dragon, 1.418
 Salomon Goldkalb, 1.294
salto moriale, 1.100, 1.102 *See also* leap
 salvation: Christ and, 1.237–38
 Satan, 1.40, 1.66
 sawing wood, *see* analogy Scaevola, 1.453
 Scarron, Paul, 2.261
 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph v.: and Hegel, 1.105, 1.335, 2.214;
 intellectual intuition, 1.105, 1.150, 1.335;
 On University Studies, 2.208;
 System of Transcendental Idealism, 2.208
 Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich v. “*Die Gotter Griechenlands*,” 2 218;
 “*Das Ideal und das Leben*,” 2.244;
 “*Resignation*,” 2.218;
 Sammtliche Werke, 2.218;
 Wilhelm Tell, 2.223
 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich v, *Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier. Ein Beitrag zur Begründung der Alterthumskunde*, 2.266
 scholarship: about Bible, 1.25–32;
 and certainty, 1.575;
 and Christianity, 2.155–58;
 vs. eternal happiness, 1.25–26, 1.30;
 and the ethical, 2.42;
 and existence, 1.344–49;
 vs. faith, 1.11–12, 1.25–34, 2.155–57;
 Greek, 2.162;
 vs. inspiration, 1.25–26;
 and knowledge, 1.347–48;
 Nielsen and, 2.158, 2.160–61;
 and objectivity, 1.43;
 in *Postscript*, 2 155;
 vs. subjectivity, 1.347–49;

and thought, 1.344–49;
 world-historical, 1.150–52
 Schubert, Gotthilf Heinrich v.: *Anischten von der Nachtseite der Natur-wissenschaft*, 2.249;
 Die Symbolik des Traumes, 2.249
 Scribe, Augustin Eugène *Une Chaîne*, 1.623;
 Et Glas Vand, 2.220;
 Les Premieres Amours ou Les Souvenirs d'enfance, 2.89;
 Oscar (with Aimé Honoré Joseph Duveyner), 2.76
 Scripture, see BIBLE
 self-annihilation, 1.461;
 and Religiousness A, 1.572
 self-reflection: and actuality, 2.75;
 canceling itself, 1.335–37;
 and skepticism, 2.75
 self-torment: vs. suffering, 1.463
 sermon(s): clergy and, 1.467–78, 2.100;
 and congregation, 1.374;
 vs. discourses, 1.256–57, 1.273, 2.64;
 pastor and, 1.467–78
 servant: as incognito, 1.599
 seventy thousand fathoms, 1.140, 1.204, 1.232, 1.288, 2.47
 Sextus Empiricus *Opera quae extant graece et latine*, 2.249;
 Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.249–50
 Seydel mann, 1.446
 Shaftesbury, Earl of, see Cooper, Anthony Ashley
 Shakespeare, William, 1.285, 2.58;
 The Complete Works of Shakespeare, 2.181, *Hamlet*, 2.206, 2.226, 2.265;
 Henry IV, Part One, 2.237, *Henry IV, Part Two*, 2.237, *Julius Caesar*, 2.232;
 Macbeth, 2.205–06;
 The Merry Wives of Windsor, 2.237;
 Romeo and Juliet, 2.222;
 Shakespeare's dramatische Werke, 2.205–06;
 Twelfth Night, 2.181
 Sibbern, Frederik Christian:

*Bemærkninger og Undersøgelser, for-nemmelig betreffende
Hegels Philosophie, betragtet i Forhold til vor Tid*, 2.209,
2.214;

“*Perseus, Journal for den speculative Idee. Udgiven af Johan Ludvig
Heiberg. Nr. 1, Juni 1837,*” 2.209

sickness: unto death, 1.488;

religious person and, 1.485–86, 1.488–89

silence: and judgment, 1.548–49;

and mediocrity, 1.548–49

Simon of Galilee, 2.186

Simonides: and religion, 1.337

simplicity, the simple, 1.170;

and knowledge, 1.180–82;

and paradox, 1.227–28;

and the religious, 1.180–82;

vs. the wise, 1.159–60, 1.227–28;

and world history, 1.182

sin: as anxiety, 1.269;

child and, 1.591–92;

and Chnstiamty, 2.139;

in *Concept of Anxiety*, 2.63;

consciousness of, 1.524, 1.534, 1.583–85, 1.592, 2.139;

and court, 1.530;

in *Either/Or*, 1.268;

and eternal punishment, 1.530;

and eternity, 1.583;

and the ethical, 1.267;

and existence, 1.208, 1.267–72, 1.583–86, 2.63;

in *Fear and Trembling*, 1.268;

and god, 1.584;

and God, 1.530;

vs. guilt, 1.583–85;

hereditary, 1.208;

and ignorance, 1.339;

and immanence, 1.583;

individual and, 1.208–09, 1.583–85;

vs. innocence, 1.591–92;

Müller on, 2.40–41;
 and paradox, 1.534;
 in pseudonymous works, 1.268;
 and the religious, 1.267–72;
 and thinking, 1.339–40;
 and truth, 2.63. *See also* forgiveness
 single individual, 1.536;
 and becoming a Christian, 1.383;
 capable of nothing, 1.469;
 and Christianity, 1.16–17, 1.51, 1.129–31;
 cogito ergo sum, 1.317;
 vs. crowd, 1.546;
 and decision, 1.129;
 and eternal happiness, 1.130;
 and the ethical, 1.144, 1.149, 1.151, 1.319–20, 2.42;
 and everyday life, 1.465;
 and existence, 1.319, 1.490;
 and faith, 1.419;
 and god in time, 1.584;
 and God, 1.149, 1.543–44;
 and guilt, 1.529, 1.554;
 human being as, 1.149;
 vs. human race, 1.584;
 vs. individual, 2.182;
 and inwardness, 1.77;
 and objectivity, 1.66–67;
 and the religious, 1.66–67, 1.480;
 and subjectivity, 1.66–67, 1.129–41;
 task of, 1.151–54, 2.42;
 and totality-category, 1.538;
 and world history, 1.149, 1.307. *See also* human being;
 individual;
 individuality
 skepticism, 1.328;
 Greek, 1.38, 1.81, 1.316, 1.335;
 Hegel and, 1.33;
 Hegelian philosophy and, 1.33;

and idealism, 1.352–53;
and insanity, 2.75;
and self-reflection, 2.75;
and thinking, 1.335, 2.75
sleep: of death, 1.485
sobriety: and the ethical, 1.143;
Greeks and, 2.76
Socrates, the Socratic, 1.51, 1.271, 1.311, 1.327, 1.386, 1.521,
[1.628], 2.9, 2.269, 2.276;
and approximation, 2.52;
and astronomy, 2.40–41;
and the beautiful, 1.383–84;
and Crito, 2.59;
and daimon, 1.80;
and death, 1.89, 1.309;
and error, 2.135;
and the ethical, 1.161–62, 1.247, 1.317, 1.503;
and evil, 1.161–64;
on existence, 1.92–93, 1.204–10, 2.77;
and faith, 1.205–10, 1.322, 1.566;
in Fragments, 1.162, 1.206–07;
gazing into space, 1.83, 1.90;
and giving birth, 2.137;
and God-relationship, 1.90;
going beyond, 1.204, 1.206–13;
and Grundtvig, 2.21;
and Hamann, 1.558;
vs. Hegel, 1.34, 1.70, 1.333, 2.184;
and ignorance, 1.84, 1.202, 1.204–10, 1.566, 2.50;
and imaginary construction, 1.206–07;
and immortality, 1.201–02;
and indirect communication, 1.70, 1.80, 1.277–78;
and the infinite, 1.83, 1.458;
and intellectuality, 1.368;
and inwardness, 1.90, 1.247–49;
and irony, 1.87–88, 1.277, 1.503, 1.552–53, 2.274;
and Kierkegaard, 1.503, 2.35, 2.184;

and knowledge, 1.161–62, 1.317, 2.81;
and Lessing, 1.69;
and paradox, 1.204–10, 2.50–52, 2.54;
and Plato, 1.205–07;
and Polus, 1.614, 2.37;
and prayer, 1.90;
and recollection, 1.205–09;
saying always the same and about the same thing, 1.284–85,
1.614;
on skipper, 1.83–84, 1.87–88;
and slander, 1.552–53;
and Sophists, 1.147;
on state, 1.504;
and striving, 1.88;
and system, 1.147;
as teacher, 1.247–49;
and tribunal, 1.184;
and truth, 1.202, 1.204–10, 1.219;
and uncertainty, 1.87–90;
understanding himself, 1.469;
and world history, 1.83, 1.147;
and Xanthippe, 1.147;
and Xenophon, 2.80
Solde, Salomon, 1.167
solemnity: clergy and, 2.82–86
Solon: and Croesus, 2.188
Sophie Frederikke (princess of Denmark), 1.449
sophistry, sophism, Sophists, 1.147, 2.88;
and the comic, 1.523–24;
and Socrates, 1.147
Sophocles, 1.232
soul: and immortality, 1.171–79
Spain, 2.136
sparrow: God and, 1.412
speaker: and comfort, 1.441;
on everyday life, 1.465–66;
on existence, 1.466, 1.482–83;

- and imagination, 1.440;
- and listener, 1.418–19, 1.435–38, 1.442, 1.530–31;
- and pathos, 1.440;
- and poet, 1.257, 1.435–47;
- religious, 1.418–19, 1.435–47, 1.465–66, 1.482–83, 1.530–31, 2.91–93;
- and result, 1.442;
- upbuilding, 1.257. *See also* discourse
- species, and animal, 1.345
- speculation, the speculative, speculative thought, 2.10;
 - and Christianity, 1.50–57, 1.215–50, 1.272–73, 1.291, 1.361–81, 1.561, 2.49–50, 2.52–53, 2.64–65, 2.80;
 - and the comic, 1.120;
 - vs. contemporaneity, 1.343–49;
 - and contradiction, 1.55–57;
 - in Denmark, 2.162;
 - vs. dialectic, 1.13–15;
 - in *Either/ Or*, 1.252;
 - and Eleatics, 1.376, 1.380;
 - and the eternal, 2.52–53;
 - and eternal happiness, 1.54–57, 1.361–62, 2.80;
 - and the eternal-historical, 1.578–79;
 - and the ethical, 1.151, 1.474;
 - and existence, 1.196–99, 1.209, 1.212–34, 1.456, 1.570–72, 2.54, 2.60–62, 2.72, 2.76;
 - and existence-communication, 1.570;
 - and faith, 1.14–15, 1.55, 1.241–42, 2.48–49;
 - Germans and, 1.191, 2.162;
 - going further and, 1.216, 2.65;
 - and Herachtus, 1.376;
 - and the historical, 1.53–54, 1.148;
 - and human being, 2.49;
 - and humankind, 1.343–49;
 - and humor, 1.272–73;
 - and *I-I*, 1.196–97, 2.50;
 - and immanence, 1.148–49;
 - and individual, 1.53–57, 1.343–49;

and individuality, 1.148;
and knowing, 1.206, 1.223–24;
and life-view, 1.474;
and mediation, 1.369–70, 1.374–76, 2.80;
and method, 1.337–38;
Møller (P.M.) on, 1.172;
and New Testament, 1.369;
and objectivity, 1.54–57;
and paradox, 1.214–34, 2.49, 2.52–53;
and past, 1.146;
Postscript and, 2.x, 2.162;
and present age, 1.617;
and presupposition, 1.377–78;
and pure being, 1.570–71, 1.603;
and result, 1.81;
and truth, 1.224;
and world history, 1.145–49, 1.151 *See also* system
speech: vs. existence, 1.463 *See also* discourse, speaker
Spinoza, Benedict (Baruch): on ignorance, 2.51;
and Jacobi, 1.100–01;
and Lessing, 1.100–01;
Ethics, 2.51, 2.200, 2.230;
Opera philosophica omnia, 2.200
spirit, spirituality: vs Baptism, 1.610;
vs. body, 1.444–45;
derived, 1.243, 1.246;
development of, 1.345–46;
and existence, 1.180;
and God-relationship, 1.245–47;
individual as existing, 1.189–93, 1.345–46;
maturity of, 1.292–93;
qualification of, 1.540, 1.553–54;
truth as, 1.37;
of wonderful lamp, 1.138–39;
world of, 1.281–82
spiritual trial, 1.415;
clergy and, 1.459;

- and the ethical, 1.458–59, 2.185;
- and God-relationship, 1.458;
- individual and, 1.458–60, 2.84–86;
- and inwardness, 2.84, 2.92;
- and the religious, 2.92;
- vs. temptation, 1.458–59. *See also* temptation
- spy: and clergy, 1.478–80;
- on everyday life, 1.466–72, 1.475–78
- stage(s): of existence, 1.520;
- of life, 1.513–14
- state: and Church, 2.144;
- Socrates on, 1.504
- Steffens, Henrich, *Indledning til filosofiske Forelæsninger*, 2.20
- Stoicism, Stoic(s): and suicide, 1.165
- Strauss, David Friedrich, *Das Leben Jesu, kritisch bearbeitet*, 2.230
- Strepsiades, 2.37
- striving: and becoming, 2.35;
- and the comic, 1.91–92;
- and decision, 2.47;
- and the ethical, 1.138–40;
- and existence, 1.91–93, 1.121–22;
- and Governance, 1.139–40;
- individual and, 1.91, 1.121–22;
- and the infinite, 1.91–93;
- Lessing on, 1.80, 1.106–09, 1.121;
- and love, 1.92;
- objective, 1.194;
- and pathos, 1.91–92;
- and prayer, 2.47;
- vs. results, 1.85;
- Socrates and, 1.88;
- vs. system, 1.121–22;
- in time, 1.203
- Stygotius, 1.621
- subjectivity, 1.121–22, 2.10–13;
- and absolute vs. qualitative disjunction, 1.350;

and becoming, 1.73, 2.54–55;
and Christianity, 1.25, 1.129–31, 1.213, 1.224, 1.230, 1.279–80,
1.282, 1.300, 1.371, 1.577–78, 1.608–11;
and clergy, 1.132;
and concretion, 1.357;
contemporaneity of elements, 1.343–49, 1.354;
death and, 1.169;
and decision, 1.33, 1.116, 1.129, 1.230, 2.46–47;
and dialectic, 1.350–51, 1.357;
and erotic love, 1.132;
and the esthetic, 1.350–51, 1.357;
and eternal happiness, 1.116, 1.130, 1.163;
and ethics, 1.133–41, 1.301, 1.316, 1.341, 1.350–51, 1.357–60;
and existence, 1.123, 1.350–60, 2.34, 2.48;
and faith, 1.132–33, 1.351;
in general, 1.353;
and God, 1.200–01;
and the historical, 1.575–76;
and imagination, 1.357;
and immortality, 1.173–77;
individual and, 1.575–78;
and inwardness, 1.189–251, 2.45–46, 2.48;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.187–88;
and knowing, 1.316, 1.347–48;
Lessing and, 1.65–67, 2.33–35;
vs. objectivity, 1.17, 1.21–22, 1.31–34, 1.37–40, 1.52–54, 1.66–
67, 1.72–80, 1.93, 1.116, 1.123, 1.129–41, 1.192–203,
1.229–30, 1.279–80, 2.11, 2.39, 2.45;
and passion, 1.350–51, 1.509, 1.575–78;
and poetry, 1.131–32, 1.357;
pseudonymous
authors and, 2.66;
and reflection, 1.116, 1.192–203, 2.45;
and the religious, 1.66–67;
and results, 1.73;
vs. scholarship, 1.347–49;
single individual and, 1.66–67, 1.129–41;

and style, 1.357;
 as task, 1.130–41, 1.158–59, 1.163–65, 1.167–70, 1.176, 1.349–60;
 and thinking, 1.73–76, 1.79, 1.301–60, 2.13, 2.33–35, 2.122;
 and truth, 1.21, 1.189, 1.192–94, 1.196, 1.199, 1.201, 1.203–04, 1.207–09, 1.213, 1.229–30, 1.253, 1.343, 2.45–46, 2.48, 2.50–51;
 and upbuilding, 1.560;
 and world history, 1.182–84
 subject-object: and existence, 1.192–93
 Suetonius: “Gaius C. Caligula,” 2.185;
 The Lives of the Caesars, 2.185
 suffering, 2.90;
 as accidental, 1.445–51;
 and actuality, 1.433–56;
 apostles and, 1.452–54;
 assistant professors and, 2.71;
 of Christ, 1.597–98;
 Christianity and, 1.582;
 certainty of, 1.458;
 clergy on, 1.445–47, 1.460;
 and comfort, 1.489–90;
 and the comic, 1.483, 1.514–15;
 in dying to oneself, 1.472;
 and the esthetic, 1.429, 1.445–47, 1.451;
 and eternal happiness, 1.443, 1.452, 1.532;
 and existence, 1.443–63, 1.483–501, 1.526–28;
 and existential pathos, 1.431–33, 1.443;
 expression of, 1.444;
 God-relationship and, 1.453–56;
 and guilt-consciousness, 1.528, 1.532–34, 1.543;
 humorist on, 1.447–51;
 and immediacy, 1.460–63;
 individual and, 1.432–64;
 and inwardness, 1.288, 1.434–39, 1.499–501, 1.615, 2.71;
 of johannes Climacus, 1.621;
 and joy, 1.452–53;

- in life, 1.438–39;
- and martyrdom, 1.597;
- and misfortune, 1.433–40, 1.453;
- New Testament on, 1.452–53;
- Paul and, 1.454;
- physical, 1.452–53;
- poet and, 1.434, 1.443–47;
- and reflection, 1.443–44;
- and the religious, 1.287–89, 1.432–64, 1.483–501, 1.524, 2.92;
- religious address on, 1.435–47, 1.453;
- vs. self-torment, 1.463;
- story of, 1.287–94;
- and τέλος, 1.598
- suicide: and courage, 1.417;
- and pure thinking, 1.308;
- Stoics and, 1.165
- Sunday, 1.185, 1.234, 2.56 *See also* church, vs life
- sympathy: pain of, 1.585–86
- system: assistant professors and, 1.195;
- beginning of, 1.111–17;
- and erotic love, 1.344;
- and ethics, 1.119, 1.121, 1.145, 1.307, 1.327, 1.346;
- and existence, 1.109–25, 1.145;
- as finished, 1.13, 1.76–77, 1.106–09, 1.119, 1.121–24, 1.145;
- and God, 1.118–19;
- and Hamann, 1.250, 2.62;
- and human being, 1.311;
- and the immediate, 1.111–14;
- vs. immortality, 1.171–74;
- and Jacobi, 1.250–51, 2.62;
- Johannes Climacus on, 1.188;
- Lessing and, 1.106, 2.38–39;
- vs. miracle, 1.184–85, 1.188;
- pantheistic, 1.122–23;
- and presuppositions, 1.14–16;
- Privatdocent* and, 2.133–34;
- and reflection, 1.112–16;

and Socrates, 1.147;
striving vs, 1.121–22;
Tryde and, 2.42–43. *See also* Hegel, Hegelian philosophy;
speculation

Tabor, 2.28

Tanke-Experiment, 2.213

Tartarus, 1.92

task: absolute τέλος as, 1.431–32, 1.525–28;
becoming a Christian, 1.377, 1.379–81, 1.383;
and beginning, 1.526–27;
of being capable of nothing, 1.469;
clergy and, 1.482, 2.85;
difficulty of, 1.481–82;
the ethical as, 1.144, 1.145, 1.151–54, 2.42;
in everyday life, 1.466;
and existence, 1.379–81, 1.383;
existential contemporaneity and, 1.348–49;
for human race, 1.151;
individual and, 1.525–28, 2.90;
Johannes Climacus and, 1.186–88, 2.58;
Kierkegaard and, 2.109, 2.117, 2.166;
of life, 1.163–65, 1.167–70, 1.176, 1.179, 1.182, 1.466;
and marriage, 1.180;
religious, 1.481–82;
and restraint, 1.164–65;
and retrogression, 1.527;
single individual and, 1.151–54, 2.42;
of subjective thinker, 1.349–60;
subjectivity as, 1.130–41, 1.158–59, 1.163–65, 1.167–70, 1.176,
1.349–60;
of systematic thinking, 1.352;
time as, 1.164–65
teacher: and doctrine, 1.326–27;
of existence, 1.622–23, 2.107–08;
Fragments on, 1.573;
god as, 1.573;

and inwardness, 1.242, 1.247–49;
 and learner, 1.242, 1.247–49, 1.573, 1.622–23;
 Socrates as, 1.247–49
 τέλος, 1.312;
 absolute, 1.385, 1.387–432, 1.443, 1.452–56, 1.459, 1.559–60,
 2.88–89;
 absolute vs. relative, 1.393–94, 1.397, 1.400–14, 1.422, 1.431,
 1.458, 1.460, 1.525;
 and decision, 2.88;
 and eternal happiness, 1.385, 1.452–56, 1.559;
 and existence, 1.387–432;
 and the finite, 1.394, 1.410–11;
 for human race, 1.155;
 and immediacy, 1.431;
 individual and, 1.313, 1.400–13, 1.422, 1.431–32, 1.443, 1.452–
 56, 1.459, 1.525;
 and the infinite, 1.394;
 love as, 1.408–09, 2.88;
 and marriage, 1.411–12, 1.456;
 and mediation, 1.397, 1.400–01;
 monastic movement and, 1.401–02, 1.405, 1.414;
 and *ne quid nimis*, 1.404;
 relative, 1.393–94, 1.397;
 and resignation, 1.400, 1.410–11;
 and suffering, 1.598;
 as task, 1.431–32, 1.525–28
 temporal, the, *see* time
 temptation: of Abraham, 1.267;
 and the ethical, 1.262, 1.267;
 vs. faith, 1.11, 1.21;
 God and, 1.267;
 of immediacy, 1.472;
 individual and, 1.458–59;
 and irritability, 1.496;
 and repentance, 1.341;
 vs. spiritual trial, 1.458–59
 Tennemann, Wilhelm Gottlieb, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, 2.244,

2.251–52

Terence: *Phormio*, 2.253;

Comoediae sex, 2.253;

The Lady of Andros, 2.257

terror: and broken pledge, 1.265–66;

of Christianity, 2.144;

and inwardness, 1.258–59;

and ordeal, 1.266–67;

upbuilding and, 1.258–59

Thaïes, 2.265

thanksgiving: clergy and, 1.177–79;

to God, 1.177–79, 1.446, 2.108

Themistocles: and Miltiades, 1.359–60

Theophilus Nicolaus, *see* Eiriksson, Magnus

Theophrastus: Zeno on, 1.283, 2.66

Thieme, M. K. Traugott, *Gutmann oder der dänische Kinderfeind*,
2.269

Thiers, Adolphe: *Den franske Revolutions Historie*, 2.253;

Historie du Consulat et de l'Empire, 1.397–98

thinking, thought: and absolute vs. qualitative disjunction, 1.350;

and abstraction, 1.301–18, 1.399, 2.72–73;

and action, 1.338–43;

and actuality, 1.301–60, 2.74–75;

Aristotle and, 2.x;

and becoming, 1.91;

vs. being, 1.189–91, 1.196–98, 1.302–08, 1.328–35, 2.73;

and Christendom, 1.308;

and the comic, 1.302–04;

and communication, 1.73–76, 1.79, 1.357;

and concretion, 1.357;

and contradiction, 1.347, 1.351;

and the dialectical, 1.86, 1.350–51, 1.357;

and the esthetic, 1.350–51, 1.357;

and eternal happiness, 1.347;

and the ethical, 1.309, 1.341–44, 1.350–51, 1.357–60, 1.497;

and evil, 1.339–40;

vs. existence, 1.73, 1.80, 1.91–93, 1.123–25, 1.253–56, 1.307–

18, 1.328–35, 1.343–60, 1.399, 1.527, 2.34, 2.72–75, 2.82–83, 2.86;
vs. faith, 1.351;
and the good, 1.339–40;
in Greece, 1.303, 1.308, 1.311, 2.73;
Grundtvig and, 2.17, 2.24, 2.28–29;
Hegel and, 1.80–81, 1.328–37, 1.561, 2.70–72;
Hegelian philosophy and, 1.309, 1.314;
and imagination, 1.357;
and immediacy, 1.347;
individual and, 1.302–04, 1.313;
individuality and, 1.309;
and intellectuality, 1.325, 1.338–39;
Johannes Climacus and, 2.x;
Lessing and, 2.33–35, 2.38–39;
and mediation, 1.399;
and the mimetic, 2.24;
and motion, 2.73;
negative vs positive, 1.80–86, 2.34;
and objectivity, 1.339;
vs. passion, 1.350–51;
and the poetic, 1.357;
and possibility, 1.339–40, 1.342;
pure, 1.304–09, 1.313–14, 1.328–37, 1.349–50, 1.561, 2.73, 2.75;
and reality, 1.328;
and the religious, 1.76;
and results, 1.84–85;
and scholarship, 1.344–49;
and sin, 1.339–40;
and skepticism, 1.335, 2.75;
and style, 1.357;
subjective vs objective, 1.73–76, 1.79;
and subjectivity, 1.301–60, 2.13, 2.33–35, 2.122;
and suicide, 1.308;
systematic, 1.352;
and world, 1.341–42

Thomas a Kempis: and Paul, 2.167

thorn in flesh, 1.454

thought-existence: duplexity of, 1.74

Tidsskrift for Litteratur og Kritik, 2.222

Tilegnelse, 2.185

Tilværelse, 2.200 *See also* existence

time, the temporal: and absolute vs. relative τέλος, 1.397;

decision in, 2.80–81;

vs. the eternal, 1.56, 1.192, 1.271–72, 1.301–02, 1.411, 1.491,
1.532, 1.570, 1.573, 1.578–79, 1.583–85, 2.47–48, 2.64;

and eternal happiness, 1.368–69, 1.570, 2.36;

and eternal truth, 2.48;

and existence, 1.92, 1.206–21, 1.294–95, 1.368, 1.526;

god in, 1.573, 1.578, 1.583–84;

God and, 1.449–50;

and humor, 2.64;

individual and, 1.301–02, 1.526, 1.570, 1.573;

and moment, 1.422;

and movement, 1.342;

and paradox, 1.299;

present age and, 1.405–06;

and Religiousness A, 1.573;

striving in, 1.203;

as task, 1.164–65;

vanishing of, 1.336–38

Titans, 1.482

Tivoli, 1.286, 2.60;

and astronomy, 2.41. *See also* amusement park

τοιοῦτος, 1.594

totality: category of, 1.537–38, 1.541, 2.91;

and the comic, 2.97;

of guilt, 1.528–29, 1.536–38, 1.549, 1.553–55, 1.560;

mediation and, 1.541;

and movement, 2.97;

religious discourse and, 1.537–38, 2.91;

single individual and, 1.538;

toy cane, *see* analogy

tragedy, the tragic: vs. the comic, 1.290–92, 1.514–18;
 and contradiction, 1.514;
 pastor in, 1.441
 train, *see* analogy
 traitor: to Christianity, 2.146
 trees, *see* analogy
 Trendelenburg, Friedrich Adolf, 2.33;
 and Aristotle, 1.110;
 and Greeks, 2.76;
 and Hegel, 1.110, 1.301, 2.184;
Erläuterungen zu den Elementen der aristotelischen Logik, 2.25;
Die logische Frage in Hegel's System, 2.214;
Logische Untersuchungen, I-II, 1.110, 2.76, 2.184, 2.207, 2.239
 Troels-Lund, Troels Frederik, *Et Liv, Barndom og Ungdom*, 2.226
 Trop, I 115, 1.514–15, 2.214;
 and Pryssing, 1.515
 trousers, 2.145, 2.153. *See also* knickers
 trust in God, 1.467
 truth: and anxiety, 1.269;
 and appropriation, 1.21–22, 1.77–80, 1.192;
 and approximation, 1.200–01;
 and becoming, 1.189;
 Christianity and, 1.15, 1.46–49, 1.213, 1.256, 1.371, 1.430,
 2.49–51, 2.64–65;
 communication of, 1.77–80, 1.242–50, 1.260–61, 1.277–78;
Either/Or on, 1.252–57;
 and eternity, 1.21, 1.47, 1.93–98, 1.192, 1.205, 1.213, 1.271–72,
 2.48–51, 2.54;
 and existence, 1.189–251, 1.255–61;
 and faith, 2.49;
 Germans and, 1.191;
 God and, 1.243–47;
 Hegel and, 1.33;
 historical, 1.21, 1.93–98;
 individual and, 1.190–250, 2.48–51;
 and inward deepening, 1.37–38;
 and inwardness, 1.189, 1.192, 1.194, 1.196, 1.199, 1.202–07,
 1.209, 1.213, 1.229–31, 1.236, 1.242–45, 1.247, 1.249,

1.252–58, 2.48–50, 2.61;
 Johannes Climacus and, 2.135;
 and knowledge, 1.252;
 and laughter, 1.512;
 Lessing on, 1.106–09, 2.34;
 and lunacy, 1.194–96;
 and mediation, 1.192;
 and objectivity, 1.199, 1.207, 1.229–30;
 and paganism, 2.50;
 and paradox, 1.199, 1.204–34, 2.48–51;
 passion and, 1.231;
 philosophical, 1.21;
 Pilate and, 1.195, 1.229–30;
 present age and, 1.195, 1.202;
 as redoubling, 1.190–92;
 reduplication of, 1.191–92;
 and reflection, 1.192–203;
 and result, 1.78;
 and sin, 2.63;
 Socrates and, 1.202, 1.204–10, 1.219;
 and speculative thought, 1.224;
 as spirit, 1.37;
 and subjectivity, 1.21, 1.189, 1.192–94, 1.1%, 1.199, 1.201,
 1.203–04, 1.207–09, 1.213, 1.229–30, 1.253, 1.343, 2.45–
 46, 2.48, 2.50–51;
 and time, 2.48;
 vs. untruth, 2.123, 1.207–09;
 and upbuilding, 1.252–53, 1.258;
 as way, 1.78;
 witness to, 2.135–36
 Tryde, Eggert Christopher: and Hegelians, 2.42–43;
 on Heiberg, *En Sjæl efter Døden*, 1.171–72;
 Nielsen and, 2.42–43;
 and system, 2.42–43
 Turkey, Turks: and Christendom, 1.608
 Typhon, 1.92

uncertainty: of death, 1.166–70;
differential knowledge and, 1.87;
and faith, 1.204–05, 1.209–10;
of God-relationship, 1.446;
and infinite passion, 1.204;
objective, 1.203–05, 1.209–10;
and paradox, 1.209;
of the religious, 1.446;
Socrates and, 1.87–90. *See also* certainty

Uncle Frank, 1.588

understanding: and absolute paradox, 1.562–69;
and Chnstiamty, 1.557–60, 1.567–69, 2.70;
and the dialectical, 1.569;
and doctrine, 1.371;
and enthusiasm, 1.568–69;
and the ethical, 1.568–69;
and faith, 1.564–69, 1.579–81;
individuality and, 1.568–69;
paradoxical-religious discourse and, 1.562–64

universality, the universal: and admiration, 1.358–59

upbringing: in Christianity, 1.589–92, 1.601, 2.55

upbuilding: discourses as, 1.256–57, 1.270–73, 1.481, [1.627],
2.64, 2.149;
in *Either/Or*, 1.268;
individual and, 1.560–61;
and paradox, 1.561;
religious address and, 1.435–36;
and Religiousness A, 1.560;
and Religiousness B, 1.561;
speaker and, 1.257;
and subjectivity, 1.560;
and terror, 1.258–59;
and truth, 1.252–53, 1.256, 1.258–60

Vedel, Anders, 2.77

venture: vs. certainty, 1.424–31;
and ethics, 1.149;

- of everything, 1.424–31;
- and intermediary, 1.429;
- of life, 1.548;
- and love, 1.425;
- religious discourse on, 1.427–28;
- and trade, 1.425–26

Virgil: *Aeneid*, 2.237–38;
Eclogues, 2.252;
Opera, 2.237

virtue: path of, 1.403–04

Vollmer, Wilhelm: *W. Vollmer's Mythologie. Abbildungen*, 2.267;
Vollständiges Wörterbuch der Mythologie aller Nationen, 2.267

Wandering Jew, *see* analogy

way: difficulty of, 1.428–29;
truth as, 1.78

Weil, Gustav, *Biblische Legenden der Muselmänner*, 1.412, 1.434–35

Wessel, Johan Herman: *Kiærlighed uden Strømper*, 1.27;
Samtlige Skrifter, 2.185;
Stella, 2.218

wig, *see* analogy

will: and result, 1.135–36

William of Ockham, 2.241

Wilson banking house: and English three percent loan, 1.612

wisdom, the wise: and paradox, 1.227–28;
vs. the simple, 1.159–60, 1.227–28 wit, 1.351–52

witness: of god, 2.52;
to truth, 2.135–36

woman, women, 1.430;
beauty of, 1.299;
and humor, 1.553;
and inwardness, 1.236, 1.291;
and irony, 1.553;
vs. man, 2.69;
as moment, 1.298–99. *See also* analogy

wonderful lamp, 1.138–39

word(s): compound, 2.20–21;

and idea, 2.84;
and language, 2.83–84;
vs. Living Word, 2.22;
spoken vs. written, 2.22. *See also* Living Word;
Word

Word: in beginning, 2.24

world: vs. church, 1.459;

God and, 1.355–56;

independence of, 1.76;

thinker and, 1.341–42

world history, the world-historical: and the accidental, 1.134–35;

and approximation, 1.149–54;

assistant professor and, 1.150;

vs. becoming, 1.307;

and China, 1.150, 1.307, 1.351;

death vs., 1.166–70;

dialectic of, 1.141–49;

Don Quixote and, 1.140;

and effect, 1.155;

vs. ethics, 1.134–41, 1.141–49, 1.151–61;

Germans and, 1.150;

God and, 1.141, 1.156–59;

Hegel and, 1.150–54, 1.307, 2.40;

and human race, 1.151, 1.154–61;

immanence, 1.156;

vs. immortality, 1.177;

individual and, 1.134–49, 1.154–61;

individuality and, 1.146–48;

and judgment, 1.141;

vs. marriage, 1.180–81;

and nisse, 1.140;

and observation, 1.150, 1.153–55, 1.159;

and past, 1.146;

and pathos, 1.389;

present age and, 1.134–35, 1.144–46;

vs. the religious, 1.182–84;

and scholarship, 1.150–52;

vs. simplicity, 1.182;
single individual and, 1.149, 1.307;
Socrates and, 1.83, 1.147;
and speculative thought, 1.145–49, 1.151;
and subjectivity, 1.182–84;
vs. thanksgiving, 1.177;
as world judgment, 1.141
worship, 1.413, 2.140–41;
vs. demonstrations, 1.546

Xanthippe: and Socrates, 1.147

Xenophon, 1.147;
and Socrates, 2.80;
Memorabilia, 2.276;
Opera graece et latine, 2.232;
Symposium, 2.232

youth: and Hegel, 1.118;
and Hegelian philosophy, 1.310–11

zealotism, 1.31;
and passion, 1.35–36
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie, 2.90
Zeno, 1.352–53;
on Theophrastus, 1.283, 2.66
Zerlina, 2.109